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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

BRUCE RUSSETT and ALLAN C. STAM examine the recent decision to expand NATO to include former Soviet satellites. They argue that the further inclusion of Russia would allow NATO to become a more effective tool in managing security threats in the next century.

ROBERT J. ART takes issue with the policies proposed by Russett and Stam in this issue and argues that an open door membership policy will destroy NATO and that there is a better alternative to create a security structure for Europe.

JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II analyzes Jimmy Carter's post-presidential career. He concludes that Carter's most important post-White House legacy may be his creation of a public policy ex-presidency.

CATHY LISA SCHNEIDER analyzes the reasons for the increasing concentration of HIV/AIDS among African Americans and Latinos. She challenges the assumptions and evidence of those who cite underclass use of illegal drugs and promiscuity, and argues that high HIV/AIDS rates among blacks and Latinos are a consequence of the racial bias in the war against drugs.

SILVIA COLAZINGARI and SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN show how in post-World War II Italy, corruption and democracy coexisted. They apply their insights to Latin American democracies with similar characteristics.

HERBERT L. ABRAMS and RICHARD BRODY examine the issue of Robert Dole's age and health in the 1996 election and its impact on the vote of the electorate. They conclude that among the voters for whom age was an important consideration, most believed that age was a potential obstacle to Dole having a successful presidency. They fault the media for not seriously discussing the possibility that Dole might not last out his term because of illness, disability, or death.

To aid our readers in understanding the impeachment process, we are reprinting from our archives MICHAEL LES BENEDICT's 1973 article about the events leading up to the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

Notice to Members of the Academy

In accordance with the bylaws, the annual corporate meeting of the Academy of Political Science will be held on Tuesday, 26 January 1999 at 1:00 P.M. in the Academy's conference room at 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, New York, for the purpose of electing directors, presentation of the president's annual report, and the transaction of such other business as shall come before the meeting.

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Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China

BRUCE RUSSETT
ALLAN C. STAM

The process of NATO expansion is on track. For a combination of bad reasons—domestic politics, organizational inertia, sloppy strategic analysis—NATO expansion up to but not beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union is a done deal.[1] But in its current limited incarnation it is a bad deal, an ill considered and potentially regressive move. By limiting NATO expansion to small Eastern European states, NATO leaders preclude the alliance from developing the capabilities it will need to confront the coming security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Current plans for limited NATO expansion ignore the biggest future security problem for the West, which is not Russia itself, but the long-run possibility of a global power transition with China sometime in the next century. In this geostrategic scenario, Russia matters because of the potential power of a Russian-Chinese alliance. The need to prevent any such alignment should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO. In the short run, the problem of securing Russian respect for the boundaries of its neighbors in Eastern Europe is best managed within the context of NATO's proven capacity for reducing and resolving conflicts among its members, of whom Russia should be one.

[1] James Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of A Decision," *Washington Quarterly* 21 (Winter 1998): 85–102, reports on the evolution of views in the Clinton administration. For a discussion of Russian views of the inevitability of limited NATO expansion, see "Russia, NATO Agree on Act Formalizing Relations," *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 49 (18 June 1997): 1–5. Also, Carroll J. Doherty, "Pact with Russia Eases Way for NATO Expansion," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 17 May 1997, 1149.

BRUCE RUSSETT is Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Yale University and director of United Nations Studies at Yale. His latest book is *The Once and Future Security Council.* ALLAN C. STAM is assistant professor of political science at Yale University; he recently published *Win Lose or Draw: War Outcomes in the Crucible of Domestic Politics.*

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We will not review the standard objections to limited NATO expansion without Russia. They were, for example, well laid out by the forty-eight senior analysts in their 26 June 1997 statement,[2] and in any event are now largely moot. For small gain, limited expansion poses great risks. Whatever westerners may say, that kind of expansion is directed against at least a hypothetical danger from Russia. It has no compelling purpose otherwise. But if it is too late to stop the first round of NATO expansion, it is not too late to consider including Russia in the next. Many Russians see an extended NATO as a direct threat against them. This threat risks reviving old Russian fears of the West, strengthening Russian militarists and nationalists, and inducing greater instability in Russian domestic politics and foreign policy.

For the near future, the risks may appear tolerable. Right now, Russia can do little more than complain.[3] Over time, likely results include intransigence on arms control issues, an increase in the resources Russia devotes to rebuilding its military capabilities, and a turn of its diplomatic orientation in a hostile direction.[4] Expanding NATO as currently planned may ultimately create from Russia a threat that is now absent.[5] The best-case future includes a hostile and isolated Russia. More plausible is a much worse outcome—an emergent alliance of Russia and China.[6] Such an alliance would look very attractive to two big powers that saw themselves as excluded from a hegemonic Western community. If Russia remains reasonably democratic, no further NATO expansion should be undertaken without it, tying Russia securely to the West.

[2] One of the more persuasive presentations of the opposition is Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (May–June 1995): 9–13. A comprehensive review is Richard L. Kugler, *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). Other discussions of flaws in the expansion argument include Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," *Survival* 37 (Spring 1995): 34–52; Jonathan Dean, "The NATO Mistake: Expansion for All the Wrong Reasons," *Washington Monthly* 29 (July–August 1997): 35–38; Michael McGwire, *NATO Expansion and European Security* (London: Brasseys, 1997); "The Debate over NATO Expansion: A Critique of the Clinton Administration's Responses to Key Questions," *Arms Control Today* 27 (September 1997): 3–12.

[3] Complaints include Alexei K. Pushkov, "Don't Isolate Us: A Russian View of NATO Expansion," *The National Interest* 47 (Spring 1997): 58–62; and David A. V. Fischer and William C. Potter, "NATO Expansion: The March of Folly," *Moscow News*, 11 April 1996, 5.

[4] A relatively early argument to this effect was Owen Harries, "The Collapse of the 'West'," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (September/October 1993): 41–53.

[5] The following review many of the current views about the possible evolution of Russian views towards the United States and NATO: Alexander Yanov, "Russian Liberals and NATO," *Moscow News*, 3 January 1997, 1–2; Alexei Arbatov, "Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda," *Foreign Policy* 104 (Fall 1996): 102–17; James Kitfield, "A Larger NATO Means Bigger Headaches?" *National Journal* 29 (19 July 1997): 1467–9; Pushkov, "Don't Isolate Us."

[6] Recent proclamations along these lines include Zhang Baoxiang, "NATO-Russia Talks over Expansion Remain Deadlocked," *Beijing Review* 40 (10 February 1997): 8; and Nigel Holloway and Charles Bickers, "China's Buying Binge in Moscow's Armory," *World Press Review* 44 (June 1997): 10–11. For a more traditional grand strategy view, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Geopolitical Pivot Points," *Washington Quarterly* 19 (Autumn 1996): 209–16.

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From a cost-benefit perspective, it is not only about what the Russians might bring to NATO, but what NATO brings to the Russians, and what the Russians then *do not* bring to the Chinese. A future round of NATO expansion that fully incorporated Russia into NATO—not just in a second class NATO-Russia Joint Council—would eliminate Russian concern about western encirclement and address the long-term problem of growing Chinese power. It would allow Russia to become a normal democratic state within the Euro-Atlantic community.[7] That would firmly bind Russia's future to Western Europe's and ensure substantial global peace for the next century.

Russia's Options

From a geostrategic perspective, expanding NATO without Russia runs the risk of creating a severe security dilemma for both the East and the West.[8] What are the choices available to a state faced with an alliance far stronger than it is or can hope to be? One possible reaction is bandwagoning.[9] A state may try to join in cooperation with those who might threaten it. This is, in essence, the policy that Mikhail Gorbachev began and is the policy that led to the end of the cold war. To date, Boris Yeltsin and other Russian democrats have largely followed Gorbachev's precedent. Russian integration into NATO would be a giant step in that direction.

Russia's second option is to hide or to withdraw into heavily armed isolation, greatly dependent on its nuclear weapons and rooted in a perception of being surrounded by potential enemies (Western, Islamic, Asian). A Russian xenophobia based in some degree on reality (many paranoids do have enemies), an economy once again autarkic and burdened by militarization, and the revival of autocratic government are surely not in Western interests. Nor are Russians likely to see it as a viable option for the long run.

If NATO will not take Russia in, Russia's third choice, therefore, will be more attractive: to look eastward for a partner with whom to balance against the perceived growing threat from the West. Expanding NATO without Russia will likely lead to a Russo-Sino rapprochement and even a formal military alli-

[7] James E. Goodby, *Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.–Russian Relations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998). Leaders of the Democratic Choice of Party in the Duma have formed a deputies group called "For the Atlantic Union," *Ria Novosti*, 28 May 1997.

[8] See Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990): 5–41; and Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990): 137–68. Jack Snyder, "Russian Backwardness and the Future of Europe," *Daedalus* 123 (Spring 1994): 179–202, discusses emerging trends in Russia and their consequences for European security. Stephen Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) is a standard citation on alliance politics.

[9] Randall L. Schweller addresses strategies for manipulating balancing versus bandwagoning behavior in "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19 (Summer 1994): 72–107.

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ance. True, there is a long history of trouble in Russian-Chinese relations,[10] and such an alliance would experience real friction; but it would not be a type of alliance without precedent. To protect their interests, states will find allies where they can and must. Russian leaders have never liked to face adversaries on two fronts.[11] It is naive to think they would not eventually (probably sooner) turn to China. Imagine Russia allied with a hugely populous partner for whom Russian military technology represents the high end of what is available to the new partnership. A Russo-Sino alliance would vitiate the single and most effective foreign policy initiative of the cold war: Richard Nixon's opening to China, a move that then deprived the Soviet Union of any hope of recovering its most powerful potential ally. Limited NATO expansion risks recreating the world of bipolarity that Nixon deftly managed to shatter.

Is such an alliance so implausible that the West can safely ignore its possibility? It would have big benefits for each side. For Russia, China's expanding economy and 1.2 billion people would prove a weighty counterbalance to NATO. For China, a Russian partner with 150 million people, great natural resources, and a GNP perhaps a third of China's would be a big catch. Russia's military technology, while now largely inferior to that of the West, remains the most modern part of the Russian economy and has the potential to serve as a catalyst for future military development. In virtually every category, Russia's capabilities are far superior to China's. From submarines to communications, to missiles and aircraft, to nuclear weapons, the Russians have much to offer a large and increasingly wealthy state. Easy access to Russian technology would hasten Chinese military modernization at reduced cost. It would also reduce incentives for the continued contraction of Russia's military-industrial-complex.

Evidence for improved Chinese-Russian relations can already be found in arms sales and diplomatic efforts alike.[12] China recently agreed to buy seventy-two advanced SU-27 fighter planes from Russia[13] and build a production line in Shenyang to make more.[14] A similar agreement on the SU-30 may be next,

[10] Sergei Repko, "We'll Never Be Allies," *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 48 (21 August 1996): 21–22.

[11] Frank Ching, "Sino-Russian Pact a Good Sign," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 May 1996, 40(1).

[12] "Yeltsin, China's Jiang Call for 'Multipolar' World," *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 49 (28 May 1997): 1–5; and Nigel Holloway, "Brothers in Arms: The U.S. Worries about Sino-Russian Military Cooperation," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 March 1997, 20–21.

[13] Patrick E. Tyler writes of a supposedly secret deal to modernize Chinese Air Force with SU-27 fighter planes in "China To Buy 72 Advanced Fighter Planes from Russia," *New York Times*, 7 February 1996.

[14] Aleksandr Koretsky points this out in "China Will Build Russian Planes Itself," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 48 (20 March 1996): 23–24; and David Fulghum addresses the issue of production rights for SU-27 fighters in "China Buys SU-27 Rights from Russia," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 144 (12 February 1996): 60. Russia, for the first time since the 1960s is ready to export military high technologies to China. This assumes great significance since the SU-27 is a transcontinental fighter and Moscow could come within its firing range.

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and Moscow recently announced a new sale of two advanced cruise missile warships.[15] Even more unsettling is evidence pointing to renewed missile sales between the two countries.[16] On the diplomatic front, Russia has been flirting with Beijing. In December 1996, President Yeltsin and Chinese Foreign Minister Li Peng announced a package of large troop cuts on their borders, trade agreements, and further arms deals. The April 1997 meeting in Moscow between Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin called for a "multipolar" world in contrast to a unipolar one where, in Yeltsin's terms, "someone else is going to dictate conditions."[17] While disavowing any causal linkage from NATO expansion, Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov recently affirmed the development of neighborly relations with China, which "even bind Russia to strengthen relations of partnership also in the military sphere." A Russia-China partnership would place the destiny of much of the Eurasian landmass and the western Pacific in the hands of an antidemocratic alliance.[18] This alliance would operate outside the structure of international law and the norms of universal human rights associated with Western democracies for the past two centuries.

How to Avoid the Dangers of a Russia–China Alliance

China, not Russia, presents the only remaining long-term credible potential threat to Western and global peace and security. This is not said to impute particular intentions or malice to China's people or to its current leaders. Nor does it imply that the Chinese government's intentions are fundamentally more than defensive, to secure a territorial integrity that includes but does not exceed historic Chinese regional claims. Rather, it is stated simply to recognize what diplomats and scholars have long understood. The period of transition from one great power system leader to another is marked by tremendous potential for instability and cataclysmic conflict, as a challenger catches up and ultimately surpasses the power base of the previously dominant state. If the rising power is dissatisfied with its place in the international system, war between the system

[15] Holloway and Bickers, "China's Buying Binge."

[16] Ukraine or Russia may sell SS-18s to China according to Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Warns Three Nations on Missile Technology Sale: Is China Seeking Soviet Rocket Secrets?" *New York Times*, 22 May 1996. This development is particularly dangerous given Chinese statements about developing regional deterrent strategies based on nuclear weapons systems they do not currently posses. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New Old Thinking: The Concept of Limited Deterrence," *International Security* 20 (Winter 1995): 5–42. For a more optimistic view see Banning Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," *International Security* 20 (Winter 1995): 43–78.

[17] From "Joint Statement by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation," *Beijing Review* 39 (13 May 1996): 6–8. See also, Pavel Shinkarenko and Tatyana Malkina, "Yeltsin Visit Marks Closer Russia-China Ties," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 48 (22 May 1996): 6–9.

[18] Discussed by Alexander Zhilin, "Rodionov to NATO: Don't Bait a Wounded Bear," *Moscow News*, 26 December 1996, 1–2.

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leader and the challenger may well result.[19] Germany's ambitions earlier in this century illustrate but by no means exhaust the list of challenges. Moreover, the dangers exist even when the challenger is not particularly aggressive or expansionist. The fears, uncertainties, and potential miscalculations of each other's intentions and capabilities provide danger enough. The approaching dangers of Western-Sino military and economic parity pose in power terms a Realist problem. Two complementary strategies—one Realist, one Liberal—are available to manage the problem.

The Realist's way is to prevent the rising state from being able to approach the dominant state's power. A preponderance of power concentrated in the hands of the system leader will often deter the initiation of the overt conflict. Deterrence can work in the short run, so long as the capabilities of the dominant alliance continue to exceed the rising state's by a considerable margin. But a pure deterrence strategy, emphasizing counter-threat and military containment, can intensify conflicts and increase the challenger's commitment eventually to achieve its own dominance.[20] Deterrence—especially nuclear—should not be relied on indefinitely, and so long as it is practiced, it can become a self-defeating strategy. It can, however, buy valuable time, during which other means of ensuring the peace can be brought to bear.

The Liberal's way is to ensure that the rising power and the dominant power have few quarrels over the nature of the international order and the distribution of goods therein. This kind of transition occurred when the United States passed Great Britain as a world power. America did not fundamentally oppose the system that Britain had put in place. In turn, Britain was not willing to fight to oppose the marginal changes to the international system that resulted from subsequent U.S. leadership. Both states shared many common interests and values, and both British and American leaders made a deliberate decision to strengthen Anglo-American ties.[21] Integrating Russia into NATO provides

[19] For the earliest discussions of this idea, see A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958). More recent treatments include Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Tests of the underlying propositions include Henk Houweling and Jan Siccama, "Power Transitions as a Cause of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (March 1988): 87–102; Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow, "When do Power Shifts Lead to War?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (October 1992): 896–922. Further empirical studies and literature review can be found in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, "The Power Transition" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies II* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); and Lemke and Kugler, eds., *Parity and War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

[20] For a discussion of what works and what does not in deterrence situations, see Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models," *American Political Science Review* 87 (March 1993): 61–73.

[21] C. S. Campbell, *From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783–1900* (New York: Wiley, 1974); Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1885–1914* (New York: Atheneum, 1968): Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 2.

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time and means to guard against the rising power of China in the short run. In the longer run, it creates a mechanism and a model by which China can over time become fully integrated into the international system, allowing the future rising power to be accommodated without cataclysmic conflict.

The one factor that most constrains a state's potential power is its population.[22] With but 150 million people, Russia is a fragment of its former self. Even a reconstituted Soviet Union, developing economically once again, could pose no fundamental danger to NATO's roughly 700 million people. Russia is not today, nor could it be in the future, a threat to the demographic and economic preponderance of the West. China is another matter. An economically growing China, with 1.2 billion citizens, is the single state that could pose a threat to the future security and prosperity of the NATO countries.

Expanding NATO to include the Visegrad countries and Russia would produce a population base of more than 900 million people. More important, the combined wealth and technological superiority of the alliance would postpone the day of reckoning with China's overtaking of the West. China can only achieve geostrategic parity by growing its economy to the point at which its income approaches that of the West, a development that is simply impossible in the near term. Even in the longer future, if the Chinese economy were to grow at 8 percent a year, while the expanded NATO's grew at only 2 percent per year, it would take nearly until the year 2030 to reach parity with the West.[23] There is no historical precedent—Japan included—for a long-sustained growth rate as high as 8 percent.[24] Nor is there much chance that China could maintain that rate with growing environmental problems[25] and, as its technological gap with the West narrowed, with less room for catching up simply by copying Western goods and services. Given an expanded NATO's power preponderance, a growing mercantilist China[26] would find it very hard to develop the mili-

[22] A. F. K. Organski and Catherine Organski, *Population and World Power* (New York: Knopf, 1961).

[23] These estimates are at purchasing power parity; calculations based on exchange rates would put the Chinese economy much smaller.

[24] Eva Paus presents a skeptical view of the notion that economic liberalism can provide for long term high-speed expansion in "Economic Growth Through Neoliberal Restructuring? Insights from the Chilean Experience," *Journal of the Developing Areas* 29 (October 1994): 31–56.

[25] See especially Daniel Esty, *Sustaining the Asia Pacific Miracle: Environmental Protection and Economic Integration* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997). Vaclav Smil, "China's Environment and Security: Simple Myths and Complex Realities," *SAIS Review* 17 (Winter–Spring 1997): 107–26, lays out China's current and coming environmental woes. Trish Saywell, "Fishing for Trouble: Asia's Fish Stocks are Dwindling Because of Over-Exploitation and Pollution," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 March 1997, 50–2, addresses the problem of dwindling food stocks. As fleets compete for catches, the region may be heading into an era of fish wars. Wen-Yuan Niu and William Harris, "China: The Forecast of Its Environmental Situation in the 21st Century," *Journal of Environmental Management* 47 (June 1996): 101–15, also addresses China's coming environmental constraints.

[26] Pete Engardio discusses China's mercantilist tendencies in, "Global Tremors from an Unruly Giant," *Business Week*, 4 March 1996, 59–62.

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tary or economic capabilities needed to challenge America and NATO for system leadership by force or beggar-thy-neighbor policies.

As for potential Chinese fears, the Chinese have their deterrents against Russian or Western aggression. An invasion and occupation of China's vast territory and population is unimaginable, particularly by a NATO limited to a defense orientation. China also possesses the world's third largest nuclear deterrent force. In this scenario, both sides would have ample time to develop a long-term solution to the parity problem, which will require a convergence of both preferences and interests.

Why Not Bring Russia In?

There are some standard objections to admitting Russia to NATO, which we list and then rebut. Carefully considered, the logic behind the argument to admit Russia is compelling, and far outweighs the concerns.

Objections

First, the Russian military establishment is too degraded to meet NATO countries' high standards. Thus, the costs of bringing Russia's military up to NATO's level are too high and the potential benefits too low. Russia's population and GNP more closely resemble Brazil's than that of a nation that could threaten or substantially contribute to one of the most powerful, stable, and enduring alliances in history.[27]

Second, even if the Russians were allowed into the alliance, we could not trust them to behave as loyal members. NATO members must be able to depend on each other to meet their commitments during potential crises. NATO cannot rely on the Russians, because their only real interest lies in blocking NATO's expansion, not in actually joining an alliance that would compromise their sovereignty and military secrecy.[28]

Third, Russia's economy is insufficiently market oriented and too corrupt to provide a match with the West. Nor is Russia's political system sufficiently democratic, stable, or even governable to provide any meaningful contribution to the NATO's overall security.

Rebuttals

Cost and benefits. Yes, today the Russian military is in bad shape. The Red Army's poor performance in Chechnya does not presage a serious Russian

[27] For views that discuss the dilapidated core of the Russian army, see Victor Loshak, "Army Bigger Threat Than NATO," *Moscow News*, 13 February 1997, 2; and Chen Yurong, "Russia Distances Itself from the West," *Beijing Review* 38 (3 April 1995): 22–5.

[28] For specific and more general arguments that expansion increases demands more than the offsetting gains, see James Kitfield, "A Larger NATO Means Bigger Headaches?" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *NATO and the Changing World Order: An Appraisal by Scholars and Policymakers* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996).

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threat to NATO now or in the reasonable future. Nor does it provide a basis for confidence that Russia will be able to meet the high military standards necessary for incorporation into NATO. Nevertheless, in the history of admissions to NATO (Greece, Turkey, Spain) the yardstick correctly applied was not the standard of a state's existing military capability. Rather, it was the potential of that state once integrated into the alliance for a range of political as well as military contributions. On the ground of potential, Russia rates highly.

Russia—our greatest former threat—over time can contribute greatly to the overall security of NATO. The equation of Russia with Brazil misses one big point. Russia possesses something quite significant that Brazil does not: its own high-technology military industrial complex with associated research and development potential waiting for the opportunity to be exploited again as it was during the cold war.

Estimates of the costs of integrating the new Eastern European members vary wildly, for political as well as technical reasons. The RAND Corporation study put the price at approximately $42 billion over ten years. This is the cost for upgrading their forces and readying NATO for rapid deployment to their territory in a crisis, but without stationing NATO troops there otherwise.[29] The Defense Department's (DOD) estimate for the most comparable upgrading is a little lower: $35 billion over twelve years, whereas the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) closest option comes in much higher at $61 billion. For the sake of an illustration, let us take the DOD figure. Suppose that for Russia, with two-and-half times as many people, the cost of upgrading Russian systems to bring them into line with NATO standards were as much as $100 billion. (This is probably too high, since increased costs for NATO rapid deployment would not be proportional.) While that is a significant sum, in the context of Reagan's historic $4 trillion arms build-up it would represent a tremendous bargain, far more than the return from bringing in just the East Europeans. Those states have no indigenous aircraft industry, no submarine manufacturing industry, no nuclear weapons, no ability to make a self-sustainable contribution to their defense and security obligations. Moreover, since the Russian military needs a retrofit anyway, the Russians will pay part of the cost.

Although the costs cannot be ignored, the potential gains from Russian integration should not be ignored either. A major benefit would be the reduced burden of acquiring information through covert means. How much have we paid in the past and are we planning to pay in the future to get information

[29] Charles T. Kelley, *Admitting New Members: Can NATO Afford the Costs?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995); Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" *Survival* 38 (Fall 1996): 5–26. On the DOD estimates, see Paul Mann, "Clinton, Senate Duel over NATO Expansion," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 147 (14 July 1997), 38–39. A comparison of the three estimates is Steven Erlanger, "A War of Numbers Emerges Over Cost of Enlarging NATO," *New York Times*, 13 October 1997. The chief author of the CBO study termed a recent estimate putting the cost at a mere $1.5 billion "ludicrous." Philip Shenon, "Pentagon Report Plays Down Cost of Expanding NATO," *New York Times*, 21 February 1998.

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covertly on Russian intentions and capabilities? To be able to integrate Russian nuclear weapons into NATO's command and control system would alone be worth the price. One of the greatest fears about Russia concerns the loss of control of its nuclear weapons. Admitting it to NATO provides the means to control its fissile materials more directly than by buying up excess warheads or trusting the Russians to convert surplus plutonium to reactor fuel. By contrast, leaving Russia out encourages its continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, maintaining thousands of warheads on alert and immensely complicating all high-priority arms control efforts to reduce nuclear weaponry.[30]

Trust and murky motives. Why was France brought into the Quintuple Alliance in 1818?[31] Did we trust the Germans forty years ago? One of the principal reasons for bringing West Germany into NATO in 1955 was fear of revived and unconstrained German nationalism. In Lord Ismay's phrase, Germany belonged to NATO to "keep the Germans down" as well as to "keep the Russians out." The allies recognized that the best way to contain German expansionism was to include the Germans in security structures, not to exclude them.[32] Similar concerns brought West Germany into the whole range of European institutions, led to Gorbachev's acceptance of a United Germany in NATO,[33] and continue to motivate French and German policy today. These same motivations should hold toward Russia. We should bring the Russians in precisely because we do not fully trust their intentions. Integrating Russian and NATO military forces will require a convergence of doctrine, command, training and equipment. For example, NATO aircraft have IFF—identify friend or foe—devices to prevent them from firing on one another. This integration of standards and equipment will require and create a level of openness impossible to obtain otherwise. Openness exposes secrets, creating conditions in which no hidden preparations, as those of Nazi Germany for Barbarosa in 1941, are possible. A large-scale German surprise attack on any current NATO member is simply inconceivable today. Much of the explanation lies in changed German intentions. But in no small part, our dismissal of such a scenario stems from the

[30] Stansfield Turner, *Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).

[31] Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[32] Helpful reviews of the initial phases of NATO development include Stephen J. Artner, *A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and NATO, 1957–1961* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985). A nice review of the social changes in Germany at the relevant time is William Park, *Defending the West: A History of NATO* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). Also see John Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942–1949* (London: Macmillan, 1992); and Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, *The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO: 40 Years After* (London: Macmillan, 1992).

[33] Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Charles S. Maier, *The Crisis of Communism and the Collapse of East Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), chaps. 5–6.

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openness that NATO provides, and in the institutional binding of Germany to Europe and the United States, including the unified NATO command. Military integration into NATO will become a guarantee of effective civilian control of the Russian military.[34]

Will Russia simply obstruct NATO's now relatively smooth operations and sow seeds of dissent among the alliance members? There are real conflicts of interest within the alliance, but NATO has a decent record of accomplishment in handling them. Consider the seemingly intractable dispute between Greece and Turkey. Although NATO has not been able to resolve all their problems, NATO's conflict-resolution techniques—a combination of mediation (as by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio in 1967) and deterrence—have kept them from going to war.[35] Without NATO, they probably would have done so by now. Fears of conflict within NATO should not preclude the expansion of one of the few organizations that truly can make a difference in solving the thorniest security dilemma the major powers will face in the coming century.

Do the Russians really want to come in? Although in 1991 Boris Yeltsin repeatedly requested NATO admission,[36] maybe Russia would not be serious. Joining NATO imposes significant constraints on a state's ability to exercise privacy rights and sovereignty. While the loss of autonomy for NATO members does not match that embodied in the European Union (EU), Russian entry into NATO would bring a substantial loss of control. Indeed, that would be part of NATO's motivation in inviting the Russians.

Russia could decline the invitation just as it declined Marshall Plan aid following World War II. However, if it does refuse a sincere offer, it will be by its own choice, not by way of NATO exclusion.[37] This should defuse many Russian objections and hence reduce the political backlash in Russia to limited expansion of NATO. A refusal to accept an offer of NATO membership would be a

[34] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984) provides a helpful exposition of the importance of civil control of military organizations. For a discussion of how the Soviets viewed U.S. policies, see Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, *The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decision Making* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983).

[35] Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958–1967: International Crises and the Role of Law* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1974); Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977); Brian Mandell, "The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution" in Norma Salem, ed., *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

[36] Yeltsin insisted it was inevitable that East and Western Europe be more unified and predicted that NATO will evolve into a single armed force for one free Europe. See "Military Alliances: Russia Wants to Join NATO," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 43 (29 January 1992), 19; and "Military Alliances: From Cold War to Security," ibid., (22 January 1992), 21–2.

[37] Many in the United States viewed this as a clear signal of future Soviet intentions. See John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). As we know from the debate about the origins of the cold war, intentions are very important but extremely difficult to divine.

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useful early indicator of the future direction of Russian foreign policy, making limited NATO expansion more justifiable.

Alternatively, Russia could accept the offer but not in good faith. What happens if NATO lets the Russians in and the expanded partnership does not work as hoped for? Or what if the two cultures are so great that they cannot be bridged by intrusive NATO institutions? Certainly, the Russians would have learned a lot about Western military doctrine and weapons. Nevertheless, the West will have learned a great deal about the Russians' command postures and intentions as well.

Or Russia might join, even intending to stay, but then throw sand in NATO's gears, with the alliance losing much of its capacity for joint action in situations such as in Bosnia. In this scenario, the Russians could effectively veto NATO actions or otherwise obstruct NATO's already limited capacity for out-of-area operations. Even in this admittedly dismal situation, Russia would not and could not pose a credible threat to NATO's security. It would chiefly limit NATO proactive offensive capacity, a risk worth taking by an alliance whose principal purpose is providing for the common defense of its members. Nor would a continuation of a security frontier in Europe—like the cold war's, only farther east—exist to feed irrational fears and resentments within Russia's borders.

Ultimately none of these objections carries much weight. If the Russians do prove obstructive, NATO would simply become a defense-only alliance, albeit one still serving to protect its members from attacks both from the outside and from each other. Ironically, this scenario produces a new NATO, which is in the end what it has claimed to be from the outset. NATO efforts at proactive out-of-area cooperation are already tenuous. More than ever, NATO will have evolved into a transparent defense alliance with little offensive capacity, a collection of states that pose no aggressive threat to anyone. It will, however, have evolved into a structure that can both inwardly and outwardly guarantee the borders of its members. Indeed, it should include a general guarantee of borders in Eastern Europe, avoiding the mistake of the Locarno treaties of 1925.[38] By creating a division of labor, pushing states to pursue technical specialization and military comparative advantage, NATO hampers its members (other than the United States) from acting alone. NATO provides powerful restraints on adventurism by its members.

Furthermore, cooperation of the sort NATO demands of its members has already begun to grow in many nonmilitary areas between Russia and current NATO members.[39] The United States is risking the lives of its astronauts in

[38] William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World: An International History* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1996, 3rd. ed.), chap. 3.

[39] For a discussion of U.S. and Russian space issues and in particular the financial issues involving the Mir space station, see Craig Covault, "Mir Assembly Nears Finale," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 144 (29 April 1996): 29–30; Andrew Lawler, "Russian Deal Bolsters the Space Station—at a Price," *Science* 271 (9 February 1996): 753–54; Tony Reichhardt, "US Deal Buys into Mir to Keep Russia On Board International Station Project," *Nature* 379 (8 February 1996): 476–77.

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cooperative aerospace projects. Russian rockets will launch critical components of the planned space station. NATO expansion would merely extend the type of cooperation already underway between the Russian space agency and NASA. Civilian firms also are cooperating in joint ventures that require exchange of technology and human resources.[40] Boeing technology and equipment will be used on Russian and Ukrainian rockets to launch communications satellites.[41] Allied Signal has established two joint ventures, to design and manufacture avionics and landing systems for Russian-built aircraft and a software development center in Zhukovsky.[42] Additional partnerships are in progress for cooperative development of environmental controls, auxiliary power, fluid systems, and engines.

Political and economic institutions. Fears of political instability in Russia are not unfounded, but limited NATO expansion will exacerbate the conditions that generate those fears. Rather than increase the risks of political instability, rising ultranationalism, and the general decline of democratic institutions, including Russia in NATO as a full partner would tend to defuse the aura of external threat that strengthens the hands of the radical conservatives in Russia. It would also eliminate the greatest external threat the Russian military can point to in the internal battles for budgetary and political influence.

Concerns about Russia's political instability should not preclude consideration of her suitability as an alliance partner. Although most NATO members have been free market democracies, Portugal joined under the Salazar dictatorship, and neither Greece nor Turkey was expelled during its periods of military rule.[43] NATO does not maintain the very high admission standard for democracy and free markets that we associate with the European Union. Russian democracy and free-market economics are surely as well developed as those of Romania, where hopes for inclusion in the next round of NATO expansion are being fanned. If we expect the Russians to continue to develop open political and economic institutions, we must address their security fears. In the long run, the best way to promote sustainable democracy is to integrate Russia into some

[40] On cooperation between Lockheed and the Russian firm, NPO, see James R. Asher, "Lockheed Martin Buys Russian Rocket Engines," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 146 (23 June 1997): 24–25. See also William Scott, "Lockheed Martin, Energomash Development of RD-180 on Track," ibid., 7 April 1997, 40–41. Scott notes that this particular project is coming in on time and under budget, unlike many of the governmental programs such as the European space station and the Mir project.

[41] Craig Covault addresses some of the lingering concerns over this type of cooperation in, "Zenit Explosion Hits Military, Civil Projects," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 146 (26 May 1997), 34.

[42] On the joint agreement with Russian Institute to supply electronic systems for aircraft, see "Allied-Signal's Russian Deal," *New York Times*, 13 October 1992; "Russian Zhukovsky Facility Shows Flight Test Diversity," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 138 (14 June 1993): 66–67.

[43] On Portugal's role in NATO, see S. J. Bosgra, *Portugal and NATO* (Amsterdam: Angola Committee, 1969); and for a review of Greece and Turkey's entry and subsequent crises, Parker T. Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, a Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965–1968* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990).

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Western institutions, NATO in particular, with the prospect of further integration when its democracy becomes firmly established. Including Russia follows directly from Secretary Madeleine Albright's characterization of more limited expansion, when she declared, "The purpose of NATO enlargement is to do for Europe's east what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe's west: to integrate new democracies, defeat old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery and deter conflict."[44]

Russian entry into NATO will not and cannot happen immediately. It will take years of preparation, as did European integration.[45] The point is to start that process now, with a firm commitment and a credible timetable. If the United States wishes to remain the leader of NATO, this is the issue on which to exercise leadership and persuade reluctant Europeans. Bringing Russia into NATO would finally complete what Tsar Peter the Great and other westernizers aimed to do from the eighteenth century onward: integrate Russia with the West, to their mutual benefit. It would bring security and enhanced stability at a lower cost than would bringing Russia into the EU, and it more directly addresses concern over the rising power of the military within Russia.

The Chinese Reaction?

Both the United States and the Soviet Union exacerbated the cold war conflict by being insensitive to the fears of the other. Would our proposal simply create a replay of the old cold war with a potentially more powerful adversary?[46] It should not, and need not. Any coming confrontation with China will be fundamentally different from the old ideological conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. During the cold war, U.S.–Soviet ideological differences made conflict virtually inevitable, as the two systems not only differed in their domestic and world-views but also were fundamentally opposed to the continued existence of the opposition. Leninist doctrine, which provided the theoretical underpinnings of the Soviet system, was based on a revolutionary world ideology—despite its rejection of Leon Trotsky's overt call for world revolution.[47] The endgame in the Leninist framework was to be world revolution driven by inevitable class struggle among a growing urban proletariat. The communist

[44] Secretary Albright's comments reflect her Senate testimony on 23 April 1997 and her House comments 5 March 1997. See Madeleine Albright and David Obey, "Does NATO Enlargement Serve U.S. Interests?" *CQ Researcher* 7 (16 May 1997): 449.

[45] A volume that addresses some of the early integration issues in the context of German reunification and Russian democratization is Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans-Joachim Spanger, eds., *In From the Cold: Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992).

[46] The two contrasting policies for managing relations with China are known as containment and engagement, represented loosely by Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Knopf, 1996); and Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: Norton, 1997). Most recently, see Joseph S. Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia Pacific," *Survival* 39 (Winter 1997–98): 65–79.

[47] Gaddis, *We Now Know*.

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system would win out in the end in part because Lenin and his followers argued that the Soviet state had the superior economic system.

The ideological foundations of the Chinese system do not carry those ambitions. Mao Zedong's ideological goals were fundamentally local, driven not by an ever-expanding worldwide urban revolution that could spread from one city to another like wildfire before a strong wind, but by his vision of a rural revolution. Moreover, today's Chinese leaders have largely abandoned Marxist economics, and in an attempt to modernize rapidly, they vigorously embrace capitalism and more open markets. In China we are left not with an expansionist regime driven by an ideology fundamentally opposed to the continued existence of the West, but rather confront a growing power governed by what is essentially a variant of Asian authoritarianism. The Asian authoritarian model does pose an ideological challenge to Western liberalism, and to some provides an attractive organizing principle for the relationship between economics and politics.[48] It does not, however, carry a fundamentally subversive and mutually exclusive ideological appeal, as did the old Marxism/Leninism.[49]

Consider how states gauge or measure success in the international arena. For the Soviet Union, success was a new communist country. Not so for contemporary China, where Mao's communist ideology is no longer at its core. Today, the Chinese gauge success by making money and increasing their influence abroad. Of course, we should not discount the antagonism of a hegemonic democratic ideology and an expanding authoritarian ideology.[50] Democracies prefer to be surrounded by other democracies in an inherently peaceful relationship.[51] The Western democracies should continue to engage China on human rights and democracy, not abandon their many advocates within China. Those advocates will in time gain influence. Nevertheless, democracies also are accustomed to surviving in relationships with nonaggressive autocracies. Economic insularity today is much more difficult for both democracies and autocracies to sustain.

Confronted with a growing NATO, China will have the same three basic options as Russia does. China could try balancing. Fear of Russian balancing behavior drives our willingness to have Russia join NATO. For those in China who wish to balance against the western alliance, if NATO follows our prescriptions it will have taken China's obvious partner, Russia.[52] China might conceiv-

[48] Kishore Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (September/October 1993): 10–14.

[49] For a pessimistic view, see Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); and a more optimistic one, Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

[50] Paul Monk, "China's Power Trip," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 March 1996, 28.

[51] Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[52] Alexandr Chudodeyev, Pavel Felgengauer, and Vladimir Abarinov, Russian political analysts, debate the possibility of an alliance between China and Russia since the Chinese political climate has changed considerably following the death of Deng Xiaoping in "Taiwan Crisis and Russian-Chinese Ties," *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 48 (10 April 1996): 10–12.

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ably attempt to balance by striking an accord with India or Japan. These developments are largely unthreatening in the former case and implausible in both cases. India has long been China's greatest regional rival. A Sino-Indian alliance would totally reverse those countries' traditional geopolitical strategy without bringing China the advanced industrial and technological support it needs.[53] While a Russia outside of NATO can threaten to balance by allying with a stronger state, China has no such options, save possibly for a deal with Japan. Moreover, it is difficult to see Japan, evermore integrated economically and institutionally with the West, throwing its weight to the Chinese side. If Japan is to line up with anyone, Chinese economic and military growth could eventually bring the Japanese into a closer arrangement with NATO.[54] Chinese balancing against an expanding NATO is very unlikely to work.

Some Chinese efforts to expand regionally against weaker neighbors are likely regardless of whether Russia joins NATO. Threats to nearby Pacific islands, including Taiwan, are to be expected.[55] For these, deterrence based on a stable overall military balance, coupled with the carrots of engagement with the West and respect for China's ability to defend its existing territorial integrity, are the proper counters. The original NATO members would not be much involved; nor do they possess the capacity or physical proximity needed to have much influence over Pacific Rim affairs. Russia, however, could be an invaluable NATO member in this regard, given its geographic proximity, naval and military bases in the Far East, and potentially respectable military capabilities.[56] Denying these potentially valuable strategic assets to China will help restrain

[53] Shireen Hunter, "Forging Chains Across Eurasia," *The World Today* 52 (December 1996): 313–16, addresses this somewhat outrageous possibility.

[54] U.S. government estimates put China's military spending as exceeding Japan's for more than a decade. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (U.S. ACDA), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997). In an interview, Chen Jian, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, highlighted the tension between Japan and China by noting that Japan decided to stop aid to China for the rest of the 1995 fiscal year, because it opposed Chinese nuclear testing programs. Cited in "News Briefing by the Chinese Foreign Ministry," *Beijing Review* 38 (18 September 1995): 9.

[55] A novel view of future security concerns in Asia is Sheldon Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in Northeast Asia," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 15 (Fall 1996): 77–99. For a more traditional perspective, see Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The Strategic Quandrangle: Japan, China, Russia and the United States in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security* 19 (Summer 1994): 149–68, reviews growing fears of increasing Chinese power in East Asia. See also June Teufel Dreyer, "Regional Security Issues—Contemporary China: The Consequences of Change," *Journal of International Affairs* 49 (Winter 1996): 391–411.

[56] Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M. Cronin, "The Realistic Engagement of China," *The Washington Quarterly* 19 (Winter 1996): 141–70, argue that multilateral containment and engagement will be the only way to manage relations with China in the future. Their key point is that not only the United States but other states as well will have to cooperate in order to prevent future East Asian regional spats from flaring into potentially global crises.

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it.[57] The inclusion of Russia would make NATO the first truly global alliance. Both northern oceans would have a NATO state on each side, with a stable Europe as the keystone. Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO treaty exclude Asia from those regions in which an armed attack against any member "shall be considered an attack against them all." While this could be amended, an amendment could be seen as a provocation to China. It is already understood that common action may occur elsewhere, outside the narrow boundaries of the North Atlantic Ocean, if unanimously approved as a Combined Joint Task Force operation.

Beijing's next possible response could be hiding, or pursuing an isolationist policy. A Chinese foreign policy stance of armed political, if not economic, isolationism would pose some difficulties for the United States and NATO. Moreover, in the short run this may be the most likely policy reaction to a broad expansion of NATO. Yet this would not necessarily lead to very bad results. To the contrary, it solves the thorniest dilemmas of the coming global power transition. An isolationist China would confront an intractable political predicament. The new leaders in China face a series of political challenges and tradeoffs that they will be forced to confront in the near future. These choices will be impelled by the high and competing costs associated with military modernization, the economic and technical difficulties associated with rapid economic modernization, and the problems of maintaining an autarchic regime in the face of a growing middle class. In the emerging global economy with its constant competitive pressures, the challenge of attempting to develop the Chinese economy while simultaneously expanding its immediate military base may prove intractable. Unlike the current Russian leaders, who have so far survived a near-stagnant economy, the legitimacy of the Chinese rulers depends almost entirely on their continued ability to deliver rapid growth.

If China aspired to match the Western alliance in military power and economic capacity, armed isolation would be very costly. Chinese leaders would have to devote proportionally more resources to the military than do the United States and NATO. While the data are imprecise at best, the following numbers are reasonable within a rough magnitude. China's military expenditures in 1995 amounted to 2.3 percent of its GNP; its per capita expenditure was a paltry $53. In the same year the United States spent 3.8 percent of its GNP on the military.[58] The U.S. GNP alone is more than two-and-half times China's. China would have to spend 10 percent of its GNP on defense to match

[57] Recent problems controlling technology transfers to China highlight the difficulties that the United States will face if it tries to forge ahead alone in its containment policy towards China. For discussion of these problems see Nigel Holloway, "Playing for Keeps," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 February 1996, 14–16. China bought hi-tech American machine tools, ostensibly for civilian use. Instead, it sent them to a weapons factory—exposing U.S. export controls as ineffective.

[58] U.S. ACDA, *World Military Expenditures*. These estimates are at purchasing power parity rather than at current exchange rates, which would put the Chinese economy much smaller. Other economic and demographic data come from the 1997 *CIA World Fact Book* available online at: http:/www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.

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the American level and nearly 18 percent to keep pace with the combined capabilities of all of NATO with Russia and the other new members. Although the Chinese army is potentially huge, the Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated that sheer numbers no longer carry the same weight in conventional war that they did during the Korean War, which was the last large-scale direct conflict between China and the West.[59] China's military is now in far worse shape than the Soviet Union's was before its collapse. To try to match the West's overwhelming capability, China would be forced into either of two courses of action:

If the Chinese decided to be isolationist and to rely principally on domestic investment, they would likely have to choose between the military and domestic consumption or investment.[60] Given the growing strains on China's internal stability, diverting significant resources to the military is not a viable alternative if the Chinese truly hope to achieve strategic parity with the West. The Soviet Union's history suggests what would happen to a China that tried simultaneously to catch up militarily, satisfy growing civilian consumer expectations, and sustain the economic growth rate needed to bring itself up to par with a far richer Western alliance.

Alternatively, China might turn to outside sources of direct investment, as is its current policy. Doing so could free domestic capital to be invested in the military, but this policy also serves Western interests. An economy sufficiently robust to be able to support high levels of military investment clearly would be dependent on Western investment. China already receives more than a third of all foreign investment in manufacturing in developing countries. From the perspective of NATO—an alliance seeking both global stability and the maintenance of the global territorial status quo—that would be a good thing. All else being equal, economically interdependent states are more likely than others to live in peace with each other.[61]

[59] Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996): 139–79, argues that a powerful interaction between a major skill imbalance and new technology caused the radical difference between the rate of casualties of Iraqi and coalition forces in the Gulf War. He points out that technology alone is not sufficient to guarantee victory, but that the combination of technological superiority and high skill levels will likely create stunning defeats for unprepared states.

[60] The idea that there is a trade-off between goods for domestic consumption and military security is frequently referred to simplistically as the guns versus butter choice. In actuality, the consequences are often complex, indirect, and vary over time and country. Nevertheless, "The price of national vigilance will have to be paid somehow. It may be paid by foregoing current consumption, by depleting past savings, or by mortgaging future economic growth." Michael D. Ward, David R. Davis, and Steve Chan, "Military Spending and Economic Growth in Taiwan," *Armed Forces & Society* 19 (Summer 1993): 533–50, quoted 547. More generally, see Michael D. Ward, David R. Davis, and Corey L. Lofdahl, "A Century of Tradeoffs: Defense and Growth in Japan and the United States," *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (March 1995): 27–50; and Steven Chan, "Grasping the Peace Dividend: Some Propositions on the Conversion of Swords into Plowshares," *Mershon International Review* 39 (April 1995): 53–95.

[61] John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (June 1997): 267–93; Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and David Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Orga-

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Would Western investment keep flowing to a hostile China?[62] Karl Marx long ago claimed that the capitalists would end up making the rope with which to hang themselves. Of late, European firms have demonstrated great willingness to invest in potentially unstable areas of the world. However, they do so at a price to the investment recipient. Bellicose states and political adversaries pay a high cost for the foreign capital they import. Investors put a higher discount on politically risky investments, with demands for higher interest rates and expected profits. Such penalties will raise the costs to China to develop its military or develop economy at a pace sufficient to allow it to catch up with the West. Therefore, the Chinese become bound by strong incentives to maintain stability and to keep sending reassuring signals to Western investors.

The Chinese dilemma is this: if they do not want to be dependent on Western investment, then they cannot afford the military needed to confront the West. If they do rely on Western investment to be able to divert domestic capital to support the military, then they become over time interdependent with the West. Already China's dependence on foreign trade and investment, and its eagerness to participate in multilateral international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), put it on a path of cooperative relationships that will be strongly resistant to reversal. Such growing interdependence reduces the likelihood that China will choose a confrontational military and foreign policy.

China's final alternative would be to bandwagon, or to join the growing alliance and bind its security interests with those of former adversaries. The Chinese have bandwagoned in the past. They turned west with the Nixon initiatives, although the United States at the time anchored the dominant pole in the international system. In doing so, the Chinese did not simply balance power nor strictly balance against an immediate military threat.[63] They could have interpreted western outposts around China—South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, SEATO—as being fully as threatening as their Soviet neighbor was. Instead, they saw improved relations with the United States as the key to building their economic and long-term military security. China bandwagoned west in a way that presaged the Soviet bandwagoning that ended the cold war.

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nizations and Militarized Disputes," *International Organization* 52 (Summer 1998): 441–67. World War I is commonly identified as a counter-example on economic interdependence. Even if the interdependence point is correct, the cited articles indicate that the likelihood of war between two states rises with geographic contiguity, a deterrence situation of power balance rather than dominance, a conflict of alliance ties, autocratic governments in one or both states, and a thin or absent network of international organizations. All these other influences were present in 1914, leaving trade alone as a conflict-mitigating force.

[62] Peter Nolan, "Large Firms and Industrial Reform in Former Planned Economies: The Case of China," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 20 (January 1996): 1–28, argues that China cannot have it all—economic gains, political autocracy, and a huge army.

[63] Tan Qingshan, *The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.)

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If Russia is to be kept out of NATO for fear of antagonizing China, much the same logic should have stopped NATO expansion into Eastern Europe for fear of antagonizing Russia. Rather, the first round of NATO expansion should be the first step toward one last big cycle of bandwagoning. NATO would then expand to include a democratizing Russia. Until China is also ready to join, it is important that NATO not gratuitously threaten Chinese security. The Chinese leaders should be encouraged to see their security vested in a policy of increasing political and economic openness.[64] China should be engaged in an ever-deepening network of international organizations and economic interdependence.[65] Ultimately, a great security management system might come to include all but the rogue states. In a sense, that would be the end of international political history. Perhaps Francis Fukuyama called it one move too soon, with not quite enough attention to geostrategic matters.[66] Such an alliance would constitute a triumph both of Western ideology and of Western power and organization.

A New Future for NATO

NATO exists to provide for the security of its members. For that purpose, considerable benefits would accrue from extending an offer of membership to Russia. Such an offer would integrate a potentially threatening state into NATO and increase the overall power base of the alliance. For Russia, the new NATO would provide security assurances on its western front and deterrent power vis-à-vis its eastern front. Membership criteria should be on both political and economic grounds similar to those required for membership in the EU. But rather than raise the bar to such heights as to preclude marginal states from joining the new NATO, the membership hurdle should be set just a notch lower than the stringent conditions for the EU.

It is far easier for states to reform their economies and polities in the absence of security concerns than when faced with powerful and potentially bellicose neighbors. Integration into the NATO alliance provides stability for a state's domestic political regime and external security that allows it to focus on the tough job of political and economic development. Any defensive alliance serves two purposes. The first is to prevent an external power from trying to alter the international territorial status quo. The second is to prevent any of the member states from wishing to do the same. NATO supplies greater physical security for all its members by integrating them into the full NATO system. Key

[64] Brzezinski, "Geopolitical Pivot Points," argues that China should be treated with the same great power respect that the Soviet Union was accorded during the cold war. On the potential reaction to various U.S. policies directed toward China, see David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996): 180–209.

[65] An argument for just this sort of engagement policy is Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," *International Security* 20 (Spring 1996): 107–35.

[66] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Knopf, 1992).

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is the integration of command, doctrine, training, and equipment. The NATO system is much more than just a traditional alliance: it creates common expectations and notions of defense versus offense and common beliefs in the stability of the interstate system. That means integration and interdependence in the broadest possible sense—ideological, institutional, and economic.

The bigger the alliance becomes, the less is the burden on any single state and the greater the security provided.[67] If smaller states cheat on defense expenditures—as some did and do in NATO past and present[68]—those states will then become even less able to mount any serious threat on their own. This potential demilitarization would provide a downward spiral of the security fears of neighboring states. Why should not other states, such as Japan, Korea, and ultimately China be attracted to this and be welcome?

Wider NATO expansion will and must proceed slowly. Japan is clearly a potential member, an outcome to be encouraged. Nevertheless, Japanese domestic politics are not ready; and for now, Japan's ties to the other industrial countries are strong enough to allow NATO membership to remain a low priority.[69] Rapid global NATO expansion would only feed historically well-founded Chinese fears of encirclement and Western imperialism. The challenge of managing the peaceful power transition that China may present is a long-term one that does not require a current policy of containing China. American and Japanese engagement with China is much to be preferred.

The potential gains from limited expansion—with or without a second round extending to Romania or the Baltic states—include stabilizing the new members domestically and protecting them from a real or imagined Russian threat. But it damages the prospects for Russian democrats. Most likely, we would wind up with some gain from Eastern Europe being integrated into the rest of Europe at the real risk of a nationalist Russia turning to China. In the global geostrategic net, this is the worst possible outcome. The United States and its current NATO partners constitute a status quo alliance with every incentive to avoid great losses. Their goal should be to preserve their dominant

[67] The common starting point in this literature is Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). For more recent treatments of collective action in NATO, see John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO," *International Organization* 44 (Summer 1990): 379–402; and Todd Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (September 1993): 446–83.

[68] John A. C. Conybeare, "The Portfolio Benefits of Free Riding in Military Alliances," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (September 1994): 405–19. See also John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," *Political Research Quarterly* 47 (June 1994): 373–96; and James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change: Further Observations," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (March 1991): 109–14.

[69] In an interview, Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa argued that there is no present need for a NATO-like security organization in north Asia. Nayan Chanda, "The View From Japan," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 December 1993, 14.

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global position as long as possible. They should not choose a policy that runs the very real and very large risk of creating a powerful opposing coalition.

Expansion with Russia also risks some losses as well as gains. The downside risk is that Russia would hamstring NATO in many respects. Even so, Russia would still be in a security system for moderating conflicts within the NATO alliance. With Russia no longer a potential ally of China, large net gains accrue to the West. Western ideological and institutional principles will lie at the core of world organization, even more than now. In effect, a continually expanding NATO provides an essential supplement to the United Nations, one with military teeth and an organizational structure to support them. It is a multilateral structure in which American leadership is strong but tempered by common perceptions and the experience of negotiated cooperation.

If NATO chooses to include Russia, the very enemy it was created to guard against, what is the potential limit to NATO's expansion? NATO should in time welcome all states that meet certain criteria of economic and political stability. Potential members should be well into the democratization process, avoiding instability and any consequent tendency toward external disputation.[70] Democratic states have less internal violence and civil war than do other states;[71] once established, democratic regimes become permanent if the democracies are also reasonably wealthy.[72] New NATO recruits would have to do what Germany, Japan, and now Eastern Europe did to enter the Western alliance: grow their economies and reform their politics. This is the kind of post-cold war security system worth striving for. NATO should expand to include anyone who meets the criteria, most certainly Asians, and especially the Chinese.*

[70] Whether democratization raises the likelihood of interstate war is hotly disputed. The positive case is by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 5–38. Challenges, rebuttals, and counter-rebuttals include the correspondence in *International Security* 20 (Spring 1996): 176–207; the exchange between Mansfield and Snyder and William R. Thompson and Richard Tucker, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (June 1997): 428–54, 457–77; Zeev Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A Theoretical and Empirical Re-assessment," *International Interactions* 24 (No. 1, 1998); Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," *American Political Science Review* 92 (March 1998): 51–62.

[71] Matthew Krain, "State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (June 1997): 331–60; R. J. Rummel, *Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997).

[72] Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49 (January 1997): 155–83.

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Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy

ROBERT J. ART

The United States and its NATO allies have gotten themselves into a real pickle. With their decision to enlarge NATO by taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, they have created three predicaments. Each is serious, none is easy to solve, and all require resolution.

The first predicament is: Where does enlargement stop? Who gets to join NATO and who does not? The weightiest members of the alliance have not determined in their own minds how many new members to take in. Yet, they have set in motion a process that is producing its own political momentum toward an ever-growing membership. Stopping expansion after one or two limited rounds, after all, will inevitably draw new lines in Europe, as those who do not want to be left out so potently argue. In response, NATO has declared that it is not in the business of drawing new such lines: "no more Yaltas" is the refrain now heard. Consequently, NATO has declared an open door membership policy: it will consider applications from any country that can meet the requirements for joining. If pursued to its logical end, this policy will convert NATO from an effective military alliance of limited membership into an entity of great size but with unclear function and effectiveness—perhaps an Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) with real military muscle, or perhaps another OSCE-like talk shop (see the third predicament below).

The second predicament is: How large can a NATO-without-Russia become before the West more or less permanently alienates Russia? Membership may indeed be open to all who qualify, but in practice neither Russian nor Ukrainian entry is in the cards for a long time. Taking in Ukraine without also inducting Russia is the quickest way to alienate Russia, because Russians across

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the political spectrum consider Ukraine to be part of Russia. Incorporating some of Mother Russia into NATO would justifiably give rise within Russia to fears of encirclement by, and exclusion from, the West. The same can be said for inducting the three Baltic states into NATO—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These, like Ukraine, were formerly part of the Soviet Union, not a part of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Taking Russia into NATO could well destroy American and allied support for the alliance. Unless the terms of NATO are changed, Russia's membership in NATO means that the United States is committed to defend it against all potential attackers, a large undertaking that not even the sole remaining superpower—and certainly not the United States Senate, as well as many of its allies—will blithely undertake. Thus, if Russia and Ukraine are ever to join NATO, they will be near the end, not the middle, of the queue.

Not to worry, we are told by the proponents of enlargement. NATO can expand without alienating Russia and endangering Ukraine. The special deals cut with these two—the Founding Act with Russia and the NATO-Ukraine Charter—will square the circle. Both states will be kept organically out of NATO but intimately tied to it.[1] As a result, Ukraine will feel more secure and Russia will have sway in NATO councils but without a veto over its actions. In Russia's case, in addition, Polish-Hungarian-Czech membership is said to be to Russia's advantage. Its western borders are made more secure and its own transition to democracy enhanced by having those three states solidly democratic and in NATO. By this line of reasoning, NATO can grow quite large, still exclude Russia, yet not alienate it.

The third predicament is: What will happen to NATO if it takes in a whole lot of new members? There are a slew of potential candidates: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are banging at the door and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright promised they would not be excluded; Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania have indicated their desire to join, but have been told to wait for the next round of expansion; Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and potentially Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia, none of which currently seek membership but might well should all the previous states get in; and finally, the former republics of the Soviet Union, all of whom are members of the OSCE, Europe's only pan-European-Central Asian, quasi-security institution. Can NATO take in all, most, or many of these states and still retain sufficient political cohesion and military readiness to be effective? Or will expansion beyond a certain point render it ineffective?

Not to worry, we are told. New members will not subtract from, but add to, NATO's effectiveness. First, NATO has expanded before without diluting it-

[1] The agreement between NATO and Russia, entitled "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The text can be found in *Arms Control Today* 27 (May 1997): 21–24. The "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine" was signed in Madrid on 9 July 1997. The text can be found in *NATO Review* 4 (July-August 1997): 5–6 of the special insert.

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self. Originally comprised of twelve states when it was founded in 1949, NATO grew to sixteen members by the end of the cold war, adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. If done properly and carefully, therefore, growth in size need not detract from NATO's functioning, as previous enlargements demonstrate. Second, states will be permitted to join only when they can meet NATO's military requirements. NATO will not be reduced to new members' standards; rather they will be brought up to NATO standards, thereby maintaining NATO's military effectiveness. Third, NATO's political cohesion will remain intact, because only democratic states will be permitted to join. Democracies are like-minded in their approach to security issues, and this will guarantee the consensus necessary to act when action is required. Fourth, NATO cannot stand still because conditions in Europe are changing. If NATO is to survive, it must adapt itself to the new security challenges. Defense of member territory is no longer the sole directive for NATO; now it must address instability within and among the newly-created states of Europe. This requires crisis prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking—missions that NATO has already begun to undertake. Fifth, new members will help NATO with its new tasks. A bigger alliance will be a more effective alliance, better at combatting instability, either because NATO permanently pacifies areas by incorporating them into its fold or because a bigger NATO has more resources and better geographic position from which to operate out of area. According to this line of reasoning, bigger is both necessary and better.

How big should NATO become? How much bigger can it get without provoking Russia? Will it get so big that it will choke on its own engorged membership? These are the predicaments that the yellow-brick-road of enlargement has created. All three are inextricably entangled; hence none can be solved in isolation from the others. All, moreover, require resolution, because the stakes are so high. NATO is the institutional repository for America's military ties to Europe, but it is also the keystone of America's global military role. If NATO is somehow gutted, the United States will likely withdraw militarily from Europe, revert to isolationism, or both—results not in Europe's, America's, or the world's best interests.

Open-Door Membership—A Bad Solution

In their carefully reasoned and provocative article, Bruce Russett and Allan Stam address all three predicaments.[2] They tackle the second head on and argue that NATO enlargement will not only alienate Russia, but might also well drive it into China's arms, creating a formidable Sino-Russian alliance hostile to Western interests. To avoid either outcome, they prescribe inducting Russia into NATO in the next expansion, so long as Russia in their words "remains

[2] Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam,"Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China," *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (Fall 1998): 361–382.

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reasonably democratic."[3] They also argue that China should ultimately become a NATO member, because this is an effective way to avoid war with it and to manage its peaceful transition to superpower status. Russett and Stam also provide an explicit answer to the first predicament, taking the logical position that if Russia and China can join, why not any other state that qualifies. Hence their prescription: "NATO should expand to include anyone who meets the criteria. . . ."[4]

Their answer to the third predicament is also clear. To the question, "Can NATO remain effective if it becomes quite large?" their answer appears to be "yes." As best I can figure it, their ultimate vision for NATO is that it transmutes itself by successive enlargements into a pan-Eurasian security organization of democratic states (or PESODS, my acronym) in which the United States, Canada, and Japan will also be members. Should this happen, PESODS will become either the military arm of, or an "essential supplement to," the United Nations.[5] If this vision comes to pass, then: "Ultimately, a great security management system might come to include all but the rogue states. In a sense, that would be the end of international political history."[6] A noble vision: a pan-continental NATO abolishes international politics as we have known it!

Noble as this vision for NATO may appear, I judge it to be profoundly misguided. The Russett-Stam prescription for open-door membership, which is also rhetorically NATO's, is unwise. It makes a bad policy even worse, and I oppose it for three reasons.

First, it is not necessary to take Russia into NATO in order to avoid its estrangement, and especially to avert the danger Russett and Stam seem to fear so much—an anti-Western Russian-Chinese alliance. The levers to avoid Russia's complete alienation from the West are more effective than Russett and Stam apparently think; Russia's incentives not to sever its ties to the West are greater than they believe; and the incentives for China to enter such an alliance are weaker than they presume.

Second, it is risky to convert NATO into PESODS. To do so will replace an alliance that works well with something that is not likely to work nearly as well, if at all. Russett and Stam are too cavalier with their assumptions that PESODS can be made to work effectively and that the United States will readily support something that so vastly expands its military commitments.

Third, there is a better way to deal with Russia's alienation: construct a viable, modern-day Concert of Europe. To work, such a concert requires that the United States take seriously the Founding Act between Russia and NATO and that it severely limit any expansion of NATO beyond the current round. If properly executed, this alternative is preferable to open-door membership, because it will preserve both the West's ties to Russia and NATO's effectiveness.

[3] Ibid., 362.
[4] Ibid., 382.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 380.

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For these reasons, I find the open-door policy unnecessary and risky, and I believe there is a better way to manage, even if not solve, the predicaments created by enlargement.

The Limits of Russian-Chinese Cooperation

Has the current round of NATO enlargement already totally estranged Russia from the West? Will another round drive it headlong into alliance with China? The answers are not self-evident. In fact, there are three good reasons to believe that the current round, and even another limited round, will neither alienate Russia completely nor inevitably produce a hostile Russian-Chinese alliance. First, Russia cannot afford to cut its ties with the West; second, it does not need a military alliance with China to protect itself; and third, China's interests dictate against entry into an alliance aimed at the United States.

Russia's Need for the West

To begin with, Russia needs the West. If it is to become a full capitalistic democracy in a reasonable period of time and with as little pain as the situation permits, Russia requires the West's help—financial resources, technical and technological knowhow, and markets for Russia's raw materials and finished goods. A good case can be made that the West has not given enough financial assistance to help Russia make the transition from authoritarian communism to democratic capitalism, even though it has transferred at least $60 billion to Russia since 1992.[7] Valid though this case may be, it is a far cry from a situation in which the West gives Russia no help at all. That, however, would be the likely result of Russia's entry into a hostile alliance with China; and the consequent cessation of Western assistance would severely, if not catastrophically, harm Russia's economy. Russia's need for the West's assistance, therefore, constrains how much further beyond rapprochement it can go with China. While Russia has complained bitterly about NATO's enlargement, it has not taken steps that would irrevocably break its ties with the West. Russia's anti-enlargement rhetoric has far surpassed the concrete steps taken to counter it.[8]

[7] From 1992–1996, the West committed through various sources over $40 billion in aid, and in 1998 it put together an emergency package of another $22 billion in aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to deal with the financial fallout Russia experienced from the Asian crisis. See Coit D. Blacker, "Russia and the West" in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The New Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 172; and Press Briefing by Stanley Fischer, first deputy managing director of the IMF, 13 July 1998 at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1998/tr 980713.htm.

[8] As one example of the rhetoric, President Boris Yeltsin, according to the Associated Press, said on 6 May 1997: "We shall do everything to minimize the consequences of NATO expansion for Russia's security. We shall continue to deepen integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially with Belarus. We shall strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries, first of all with China." Quoted in Stanley Kober, "Russia's Search for Identity" in Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, eds., *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998), 136.

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Russia's Nuclear Security

Russia's security does not rest on great power alliances. It does not need China to protect itself against an enlarged NATO or against any other great power. After all, Russia is a nuclear power, the next most formidable nuclear power in the world after the United States, and nuclear-armed states are rarely subject to massive attack by others. Russia's conventional forces may collectively constitute a basket case, but its nuclear force remains strong enough to deter attack or invasion from any great power. Thus, the prime incentive for Russia to enter into a military alliance with China—the need to protect itself against attack—is absent.[9]

Russett and Stam implicitly recognize this logic when they tell us why China should not fear a NATO that has inducted Russia into its fold. They argue: "As for potential Chinese fears, the Chinese have their deterrents against Russian or Western aggression. An invasion and occupation of China's vast territory and population is unimaginable, particularly by a NATO limited to a defense orientation."[10] But if this logic is good for China facing a NATO with Russia in it, why is it not equally valid for Russia facing NATO with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in it? Is Russia, too, not a "vast territory?" Does Russia not have its deterrents against "Western aggression?" Is NATO not as "limited to a defense orientation" with three Central European states in it as it would be with Russia in it? What, in sum, does a military alliance with China add to Russia's homeland security? The answer: very little. Therefore, as long as Russia maintains a second strike nuclear deterrent, it will be secure against any significant external attack.

To take this position, however, is not to dismiss the adverse political effects that enlargement has had on Russian-Western relations. The West has done itself no good by going through with a decision that is unpopular across the entire spectrum of Russian political opinion and that has complicated the life of pro-Western reformers who want to tie Russia closer to the West.[11] Except for those on the extreme right, Russians do not believe that the present enlarge-

[9] William Wohlforth puts the matter well: "Officially and unofficially, Russians see no direct military threats for at least the next decade. . . . No power is thought to have interests that could lead to the direct use of force against Russian territory. . . . All sides—government and opposition, democrats and nationalists—agree that the probability of any direct security threat to Russia now or in the near future is low or nonexistent. The main threats are internal to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States and reflect uncontrolled processes or unintended consequences. . . . While politicians cannot resist the allure of nationalist great-power rhetoric, military and national security officials have dramatically lowered their threat assessments since 1992." See William Wohlforth, "Redefining Security: Russia's Intellectual Adjustment to Decline," *Harvard International Review* 29 (Winter 1996/1997): 59–60.

[10] Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 368.

[11] Resentment against enlargement is not simply an elite affair. In a poll conducted before the enlargement agreement was signed, 51 percent of Russians polled saw NATO expansion as a serious threat and only 14 percent disagreed with that premise. See Susan Eisenhower, "The Perils of Victory" in Carpenter and Conry, *NATO Enlargement*, 114.

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ment threatens their territory.[12] What they fear from enlargement is exclusion from the West, not attack by NATO. The European Union and NATO are two of the West's most important institutions, and membership in them rightly signifies full participation in Western affairs. Russians can therefore view their inability to join either as meaning that they are not considered worthy of full participation in the Western world.[13] This sense of exclusion is a serious issue. It is not serious enough to create a Sino-Russian alliance, but it is serious enough to complicate American foreign policy in many other ways unless countermeasures are taken. I offer one in the last section of this article.

China's Independent Foreign Policy

China is not likely to join Russia in an alliance directed against the United States solely because NATO gets bigger. Therefore, even if I am wrong and Russia decides to woo China ardently, a military alliance between the two is still not likely to be consummated. It takes two to make an alliance, and China's current and foreseeable interests strongly militate against it, particularly as long as the United States continues to play its cards more wisely in East Asia than it has so far in Europe. Thus, even if Russia comes to want such an alliance, China in all likelihood would reject it. A look at the factors behind the rapprochement between Russia and China will help explain why.

The current rapprochement is a normalization of relations, not a strategic partnership aimed at the United States.[14] Russia and China have cooperated

[12] Again, Wohlforth puts the point well: ". . . The overwhelming majority of Russia's policy elite sees NATO expansion as detrimental to Russia's security interests and as evidence of a policy failure of major proportions. Only the most committed of Westernizers can view NATO expansion with equanimity. However, even strident opponents of the move do not see it as motivated by any immediate designs on Russia, and their opinions vary on the actual significance of the security threat it implies." See Wohlforth, "Redefining Security," 59.

[13] As one Russian scholar, Irina Zhinkina, put it: "How come that the new Russia, which has discarded its former ideology, remembered God, sworn loyalty to the new ideals of democracy and fallen into the embrace of its recent 'probable adversaries' is not accepted [sic] to Western civilization. What else must it do?" Quoted in Kober, "Russia's Search for Identity," 135–136.

[14] Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, *The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., *Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40–126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," *Harvard International Review* 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28–35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," *SAIS Review* 16 (1996): 1–19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in *Asian Survey* 33 (March 1993): 272–284 and 285–302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16–62 and 63–107.

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with one another since the end of the cold war for three main reasons. First is the mutual desire to settle their long-standing border conflict in the Far East. Second is a shared approach toward Central Asia—having the borders of the new Central Asian states stable and secure, limiting ethnic separatism and their support of cross-border independence movements, and combatting the perceived Islamic fundamentalist threat from the south. Last are the mutually beneficial gains that are realized from China's purchases of Russian arms. A fourth factor—the desire to counter America's predominance—has played a part, but only a bit part, in the cooperation the two states have forged to date.

The drive to normalize their relations predates the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mikhael Gorbachev began the normalization process in the mid-1980s as part of his "new thinking" in foreign policy. He matched the goal of ending the cold war in the West with sustained efforts to end the long-standing Sino-Soviet conflict in the East. Tentative agreement on the eastern Sino-Soviet border was reached in 1987 and the Gorbachev-Deng Xiaoping summit in May 1989 formally ended the Sino-Soviet conflict. Throughout the 1990s, Boris Yeltsin continued Gorbachev's normalization policy, partly out of Russia's general weakness, partly out of the central government's concern for the vulnerability of its far eastern provinces, which it could no longer wall off from outside influences as the Soviet government did, and partly out of a desire to reduce Russia's military burden. China was open to these overtures, partly because of its desire to reduce its military burden on the northern border, partly to engage in profitable commerce with Russia's far eastern provinces, and partly from its general desire to maintain stable relations with both Russia and the United States so as to be hostage to neither.[15] Each government felt another powerful pressure to settle their border dispute: the concern each has about center-periphery relations. Both governments are worried about the potential erosion of their control over their respective provinces and regions. The last thing each wants is turmoil along the shared border. For all these reasons, both have had strong incentives to settle the matter.

Over the last six years, China and Russia have reached two important agreements: one demarcating the border between them in the Far East and another demilitarizing it one-hundred kilometers on either side.[16] To date, the border issue has not been completely solved, but now it is only a minor irritant in Sino-Russian relations.

In Central Asia, Russia and China have reached a modus vivendi based on an overlap of interests. Both states have favored secure and stable borders for the five new states born from the Soviet Union's disintegration. Russia is concerned about the threat that Islamic fundamentalism from the South could have on its own considerable Muslim population, and it is also determined to keep

[15] See Nathan and Ross, *Great Wall*, chap. 3, for a good overview of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Russian relations since 1950.

[16] For details on the agreements and their negotiating history, as well as the issues still outstanding, see Anderson, *Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, chap. 2.

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the region within its sphere of influence. China is concerned about its hold over its western province of Xinjiang and, therefore, worries about the threat posed by the Uighurs living in Kazakhstan who favor a Xinjiang independence movement. The Uighurs are the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang. China is also concerned about Islamic fundamentalism in general. China has accepted for the time being Russia's political-military predominance in the region, and in return it has benefited from Russia's efforts to create stable borders and control cross-border independence movements along the periphery of the former Soviet Union.

China's purchases of Russian arms help modernize China's military, which is badly in need of modernization. But they also help Russia's military-industrial complex, which cannot survive, much less produce the next generation of military equipment, on the orders of the Russian military alone. As a consequence, transfers of technology and equipment began in 1992, and since then Russia has sold to China advanced electronics, air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, armored fighting vehicles, T-72 tanks, and Su-27 fighters. Russia is now China's largest source of modern arms, providing nearly 70 percent of China's arms imports in 1996.[17] All these considerations have led to a rapprochement in Sino-Russian relations that was much overdue.

Underneath the cooperation in these areas, however, are conflicts, latent and real, and mutual wariness. Russia's provision of advanced military equipment to China is a two-edged sword, especially since China seeks transfers of technology so that it can produce its own advanced weapons. China is a rising power; Russia is a declining one. Arming a rising power only hastens its rise. Russians in the Far East worry about the huge demographic asymmetry between them and the Chinese contiguous to them. There are eight million Russians in the Russian Far East and 120 million Chinese nearby, giving rise in those Russian provinces to fears of Sinicization of the Russian Far East through cross-border trade and illegal immigration. China is becoming an economic competitor to Russia in Central Asia, seeking to revive the old silk road and looking to tap into the huge Caspian energy reserves. China has become Kazakhstan's second most important export market. It is on the verge of surpassing Russia as the dominant supplier of light-industrial products to the whole region, and it has joined with Western and Japanese companies in exploring pipeline construction out of the Caspian area. The states of Central Asia, seeking to free themselves of Russian predominance, welcome the Chinese (and the Western and Japanese) presence. These considerations are not sufficient to break the current cooperation between Russia and China, but neither are they so weak as to provide no resistance against the signing of a firm military alliance between the two.[18]

[17] Garnett, "Slow Dance," 30–31; and Anderson, *Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, 36.

[18] On these matters, see Garnett, "The Russian Far East"; Nathan and Ross, *Great Wall*, 48–55; Peter Pavilions and Richard Giragosian, "The Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Central Asia," *Harvard International Review* 28 (Winter 1996/97): 24–27 and 62–65; and Stephen J. Blank, "Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals, " *Central Asian Survey* 14 (1995): 373–406.

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Concern about "American hegemonism" has played little, if any, role in the Sino-Russian normalization. The border agreements reached by the two states tackled problems that needed tackling. The Central Asian modus vivendi and the arms purchases satisfied the interests of the two powers, independent of their concerns about the United States. Normalization would have occurred in the absence of these concerns, and the best proof available is that it began before the Soviet Union disintegrated and left the United States as the world's dominant power. It was Gorbachev's drive to end the Sino-Soviet conflict, not America's emergence as the sole superpower, that jump-started Sino-Russian normalization, that obviated China's need to cooperate with the United States against Soviet hegemonism, and that made possible (although not inevitable) the current Sino-Russian rapprochement.

Does this mean that in the 1990s Russia and China have had no concerns at all about America's singular superpower status? Clearly not. Both share such concerns, and the two proclaimed a strategic partnership in April 1996. Russian foreign policy took a less Western and more balanced turn in late 1994, after the United States declared that it intended to expand NATO. Under Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov, who took over in January 1996, Russia has tried to create counterweights to the United States by cultivating ties with China, India, and Iran.[19] Practically overnight in April 1996, China agreed to a strategic partnership, in part because of the after-effects of the Taiwan Straits standoff in March 1996 and the reaffirmation of the U.S.–Japan treaty in April. Clearly, America's actions in Europe and East Asia have had something to do with the creation of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership.

For our purposes, however, the important point about this partnership is not its existence, but its meaning. Russia and China view it differently. Russia makes it out to be much more important than does China, and Russia has been the suitor in trying to move the relationship beyond normalization to something more potent. China has been resistant. Jennifer Anderson, a close observer of Sino-Russian relations, makes this clear:

> China's leaders have been far more cautious [about the strategic partnership], repeatedly playing down elements of the relationship and placing it in the context of longer-standing traditions of adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and aversion to bloc or alliance politics. Jiang's agreement to upgrade links from "constructive" to "strategic" partnership on 24-hours' notice, rather than seeking agreement from other Chinese leaders, appears to confirm that no significant departure from China's foreign-policy stance of independence and pragmatism has taken place. . . . Although Jiang has agreed to describe relations as a "strategic partnership," China has often backed away from Russian definitions of what this actually means. . . . Jiang described links with the US as a "strategic partnership" after a trip there in October 1997.[20]

[19] See Blacker, "Russia and the West," 178–188.

[20] Anderson, *Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, 24.

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Russia and China differ in how far each is prepared to go in offsetting American power. China wants Russian arms, stable borders, and secure peripheries; but it is wary of Russia's attempt to make more of their cooperation than that. Although Russia wants strategic partnership, China stops at normalization.

Unless current conditions change dramatically, there are four good reasons why China will not allow the current rapprochement to transmute into a military alliance directed against the United States. First, China needs American investment and especially access to America's market to help it modernize. China has a favorable balance of trade with the United States that is second only to Japan's and that often runs neck and neck with it on a monthly basis. No country takes as many Chinese goods as does the United States, and no other country, especially Russia, is placed to do so, should the United States severely restrict China's access to its market. China will not sacrifice its access to America's market simply because Russia wants an alliance with it. Just as is the case for Russia, therefore, China's need for the American market and American investment puts limits on how closely it will cooperate militarily with Russia against the United States.

Second, China no more wants to be under Russia's thumb than under America's. China's goal is an independent foreign policy. It will use Russia to offset the United States, the United States to offset Russia, and both to offset Japan, when circumstances require it. The drive to be independent is powerful in China, especially given its experience with Western, Russian, and Japanese colonialism.

Third, China does not need an alliance with Russia to secure itself against the United States. China, like Russia, is a nuclear power, not as powerful as either Russia or the United States, but a nuclear power nonetheless. Just as Russia does not need China to secure itself against an American-led NATO invasion, so China does not need Russia to secure itself against an American invasion.

Fourth, China's attitude toward a military alliance with Russia will be determined by what happens in Asia, not in Europe. It stretches credulity to believe that China will sign a full-blown, anti-American military alliance with Russia because NATO takes in Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and even the Baltic States and Ukraine. China may consider itself a global power, but its vital interests and core security concerns lie in Asia, not in Europe. Therefore, what the United States does in Asia, particularly in northeast, east, and southeast Asia, not what it does in western and central Europe, will govern how closely China moves towards military cooperation with Russia.

This, then, is the key. It is in America's, not Russia's hands to determine whether China moves from a vague, if not meaningless strategic partnership with Russia into an anti-American military alliance. The United States could bring a military alliance about by pursuing a stupid policy in East Asia. It could, for example, support independence for Taiwan, which it does not. It could move American troops up close to the Yalu when Korea unites, which it should

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not. It could push the Japanese to patrol aggressively close to Chinese waters, which it dare not. Short of this sort of bungling by the United States, Russia and China will cooperate when their interests dictate, but that cooperation will remain short of a firm and hostile military alliance directed against the United States and its allies.

China is the rising power; Russia, the declining one. As the declining power, Russia needs China more than China needs Russia. The only way China will need Russia as much as Russia appears to need China is if the United States takes steps to drive it into Russia's waiting arms. Therefore, the United States should make certain that it does not commit the blunders in Asia to produce such an outcome.

PESODS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF NATO

The second reason to oppose the open-door membership policy is that it will destroy NATO and replace it with something that will work far less well to keep Eurasia stable. If PESODS ever does emerge, it will be too unwieldy to be effective. NATO is too valuable to sacrifice on the altar of what is essentially a putative collective security organization.

PESODS' problem is one of size and scale. When an alliance expands to the number of states and territorial scope that Russett and Stam contemplate for NATO, it will then take on many of the fatal defects that plague a collective security organization (CSO).[21] In all fairness, Russett and Stam do not call their ultimate vision for NATO "collective security," but the functions that they appear to attribute to it make PESODS look pretty much like a CSO. In analyzing what alliances such as NATO do, they state: "Any defensive alliance serves two purposes. The first is to prevent an external power from trying to alter the international territorial status quo. The second is to prevent any of the member states from wishing to do the same."[22] An alliance is directed primarily against the first contingency and is concluded by states that usually have a specific enemy or enemies in mind. If the alliance is working, however, it will also deal effectively with the second contingency as well, as Russett and Stam point out, even though there is no formal alliance obligation to do so. After all, to deter or defeat an attack against the alliance, its members must be united, not fighting amongst themselves.[23]

[21] Good analyses of why collective security organizations do not work can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1964), 412–418; Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 5; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," *Survival* 34 (Spring 1992): 36–51; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994/95): 26–37.

[22] Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 380.

[23] NATO performed both these functions throughout the cold war. It was an alliance directed against the Soviet Union, but it also prevented conflict among its members, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus notwithstanding. Through NATO the United States placed a substantial fraction of its cold war military machine in Western Europe, concentrated it in West Germany, and thereby reas-

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By contrast, a genuine CSO is designed to deal explicitly with aggression from both external powers and CSO members. The contracting parties enter a CSO with no specific aggressor state in mind, or to put the point differently, with all potential aggressor states in mind. A CSO's central goal is to deter attack upon any of its members; but if deterrence for some reason fails, it will defend that member. If a CSO works as intended, however, defensive operations should not have to be mounted because attacks will not occur. Deterrence will be highly effective because all potential aggressors know that punishment of aggression will be certain, swift, and overwhelming. It is the automaticity of punishment that is designed to dissuade aggressors from attacking. Hence if a CSO works, aggression and war within its domain will not happen.

Alliances are more qualified than genuine CSOs in the degree to which they bind their member states to render military aid to the victims of aggression. Alliances qualify their commitments either by retaining national control over the decision to use force, or by clearly specifying the exact circumstances under which military aid shall be rendered, or by doing both.[24] What an alliance gives up in certainty of response, however, should be more than compensated for by the strength and intensity of the interest its member states have in preventing a specific aggressor from attacking them. By narrowing its scope (the range of aggressions it seeks to prevent), an alliance thereby strengthens its deterrent power. If it works well, an alliance should be as effective at deterring specific potential aggressors as a genuine CSO is in deterring all potential aggressors.

These foregoing differences between traditional military alliances and genuine CSOs begin to narrow as a defensive alliance grows in size. As it increases the number of members and the geographic scope of operations, the alliance gradually loses its restrictive character and begins to take on the attributes of a CSO. More states and greater territorial coverage mean more contingencies to guard against. The eventual result is that member states have pledged military assistance to prevent circumstances that are more and more remote from their central interests. When the alliance becomes quite large, then the member states are put in the position of guaranteeing practically everyone against prac-

sured Germany's allies that it would not revert to its aggressive past. "Keeping Russia out, Germany down, and the United States in" was how these two (or three) functions were usually described.

[24] In the Washington Treaty that created NATO, the signators did not formally qualify the enemy against whom the alliance was directed, although all knew it was the Soviet Union. The treaty did, however, retain for the member states the right of national control over the use of force, thereby rendering military assistance not automatic, but contingent upon national decision. This was the price to be paid in order to get the Washington Treaty through the United States Senate. The text of the treaty makes the point clear. By Article 5, "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." By Article 11, however, the members provided a safety catch: "This Treaty shall be ratified and *its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.*" (Emphasis added.) The Washington Treaty text can be found in NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels, 1995), 231–235.

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tically everything. If the alliance becomes all inclusive for a particular region, it transmutes into a regional CSO.

Because of the eventual size contemplated for PESODS, we can legitimately consider it a regional CSO that covers most of Eurasia, Japan, and North America. The problem with PESODS, however, is that it will be too large to work as Russett and Stam intend. There are three reasons why.

First, PESOD's large size will inhibit the development of the necessary consensus for action. Russett and Stam miss the point when they argue: "the bigger the alliance becomes, the less is the burden on any single state and the greater the security provided."[25] The correct statement would be: "the bigger the alliance becomes, the more difficult it is to develop consensus for military action, and the less secure all states will then feel."[26] States are not likely to honor their commitments to aid one another with force if the possible range of both geographical action and military contingencies is so large that they in effect are guaranteeing everyone against everything. States have never been prepared to give such open-ended guarantees in the past. Why should we expect them to do so now?

For those who argue that democracies will operate differently and achieve the consensus necessary to act, go study the record on Bosnia. The Western Europeans were at loggerheads with one another and with the United States over what to do in Bosnia, and they all were at loggerheads with Russia. Had the United States not seized the leadership role in 1995, NATO would never have undertaken the air strikes against the Serbs in the summer of 1995 that helped bring the Bosnian war to an end. At the time, America's French and British allies were opposing any NATO military actions that could threaten the lives of their peacekeepers who were operating under United Nations auspices in Bosnia. Furthermore, had Russia then been a member of NATO, the alliance would never have launched these air strikes. Russia was opposing the air strikes because it consistently favored the Serbs over the Bosnian Muslims. Roughly the same pattern—allied dissensus and Russia's Serbian bias—has been repeated in the tragedy now taking place in Kosovo.

The first lesson of the Bosnian case is, therefore, this—democratic states find it hard to achieve consensus on taking military action when their own immediate security is not at stake. Just because democracies can agree not to fight with one another does not mean they will invariably agree to fight together in alliance against outsiders. Peacelike in their relations toward one another, there is no guarantee they will be warlike in unison toward others.

The second useful lesson has to do with the role that dominant actors play in security organizations. The United States was essential to produce effective NATO military action. America's ability to dominate NATO wrested the air

[25] Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 381.

[26] For the argument that collective action problems will prevent even the NATO of present size from engaging in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, see Joseph Lepgold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem," *International Security* 23 (Summer 1998): 78–107.

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strikes from the alliance. Without the United States, NATO would not have acted as decisively as it eventually did. There is thus an important point here: if American power is diluted because a large number of states are added to NATO, especially powerful ones like Russia, then effective action will be that much harder for the leader to produce.[27] The Bosnian case demonstrates how essential a dominant actor is in order to get effective military action out of a security organization, whether it be an alliance or a CSO.

The third lesson has to do with the ability of powerful actors to concert their actions. Bosnia lies in an area of the Balkans that both Russia and the United States claim to be within their sphere of influence. The area is thus a shared sphere, and the United States and Russia each had to take the interests of the other into account. The United States had the upper hand because it dominated NATO, because British and French troops were already on the ground, and because Russia was militarily weak. The United States was therefore able to get more of what it wanted than Russia could, but it still did not get all that it wanted because Russia retained the ability to thwart NATO action by sending military supplies to the Serbs if NATO went too far. Imagine how PESODS would operate in those parts of Eurasia that even a democratic Russia would consider its exclusive sphere, and then add to that picture a Russia that is much more powerful militarily than it now is, because some day in the future it will be.

The second reason why PESODS will not work is that when consensus on action becomes difficult or impossible to achieve, then the signatories' pledge of military assistance becomes problematic. When that happens, the member states will no longer be able to count on each other if they are attacked. That is fatal to a security organization, whether it be an alliance or a CSO, because their raison d'etre is the guarantee of military assistance. The military guarantee cannot be a sometimes affair. If it is perceived as such, then the member states will put little or no trust in the security organization, and one of two things, or both, will happen. Either the member states will fend for themselves, or they will seek out those few states upon whom they can rely. If the former occurs, the alliance or CSO collapses; if the latter, a new alliance is in effect formed. Both fates would likely befall PESODS.

The third reason why PESODS will not work has to do with the interests of the United States. As argued above, for an alliance or a CSO to work, the strongest military power (there always is one) must back the organization. For PESODS, under current and foreseeable circumstances, that power is the United States. The problem is that the United States will not back PESODS

[27] Adding Russia to NATO is not popular with the European members of NATO. David Yost, a close observer of European security affairs, cites German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe's views, made clear in September 1994, as representative of European views on adding Russia: "Russia cannot be integrated, neither [sic] into the European Union nor into NATO. . . . If Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart. . . . It would be like the United Nations of Europe—it wouldn't work." Quoted in David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security," *Survival* 40 (Summer 1998): 139.

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fully. How can we expect the United States to agree to make or fulfill military promises that guarantee, in effect, all qualifying states in Eurasia? Americans may not presently know the difference between Slovakia, Slovenia, and Slavonia, but if they find their young men and women dying in any of those places in significant numbers, they will quickly consult the map and wonder why their leaders have put them in harm's way in such places. Because America's leaders know this will happen, they will not send them there in the first place. Bosnia sold in Peoria, partly because the fighting stopped before Americans were sent in and partly because the Balkans is right next door to Western Europe. Bosnia-like actions further afield will not sell so well. Imagine an American president going on national television to try to convince the American people that if PESODS is to have credibility, then the United States must help defend Russia against a Chinese attack to reclaim Bolshoy Ussuriisk and Tarabarov—two islands at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, which were left out of the 1991 border agreement between Russia and China.

The bottom line is that a security entity of the size and scale that Russett and Stam envision will founder on the same shoals as did the League of Nations and the United Nations. Neither of these were set up as genuine collective security organizations, because their member states did not want them to be. They refused to yield the right of national decision on the use of force to either organization, and instead retained national control.[28] This had the effect of making these two institutions imperfect CSO's, thereby rendering the use of force problematic in both. As a consequence, the combined track record of the League and the United Nations for collective security enforcement (punishment of aggression) is poor. Of the thirty-two interstate wars between 1922 and 1991, the League and the United Nations attempted collective enforcement only three times. The first—League action against Italy in 1936—was a disaster. The next two—UN action in Korea in 1950 and UN action in the Gulf in 1991—were American-led and American-run affairs.[29] Three attempts out of thirty-two, with one failure and two questionable collective actions, is not a decisive endorsement for collective security.

Exactly the same fate will befall NATO if it is made too large. Its military guarantee, which is the heart of the alliance, will be effectively diluted. Either the member states will formally water it down as NATO enlarges, or they will not honor their military guarantee when their interests dictate ignoring it. Security will no longer be a collective but a divisible enterprise; and at that point, PESODS will be effectively neutered, and NATO will have been destroyed.

[28] On this point, See Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 298–311.

[29] The first action effectively destroyed the League. The second took place only because the Soviet Union happened to boycott the Security Council meeting on the day that the action was voted. The third was another American-run affair, which the UN essentially delegated to the United States and its NATO-Arab allies. The thirty-two interstate wars for these seventy years can be found in "Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816–1992," (ICPR 9905), Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 1994.

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A Concert of Europe—The Better Alternative

There is a better way to deal with the predicaments created by NATO's first round of post-cold war enlargement. It is to limit severely any further expansion and to take seriously the Founding Act. The first step is the prerequisite to the second. If both are taken, there is the chance to create a viable Concert of Europe. To be sure, this will be an imperfect arrangement, but it is the best option that we have to create a workable security structure for all of Europe.[30]

NATO's expansion must be limited and, preferably, stopped, if Russia's cooperation is to be secured. No European-wide structure will succeed if in the process of creating it, Russia is estranged or, worse yet, made an implacable enemy. Yet that is exactly what the United States and its allies risk if they next induct the Baltic states or Ukraine into NATO. According to Anatol Lieven, an experienced correspondent for the *Financial Times* in Moscow and Central Europe, Boris Yeltsin is on record as stating that if NATO takes in any of the former Soviet republics, that will be cause for abrogating the Founding Act and will lead to a complete breakdown of Russia's relations with the West.[31] The same result is nearly as likely if many more states are inducted but Russia continues to be excluded. The larger NATO grows without Russia, the more apparent it becomes that Russia is being discriminated against. Thus, if the Founding Act is to be used as the institutional hook to draw Russia into a cooperative security arrangement with the West, then it is the height of stupidity to take steps that would cause Russia to abrogate it.

If further expansion of NATO without Russia risks alienating it, then the West faces two choices. Either it closes the barn door for a long time after taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, or it makes a second round of expansion, if political expediency requires another one sometime soon, as innocuous as possible by taking in only a few states and only those that are noncontroversial, such as Slovenia, Austria, and Sweden. The states of Europe that lie in the contested zone—such as Finland, the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia, Macedonia—must understand that they have no God-given right to NATO membership. Furthermore, they must be made to understand that NATO expansion beyond a certain size risks bringing on two scenarios: the one they fear most—a Russia hostile to them; and the one they think about least but which is equally bad for them—an ineffective NATO. If

[30] Some may argue that Europe does not need such a structure. Others may argue that if it does, the United States need not be part of it. Still others may argue that the West does not need to take Russia's concerns into account. I do not think that Russett and Stam hold to any of these views, and neither do I. Our differences, therefore, center on the means to attain the end I believe we three share—to keep Europe as stable, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic as possible. For my veiws on the role of the United States in European affairs, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Spring 1996): 1–39; and on Eurasia in general, Robert J. Art, *Selective Engagement: An American Grand Strategy* (forthcoming), chaps. 2 and 7.

[31] Anatol Lieven, "The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution" in Carpenter and Conry, *NATO Enlargement*, 144.

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these nonmember states cannot, for understandable historic reasons, comprehend these two dangers, then the United States together with its Western allies must make the facts of Realpolitik life clear to them, instead of catering to their historic nightmares and pandering to America's manifold European ethnic groups, as has been the case to date. These states must be made to understand that their security is better off with a viable NATO that they cannot join than with one that is not viable but to which they belong. The latter will do them no good whatsoever, but there is always the chance that the former can do them some good.[32] An alliance that works well is better than a CSO that works poorly or not at all.

The second step in creating a workable concert is to integrate Russia more fully into the deliberations of the other European great powers. The mechanism to do this has been set up: it is called the Founding Act. Now what is required is to make certain that it is treated seriously. The West should not view the Act as a sop to sell the first round of expansion to Russian public opinion, but instead should make it the institutional centerpiece of Russian-Western consultation and cooperation on security matters of common concern. The OSCE cannot serve this function. It is too large. With fifty-three member states, almost all of whom have equal say in any dispute, consensus on action is too difficult to produce. This is not to denigrate the OSCE. It has performed many useful functions since the cold war ended, such as preventive diplomacy and election monitoring, but concertation of the great powers for the use of force is not one of them. Instead, the West should attempt to institutionalize NATO-Russian security cooperation through systematic use of the Founding Act. This is possible because NATO contains all the great powers of Europe; the United States is still its acknowledged political-military leader and can use its leadership to help forge consensus; and NATO is still small enough and the habits of consultation strong enough that concertation of Western action is possible. What now has to happen is to bring Europe's other remaining great power—Russia—into this consultative Western process without destroying it.

To achieve this goal, the West should view the NATO-Russian accord as an attempt to construct the twenty-first-century equivalent of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe.[33] The defining characteristic of the first concert was

[32] Through its Partnership for Peace program (PFP), NATO has made a vague commitment to PFP members: "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security." This is not a defense pledge, but neither is it meaningless. It leaves the door open for NATO to decide whether it wants to aid a state under duress or attack. See Yost, "The New NATO," 144.

[33] My proposal for a modern day Concert parallels in some respects that of Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan. They want to institutionalize great power concertation in the CSCE, effectively turning it into a formal collective security system by creating a security council of the five great powers. I do not think this is politically feasible, because forty-eight smaller powers of Europe and Central Asia will resist it. I also believe that collective security will not work for the reasons set forth earlier. My proposal, which is NATO's at least on paper, keeps cooperation looser and does not promise what cannot be delivered. For the details of what the revamped OSCE would look like, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,"

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the agreement among the European great powers not to take unilateral advantage of unstable situations in order to improve their positions vis-à-vis one another. Instead, they all agreed to concert their actions so as to attain the shared goal of preserving the peace. The concertation of action took place in formal conferences that met periodically, at least in the early years of the Concert. Extensive consultation, the reaching of a consensus on action, and joint action were the modus operandi of the first concert.[34]

In its rhetoric and provisions, the Founding Act makes the same commitment to concerting action between NATO and Russia: "the shared objective of NATO and Russia is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible." The basis for joint action is "their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples." The goals are defined as "inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area" based on the "principles of democracy and cooperative security." The Act devises a mechanism to bring all this about: "the Permanent Joint Council will be the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability" and its activities "will be built upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency." Finally, there is an implicit recognition of spheres of influence and an explicit injunction against giving Russia a veto power over NATO deliberations: "The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia," and "Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other . . . nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action."[35] Thus, the intent to foster a European great power concert based on NATO-Russian cooperation is imbedded in the Founding Act. What remains is to implement it.

This would-be modern day concert may not achieve the same degree of coordination that the earlier one did. In spite of a lot of fuzzy rhetoric about it, we must remember that the first concert was, after all, a mechanism devised by the monarchs and aristocrats of the great powers to preserve their dynastic necks and their privileged lives. Their purpose in devising a concert of monarchies was to prevent interstate war so as to suppress revolution, because they had learned the hard way from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era (1792–1815) that war brought revolution. Their concert worked so well for so long because the horrors of the 1792–1815 period were seared into their collective heads.

International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 151–160. For a solution that closely parallels mine, see Yost, "The New NATO."

[34] A good overview of the first Concert of Europe is found in Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985): 58–79.

[35] Quotes are from the text of the Preamble and Sections 1–3 of the Founding Act, found in *Arms Control Today*, 21–23.

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Can the twenty-first century version of the European concert work as smoothly for as long? No one can answer the question with certainty now. It depends on a host of important factors—the course of events in Russia, the nature and extent of American leadership, the evolution of the European Union, and the political cohesion of NATO, to name but a few. Concerts, just like alliances, however, work best when consensus among the concerting powers or allies is high. Consensus depends in good part on a preexisting set of common interests among states, which are usually produced by a conjunction of historical events and powerful underlying international conditions. This was certainly the case for the nineteenth-century concert, which was born out of the maelstrom of nearly twenty-five years of continuous great power war. But concerts do not come into existence solely because of shared underlying interests, even though this is the most important factor in their creation. Leadership and institutions can play a role in helping to forge the sense of shared interests. This was true of Europe's first concert; it is equally valid for the present putative one.

Conclusion

Three final points need to be made. First, building the modern concert with Russia through the Founding Act requires that Russian interests and perspectives will have to be taken into account. This does not mean giving Russia a veto over NATO's decisions as some have argued, but it does mean taking its views seriously and making compromises when deemed necessary. Any attempt at a European-wide security structure, whether fashioned from PESODS, the present day OSCE, or the Founding Act, will have to take into account the interests of its weightiest members; otherwise it will not work. Concerts mean that great powers act collectively when they can agree to do so; and when they cannot, they act separately. NATO and Russia should act together when they can agree to do so; they will act separately when they cannot.

Second, the attempt to fashion the twenty-first century Concert of Europe out of the Founding Act may well fail. In that case, NATO remains to provide security for Western Europe and the hope of protection for the areas of Europe that do not belong to it. Should Russia turn aggressive, NATO can always expand to protect those areas it wants to protect, or give military equipment and advice and even send combat forces to those areas it chooses to protect but not incorporate. This is a fall-back position should the Concert attempt fail and Russia turn nasty.

Third, what should be patently clear is that no concert based on the Founding Act will come into existence unless NATO remains viable. Because of the American guarantee to its members' security, NATO provides important reassurance to its members, helps stabilize relations among all but one of Europe's great powers (and arguably helps stabilize relations with Russia, too), creates transparency and integrated military planning, and promotes common politi-

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cal-military approaches to crises. No other security institution in Europe does all these things, and in my view no other one that analysts may devise or that currently exists will do so for the foreseeable future. These are the reasons why NATO is so valuable to any European-wide security structure. Whatever it ultimately looks like, such a structure must be grafted onto NATO, not NATO absorbed into it.

In sum, at this time, there is a window of opportunity in Europe for concert construction. The United States should seize it, exercise leadership, and use the Founding Act as the vehicle to build the second Concert of Europe.*

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Jimmy Carter's Public Policy Ex-Presidency

JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II

The United States has had many great presidents, but few great ex-presidents. This may be due to the fact that the greatest chief executives—George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt—died in office or shortly thereafter. Paradoxically, the greatest ex-presidents, at least in terms of continued public service—John Quincy Adams, William Howard Taft, Herbert Hoover—have been presidential failures. Jimmy Carter fits this mold. Rejected by the voters in 1980, he was at best an average president; yet Carter has emerged as perhaps America's greatest ex-president with his strengths generally outweighing his weaknesses.[1] Out of office, he is less eager to please than he was as a politician; his trademark, that embarrassed tooth-filled grin, is gone. He is more obviously serious now. As an ex-president, Carter seems somehow more presidential.

[1] The Schlesinger poll ranks Carter low average as president. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton," *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (Summer 1997): 179–190, esp. 189. Nathan Miller includes Carter among the *Star-Spangled Men: America's Ten Worst Presidents* (New York: Scribner, 1998). However, both scholars critical of Carter's presidency, such as Burton I. Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993) and highly favorable of his presidency, such as Douglas Brinkley, "The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The 'Hands on' Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President," *Diplomatic History* 20 (Fall 1996): 505–29, note the extraordinary quality of Carter's postpresidency. So do the media: Stanley W. Cloud, "Hail to the Ex-Chief," *Time*, 11 September 1989, 60–63; Kai Bird, "Citizen Carter: The Very Model of an Ex-President," *Nation*, 12 November 1990, cover, 560–64. The first volume of Douglas Brinkley's three-volume, authorized biography, *The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter's Journey Beyond the White House* (New York: Viking, 1998), a celebrative account of Carter's post-presidential career, was published as the present article was in press.

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In the tribute to Carter's post-White House accomplishments, however, what has been relatively unrecognized is the degree to which Carter has redefined the Office of the Former President of the United States. Institutionally in the 1980s and 1990s, Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter have created a new model for former presidents and their spouses.

I

The old pattern was that ex-presidents retired to their estates from which they offered sage advice and sometimes political endorsements or cover—for example, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson at their Virginia plantations, Andrew Jackson from the Hermitage in Tennessee, or Dwight Eisenhower at his Gettysburg farm.[2] A few played more active public roles, two of them in formal offices: John Quincy Adams serving with distinction in the House of Representatives and William Howard Taft heading the U.S. Supreme Court. Herbert Hoover assisted in post-World War II refugee relief and later headed two "Hoover commissions" on efficiency in the federal government. But Hoover acted sporadically, and as a wealthy individual, he did so largely with his own funds and from his residence in New York City. Some other ex-presidents, Harry Truman in particular, had little means despite a desire to continue to provide public advice. So institutionally, the passage of the Former Presidents Act in 1958 authorized public funding for maintaining a dignified life for a former head of state—providing salary, office, and staff. Secret Service protection was added in 1965.[3]

A second dimension to the ex-presidency emerged with the creation of a presidential library system. This served the archive and mausoleum function. Franklin D. Roosevelt built the first modern presidential library but did not live to use it. Rather, the system was formalized by the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, which provided federal funding for maintaining presidential libraries and museums built by private donations.[4] Initially, these were constructed near

[2] Ex-presidents have been little studied comparatively; among the few such works are Richard Norton Smith and Timothy Walch, eds., *Farewell to the Chief: Former Presidents in American Public Life* (Worland, WY: High Plains Publishing, 1990); and Marie B. Hecht, *Beyond the Presidency: The Residues of Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1976).

[3] The Former Presidents Act of 25 August 1958 (72 Stat. 838; 3 U.S.C. 102). On the evolution of the Office of the Former President, see John Whiteclay Chambers II, "Presidents Emeritus," *The American Heritage Magazine* 30 (June/July 1979): 16–25; and the author's testimony, 7 November 1979, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committees on Appropriations and Governmental Affairs, *Hearing: Cost of Former Presidents to U.S. Taxpayers*, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1980), 165–200.

[4] Presidential Libraries Act of 1955 (69 Stat. 695); see also Fritz Veit, *Presidential Libraries and Collections* (New York: Greenwood, 1987); and Pat Hyland, *Presidential Libraries and Museums: An Illustrated Guide* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995). Since 1986, Congress has required that organizations that build the presidential libraries also create endowments to help pay for repairs and maintenance.

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the president's home. Harry Truman maintained an office in his in Independence, Missouri. Although Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford built them in their hometowns (Ford split his—the library in Ann Arbor and the museum in Grand Rapids), they retired to locations they found more attractive. Characteristically, Lyndon Johnson erected an enormous library-museum; he also linked it to the University of Texas, which he persuaded to create a School of Public Administration named after him. His model may have been Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, named in 1966 after the martyred president.[5] Richard Nixon had planned to build his presidential library and a public policy center on a hilltop overlooking his home in San Clemente.[6] But the plan collapsed with his exile. In 1991, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library was dedicated in Simi Valley not far from Los Angeles, together with a Center for Public Affairs, a conference center without connection to an institution of higher learning. George Bush returned to the Kennedy-Johnson model by linking his presidential library with a professional school of public administration named after him. In fall 1997, the George Bush School of Government and Public Service and the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum opened at Texas A&M University.[7]

The Carters, however, have added to these a third dimension. Instead of a school for training public servants, they founded an institution from which they can continue to be public servants. The Carter Center, connected to both the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and to Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, is unique among the memorials established by former presidents of the United States. It is a major public policy institute from which the ex-president—and the former first lady—can continue an active public service role. The Carters have established a Public Policy Ex-Presidency.[8]

II

In the decade and a half since leaving the Oval Office, Carter, usually accompanied by his wife Rosalynn, has circled the globe on humanitarian missions.

[5] Harvard's Graduate School of Public Administration had been founded in 1936, but in 1966, an Institute of Public Policy was established by friends and members of the Kennedy family "to build bridges between the study of government and the real world of politics," and the entire school was named for John F. Kennedy. *Facts about the John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1997–1998*, brochure, 1997; and telephone interview by the author with the Kennedy School's Public Information Office, 30 March 1998.

[6] H. R. Haldeman, telephone interview with the author, 11 July 1980.

[7] Edmund Morris, "A Celebration of Reagan: What the Presidential Library Reveals about the Man," *New Yorker*, 16 February 1998, 50–57; Peter Baker, "Bush Library Opens as History Comes Full Circle," *Washington Post*, 7 November 1997.

[8] Among cabinet officers, only James A. Baker III, secretary of state under George Bush, founded a public policy institute—the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy established at Rice University in Houston in 1996. The Stimson Center, a public policy research institution created in Washington, DC in 1989, was named for Henry L. Stimson, former secretary of state and secretary of war, who died in 1950.

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Goals of peace, justice, human rights, democratic development, disease control, and improvement of living conditions have led the Carters to Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Balkans, and this is in addition to their projects to assist the poor and needy in the United States. The public sees or reads about their home-building for Habitat for Humanity and the Atlanta Project to alleviate urban poverty, their efforts to eradicate Guinea Worm disease in Africa, their election monitoring for democracy in Panama and Nicaragua, and the successful mediation of international confrontations in North Korea and Haiti.

Yet the Carters have been involved in even more public service activities than are reported in the media. These range from increasing agricultural yields to combat famine in sub-Sahara Africa to encouraging better health care programs in Third World countries through expanded immunization programs and reduction of polio, measles, yaws, rabies, and the "river blindness" disease. Carter has tried to mediate an end to civil wars in half a dozen countries and has done election monitoring in more than a dozen lands, most recently in Liberia, Jamaica, and Mexico in 1997. In the United States, the Carters have pursued programs aimed at child immunization, mental health, gun control, and the reduction of tobacco usage. The former president also offers his prestige and conflict resolution techniques for mediating labor disputes.[9]

And of course, the Carters have written their books, not just memoirs but also prescriptions for a longer and fuller physical and spiritual life, advice for young people on conflict resolution, and suggestions for peace in the Middle East. Carter's post-White House record has been so full and acclaimed that some critics deride his presidency as merely a preparation for his ex-presidency, while some admirers call it his "Second Term."[10]

What drives Carter, now in his mid-seventies, to this frenetic dedication to public service? Why doesn't he simply take his presidential pension and retire, like most other recent former presidents? The question of why Carter is so driven has received considerable attention. Surely part of the answer lies in Carter's personality, shaped by his ambition and his religious moral sense of responsibility and mission. Fascinating and frustrating, Carter is admirably idealistic, yet compulsively controlling and rigidly self-righteous. Little wonder that his favorite president is Woodrow Wilson.[11]

[9] "Carter Center Observes Elections in Liberia, Jamaica, and Mexico," *Carter Center News* (Winter 1998): 1; see also the Carter Center, *The Carter Center at a Glance*, n.d. [1996]; *The Carter Presidential Center*, n.d. [1997]; *1996 Annual Report*; *Fifteen Years of Waging Peace: The Carter Center, 1982–1997*, n.d. [1997]; "3 Fla. Farm Workers Give Up Hunger Strike after Carter Plea," *Washington Post*, 19 January 1998.

[10] Elizabeth Kurylo, "Jimmy Carter: His Second Term," *Atlanta Journal*, 11 December 1990; "His Second Term," *Economist*, 2 September 1989, 29.

[11] For insights into Carter's complex personality, see Leo P. Ribuffo, "God and Jimmy Carter" in M. L. Bradbury and James B. Gilbert, eds., *Transforming Faith: The Sacred and Secular in Modern American History* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1989), 141–59; Kenneth E. Morris, *Jimmy Carter: American Moralist* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996); and Peter G. Bourne, *Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Postpresidency* (New York: Scribner, 1997).

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Many believe that Carter is driven to vindicate his presidency and counter his rejection in 1980.[12] But the redemption idea can be overemphasized, for it presumes Carter believes he needs to redeem his presidency. Consciously at least, he does not. He claims to take pride in what his administration accomplished, and he argues that he was misunderstood by the media because he was a Southerner and a New Democrat. Reporters condemned him unfairly, he explains, because they were still motivated by post-Watergate skepticism and aggressiveness.[13] While emphasizing his accomplishments, Carter blames his low presidential approval ratings and his electoral defeat primarily on external circumstances, especially the dismal economy and the hostage crisis caused by Iranian militants. Recently, however, he partially accepted the responsibility for the failures of his presidency, suggesting to a group of historians and political scientists in 1997, "perhaps we tried to do too much.[14] Carter hopes for greater scholarly and public appreciation of his presidency, but it is not a conscious desire for redemption that drives him as an ex-president. Rather, he takes a longer view and has a larger goal. Carter seeks to ensure his place in history with a legacy that encompasses a long and worthy career in public service as naval officer, legislator, governor, president, and as former president.

Carter is also driven by his own sense of mortality. Pancreatic cancer, nearly impossible to detect early, killed his father, his brother, and two sisters at relatively young ages. Carter was only fifty-six when he left the White House. Initially depressed, he soon resumed his normal drive, analyzing that proper diet and regime could add eleven years to a person's life.[15] Still, as his aides attest, he has a compulsive desire to achieve a great deal in a rapidly dwindling period. "You're not moving fast enough for me," he told one aide in 1992. "I'm sixty-seven years old and this might be the last thing I have a chance to do, and I want to make sure that I have a chance to *do* it."[16]

III

Explaining why Carter is so driven to public service does not fully explain how he has become such an acclaimed ex-president. Seemingly confounding is the paradox of an unsuccessful president becoming a highly successful ex-president. But the paradox can be overdrawn. As chief executive, Carter was more

[12] Erwin C. Hargrove quoted in Kurylo, "Jimmy Carter: His Second Term."

[13] Jimmy Carter, interview with the author, 18 May 1992, at the Carter Center, Atlanta, GA, 12–14, transcript to be deposited at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA. Because Carter's postpresidential papers have not yet been opened, the author has relied heavily upon published materials supplemented by his own interviews and documents from the Carter Center.

[14] Jimmy Carter, "Historical Presidential Press Conference," 20 February 1997, conference on "The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post New Deal Era," The Carter Center, 20–22 February 1997.

[15] Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter, *Everything to Gain: Making the Most of the Rest of Your Life* (New York: Random House, 1987), 38.

[16] Dan E. Sweat, interview with the author, 18 May 1992, The Carter Center.

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successful than is often remembered. Regardless of other problems, his administration achieved such major results in foreign policy and human rights as the Camp David Accords, relations with China, the Panama Canal Treaties, and prioritizing of human rights. And as an ex-president he has not always been as successful as it appears. There have been numerous failures. Despite many attempts, for example, he was unable to mediate a conclusion to the civil wars in Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Sudan. Even more discouraging to Carter are his failures in the Middle East, a place of particular political and Biblical importance to him.[17] The rejections of the ex-president's peace initiatives indicate not simply Israel's view that Carter is overly sympathetic to the Palestinians, but the beliefs of vulnerable Arab governments like King Hussein's in Jordan that the former president could be rebuffed without alienating the U.S. government or American elites.[18] Nor has Carter's major domestic initiative, the Atlanta Project (TAP), which sought to overcome major problems of poverty through community empowerment and public-private partnership, achieved much success. Forced to admit in late 1995 that the initial five-year plan had been "overly ambitious," Carter cut the staff in half and accepted much more modest goals.[19]

Despite such setbacks, Carter is undeniably more popular now than he was in the White House.[20] Indeed, many see him as the very model of a modern former president. How did he do it? Part of the answer is that although Carter lost his political capital when the voters rejected him, he did not lose his moral authority. His international prestige derives not simply from being a former U.S. head of state but as a world figure recognized for his integrity and his dedicated moral commitment to peace and justice. As a global humanitarian, he has become the leading American "do-gooder" for the world.

For Carter, a major difference between before and after 1980 is his freedom of choice. A modern American president is expected to address all or at least most of the most pressing problems on the public agenda. In the Carter presidency, many of these proved unmanageable, compounded by the changing political culture—the growing sense of the limits of government and resources—and more immediately by the deep divisions within the Democratic party and the acerbic relations between the Carter White House and the Democratic ma-

[17] Jimmy Carter, *The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985).

[18] Interview by the author with Emmanuel Sivan, former adviser to Shimon Peres when he was Israeli foreign minister, 22 October 1991, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

[19] John B. Hardman, executive director of the Carter Center, *The Atlanta Project: Lessons Learned in Phase One* (The Carter Center, 1966), 2–5; "Atlanta Project Increases Focus on Children and Families," *Carter Center News*, Winter 1997, 6; Creel McCormack, associate director of TAP, to the author, 7 March 1997.

[20] Carter's public approval rating was 50 per cent in 1992, up from 34 per cent at the end of his term in office, according to the Gallup Poll. "How the Public's View Changes As the Presidents Become History," *New York Times*, 24 January 1993.

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jority in Congress.[21] As an ex-president, Carter is free to select the problems he addresses and the people with whom he works.

Never comfortable with the back-slapping, log-rolling, parochial aspects of legislative politics, Carter has always preferred to deal with leaders and administrators.[22] Whether at home or abroad, he avoids legislators and the bureaucracy and goes directly to the top, where his status gains him access. In addition to his own empathy and considerable skill, he brings promises of additional personnel, technology, and perhaps most importantly, media recognition, which in turn helps to produce political and financial support. "When I go to a country in the Third World, it's a big deal," Carter explained to me in 1992, before Bill Clinton's 1998 visit to Africa. "I'm the only [U.S.] president that's ever visited sub-Sahara Africa at all, except, Theodore Roosevelt [who as an ex-president] went hunting in Kenya. But I have been to more than twenty countries in Africa. And when I go there on humanitarian projects . . . my presence makes the issue that I bring very important to the incumbent king or president or to the cabinet officers. They want to join in with any sort of partnership with the United States."[23]

Mobilizing support through the media, what one scholar has called the modern presidents' penchant for "going public," has significantly bolstered Carter's effectiveness as an ex-president.[24] Undeniably, Carter has achieved greater success in dealing with the media since he left the Oval Office. The media now mainly emphasize his successes, because it is so surprising and thus news that an ex-president can actually influence public policy and sometimes even determine events. Carter has not gotten a free ride from the press. Critics on the Left and Right have chastised him for making concessions to dictatorial regimes in his attempts to mediate peaceful resolutions to violent situations or for making inappropriate remarks, such as telling the Haitian junta that he was "ashamed" of U.S. policy or negotiating with Bosnian Serb leaders considered "war criminals."[25] The press tweaks his self-righteousness and his denied ambitions; and harking back to Carter's pre-election interview for *Playboy* magazine in which he admitted sometimes having "lust in my heart," the media sometimes josh Carter about his admiring remarks about the wives of men with

[21] Erwin C. Hargrove, *Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), esp. 161–93.

[22] Jimmy Carter, interview with the author, [hereafter Carter interview], 18 May 1992, transcript, 22.

[23] Ibid., transcript, 7–8. In March 1998, Clinton became the first incumbent president to visit sub-Sahara since Carter's 1978 trip (except for a lightning trip by George Bush to visit U.S. soldiers in Somalia).

[24] Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986); Carter says he has employed such strategy since being governor of Georgia. Carter interview with the author, 18 May 1992, 9–10.

[25] William Safire, "Jimmy Clinton II," *New York Times*, 22 September 1994; A. M. Rosenthal, "Men of Honor," ibid., 23 September 1994; Joe Klein, "Empathy for the Devil," *Newsweek*, 3 October 1994, 39; Murray Kempton, "The Carter Mission," *New York Review of Books*, 20 October 1994, 71.

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whom he is negotiating, most recently Yannick Cédras in Haiti.[26] But while Carter was honest in admitting desire to *Playboy*, no one ever accused him of sexual harassment or infidelity; his moral stature has risen even farther as Bill Clinton's has declined.

Media approval is significant because it contributes to Carter's continued effectiveness. The ex-president brings the media spotlight and public acclaim with him, and this increases his leverage when he negotiates. Carter believes that his highly visible participation in Habitat for Humanity played a major role in the media turn-around toward him that began in 1984. During the Reagan presidency, the televised image of a former president and former first lady in overalls carrying lumber and hammering nails to help the poor build their own homes was a powerful symbol of altruism. As he travels through America, Carter says the vast majority of people he meets tell him, "We sure like you building homes for those poor folks."[27]

Carter's subsequent media success has been partly due to conducive circumstances. One is his contrast with other ex-presidents, some of whom were accused of "selling the presidency." Former president Gerald Ford was sharply criticized for living the high life—hobnobbing with elites on fashionable golf courses and ski slopes—and particularly for enriching himself by accepting positions on corporate boards and endorsing certain products.[28] Before Alzheimer's disease forced him to withdraw from public appearances, Ronald Reagan also came under fire for accepting hefty lecture fees, particularly his acceptance of a $2 million fee for a speaking tour of Japan sponsored by a Tokyo-based communications conglomerate.[29] Richard Nixon was *sui generis*, but although before his death in 1994 he had rebuilt his reputation for perceptive analysis of international relations, he could never fully recover from the disgrace that led to his resignation.[30] The most recent ex-president, George Bush, has kept a low profile since 1993, except when he skydived out of an airplane[31] or dedicated his presidential library. In contrast to Nixon, Ford, and Reagan, Carter's ex-presidential lifestyle was never criticized by the press; nor was any doubt expressed about his integrity and dedication to continued public service.

[26] "The Meaning of Madame Cédras," *The New Yorker*, 3 October 1994, 45.

[27] Carter interview, 15, also 12, 19, for Carter's emphasis on television coverage of Habitat for Humanity. Photo caption, "Carpenter Named Carter Comes to New York," *New York Times*, 3 September 1984.

[28] Jerry F. terHorst, "Our 38th President Is for Sale," *Free Enterprise* (Spring 1977); terHorst, "Ex-Presidents: Big Retirement and Big Money?" *Washington Post*, 21 August 1977; "Gerry Ford Incorporated," *Newsweek*, 11 May 1981, 28–29.

[29] William Safire, "Recruiting Reagan," *New York Times*, 11 May 1989; Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Given Top Award by Japanese," ibid., 24 October 1989; Walter B. Robinson, "Reagan's Legacy Loses Luster During His Year in Retirement," *Boston Globe*, 12 February 1990.

[30] Lloyd Grove, "Richard Nixon: The Sequel: From Exile to Elder Statesman," *Washington Post*, 12 March 1994.

[31] B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "At 72, Bush Leaps Into the Open Sky," *New York Times*, 26 March 1997.

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Foreign policy difficulties of incumbent Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton provided Carter with his greatest opportunities for influencing policy and events. Lacking Reagan's decisiveness and public acclaim, Bush and Clinton were seen as indecisive and without coherent foreign policy. From the beginning, the Bush administration experienced difficulties with international changes as the collapse of the Soviet Empire unravelled familiar circumstances and scenarios.

Confronted with electoral manipulation and other irregularities by Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, Bush acquiesced in 1989 as Carter teamed up with Ford to monitor the election there. Arriving in Panama, Carter immediately took charge and used his access to the local media and his ability to speak Spanish to exhort Panamanians to vote. On election day, he declared the opposition candidate the winner, condemned Noriega's attempt to steal the election, and urged international pressure to force Noriega out as military leader.[32] Carter's courage and strong moral role in challenging the Panamanian dictator in his own country were widely hailed in the United States and abroad.[33]

Less than a year later, Carter achieved an even greater triumph in Nicaragua, when in February 1990 he monitored a key election and persuaded the defeated Sandinista President Daniel Ortega Saavedra to accept the results and step down.[34] In an extraordinary conference in the middle of election night, Carter shared his 1980 sense of defeat with Ortega, explained how his own career showed that there could be stature even after such a setback, and provided the rejected leader with some face-saving statements from the president-elect and the Bush administration.[35] Helping to avert a threatened abrogation of the election by the Sandinistas, Carter transformed the role of election monitor from observer to personal participant in the peaceful transition to democracy.[36]

President Bill Clinton's foreign policy, combining brinkmanship with indecision, as well as the Democratic party's post-Vietnam difficulties with using military force, led to a series of crises, which allowed Carter to come to the rescue as a peacemaking mediator. In 1993, Carter helped Clinton disengage from a seemingly hopeless situation in Somalia by opening negotiations with

[32] William Branigin, "Carter Says Noriega Is Stealing Election," *Washington Post*, 9 May 1989.

[33] Hendrik Hertzberg, "Mr. Ex-President," *New Republic*, 5 June 1989, 4; Richard Cohen, "The Carter Distinction," *Washington Post*, 11 May 1989; Peter Applebome, "Unofficially, Era of Carter Is Still Here," *New York Times*, 11 May 1989.

[34] Mark A. Uhlig, "Nicaraguan Opposition Routs Sandinistas," *New York Times*, 27 February 1990.

[35] For details of Carter's visit with Ortega, see Carter interview with the author, transcript, 25–27.

[36] Mark A. Uhlig, "Ortega, Defeated in Vote, Declares Contra Cease-Fire," *New York Times*, 1 March 1990; Uhlig, "Chamarro Takes Nicaragua Helm; Hails a New Era," ibid., 26 April 1990. Carter and his group, the heads of freely elected countries, continued to monitor elections, when called upon to help developing democracies, for example, in Haiti, in 1990; Zambia, 1991; Guyana, 1992; Ghana, 1992; Paraguay, 1993; Panama, 1994; Palestinians' first general election in 1996; Dominican Republic, 1996; Nicaragua, 1996; and in 1997, local elections in China and Mexico, parliamentary elections in Jamaica and general elections in Liberia.

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clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid and by redirecting U.S. policy there away from military force.[37]

More publicly, Carter helped defuse a dangerously escalating confrontation in 1994 between North Korea and the United States over Pyongyang's nuclear program. While the Clinton administration moved toward economic sanctions and hawks talked of bombing raids, Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter visited the North Korean capital and restarted a dialogue with the United States.[38] The Carter initiative, ultimately supported by the Clinton administration, not only defused the crisis but helped move long-term U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea from ostracism to an active effort through constructive engagement to bring it out of its isolation.[39]

Most dramatically, Carter directly affected policy and events in Haiti later in 1994, when in a weekend of negotiations in September 1994, the ex-president led a delegation that achieved U.S. goals and successfully headed off an airborne invasion already on its way to depose the Haitian military junta.[40] Despite the criticism about face-saving concessions that Carter had made to the junta and the inappropriateness of some of his remarks about U.S. policy, most of the press hailed Carter's—and Clinton's—achievement in obtaining the return of Haiti's first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, without a massive and potentially bloody U.S. invasion. Noting that Carter had now been nominated for the fifth time for the Nobel Peace Prize, the *New York Times* called him a "unique diplomatic resource," praising him as "our most useful and perhaps most versatile former President."[41]

Carter's new image lost some of its luster, however, when in a post-Haitian mission interview in September 1994, he revealed that during the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf crisis he had written privately to the heads of member nations of the UN Security Council urging them to oppose President Bush's request for UN authorization to use military action if necessary to force Iraq out of Kuwait.[42] The former president's attempt to undercut U.S. political-military policy

[37] Michael Kramer, "It All Codepends," *New Yorker*, 3 October 1994, 83–84.

[38] Andrea Stone, "Citizen Carter, The Statesman," *USA Today*, 15 June 1994; Douglas Jehl, "Carter, His Own Emissary, Outpaces White House," *New York Times*, 20 June 1994; Elizabeth Kurylo, "Agreement Is Feather in Carter's Cap," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 23 June 1994; David E. Sanger, "Who Won the Korea Deal?" *New York Times*, 23 October 1994.

[39] "Carter Trip Paves the Way for U.S.–North Korean Pact," *Carter Center News* (Winter 1995): 6, 11.

[40] Larry Rohter, "Carter in Haiti, Pursues Peaceful Shift," *New York Times*, 18 September 1994; Thomas W. Lippman, "Once Again Carter Plays Peacemaker," *Washington Post*, 19 September 1994; Eleanor Clift, "A Man with a Mission," *Newsweek*, 3 October 1994, 36–38; Michael Kramer, "The Carter Connection" and Bruce W. Nelan, "Road to Haiti," *Time*, 3 October 1994, 30–38.

[41] Editorial, "Jimmy Carter's Contribution," *New York Times*, 19 September 1994; Editorial, "Peacemaker," *USA Today*, 21 September 1994. For criticism of Carter, see Douglas Farah, "U.S. Assists Dictators' Luxury Exile," *Washington Post*, 14 October 1994.

[42] Jimmy Carter quoted in Maureen Dowd, "Despite Role as Negotiator, Carter Feels Unappreciated," *New York Times*, 21 September 1994. In the interview, Carter acknowledged that his action "was not appropriate perhaps."

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through private appeals to bargain with the aggressor, Saddam Hussein, was unprecedented and bordered on disloyalty. Although he never publicized Carter's lobbying, which he learned about from a Security Council member rather than the ex-president, Bush was privately irate. Later as a former president himself, Bush observed in 1998 that he had "had a big problem with President Carter's lobbying member[s] of the UN Security Council against the policy of the US government. . . ." However, Bush added: "In fairness you should know that I have a high regard for President Carter, though I did not like what he did in this instance."[43]

In December 1994, Carter was criticized when he tried to end the Bosnian civil war by expressing some sympathy for Bosnian Serbs and negotiating in Pale with their leaders—Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, considered war criminals by some. Although Carter achieved a cease-fire between them and the Muslim-led Bosnian government in Sarajevo, it lasted only through the winter.[44] With a changed military situation, the Clinton administration bypassed the Bosnian Serbs and dealt directly with the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia in successfully brokering the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.[45]

The foreign policy crises of the Clinton administration have eased since then, and Carter is not in the news as much as he was in the mid-1990s. But the media continue to report favorably on the ex-president's public service work. He obtained national press coverage in 1996, when he acted as a leading mediator trying to end the cycle of bloodshed in Burundi and Rwanda, when he criticized the Helms-Burton act tightening the U.S. embargo on Cuba as "the stupidest," and when he chastised Christian fundamentalists for mixing religion and politics.[46] Carter made news again in 1997, when he argued against demonizing China, took part in former General Colin Powell's working conference in Philadelphia on voluntarism in America, and when the State Department, now under Carter's former adviser Madeline Albright, established a working relationship with the ex-president.[47]

In Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, from peace-making and human rights, to health-improvement and home-building programs for the

[43] George Bush letter to the author, 13 June 1998, in author's possession.

[44] Roger Cohen, "Bosnia Foes Agree to 4-Month Truce, Carter Reports," *New York Times*, 21 December 1994; Editorial, "A Little Help From Jimmy Carter," ibid., 21 December 1994; "Carter Center Jump Starts Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Carter Center News* (Winter 1995): 1, 3.

[45] Elaine Sciolino, "Accord Reached to End the War in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 22 November 1995.

[46] Barbara Crossette, "Fearing Strife, U.N. Withholds Report on Death of Burundian," *New York Times*, 30 July 1996; "Carter Blasts Helms-Burton Law," Reuters' dispatch from Montreal, 12 July 1996, copy at Carter Center Office of Public Information; Jimmy Carter, "Prayer and Civic Religion," Op-Ed., *New York Times*, 24 December 1996.

[47] Mimi Hall and Andrea Stone, "Army of Volunteers Called Up; Presidents, Powell Kick Off Summit," *USA Today*, 28 April 1997; Francis X. Clines, "Overwhelmed by Good News," *New York Times*, 4 May 1997; James Bennet, "A Presidential Cold War Begins to Thaw," ibid., 21 May 1997; Jimmy Carter, "It's Wrong to Demonize China," Op-Ed, ibid., 10 August 1997.

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poor, Carter's postpresidential areas of concern have reflected primarily interests and strategies that he demonstrated in the White House. So have Rosalynn Carter's, including her advocacy of immunization and mental health programs.[48] But despite the continuity of interests in the Carter presidency and postpresidency, there has also been an important discontinuity—the creation of the Carter Center as a basis for the Public Policy Ex-Presidency.

IV

What is often overlooked in explaining how Jimmy Carter has been able to serve so effectively as an ex-president is the institutional base he has created for his activities. Since the mid-1950s, ex-presidents have had presidential libraries maintained at public expense as well as a core of federal support. The Former Presidents Act of 1958 established a quasi-public Office of the Former President and provided ex-chief executives with a salary (not technically a pension) and allowances for staff, offices, and expenses.[49] That support expanded dramatically, and today it totals $2.8 million in allowances and salaries (currently $151,800 each) for the four living ex-presidents, not counting Secret Service protection for them and their spouses.[50] Carter's federal stipend for 1998 is half a million dollars, but he has gone far beyond this in building a base for his continued public role.

The Carter Center in Atlanta is unique. Not designed to be a think-tank or simply a conference center, this public policy institute is, like its founder, action-oriented. "All of our programs are—have to be—active in nature," Carter explained. "We don't take a project just for scholarly analysis. Or to make recommendations to other people. Unless we believe at the very beginning that there will be an action result, we don't take it on."[51]

Located next to the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, the Carter Center sits in park-like surroundings on a hilltop overlooking downtown Atlanta. It is about a three hour drive from the Carters' home in Plains, Georgia and contains an office and an apartment where they stay while working there each week. Less than three miles from the Emory University campus, its affiliation with the university has provided status and support that have helped to make the Carter Center what it proclaims: a nonprofit organization dedicated to pro-

[48] On the continuity theme, see John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The Agenda Continued: Jimmy Carter's Post-Presidency" in Hugh Davis Graham and Gary Fink, eds., *The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post New Deal Era* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 267–85.

[49] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, *Retirement, Staff Assistants, and Mailing Privileges for Former Presidents and Annuities for Widows of Former Presidents*, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, H. Rept. 2200 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1958).

[50] Karen Gullo, Associated Press, "Former Presidents Avert a Cut in Expenses for Office and Staff," Newark, NJ, *Star-Ledger*, 13 January 1998, 6. Carter's FY 1998 allocation is $499,800.

[51] Carter interview, transcript, 16–17.

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moting peace and human rights; resolving conflicts; fostering democracy and development; and fighting poverty, hunger, and disease throughout the world.[52]

Searching for what to do in his post-presidential life in 1981, Carter rejected offers to become a university president, because he wanted to remain in Georgia. Most importantly, "I wanted to be totally free to say what I pleased."[53] He found freedom as well as a prestigious institutional affiliation at Emory University, where President James T. Laney, a former army officer and minister, named him a Distinguished Professor in 1982 and provided him with temporary quarters until the Carter Presidential Library and Carter Center complex were completed in 1986. The relationship became permanent in 1994, when the two institutions signed an agreement under which the separately chartered, independently-governed Carter Center became a permanent part of Emory University.[54]

By the 1990s, the Carter Center employed at least 200 persons on a full- and part-time basis, a figure which reached 300 during the peak of the Atlanta Project.[55] In addition, more than 100 students from Emory and other colleges work there as interns each year, and approximately 130 volunteers donate a day of their time each week. The Carter Center had an annual operating budget of $28.5 million in fiscal year 1994 and an endowment and other assets of $65 million.[56] Indeed, the paid staff of the Carter Center amounts to nearly half the size of the Carter White House staff.[57]

The idea of the Carter Center originated in the ex-president's efforts in the wake of his electoral defeat to build a presidential library and to establish a post-presidential career. Like his predecessors, Carter was faced with the task of raising millions of dollars to build a presidential library and deciding what

[52] Elizabeth Kurylo, "Carter Center to Merge with Emory University," *Atlanta Constitution*, 28 September 1990; see also the Carter Center, *The Carter Center at a Glance* (n.d., c.1996).

[53] Carter interview, transcript, 21–22.

[54] Elizabeth Kurylo, "Joining Forces: Emory to Absorb Carter Center," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 30 August 1994; John D. Thomas, "A Bonding Experience," *Emory Magazine*, Autumn 1996, 10–13. The Carter Center is governed by an independent board of twenty-two trustees, chaired by Jimmy Carter with Rosalynn Carter as vice-chair, and composed mainly of corporate CEOs but also including former Mayor Andrew Young, Senator Sam Nunn, the president of Emory, and the president of the American Political Science Association. Under the 1994 agreement, the Emory University Board of Trustees was given the power to appoint half of the Center's trustees and to approve the Center's budgets. The Carter Center, *1995 Annual Report*, 38–41; and John B. Hardman, executive director, to Carter Center Staff, 23 August 1994, Subject: The Carter Center, Inc./ Emory University Relationship, memorandum in Carter Center of Emory University File, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA.

[55] The Carter Center, *1995 Annual Report*, 6; Carter Center, *The Carter Center at a Glance*, 5; Natasha Singh program assistant, Office of Public Information, the Carter Center, letter to the author, 7 March 1997.

[56] The Carter Center, *1995 Annual Report*, 6, 48–50.

[57] In the first year of Carter's presidency, the White House had a fulltime staff of 461 and a budget of $17.6 million. *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), 815.

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use, if any, he would make of it. Instead of erecting an imposing monument—one architect suggested a spire that would dominate the Atlanta skyline—Carter characteristically chose a less ostentatious arrangement: a complex of interconnected, two-story circular buildings in a garden setting.[58] The library would contain his papers; the museum, like those of the other presidents, would emphasize his achievements and explain his failures. Both would be turned over to the National Archives.

In his quest for a post-presidential role, Carter began seeking funds for a practical program. His fundraiser, James M. Brasher, suggested that they visit foundations, but they soon learned that Carter was not always welcome. Several foundation presidents told Brasher: "Jim, let's not embarrass ourselves or the President by having him come in. My board couldn't possibly give you money."[59] Nevertheless, in the winter of 1982–1983, some agreed to see him, and it was during those discussions that the working concept of the Carter Center emerged. David A. Hamburg of the Carnegie Foundation and a number of others praised in particular Carter's success in negotiating the Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel.[60]

One night, Rosalyn woke up and found her husband sitting bolt upright in bed. "What's the matter?" she asked. "I know what we can do at the library," he said. "We can develop a place to help people who want to resolve disputes."[61] Over the next few days they expanded the idea from conflict resolution to protection of human rights and alleviation of hunger and suffering among the world's poor, and provision of health care and adequate services for the mentally afflicted. An elated Carter said to his wife, "Who knows what we can do if we set our objectives high? We may even be able to do more than if we had won the election in 1980!"[62]

Early in 1983, Carter finalized his concept for the Carter Center. Formally launching a $30 million capital campaign, he said he chose only projects that he was deeply committed to and was fully informed about. Although he used a low key approach, his knowledge and enthusiasm helped to win over donors.[63]

The model Carter developed for his center drew on his strengths as a systematic planner and manager as well as his issue network ability. From the Center, Carter brings together groups of nonprofit and government officials to develop coordinated strategies for solving problems ranging from the immunization of impoverished children to U.S. health policy. By assessing the prob-

[58] Carter, *Everything to Gain*, 29–32; see also, Bill Shipp, "Maybe Carter's Grandest Achievement," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 10 August 1986.

[59] Anne Lowrey Bailey, "Jimmy Carter Adds a New Dimension to Philanthropy," *Chronicle of Philanthropy*, 19 November 1991, 10. I am indebted to Walter E. Beach for calling my attention to this article.

[60] Ibid., 10–11.

[61] Carter and Carter, *Everything to Gain*, 31.

[62] Ibid., 32.

[63] Bailey, "Jimmy Carter Adds a New Dimension," 10.

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lems, setting goals and deadlines, dividing up the work strategically, and pulling in new sources of support where they are needed, these coalitions (or task forces) often obtain results where scores of nonprofit groups, working individually, had failed.

From his experience in the White House, Carter saw an important niche for his Center. In foreign affairs, he recognized the increasing problem that most of the world's conflicts were civil wars and that the charter of the United Nations precluded it from intervening in the internal affairs of member nations. Indeed, many nations were opposed to such intervention. Carter believed that, as at Camp David, he might be able to help resolve other conflicts as well, drawing upon his prestige and skill and the emerging field of conflict resolution theory.[64]

Washington's comparative neglect in the 1980s of Africa and of health and human rights issues in the Third World provided another opportunity for Carter. So from the beginning, the Carter Center drew on the Atlanta-based federal Centers for Disease Control and focused its public-private efforts particularly on Africa and on health improvement and crop yields in the Center's Global 2000 project. Having made human rights a cornerstone of his foreign policy as president, Carter remained its champion as an ex-president. Now he teamed up with Houston oil heiress and philanthropist Dominique de Menil, and through the Carter-Menil Human Rights Foundation encouraged efforts for peace and human rights.[65] In 1991, following more than a decade of federal urban neglect, Carter saw another opportunity—a chance to mobilize Atlantans in an attempt to alleviate urban poverty before the 1996 Olympics in that city.

To head these projects, Carter put together a senior staff whose areas of expertise and organizational credentials complemented the ex-president's political leadership. William H. Foege, the first executive director of the Center and Global 2000, had headed the Centers for Disease Control during Carter's presidency and was renowned for developing the strategy that ended smallpox. Later, another physician-administrator, John Hardman, became executive director, and Foege continued to head the Task Force for Child Survival and Development. The senior staff also includes Norman Borlaug, 1970 Nobel laureate and an expert in increasing crop yields, who is credited with the green revolution in India; Harry Barnes, Jr., director of the Conflict Resolution Program and Human Rights Program, who was a former U.S. ambassador to Chile,

[64] Typically, Carter drew upon leading authorities to help him master the field; in conflict resolution it was William L. Ury, co-author with Roger Fisher of *Getting to Yes: Negotiating without Giving In* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981) and James H. Laue, *Direct Action and Desegregation, 1960–1962: Toward a Theory of the Rationalization of Protest* (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson, 1989), both of whom helped Carter develop the Center's mediation program in the mid-1980s. See Kelly, "It All Codepends," 82; and presentations by Laue and Dayle E. Powell, the Carter Center's conflict resolution fellow, 27 February 1990, at a conference on conflict resolution held at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.

[65] Dominique de Menil died in January 1998 at 89. Sam Howe Verhovek, "How Houston's Adopted Daughter Said Thank You," *New York Times*, 20 January 1998.

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India, and Romania; Robert Pastor, director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program, who was with Carter in the White House; and, until his death in 1997, Dan Sweat, initiator of Carter's Atlantic Project, who since the 1960s had been a key architect of the business development of downtown Atlanta.[66]

Although the Carter Center had confronted cash-flow problems in the early 1980s, that difficulty had been overcome by the end of the decade as a result of enormous fundraising efforts by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter.[67] Their fundraising was relentless: personal solicitations to foundations, philanthropists, virtually every possible source of tax-deductible donations. In addition to obtaining grants from governmental agencies and private institutions, the Carter Center sent out extensive mailings; and the Carters made personal visits to big givers, invited some of the largest donors on vacation excursions with them, and held regular auctions of Carter's hand-made furniture. Cynical observers saw even the books the Carters wrote—more than a dozen already—as designed as much to raise money as to educate. All the proceeds, even prize money, went to the center and its programs.

By the early 1990s, the Carter Center (excluding the presidential library and museum which are maintained by the National Archives) was operating on an annual budget of approximately $20 million. Of this 91 percent came from gifts and grants ($18.4 million); 3 percent from Emory University ($645,000); nearly 3 percent from the Carter Center's endowment ($575,000); and 1.6 percent from other sources ($324,000).[68] In addition, between 1990 and 1994, the Center raised $60 million.

V

Although he had not been a particularly good fundraiser in his electoral campaigns, Carter has been extraordinary in obtaining resources as an ex-president. During the first decade after leaving the Oval Office, he raised more than $270 million in private donations to build his presidential library and the Carter Center and to provide operating expenses and an endowment for the Center.[69] This fundraising, however, was not without its problems. George Schira, who

[66] The Carter Center, *1995 Annual Report*, 41; and periodic staff profiles in the *Carter Center News* issued three times a year, such as "Profile: Robert Pastor," ibid., (Fall 1990): 3; Howard Pousner, "Former CDC Head to Oversee Carter Center's Global Goals," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 21 September 1986; Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., "Dan E. Sweat Dies at 63, Guided Atlanta," *New York Times* 9 March 1997.

[67] On 1985 cash-flow problems, see Bill Shipp, "Jimmy Carter Fights for His Life," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 13 November 1985.

[68] In regard to expenditures, of the $20 million budget for the Carter Center in 1991–1992, $8.1 million went for Global 2000, $5.9 million for the Carter Center of Emory University, $3.8 million for the Carter Center, and $2.2 million for the Task Force for Child Survival. Bailey, "Jimmy Carter Adds a New Dimension," 10.

[69] Ibid., 6–7, 10–11. On Carter's own admission of inadequacy as an electoral fundraiser, see Carter and Carter, *Everything to Gain*, 17–18.

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had managed the original fundraising campaign for the Carter Library and Center and then travelled around the world with Carter as his chief of staff in 1986 and 1987, was dismissed in April 1987 and indicted in August 1992 on charges that he had subsequently impersonated the former president in phone calls and defrauded the Center and one of its founding contributors, a Greek shipping tycoon, George E. Paraskevaides, out of $650,000.[70]

Questions were raised about Carter's accepting donations from some controversial sources. Perhaps he had been driven to it. In December 1981, when he had finished his memoirs and turned to raising money for the library, he had made more than a hundred phone calls to potential donors. As a recently rejected Democrat in the first year of a Republican administration, he had, he recalled bitterly, failed to raise a dime.[71] Ultimately, of course, he was able to raise the nearly $27 million required to build his presidential library and the Carter Center.[72] But nearly $4 million of that, plus subsequently nearly $20 million for Carter's Global 2000 project (82 percent of that project's budget for health and agriculture in Asia and Africa between 1985 and 1990) came from two tainted, foreign donors, who were self-made entrepreneurs—Ryoichi Sasakawa, a gambling czar and former Japanese militarist, and Agha Hasan Abedi, a shadowy Pakistani financier, both of whom benefited from Carter's continued prestige abroad.[73]

Japan's richest philanthropist before his death in 1995 at the age of 96, Sasakawa, had been born the son a humble sake brewer near Osaka, but became a millionaire by the 1930s, chiefly through stock deals and trading in rice futures. An ardent rightist, he built up a protofacist organization, encouraged Japan's antiforeign policies, and supported its military expansion in Asia. He posed proudly with Benito Mussolini in 1939. A few months after the Pearl Harbor attack, he was elected to the Japanese parliament on an imperialistic platform. In 1945, the U.S. Army jailed him as a suspected war criminal, but he was released in 1948, renouncing his militaristic views and vowing to work for world peace. Within a decade, he was a billionaire, profiting from shipbuilding and from securing Japan's only private gambling concession—on motorboat racing. Since Japanese law required him to donate a certain portion of the proceeds from legal gambling into public interest work, he set up the Sasakawa Peace

[70] Mark Curriden, "Ex-Director of Carter Center Indicted in $650,000 Fraud," *Atlanta Constitution*, 16 August 1992; Helene Cooper, "Former Carter Center Official Accused of Impersonating the Ex-President," *Wall Street Journal*, 27 August 1992. Paraskevaides had already given $500,000 to the Center between 1983 and 1990.

[71] Jimmy Carter, remarks at news conference, attended by the author, 23 September 1986, preparatory to dedication on 1 October 1986 of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Carter Center.

[72] Carter said he spent much of the previous four years in the "terrible task" of raising the money; one-half came from individuals and corporations in Georgia ("other states were not much interested") and one-quarter from foreign benefactors from Japan, Pakistan, and the Middle East. Ibid. See also Phil Gailey, "To Build a Library, Some Chairs Go Up for Bids," *New York Times*, 23 September 1983.

[73] Elizabeth Kurylo, "Carter Donors: Questionable Givers?" *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 14 April 1991.

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Foundation and made contributions to a variety of causes and carefully cultivated world leaders, including U.S. presidents beginning with Richard Nixon. Critics claimed that Sasakawa used the more than $1.5 billion in donations to deflect his reputation as a fascist and allegations that his gambling operations also involved the *yakuza* criminal gangs in Japan. Sasakawa contributed liberally to the Carter Center and to its Global 2000 project, the latter alone receiving more than $11 million from him.[74] Dismissing criticism of Sasakawa, Carter emphasized that the Japanese magnate and his foundation had given funds for health causes, such as the eradication of smallpox and Guinea worm, that few governments would initiate.[75] Nevertheless, noting that a full-page ad in the *Wall Street Journal* in 1989 had Carter praising Sasakawa and his foundations, Pat Choate, author of *Agents of Influence*, an attack upon Japanese efforts to sway American public opinion, claimed that Sasakawa was engaged in a campaign of "renting respectability" by funding Carter's pet projects and traveling with him.[76]

Even more problematic was Carter's connection with Agha Hasan Abedi, a shadowy Pakistani financier who founded the infamous Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Obtaining seed money from the ruler of Abu Dahbi and other wealthy Arabs, Abedi had founded the bank in 1972, chartering it in Luxembourg because of its easier regulations while directing it from London. Within a decade, BCCI became a world-wide financial system that at its peak in the 1980s had offices in seventy-two countries, 1.3 million depositors, and more than $20 billion in assets—at least on paper.[77] But after suffering a massive heart attack in 1988, Abedi sold his interest in the bank and retired to Pakistan, where he died in 1995. In 1988, the bank, two subsidiaries, and nearly a hundred employees were indicted in Florida for knowingly laundering drug money. Three years later, in a partial plea bargain, the two subsidiaries pleaded guilty. The bank collapsed as BCCI was found guilty in several countries for violating exchange controls and was accused of extensive fraud, financing arms deals, laundering drug money, and engaging in a variety of other criminal activities. Prosecutors and investigators declared that BCCI's philanthropy was a barely disguised system of bribery in which depositors' money was used to win favor with politicians around the world.[78]

[74] Bob Deans, "Sasakawa: From Militarist to High-Profile Philanthropist," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 14 April 1991; see also Elizabeth Kurylo, "Sasakawa, Philanthropist Who Aided Carter, King Centers, Dies in Japan," ibid., 21 July 1995; Kevin Rafferty, "Ryoichi Sasakawa: Tainted History of a Rich Good Guy," Manchester *Guardian*, 20 July 1995, 13; "Ryoichi Sasakawa, 96, Rightist And Gambling Figure in Japan," *New York Times*, 20 July 1995.

[75] Baily, "Jimmy Carter Adds a New Dimension to Philanthropy," 10.

[76] Kurylo, "Carter Donors: Questionable Givers?" Carter fundraiser James Brasher said the Center had no reservations about accepting contributions from Sasakawa, who had donated billions to the United Nations and dozens of universities and charities around the world. Ibid.

[77] "Agha H. Abedi Dies in Pakistan, Aged 74," *London Times*, 6 August 1995, 1; "BCCI Founder Dies," ibid., 8 August 1995, 17, 40; obituary, Manchester *Guardian*, 7 August 1995, 1, 8.

[78] "Caught in the Money-Laundering Wringer," *U.S. News & World Report*, 24 October 1988, 13–14; J. Beaty and S. C. Gwynne, "The Dirtiest Bank of All," *Time*, 29 July 1991, cover, 42–47; S. C. Gwynne,

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Abedi and Sasakawa were the two largest donors to the Carter Center. Carter had met Abedi through Georgia banker, Bert Lance, Carter's friend and onetime federal budget chief; he met Sasakawa through a mutual friend, D.Wayne Smith, Georgia founder of the Friendship Force Foundation. Abedi and his bank gave between $500,000 and $800,000 toward the construction of the Carter Center. Both Abedi and Sasakawa came to Georgia to visit the Center, and Carter named them co-chairs of Global 2000, the Third World development project. Through 1989, they and their organizations were the primary donors to Global 2000, giving between them nearly $20 million.[79]

The public learned of the size and source of these donations in the late 1980s, when the scandal began to break around Abedi's Bank of Credit and Commerce International. It was also learned that Carter had used BCCI's planes on travels to Africa and Asia to monitor Global 2000 projects. At first, Carter defended Abedi and blamed the bank's problems on "a few unsavory characters." Later he refused to discuss BCCI's problems.[80] According to officials at the Carter Center, Abedi's contributions had been straight, no-strings attached donations. There was no suggestion that Carter had performed any direct services for BCCI,[81] but the former president had been unwise or at least naïve in sharing public appearances with Abedi, lending the prestige of a former president to the high-flying global entrepreneur.[82] Carter's connection with Abedi and Sasakawa failed to tarnish his image, however; there was no press criticism comparable to that Ford and Reagan received for accepting sizable retainers or speaking fees. Although Global 2000 had received the bulk of its funds from Sasakawa and Abedi in the 1980s, the Carter Center's other programs became more widely funded. Not surprisingly, the larger donors included several Atlanta-based corporations and individuals, among them Coca-Cola, the Woodruff Foundation, Delta Air Lines, and Anne Cox Chambers, publisher of the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*.[83] Increasingly in the 1990s, the Carter Center turned to direct-mail solicitation to augment specific corporate, government, or foundation grants. By mid-decade, direct mail generated more than 100,000 donors, reflecting a grassroots commitment to Carter's pro-

"Con Men of the Year: Masters of Deceit," ibid., 6 January 1992, 42; Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., "Agha Hasan Abedi Dies at 74, In the Shadow of a Vast Fraud," *New York Times*, 7 August 1995.

[79] Kurylo, "Carter Donors: Questionable Givers?" G. Morgenson, "Is Bert Lance Back?" *Forbes*, 13 June 1988, 12.

[80] Elizabeth Kurylo, "Carter Defends Bank Named in Drug Case," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 3 February 1990; Kurylo, "Carter Center: 'No Strings Attached' to Gifts," ibid. 14 April 1991.

[81] Ronald Smothers, "Seized Bank Helped Atlanta's Ex-Mayor and Carter Charities," *New York Times*, 15 July 1991.

[82] The *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, a champion of the Carter Center, warned that "BCCI has used its connection with Mr. Carter to promote itself around the world," and urged the former president to "sever the connection with all deliberate speed." Editorial, "This Charity Is At Too Expensive a Price," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 11 February 1990. The BCCI's final pledge of $2.5 million to the Center was made up by the United Arab Emirates, "Global 2000 Inc.," ibid., 14 April 1991.

[83] Kurlyo, "Carter Center: 'No Strings Attached' to Gifts."

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grams and contributing a substantial portion of the general operating revenues of the Carter Center.[84]

Money is no longer a problem, and the Carter Center is now a permanent institution. Between 1990 and 1994, the Center raised $60 million—half for endowment and half for programs. That is what was required by Emory before the trustees would accept the Center as a permanent entity of the university. In 1994, after a decade as an experiment, the two institutions signed an agreement under which the separately chartered, independently-governed Carter Center became a permanent part of Emory University.[85] The merger provided the Center with a viability even after Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter are no longer involved in its operations.

VI

Seventeen years after leaving office, two decades after his inauguration as president, Jimmy Carter is widely hailed as a model ex-president. Building on themes and achievements in his presidency, Carter focused on mediating conflicts, encouraging democracy and human rights, public-private efforts to aid the poor and to increase crop yields and public health in the Third World. Despite sometimes cloying self-righteousness, Carter is able to articulate and often exemplify some of the nation's highest ideals and yearnings for peace, justice, and universal betterment.

A skillful technocrat and fundraiser, Carter has become, more surprisingly, a successful media manager. Building on his moral authority and his obvious empathy (albeit with a paternalistic cast) for the poor and oppressed, the ex-president brings his mediational, managerial, and promotional skills to carefully chosen issues. He articulates a vision and mobilizes public support; through his connections, he builds coalitions of groups and agencies for particular projects. As his 1980 defeat fades into history, his successes as an ex-president increase his stature and future ability. Under the right circumstances, he can command international media attention. He has raised issues to the public agenda, and sometimes—as in Panama, Nicaragua, North Korea, and Haiti—affected public policy.

In the process, Jimmy Carter has redefined the ex-presidency and established new dimensions of public service for former presidents. He is doing it personally. What has been less recognized, he is doing it institutionally. Direct federal funding for the Office of the Former President is only a small, if nevertheless important core of his institutional base. Unwilling to use it to retire in comfort, this compulsive public servant, this born-again Baptist from Georgia and the White House has built upon the public provisions for ex-presidents and

[84] The Carter Center, *1995 Annual Report*, 2.

[85] Elizabeth Kurylo, "Joining Forces: Emory to Absorb Carter Center," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 30 August 1994.

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through massive public-private fundraising and coordinated efforts made the Carter Center one of the most active and prestigious nongovernmental organizations in the world today.

Among ex-presidents of the United States, only Carter has created such a public policy institute, one that combines financial resources, expertise, and the Carters' leadership to play an important public service role. It offers a new model available for former presidents—a Public Policy Ex-Presidency.

It is not perhaps coincidental that Bill Clinton, who will be only 54-years-old when he becomes the next ex-president in 2001, announced at the beginning of his second term that he would create a center for the study of policy in connection with the William Clinton Presidential Library, which will be linked to the University of Arkansas at Little Rock.[86] It remains to be seen whether the Clintons will try to emulate the Carters, and a Clinton Center will become part of the new Public Policy Ex-Presidency.[87]

[86] James Bennet, "Clinton Picks Little Rock for His Library," *New York Times*, 13 February 1997.

[87] For speculation, see Mimi Swartz, "The Next Ex-Presidency: Clinton's Afterlife," *New Yorker*, 20 and 27 October 1997, 100–112.

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

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Racism, Drug Policy, and AIDS

CATHY LISA SCHNEIDER

By 1995, over half a million people in the United States had been diagnosed with AIDS. Approximately 40,000 to 80,000 become infected each year. Women and racial minorities are the most rapidly growing proportions of these new AIDS cases. In 1992, blacks formed only 12 percent of the U.S. population, but 30 percent of AIDS cases. Latinos were 9 percent of the population, but 17 percent of AIDS cases. Latinos and blacks together accounted for 46 percent of AIDS cases and 54 percent of deaths from AIDS.[1] By 1993, over two-thirds of HIV infected youth were black or Latino.[2] Two years later the estimated HIV seroprevalence of blacks was almost five times that of whites, and by 1997 blacks made up 43 percent of all AIDS cases.[3]

Black and Latino women and children in particular have been affected. AIDS is the number one killer of minority children. In 1992, 52 percent of women with AIDS were black, and 75 percent were either black or Latina. HIV in the black community was 177 percent higher for males and 796 percent higher for females than in the white community. The rate of increase of HIV was and continues to be more than double in the black community.[4] By 1996, black women were fifteen times more likely to test positive for HIV than white women.[5] Assuming the trend continues, the virus will be increasingly concen-

[1] National Commission on AIDS, *The Challenge of HIV/AIDS in Communities of Color* (Washington, DC: National Commission on Aids, December 1992), 4.

[2] Reuters, "AIDS Virus Infecting Fewer Young White Men," *New York Times*, 17 June 1998. Article cites a National Cancer Institute report that calculates that between 1988 and 1993 HIV rates declined 50 percent among young white men and increased 60 percent among young black women.

[3] Dawn Day, *Health Emergency 1997* (Princeton: Dogwood Center, 1997), 22. See also Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report for Cases through December 1997," 1998.

[4] National Commission on AIDS, *Challenge of HIV/AIDS*, 4.

[5] Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "U.S. Says AIDS Cases Fell in 1996, Ending 16 Year Rise," *New York Times*, 19 September 1997.

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trated among people of color. Combined with the growing disparity in AIDS treatment, the impact of AIDS on inner city black and Latino communities will approach a holocaust.[6] Twelve percent of African Americans, 19 percent of Latinos, and 33 percent of whites receive the new three-drug therapy, while 54 percent of blacks and 38 percent of Latinos do not receive any drug therapy at all.

What is the relationship between race and AIDS, and why is the disease so concentrated in communities of color? Among the most frequently given interpretations are those that attribute the spread of AIDS to an "underclass" disposed to drug use, promiscuity, and crime. Since almost 50 percent of new AIDS cases occur among drug users, and the rest are concentrated among those who engage in unprotected sex, many argue that underclass culture predisposes blacks and Latinos to higher rates of AIDS. This article challenges such characterizations of inner city residents as pathological and/or criminally disposed. Instead, it argues that the disproportion and unequal concentration of arrest rates and HIV/AIDS rates among blacks and Latinos can be accounted for by the racial bias in the war against drugs.

James Q. Wilson, for instance, claims that a combination of biological and cultural factors predisposes inner city blacks and Latinos toward drug use. In the 1960s, he insists, the United States became two societies, "one affluent and worried, the other pathological and predatory."[7] "A sizable proportion of all inner city blacks and Hispanics who reached the age of 18 became addicted. . . . Drugs and crime do not follow each other in some neat sequence; rather both—as well as many other social pathologies—arise from deeply rooted causes, some symptoms of which appear in early childhood."[8] AIDS, he concludes, is a consequence of such predatory and criminal behavior. What needs to be done, "is basic research . . . the presence or absence of *biological markers* that will help us identify the individuals most at risk for addictive behavior and the early childhood and familial processes that increase the likelihood of young people allowing their impulsiveness . . . lead them into self-destructive behavior."[9]

An alternate version of this argument is a structural one in which poverty and unemployment set the stage for drug use and AIDS. William Julius Wilson argues that changes in the job market have created a black urban underclass predisposed to criminality and drug use: "One of the legacies of historic discrimination is the presence of a large black underclass in the central cities. Blacks constituted approximately 23 percent of the population of central cities

[6] Lynda Richardson, "Whites Have More Effective New AIDS Drugs, Survey Shows," *New York Times*, 27 January 1997.

[7] James Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 14.

[8] James Q. Wilson, "Drugs and Crime" in Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, eds., *Drugs and Crime* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 530.

[9] Ibid., 543. (Emphasis added.)

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in 1983, but were 43 percent of the poor in these cities."[10] The distance of such neighborhoods from mainstream institutions or suitable role models had made their "truly disadvantaged" residents vulnerable to a range of social pathologies.

In a similar vein, Robert Fullilove argues, "Blacks and Latinos are increasingly concentrated in areas that are becoming poorer, and with that concentration has come an increase, not just in HIV infection, but a whole host of other serious social problems ranging from crime to just about anything you can describe."[11] This line of reasoning has led the National Commission on AIDS to conclude that "while HIV is transmitted by individual behavior, we can infer that social and economic factors have a powerful influence on how individuals behave."[12]

There is ample evidence that blacks and Latinos have suffered from deteriorating social conditions. In 1985, for instance, 50 percent of all black men were chronically unemployed, and unemployment rates among black youth were 45 percent higher than that for whites. Forty-five percent of all black children lived in poverty. In 1989, black median income was 54 percent that of whites, and 9.7 million blacks lived in poverty. Twelve percent earned less than $5,000 annually.[13] By 1992, the unemployment level for both blacks and Latinos was twice that for whites, and poverty among Latinos had surpassed that among blacks. The gap between the wealthiest 20 percent of families and the poorest 20 percent continued to grow between 1986 and 1996.[14] In 1996, the ratio of the average income of the top 20 percent to the average income of the bottom 20 percent in New York City was 19.5, and in Washington, D.C. the ratio was 28.2.[15]

In New York City, for example, between 1989 and 1996, per capita household income for Dominicans dropped by 22.9 percent, per capita income of other Latinos dropped by 13.2 percent, and per capita income of blacks dropped by 19.4 percent, while the average per capita income of whites increased by 4.6 percent.[16] Given the dramatic rise in poverty among blacks and Latinos, it is hardly surprising that the illegal narcotics industry became a major employer and "illegal drug trafficking the major economic activity in many Black and Latino neighborhoods."[17]

[10] William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 33.

[11] Robert Fullilove, "Testimony before the National Commission on AIDS," Washington, DC, 17 January 1991: 61–65; see also National Commission on AIDS, *Challenge of HIV/AIDS*, 11.

[12] Ibid., 8.

[13] Clarence Lusane, *Pipe Dream Blues: Racism and the War on Drugs* (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 48.

[14] Richard Pérez-Peña, "Income Gap Between the Rich and Poor in New York Is the Nation's Largest," *New York Times*, 17 December 1997.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Celia W. Dugger, "Study Shows Dominicans Sink Deeper into Poverty: In New York City Their Hopes Are Elusive," *New York Times*, 10 November 1997.

[17] Lusane, *Pipe Dreams*, 49.

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The growth of drug trafficking in inner city neighborhoods led sociologists such as Eliot Currie to conclude that minority neighborhoods had developed not only an alternate economy but an alternate sense of values and identity. Youth as young as twelve, he argued, "are driven to selling drugs not by their own lack of employment (given their age) but because they live in places where economic opportunities are so constricted that drug use and drug dealing has become an established alternate source of income and identity."[18] Similarly, Michael Tonry has more recently observed: "the concentration of urban poverty, labor force participation, illegitimate births, single parent households and general deterioration of neighborhoods, was getting worse in the inner city in the late 1980s. Increased drug abuse and drug related crimes were not unexpected correlates and consequences."[19]

While there is substantial evidence linking neighborhood and unemployment rates in neighborhoods to drug overdoses, emergency room drug cases, and AIDS,[20] there is surprisingly little evidence that increasing unemployment and poverty have directly promoted either increased drug use or AIDS among blacks and Latinos. Even at the height of the crack epidemic, which coincided with a period of extremely high unemployment and poverty among blacks and Latinos, National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) surveys showed an almost even spread of drug use among racial categories (approximately 8.6 percent of blacks, 6.2 percent of Latinos, and 6.6 percent of whites consumed illicit drugs), with the bulk of drug users (over 77 percent) being white.[21] If the link between AIDS and race was simply behavior or drug use, less than 20 percent of those who contracted AIDS through needles or through partners who use drugs would have been black or Latino. Yet, even in 1989, blacks and Latinos made up 37 percent of those who contracted AIDS through needles and 48 percent of those who contracted AIDS through those who use drugs.[22]

[18] Eliot Currie, *Reckoning: Drugs, Cities and the American Future*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 90.

[19] Michael Tonry, *Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Punishment in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 103.

[20] Roderick Wallace, "Urban Desertification, Public Health, and Public Order: Planned Shrinkage, Violent Death, Substance Abuse and AIDS in the Bronx," *Social Science and Medicine* 31 (July 1990): 801–813; see also Currie, *Reckoning*; Lusane, *Pipe Dream Blues*; National Commission on AIDS, *Challenge of HIV/AIDS*.

[21] National Institute on Drug Abuse, *National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Population Estimates 1990*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, [GPO], 1991); see also Lusane, *Pipe Dreams*, 50.

[22] Lusane, *Pipe Dream Blues*, 50. Tonry, *Malign Neglect*, argues that NIDA data is not entirely reliable and undercounts the young and mobile. He prefers the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) data and Drug Use Forecasting Program (DUF) data. The first shows that most emergency room admissions are black. The second shows that most felons that are black test positively for drugs (80 percent of those arrested in Manhattan). What the DAWN and DUF data measure, I argue, is not minority drug use, but minority drug-related arrests and minority drug-related emergencies. Both are much higher among black and Latino drug users than among white drug users.

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More significantly, recent studies show wide gaps in HIV rates between black and Latino injection drug users and white injection drug users.[23] John Watters's study of street injection drug users in East Palo Alto, for instance, found the rate of HIV among black injection drug users to be double that among white injection drug users, 41 to 23 percent.[24] Alex Kral's study of more than 6,000 injection drug users in sixteen cities found an even greater disparity.[25] Nationwide, he found 43 percent of Caribbean Hispanic injection drug users testing positively for HIV, and 12.5 percent of African Americans testing positive compared to only 2.8 percent of white injection drug users and 2.4 percent of other Latinos.[26] Dawn Day, in her analysis of Census Bureau and CDC (Center for Disease Control) data, found that among injection drug users African Americans were four times as likely to contract AIDS as whites, and Latinos were one and one-half times more likely.[27]

The racial bias in AIDS rates is not the result of an underclass culture that induces blacks and Latinos to use drugs and/or engage in unprotected sex. As Eva Bertram, Kenneth Sharpe, Morris Blachman, and Peter Andreas persuasively argue, the high concentration of arrest rates, homicides, drug overdose deaths, and AIDS among blacks and Latinos is not "simply a reflection of urban poverty in the United States. Nor is it the by-product of decades of government neglect, although grossly inadequate social policies have set the stage for current conditions. A more proximate and insidious catalyst is the logic of the drug-war strategy."[28] Blacks and Caribbean Latinos have higher rates of AIDS because they live in neighborhoods where the drug war has made both injection drug use and unprotected sex extremely risky.

The racial bias in both drug legislation and law enforcement has led to an unusually high incidence of AIDS in neighborhoods targeted by police. First,

[23] S. R. Friedman, J. L. Southeran, A. Abdul-Quadar, et al., "The AIDS Epidemic among Blacks and Hispanics," *Millbank Quarterly* 65 (Suppl 2, 1987): 455–459; D. M. Novick, H. L. Trigg, D. C. Des Jarlais, S. R. Friedman, D. Vlahov, and M. J. Kreek, "Cocaine Injection and Ethnicity in Parenteral Drug Users during the Early Years of the HIV Epidemic in New York City," *Journal of Medical Virology* 29 (November 1989): 181–185; R. J. Battjes, R. W. Pickens, H. W. Haverlos, and Z. Sloboda, "HIV Risk Factors among Injecting Drug Users in Five U.S. Cities," *AIDS* 8 (May 1994): 681–687; J. K. Watters and D. K. Lewis, "HIV Infection, Race and Drug Treatment History [letter]," *AIDS* 4 (July 1990): 697; Alex H. Kral, Ricky N. Bluthenthal, Robert E. Booth, and John K. Watters, "HIV Seroprevalence among Street-recruited Injection Drug and Crack Cocaine Users in 16 U.S. Municipalities," *American Journal of Public Health* (January 1998): 108–113; Ricky N. Bluthenthal, Alex H. Kral, Jennifer Lorvick, and John K. Watters, "Impact of Law Enforcement on Syringe Exchange Programs: A Look at Oakland and San Francisco," *Medical Anthropology* 18 (December 1997): 61–83.

[24] Watters et al., "HIV Infection, Race and Drug Treatment History [letter]."

[25] Alex H. Kral, Ricky N. Bluthenthal, Robert E. Booth, and John K. Watters, "HIV Seroprevalence among Street-recruited Injection Drug and Crack Cocaine Users in 16 U.S. Municipalities," *American Journal of Public Health* 88 (January 1998): 108–113.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Day, *Health Emergency*, I. Data do not separate Caribbean Latinos from other Latinos.

[28] Eva Bertram, Morris J. Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas, *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 37.

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intense police surveillance, combined with laws against possession of drug paraphernalia, has made the possession of clean syringes in minority neighborhoods extremely risky. Fear of arrest compels injection drug users to rely on syringes borrowed at the moment of injection. Second, persistent police harassment has promoted the spread of underground shooting galleries. These are the most risky sites of HIV transmission, because of both sharing of infected syringes and sex for drugs exchanges. Third, differential arrest rates have exposed black and Latino males to unsafe drugs and sex in prison. Fourth, the frequency of shared syringes, shooting galleries, and unsafe sex and drugs in prison has increased the rate of HIV infection among black and Latino males and made it more likely that an adult "who borrows a needle from a friend is much more likely to borrow an infected needle than is the young white adult who borrows a needle from another white."[29] Fifth, the high rate of HIV among black and Latino males has exposed women and their offspring who live in those neighborhoods to a much higher risk of infection from unprotected sex.

This article rejects arguments that blame the concentration of AIDS in black and Latino communities on underclass behavior such as drug use or promiscuity. Theories that focus on such risky behavior cannot explain why we do not see equally high rates of AIDS among white drug users and sexually active white women. AIDS rates among white injection drug users and their sexual partners are much lower than among black and Latino injection drug users and their partners because drug use is treated as a public health problem when the drug user is white. White drug users are more likely to be sent to treatment centers than jail. They are not forced to use infected syringes or arrested for carrying clean ones. White women are unlikely to get AIDS when they have unprotected sex, since they are more likely to have sexual relations with HIV negative men. Witness the low rate of HIV, but high rate of Herpes and other STDs (sexually transmitted diseases) among white women. Over 50 percent of AIDS cases among blacks and Latinos and 90 percent of AIDS cases among black and Latina women (and consequently black and Latino children) have their origin in an infected syringe.[30]

Racism and the Drug War

The high rate of drug arrests, overdose deaths, and AIDS among black and Latino drug users in comparison to white drug users is inexplicable without a serious look at the role of race in the legislative process and the use of racial

[29] Day, *Health Emergency*, 8.

[30] Dawn Day, unpublished analysis of 1996 CDC data, sent at my request, January 1998; see also Center for Disease Control and Prevention, "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report for Cases through December 1995," 1996. Day's analysis of CDC data combines data on women who get AIDS from injection drug use and women who get AIDS from partners who use drugs. It also assumes that cases of unknown origin fall roughly along the same lines as cases of known origin.

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categories in deciding both penalties and law enforcement strategies. On the one hand, as Eva Bertram et al. argue, "when a war against supply and users collides with the social conditions of the inner cities it will inevitably end up being a war against the poor and minorities."[31]

> Drug-enforcement policies not only combine with inner-city conditions to create a ready pool of street-level dealers but also to ensure that visible retail drug markets remain concentrated in these neighborhoods. . . . This creates a pattern in which the wholesale drug industry—the big-time dealers—are located outside poor urban neighborhoods, while these neighborhoods become the distribution centers of the less profitable retail market. . . . Dire social conditions are thus compounded by a drug war that helps to channel the retail trade into poor and minority neighborhoods. Add to this mix a third factor—thousands of law enforcement officials and prosecutors who are desperately attempting to implement a flawed strategy against suppliers and users—and the formula for a grossly discriminatory drug war is complete. These conditions guarantee that poor and minority residents will be netted by the drug-enforcement system in highly disproportionate numbers. Racial discrimination need not be the intent of a law-enforcement official or policy maker, but it will be the effect."[32]

As former New York City Policy Commissioner Lee Brown put it, "It's easier for police to make an arrest when you have people selling drugs on the street corner than those who are in the suburbs or office buildings. The end result is that more blacks are arrested than whites because of the relative ease in making those arrests."[33]

On the other hand, as a recent *Washington Post* article observed, most drug dealing still takes place in white suburban neighborhoods, and most drug dealers are white students. These white student dealers are rarely prosecuted, and almost none face jail time.[34] Black and Latino inner-city neighborhoods, themselves a creation of racially biased housing policies, are particularly vulnerable to drug trafficking. Racially segregated labor markets, a racially segregated drug industry, and a racially biased drug war all compound this effect. But drug legislation also excessively penalizes those who possess drugs marketed in minority neighborhoods, and law enforcement agencies target almost exclusively residents of minority neighborhoods. (See Table 1.)

As Michael Tonry argues:

> the police emphasis on disorganized minority neighborhoods produces racial proportions in arrests that do not mirror racial proportions in drug use. . . . In 1990, for example, a year in which 41 percent of drug arrestees were black, NIDA's national household survey on drug abuse indicated that only 10 percent of blacks reported

[31] Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics*, 37.

[32] Ibid., 41.

[33] Cited by Sam Meddis, "No 'Conspiracy' in Black Drug Arrests," *USA Today*, 26 July 1993.

[34] Pierre Thomas, and Patricia Davis, "Young Dealers Slip Through the Loopholes: Drug Laws, Parental Denial Leave Teens Few Deterrents," *Washington Post*, 15 December 1997.

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> they had ever used cocaine (compared with 11.7 percent of whites and 11.5 percent of Hispanics), 1.7 percent reported ever using heroin (compared to .7 percent whites and 1.2 percent Hispanics). . . . Drug arrests are a principal reason that the proportions of blacks in prison and more generally under criminal justice system control have risen rapidly in recent years to extraordinary levels.[35]

In contrast, police rarely arrest white drug users or even white dealers. They do not conduct sweeps of white neighborhoods, white schools, or white universities. And judges rarely condemn white drug users or drug dealers to prison.

Recent work on the construction of race and its use in policy making and social control is more useful in accounting for such disparity.[36] Charles Tilly, for instance, observes, that governments, police, and other social control agencies solve pressing organizational problems by means of categorical distinction: the matching of "interior categories" such as crimes and sentences to "exterior categories" such as race, gender, or ethnicity.[37] Such categorical distinctions, argues Tilly, "gain strength and operate at lower cost when matched with widely available paired and unequal categories. . . . When many organizations adopt the same categorical distinctions, those distinctions become more pervasive and decisive in social life in general."[38] Drug policy is one such example. Agencies involved in the implementation of drug policy link interior categories such as classifications of drugs, penalties attached to classified drugs, and the communities where drugs are targeted to the exterior category of race.

Race and Drug Prohibition

Before 1914, the sale, manufacture, possession, and use of drugs were legal under federal law. Drug prohibition was carried out in stages as particular drugs were linked to particular racial and ethnic groups. The first drug declared illegal, for instance, was opium, which was part, Congress argued, of "an alleged Chinese effort to undermine American society."[39] Later blacks were identified with cocaine addiction, and cocaine possession was criminalized, because "the South feared that [black] cocaine users might become oblivious of their prescribed bounds and attack white society."[40] In his official report to Congress, Hamilton Wright argued that "it has been authoritatively stated that cocaine

[35] Tonry, *Malign Neglect*, 103–110.

[36] Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley: University of California, 1998); Desmond King, *Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the U.S. Federal Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Lusane, *Pipe Dream Blues*; Adolph Reed, Jr., "The 'Black Revolution' and the Reconstitution of Domination" in Adolph Reed, Jr., ed., *Race, Politics, and Culture: Critical Essays on the Radicalism of the 1960s* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).

[37] Tilly, *Durable Inequality*, 8.

[38] Ibid., 9.

[39] Eric E. Sterling, "The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition, Politics and Reform," *Villanova Law Review* 40 (January 1995): 392; see also David F. Musto, MD, *The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 254.

[40] Sterling, "Sentencing Boomerang," 392; see also Musto, *American Disease*, 254.

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TABLE 1

Drug Arrests (per 100,000) By Race

	Arrests for all drug crimes	*Arrests for sales*	*Arrests for possession*
Blacks	1,600	640	900
Whites	400	120	270

Source: Sam Meddis, "More White Users, Black Arrests," *USA Today*, 23 July 1993; Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion," 101.

is often the direct incentive to the crime of rape by the [African Americans] of the South and other sections of the country."[41]

Later, Congress prohibited opium use by native Filipinos, and still later criminalized marijuana possession, which they claimed was used by "Mexican immigrants as a drug of entertainment . . . and as a source of crime and deviant behavior."[42] The police used these new laws to repress these racial and ethnic minorities. "Simultaneous to the rise in concern over narcotics use," Eric Sterling observes, was a rise in persecution of those groups associated with narcotics use."[43] The historian David Musto notes:

> The most passionate support for legal prohibition of narcotics has been associated with *fear of a given drug's effect on a specific minority. Certain drugs were dreaded because they seemed to undermine essential social restrictions which kept these groups under control*: cocaine was supposed to enable blacks to withstand bullets which would kill normal persons and to stimulate sexual assault. Fear that smoking opium facilitated sexual contact between Chinese and white Americans was also a factor in its total prohibition. Chicanos in the Southwest were believed to be incited to violence by smoking marijuana. . . . *In each instance, use of a particular drug was attributed to an identifiable and threatening minority group.*[44]

We see a similar pattern in the more recent legislation and law enforcement strategy aimed at controlling the distribution and use of crack cocaine. In 1984, crack emerged as a low-cost way to market cocaine in low-income communities. Since 1970, cocaine had been smoked through free basing. The creation of crack allowed smokable cocaine to be packaged and marketed in small enough quantities to be affordable to low-income drug users. While the physical effects of crack were no different from those of free base—an intense short-lived cocaine high—crack allowed inner city entrepreneurs to buy and sell small quantities of the drug. As one study, published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* (JAMA) observed, "abuse liability for these two routes of [cocaine] administration could not be differentiated."[45] But, unlike cocaine or her-

[41] Sterling, "Sentencing Boomerang," 394; see also Musto, *American Disease*, 43–44.

[42] Sterling, "Sentencing Boomerang," 395; see also Musto, *American Disease*, 219–220.

[43] Sterling, "Sentencing Boomerang," 392.

[44] Musto, *American Disease*, 245. (Emphasis added.)

[45] Dorothy K. Hatsukami and Marian W. Fishman, "Crack Cocaine and Cocaine Hydrochloride: Are the Differences Myth or Reality?" *JAMA* 276 (20 November 1996): 1582.

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oin, which were run by large criminal syndicates, crack offered an opportunity for unemployed youth to start their own businesses and make it in the lucrative drug trade. Although only a small percentage of the people who had used cocaine used crack, mainly "the poorest most marginalized people in American society,"[46] it was not long before competition for control of the trade sparked a rapid rise in homicide rates in inner-city communities.

The rise in homicide rates, coupled with an explosion of exaggerated media stories on black crack addicts during an electoral year, produced what Craig Reinerman and Harry Levine call the drug scare of 1986–1990.

> Dramatic footage of Black and Latino men being carted off in chains, or of police breaking down crack house doors, became a near nightly news event. In July 1986 alone, the three major TV Networks offered 74 evening news segments on drugs, half of these about crack. . . . In this conservative ideological environment, supporting the drug war became extremely useful politically for Democrats as well as Republicans. The drug war was not effective or wise policy, but politicians promoted it nonetheless because, among other reasons, it provided a convenient explanation—a scape goat—for enduring and ever growing urban poverty.[47]

Crack was blamed for "threatening the central institutions of American life: families, communities, schools, businesses, law enforcement, and even national security" and for devastating the urban landscape.[48] During this period Senator Robert Dole proposed a bill that would increase the penalty for crack possession by twenty times. Not to be outdone, the Democrats countered by raising the penalty fifty times. The Republicans then demanded a penalty 100 times higher, so that each gram of crack would carry the same penalty as 100 grams of powder cocaine.[49] The Democrats went along, and the measure passed. Since 1986, crack has carried 100 times the penalty as the active substance cocaine. Five hundred grams of cocaine costs about $32,000–$50,000 and nets 5,000 doses; five grams of crack costs about $235–$750 and nets about ten to twenty doses. Yet possession of five grams of crack carries the same penalty as 500 grams of cocaine, a five-year mandatory minimum. Fifty grams of crack, or 5,000 grams of cocaine result in a fifteen-year minimum sentence.

Besides this dramatic increase in penalties, the new law mandated that possession of small amounts of crack be considered distribution rather than possession. This gave the police a large incentive to crack down on crack, the street drug, rather than the cocaine distributed by large-scale dealers. If the police arrested a cocaine distributor with 500 grams of cocaine, for instance, they would get one arrest with a five-year mandatory minimum. If they waited until it reached the inner city, where it was diluted and cooked with baking soda, the

[46] Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine, "The Crack Attack: America's Latest Drug Scare, 1986–1992" in Joel Best, ed., *Images of Issues* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), 149.

[47] Ibid., 152 and 151.

[48] Ibid.

[49] United States Sentencing Commission, *Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy: Special Report to the Congress* (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1995), 117.

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police could arrest eighty-nine crack dealers, each with 1/90 of the supply and condemn each to a five-year minimum. Thus, the same 500 grams would net either one white arrest or eighty-nine mostly black arrests. It is unsurprising that while there are three times as many users of cocaine powder, there are far more prosecutions for crack.[50]

As the report of the U.S. Sentencing Commission noted, "issues of fairness or just punishment result when relatively low-level crack retailers receive higher sentences than the wholesale-level cocaine dealer from whom the crack sellers originally purchased the powder to make the crack."[51] The report describes one case in which two defendants in a recent federal case purchased 255 grams of cocaine from their supplier. They cooked the powder to produce 88 grams of crack. Unhappy with the low quantity produced (normally it should have been 200 grams) the dealers called the supplier to complain. He agreed to replace the 88 grams of crack with 250 grams of fresh cocaine. When the defendants arrived at the supplier, they were intercepted by the police. At sentencing, the report notes: "the suppliers' guideline sentencing range (a first time offender) for selling the 266 grams of powder is 33 to 41 months' imprisonment; the range for the defendants (also first time offenders) who bought a portion of the suppliers powder and cooked it is 121 to 151 months. In addition the two "crack" defendants are subject to a mandatory minimum penalty of ten years, while the supplier who sold them the powder cocaine that enabled them to make crack is subject to no minimum penalty."[52]

In 1995 the Sentencing Commission sought to amend the sentencing guidelines and "recommended that Congress eliminate the statutory differential distinguishing crack and powder."[53] Under normal conditions, the Sentencing Commission's amendments would have gone into effect automatically. However, for the first time in the commission's history, both houses of Congress, with the support of President Clinton, vetoed the commission's recommendations.[54]

Impact of Racially Discriminatory Drug Laws on Black and Latino Arrest Rates

Easy arrests and convictions have encouraged police to look for crack almost exclusively in inner-city black and Latino communities. In 1992, for instance, 92.6 percent of those arrested for federal crack offenses were black,[55] although

[50] Ibid., viii.

[51] Ibid., 193.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Randall Kennedy, *Race, Crime and the Law* (New York: Pantheon, 1997), 381.

[54] Ibid., 381.

[55] Clarence Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion: The Continuing Significance of Race and America's Drug Crisis," *University of Chicago Law Review* (January 1994): 96.

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TABLE 2

Racial Differences in Cocaine Sentences

	Crack	*Powder*
Trafficking:	white (3%)	white (97%)
	black (54%)	black (46%)
Possession:	white (7%)	white (93%)
	black (55%)	black (45%)

Source: Richard Seltzer, *"Racial Disparities in Drug Convictions Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,"* October 1991–September 1992 (using data from the *United States vs. Christopher Maske*, 840 F Supp 151 (D DC 1993) (on file with *University of Chicago Legal Forum*); Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion," 101.

according to a 1991 Household Survey 52 percent of those reporting crack use were white, and only 38 percent were black.[56] Eighty-eight percent of federal crack cocaine distribution convictions in 1993 were black, while only 4.1 percent were white. Of the 2,100 federal prisoners serving time for crack about 92 percent are black.[57] (See Table 2.)

The mandatory minimum sentences created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 exacerbated these effects. By 1991 blacks were "21 percent more likely to receive at least the mandatory minimum terms than whites; and Hispanic offenders were 28 percent more likely."[58] Blacks were more likely to be sentenced to federal or state prisons and whites to local county jails. Blacks served longer sentences for the same crime and were less likely to find jobs on leaving prison. The elimination of parole in the federal system compounded these differences.[59]

In 1989, African Americans, representing 12–15 percent of all drug use in the United States, made up 41 percent of all arrests, up from 38 percent in 1988. Whites, who comprised 47 percent of those in state-funded treatment centers, made up less than 10 percent of those committed to prison.[60] By 1994, in at least thirty major cities, "blacks were ten times more likely to be arrested for drugs than whites."[61] Fifty percent of adults and 71 percent of all juveniles arrested on charges involving cocaine and opium derivatives were black.[62] In St. Paul, a city whose population is 94 percent white, 62 percent of those arrested on drug charges were black.[63] A survey by the University of Minnesota during the same

[56] United States Sentencing Commission, *Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy*, xi.

[57] Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion," 97.

[58] Ibid.; see also United States Sentencing Commission, *Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy*.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Lusane, *Pipe Dream Blues*, 45.

[61] Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion," 99; see also Sam Meddis, "More White Users, Black Arrests," *USA Today*, 23 July 1993.

[62] Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion," 99; see also Meddis, "No Conspiracy in Black Arrests," *USA Today*, 26 July 1993.

[63] Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics*, 42; see also Sam Meddis, "In Twin Cities: A Tale of Two Standards," *USA Today*, 26 July 1993.

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period found that "white youths were using cocaine at almost twice the rate that blacks were."[64] In the northern district of Georgia, 99 percent of those charged with crack cocaine offenses in 1990 were black.[65] In Livonia, Michigan the arrest ratio of blacks to whites for drug charges is 43 to 1, in Madison, Wisconsin it is 21 to 1, in Alexandria, Virginia it is 18 to 1.[66]

The impact of this racially discriminatory policy in Washington, DC, the nation's capital, has been calamitous. On any given day, between 42 and 50 percent of black men between the ages of 18 and 35 are in prison, out on bond, parole, or sought by police.[67] Eighty percent have been criminally processed at some time in their lives. Only 6 percent of whites are in the same situation.[68] Since street-level drug dealers are easier to find and arrest then big-time wholesalers or suburban users and since the likelihood of convictions and mandatory sentences are much higher, there has also been a tendency to concentrate on neighborhood raids, leading to mass neighborhood arrests. One district neighborhood sweep, for instance, netted 4,800 arrests, 4,300 of whom were charged with misdemeanors.[69]

While the official justification for the high penalty given for possession of crack was its association with violence, the purely statistical correlation between crack use and violence unfairly penalizes nonviolent crack users and doubly penalizes crack users convicted for violent crimes. Less than 25 percent of those arrested for crack possessed a weapon, and 45 percent had never committed any other crime. As Steven Belenko, explained, when interviewed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission: "The levels of violence and crime associated with crack appear to reflect parallel and other interactive forces that are related to the relative immaturity and volatility of the crack markets, the ages and types of persons initially attracted to crack distribution, the increasing social and economic disorganization of the nation's inner cities beginning in the 1980s and the mounting proliferation of more powerful guns, as well as the spread of cheaper powder cocaine during the same period of time."[70]

Similarly, Jerome Skolnick notes, "crack is simply processed cocaine. In fact the people who are probably the most violent are the people dealing in kilos because that is where the money is. A lot of dealers . . . don't use crack. They sell it. They're business people and they are dealing in powder cocaine. So the distinction is not a sensible distinction."[71] Instead of increasing the pen-

[64] Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion," 99; see also Meddis "In Twin Cities."

[65] Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion," 100.

[66] Ibid., 99; see also Meddis, "In Twin Cities."

[67] Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics*, 39, figure is 42 percent of all black males. Tim Russert, on *Face the Nation*, 12 October 1997, cited a more recent study which estimates that over 50 percent of all black males in Washington, DC, are enmeshed in the criminal justice system.

[68] Lusane, *Pipe Dream Blues*, 44.

[69] Ibid., 46.

[70] United States Sentencing Commission, *Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy*, 202.

[71] Ibid., 203.

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alty for violence, the mandatory minimum sentences for drug possession have increased the percentage of prison cells used to house nonviolent drug offenders, forcing the early release of the most violent criminals.

Between 1980 and 1990, for example, the average sentences for robbery, rape, and kidnaping fell; while average drug sentences almost doubled. The proportion of persons imprisoned for drug offenses increased while those imprisoned for violent crimes decreased. Federal drug offenders sentenced to incarceration, for instance, shot up 262 percent between 1980 and 1989, from 3,675 to 13,306. By 1993, "the total number of drug offenders sentenced to incarceration was 18,698, almost 50 percent higher."[72] Drug offenders as a percentage of inmates in federal prisons increased from 25 percent in 1980 to 61 percent in 1993.[73] Only 17 percent of federal prisoners the same year were convicted of violent offenses.[74]

"Mandatory sentences," concludes a report from the Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy, "have resulted in greater use of court resources in responding to low level drug offenders at the expense of higher level offenders."[75] The consequence of this, as Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins note, is that "the incentive to avoid killing is reduced as the severity of the nonlethal form of the crime is increased because the gap between the two punishments will be diminished. . . . The paradox of crime wars is that the largest increases in punishment resources occur in reaction to offenses of lesser seriousness, those on the margin between prison and nonprison sanctions."[76]

By 1993, over one million people (including those sentenced to state and local prisons) had been arrested for drug abuse violations. Seventy-five percent had been arrested for simple possession, over half of whom were black or Latino.[77] "Drug commitments of nonwhite males rose by 1,613 percent during the decade [1980s]; white males by 477 percent."[78]

The Impact of a Racially Biased Drug War on AIDS

The consequences of this racially discriminatory war have been devastating. First, it has increased profits for those selling drugs. Since the supply of coca vastly outweighs its demand (about 14 percent of the world's coca supply

[72] Sterling, "The Sentencing Boomerang," 385.

[73] Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics*, 52.

[74] Ibid.; see also U.S. Department of Justice, "Bureau of Justice Statistics: Criminal Offender's Statistics," (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), 1.

[75] Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy, *Evaluating Mandatory Minimum Sentences*, 6 October 1993; see also Lusane, "In Perpetual Motion," 97.

[76] Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, *Crime is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in America* (New York: Oxford, 1997), 181.

[77] Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics*, 39.

[78] Tonry, *Malign Neglect*, 115.

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reaches the U.S. market[79]) under normal conditions all forms of cocaine would be cheap commodities, and prices would soon dip below profitable levels. The $140 million spent on interdiction efforts reduces the supply and makes drug selling profitable.[80] High profits and successful law enforcement in some neighborhoods increase prices and competition for territory and markets in other neighborhoods. In 1989, for instance, when drug entrepreneurs vied for control of the new crack market, homicides in New York increased from 350 in 1960 to 2,250.[81] In Washington, DC, a city with a population of only 600,000, homicides increased 160 percent, with 434 murders in 1989.[82] Most of those murdered were black or Latino.

While the stabilization of the crack trade has led to large drops in homicide rates in those cities where crack was most popular, increasing police harassment has created a rise in drug overdoses and AIDS in African American and Caribbean Latino inner-city neighborhoods. Over 70 percent of injection-related AIDS among blacks and Latinos have been reported in the last five years.[83] Neighborhood sweeps and fear of arrest have forced drug users to avoid carrying syringes and to rely on clandestine shooting galleries and shared drug works; to shoot up powder cocaine, which carries a lower penalty than the smokable crack, but carries a far higher risk of HIV infection than heroin since, it demands far more frequent injections; and to reside underground in a world where crack smokers mingle with injection drug users, increasing the spread of HIV from one to the other. The combined effect leads to extremely high rates of AIDS. As Ricky Bluthenthal notes: "The most systematically described risky injection setting is the shooting gallery. Shooting galleries emerge directly out of the clandestine and illicit nature of drugs. All such settings have in common three features: 1) close proximity to drug copping locations; 2) relative safety from law enforcement interference; and 3) availability of injection equipment including syringes. Several studies have found shooting gallery use to be associated with HIV infection (even among those who do not share syringes).[84]

[79] Coletta Youngers, "The Only War We've Got: Drug Enforcement in Latin America," *NACLA: Report on the Americas* 31 (September/October 1997): 14.

[80] Peter Andreas, Eva C. Bertram, Morris J. Blachman, and Kenneth Sharpe, "Dead End Drug Wars," *Foreign Policy* 85 (Winter 1991–1992): 109.

[81] "Needle Exchange Programs Are Shown to Curb Infection by HIV among Addicts," *New York Times*, 26 November 1995.

[82] Lusane, *Pipe Dream Blues*, 168.

[83] Day, *Health Emergency*, i.

[84] Author's personal communication with Ricky N. Bluthenthal, associate specialist, Urban Health Study, Institute for Health Policy Studies, October 1997; see also Michael Marmor, Donald Des Jarlais, Henry Cohen, Samuel Friedman, Sara T. Beatrice, Neil Dubin, Wafaa El-Sadr, Donna Mildvan, Stanley Yancovitz, Usha Mathur, and Robert Holtzman, "Risk Factors for Infection with Human Immunodeficiency Virus among Intravenous Drug Abusers in New York City," *AIDS* 1 (May 1987): 39–44; Ellie E. Schoenbaum, Diana Hartel, Peter Selwyn, Robert Klein, Katherine Davenny, Martha Rogers, Cheryl Feiner, and Gerald Friedland, " Risk Factors for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in Intravenous Drug Users," *New England Journal of Medicine* 321 (September 1989): 874–879; Dale Chitwood, Clyde B. McCoy, James Inciardi, Duane C. McBride, Mary Comerford, Edward Trapido, Virginia McCoy, J. Bryan Page, James Griffen, Mary Ann Fletcher, and Margarita A. Ashman, "HIV

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Prohibitions against possession of drug paraphernalia exaggerate the problem. As Bluthenthal notes, "previous research suggests that HIV risk behaviors are associated with prescription and drug paraphernalia laws. Prescription laws make syringes difficult to obtain . . . dangerous to carry [and] create scarcity at the moment of drug injection. The absence or removal of such laws has been associated with lower rates of syringe based HIV risk behavior."[85]

Dawn Day observes: "Race is a factor in access to clean needles because black communities have frequently been the target of police drives to enforce drug laws. . . . Among persons who inject drugs, African Americans are at least twice as likely to be arrested for possession of heroin or cocaine . . . . This means that the legal system, via the police, is more likely to confiscate the personal needles of blacks. Also, because black users know (correctly) that they are vulnerable to arrest, these users are likely to 'voluntarily' get rid of their own clean needles to avoid arrest."[86] The repeal of paraphernalia laws in Connecticut, for instance, substantially reduced the rate of HIV infection among injection drug users. In contrast, recent studies comparing the effectiveness of syringe-exchange programs have found that police harassment impedes the functioning of existing needle exchanges in comparison to those located in areas without such harassment.[87]

Differentially enforced paraphernalia laws are also responsible for the even larger disparity in AIDS rates among African American and Caribbean Latino (in particular Puerto Rican) women and children. Since paraphernalia laws are enforced predominantly in black and Caribbean Latino inner city neighborhoods (in particular New York City, Newark, Jersey City, Miami, Washington, DC, San Juan, and Chicago) where African Americans and Caribbean Latinos share urban space or are the majority of inner-city residents, differential enforcement leads to higher rates of HIV among neighborhood drug users. HIV-infected drug users then act as a focal point for the spread of AIDS throughout entire neighborhoods. In the South Bronx, for instance, neighborhood HIV rates among adults run over 20 percent.[88] A recent Bronx-Lebanon Hospital

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Seropositivity of Needles from Shooting Galleries in South Florida," *American Journal of Public Health* 80 (February 1990): 150–152; Robert J. Battjes, Zili Sloboda, and William Grace, eds., *The Context of HIV Risk among Drug Users and Their Sexual Partners*, vol. 143 (Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1994); Carl Latkin, William Mandell, David Vlahov, M. Oziemkowska, Amy Knowlton, and David Celentano, "My Place, Your Place, and No Place: Behavior Settings as Risk Factors for HIV-Related Injection Practices of Drug Users in Baltimore, Maryland," *American Journal of Community Psychology* 22 (June 1994): 415–430.

[85] Ricky Bluthenthal, Alex Kral, Jennifer Lorvick, and John K. Watters, "Impact of Law Enforcement on Syringe Exchange Programs," *Medical Anthropology* 18 (December 1997): 9; see also Marmor et al., "Risk Factors for Infection"; Schoenbaum et al., "Risk Factors for Human Immunodeficiency virus"; Chitwood et al., "HIV Seropositivity of Needles for Shooting Galleries"; Battjes et al., "The Context of HIV Risk Among Drug Users and their Partners"; Latkin et al., "My Place, Your Place and No Place."

[86] Day, *Health Emergency*, 3.

[87] Bluthenthal et al., "Impact of Law Enforcement on Syringe Exchange Programs," 61–83.

[88] Ernest Drucker, "Epidemic in the War Zone: AIDS and Community Survival in New York, *Centro de Estudios Puertoriquenos* (Spring 1994).

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study found that 23 percent of patients admitted for non-AIDS-related illnesses were HIV positive. As an editorial in *New York Newsday* put it, "With that much virus around, just about anyone who is sexually active is at risk."[89]

For women, AIDS rates are directly proportional to the percentage of heterosexual HIV positive men in the neighborhood where they live. In 1987, women made up only 7 percent of all AIDS cases. By 1995 they made up 17 percent. The vast majority of these women are African American or Latino.[90] African American and Latino women and children are disproportionately affected because partners or parents are more likely to have used infected syringes.[91] Over 90 percent of black and Latina women and children with AIDS acquired the disease from an infected syringe or a partner or parent that had acquired the disease through an HIV infected syringe.[92]

Long mandatory sentences given to first-time offenders have meant that in most inner city neighborhoods young people are more likely to spend time in jail than in college. Given the high rates of sex (or rape) and drugs without condoms or syringes, jail carries an even higher risk of exposure to HIV. In 1994, for instance, for every 1,000 inmates, 5.2 had AIDS compared to .9 per 1,000 in the general population. In New York City's Rikers Island prison fully 26 percent of the women and 12 percent of the men are HIV positive.[93]

Those who contract AIDS in jail then bring it home to their loved ones, as the teenage poet Gil C. Alicea learned the hard way.[94] After waiting ten years for his father to return from prison, Alicea was delighted to see his family reunited and his mother expecting a child. His hopes were shattered when he learned that his new sister carried the AIDS virus, as did his mother and his father, all of whom have since died. The story is not uncommon in neighborhoods so saturated with HIV that prison is only one additional risk. For adults between the ages of forty and forty-five, "the incidence of injection-related AIDS among African Americans is eighteen times that of whites, and among Latinos is eight times that of whites."[95]

Conclusion

Over 50 percent of black and Latino AIDS cases and over 90 percent of AIDS cases among black and Latina women and children originate in an HIV-

[89] Editorial, "The Changing Face of AIDS," *New York Newsday*, 9 April 1995.

[90] Ibid.

[91] National Commission on AIDS, "Challenge of HIV in Communities of Color," 5.

[92] Day, unpublished data calculated from Center for Disease Control, "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report," 1996.

[93] Mathew W. Purdy, "As AIDS Increases Behind Bars, Costs Dim Promise of New Drugs," *New York Times*, 26 May 1997.

[94] Gil C. Alicea with Carmine De Sena, *The Air Down Here: True Tales form a South Bronx Boyhood* (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1995).

[95] Day, *Health Emergency*, 7.

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infected syringe.[96] If all black and Latino men and women abstained from drugs and used condoms at all times (even with their wives and husbands), they would probably avoid HIV infection. Yet whites are not subject to the same requirement. African Americans and Latinos are more likely to live in neighborhoods where police surveillance makes injection drug use and unprotected sex, even with one's husband, far more risky than it is for whites. Given the huge differential in associated risk, the percentage of black or Latino AIDS cases attributable to "underclass" or deviant behavior is likely to be negligible. There simply is no evidence that either drug use or unprotected sex is so much more frequent among blacks and Latinos, that such behavior alone can account for the enormous disparity in AIDS rates in a country where the majority of both drug users and sexually-active women are white.

This study challenges the fundamental assumptions and evidence that undergird theories of the underclass. William J. Wilson, for instance, bases his analysis of the urban "underclass" on arrest rates, which he argues are "reasonably related to the crime process."[97] Michael Tonry concurs and claims that blacks are much more likely to engage in crime than whites, and that arrest rates, with the exception of drug related arrests, are an accurate measure: "The answer to the question 'Is racial bias in the criminal justice system the principal reason that proportionately so many more blacks than whites are in prison?' is NO, with one important caveat . . . concerning drugs. . . . The evidence seems clear that the main reason that black incarceration rates are substantially higher than those for whites is that black crime rates for imprisonable crimes are substantially higher than for those for whites."[98]

Randall Kennedy argues that drug policy is unbiased. Eleven out of twenty-one black members of Congress voted in favor of stronger penalties for crack than for cocaine, he notes. White members endorsed a recent bill that raises the penalties on methamphetamine, a drug used mostly by whites.[99] Kennedy is unwilling to recognize racial bias in anything other than individual attitudes and behavior and overlooks structural and systemic biases. Tonry recognizes such a bias in drug policy. "At every level of the criminal justice system," he argues, "empirical analyses demonstrate that an increasing black disproportion has resulted from the War on Drugs—in jails, state and federal prisons, and juvenile institutions."[100] Yet, if 61 percent of federal inmates are serving sentences for drug offenses, and African American injection drug users are more than twice as likely to be arrested on possession charges than white injection drug

[96] Day, unpublished data. According to Day's analysis of CDC data, 93 percent of AIDS cases among black women, 92 percent of AIDS among Latina women, and 78 percent of AIDS among white women have their origins in an HIV infected syringe.

[97] Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, 32.

[98] Tonry, *Malign Neglect*, 79.

[99] Kennedy, *Race, Crime and The Law*.

[100] Tonry, *Malign Neglect*, 113

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users, and 60 to 80 percent of blacks and Latinos arrested for other crimes also test positively for drugs, the majority of black and Latino arrests, not only drug related arrests, can be explained by the drug war. As one recent Columbia University study cited in the *Washington Post* noted, 80 percent of all adults in U.S. prisons suffer from some form of substance abuse.[101] If we add the widespread availability of guns in inner-city neighborhoods and the homicides associated with competition for drug markets (a direct consequence of the war on drugs), the racial disparity in arrest rates nearly disappears. Zimring and Hawkins, for instance, note that: "Eighty percent of the differences between the races in the national statistics disappear when the comparison involves only city populations. . . . Here is a concrete demonstration of how the general social structure helps to account for what appears as differences between racial groups. . . . The total exclusion of offenses attributed to blacks would not alter the distinctive position of the United States as an industrial democracy with extraordinary high rates of high-lethality violence."[102]

Neither arrest nor conviction rates are an accurate measure of criminality and social deviance. Evidence from the drug war suggests a weak relationship between race and propensity to use drugs or commit crimes, and a strong relationship between race and increased law enforcement. The racial disparity in arrest rates, and the reliance of social scientists on such arrest statistics, has distorted the public's image of inner city life. As one *New York Times* reporter observed, when arrest records are used as the barometer, blacks appear to commit aggravated assault at three times the rate of whites. In victim surveys, however, the rates of reported aggravated assault are "virtually identical: 32 in 1,000 for blacks and 31 in 1,000 for whites."[103]

The measures needed to reduce crime, drug abuse, and poverty are not those designed to correct the behavior of inner-city residents. Such policies exacerbate the problem, while increasing racial inequality. The only effective solution, as Charles Tilly argues, would be "authoritative intervention [that] inhibits the matching of interior and exterior categories within reward distributing organizations, redistributes enough of the surplus . . . to guarantee all individuals a social acceptable package of income and services, insures that sorting institutions such as schools resist the installation of exterior categories and attenuate the performance effects of previous categorically differentiated experiences, and reduces the transmission of categorically organized advantages from generation to generation and generally weakens the links among exploitation, opportunity hoarding, and widely prevalent categorical pairs."[104]

[101] Around the Nation, "80 Percent of Prisoners," *Washington Post*, 9 January 1998.

[102] Zimring and Hawkins, *Lethal Violence*, 81.

[103] Lusane, *Pipe Dream Blues*, 23; Evan Stark, "The Myth of Black Violence," *New York Times*, 18 July 1990.

[104] Tilly, *Durable Inequality*, 243.

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Finally, we will not curb the AIDS epidemic until we treat drug abuse as a public health issue in the inner city and in black and Latino neighborhoods, as well as white suburbs. We need to abolish mandatory sentences for drug possession, make more drug treatment programs available, along with programs to increase jobs and reduce urban poverty. The federal government must override state prohibitions against clean needle programs, syringe sales, and possession of drug paraphernalia.[105] Until we eliminate racism in drug policy, sentencing, and law enforcement, AIDS will continue to be the number one killer of African American and Latino adults between the ages of 25 and 44. Unless current rates are reversed this will mean an epidemic of genocidal proportions.*

[105] Day, *Health Emergency* 28, cites a 1996 study by Peter Lurie and Ernest Drucker, "An Opportunity Lost: Estimating the Number of HIV Infections Associated with the U.S. Government Opposition to Needle Exchange Programs," where they estimate that "if clean needles were immediately increased to reach 50 percent of persons who inject drugs, between 5,000 and 11,000 infections could be prevented by the year 2000."

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Corruption in a Paternalistic Democracy: Lessons from Italy for Latin America

SILVIA COLAZINGARI
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN

In its recent history, Italy combined democracy with high levels of corruption and illegal campaign financing. Corruption in Italy is not new, but by the time of the recent "Clean Hands" prosecutions it had reached the highest echelons of government and was pervasive in all business-government dealings.[1] In spite of overall good economic performance, the Italian combination of corruption with what we will call "paternalistic democracy" has produced inefficiency, unfairness, and a loss of political legitimacy.

We begin by reviewing the special features of the Italian democratic experience, which produced remarkable stability in the face of apparent political fragmentation and in the process created a fertile field for corrupt dealings. With this background, we examine the trial of Sergio Cusani, one of the major cases brought by the Milan prosecutors after they launched their investigation in 1992.[2] This case highlights the corrupt workings of Italian business-government relations during the 1990 nationalization of the chemical industry. Since the case of the chemical industry appears to be distinctive only in its scale, the case helps one understand the costs that corruption has imposed on the nation's citi-

[1] Franco Cazzola, *Della corruzione. Fisiologia e papologia di un sistema politico* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988), 31–32; Gherado Colombo, "Le indagini della magistratura italiana nei reati contro la pubblica amministrazione. Il danno conseguente alla corruzione." *Questione Giustizia* 13 (Spring-Summer 1994): 467–478; Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, "The 'Perverse Effects' of Political Corruption," *Political Studies* 45 (Special Issue 1997): 516–538. In 1988, one source estimated that the turnover of bribery and extortion totaled 27 billion lira. See *Fortune-Italy*, no. 7 (October 1989): 41.

[2] Colombo, "Indagini della magistratura italiana."

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zens. We argue that the ability of top officials in Italy to siphon off resources for personal and political use was a function of the organization of the political system. Neither bribe payers nor recipients were victims. Instead, both operated together under the political conditions of the time.

Democratic forms were not sufficient to control harmful corruption. Yet the breakdown of the postwar political system in the aftermath of the Clean Hands investigations suggests the political risks to elected officials of failing to deal with pervasive corruption in political and bureaucratic life. Although we argue that the independence of the Italian prosecutors and judges was a necessary check on corruption, we go on to suggest other needed reforms in the way of internal controls, external monitoring, and greater transparency. The lessons of Italy are then extended to the case of Latin American democracies, which share some of the characteristics of the postwar Italian state.

Italian Politics: Fragmentation and Stability

At the beginning of the 1990s, some observers commented on the disjunction between Italy's modern economy and its "increasingly antique" state.[3] This view, however, overlooks the similarity between political and economic life in Italy.[4] Large companies felt secure because of their privileged relationship to the state, and political parties were similarly secure with stable niches in the political structure. Italy's paternalistic state-protected industry and paradoxically the fragmentation and ideological polarization of the political system protected the ruling parties from turnover, making them unaccountable to the electorate.

A paternalistic state intervenes in the economy, but it is not capable of governing it. Unlike a state that only manages the development process,[5] the Italian state had two roles. It maintained a reasonable level of economic activity and also provided distributive benefits to firms, regions, and individuals. Public enterprises were an important aspect of state activity. In 1981, they accounted for 12 percent of GDP and 33.3 percent of gross fixed investment. Unlike France, where state ownership has been accompanied by state planning, or Japan, where public-private cooperation was directed by state elites, a large public sector developed without any overall industrial planning.[6] The state enterprises lacked bureaucratic autonomy and depended financially on the central government, which never provided a consistent industrial policy.[7]

[3] *The Economist*, Special Survey, 26 May 1990.

[4] Romano Prodi, "Sindrome botte di ferro," *Mondo Economico*, 29 May 1993, 28–29.

[5] Ziya Önis, "The Logic of the Developmental State," *Comparative Politics* 24 (October 1991): 109–126.

[6] Paolo Sylos Labini, "Il ruolo delle imprese pubbliche nel recente svilluppo dell'economia italiana," *Economia Pubblica*, No. 1–2, (January-February 1984): 5–12.

[7] Romano Prodi and Daniele Di Giovanni, "Forty-Five Years of Industrial Policy in Italy: Protagonists, Objectives, and Instruments" in Mario Baldassarri, ed., *Industrial Policy in Italy, 1945–90* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 31–58.

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The state had a paternalistic relationship with both public and private firms. Like enterprises in socialist economies, Italian firms had "soft budget constraints."[8] The state helped rescue firms in financial difficulties, often by nationalizing them. In spite of a 1981 government report recommending a change in strategy, the government continued to take over weak industrial enterprises throughout the 1980s.[9] As a consequence, large firms did not make the tough decisions needed to assure efficient operation. Instead, firm managers spent time shoring up their political connections, time that could have been spent improving the efficiency of their businesses. The process of seeking favors and special advantages fueled corruption, as business people paid politicians and officials to assure the benefits they wanted.

During the so-called First Republic from 1948 until 1994, the political classes also operated in an unusually secure environment in spite of the democratic nature of Italian politics.[10] At first glance this might seem paradoxical, since Italy had fifty-four separate governments in fifty years.[11] Unlike the Institutional Revolutionary party in Mexico or the Liberal Democratic party in Japan, the Christian Democrats (DC) in Italy never won a majority of the votes in parliamentary elections in the postwar period. After 1960 their share never exceeded 40 percent and fell steadily in the 1970s and 1980s. The electoral share of the three largest parties ranged from 83 percent to 75 percent. The Christian Democrats were helped by the strength of the Communists, who polled from 34 percent to 27 percent over the period, but were not viewed as acceptable coalition partners.[12] One reason for excluding them from any formal coalition government was the United States' strong opposition to the inclusion of Communists in West European governments during the cold war.[13] This left the

[8] Janos Kornai, "Degrees of Paternalism" in Janos Kornai, *Economics of Shortage*. (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1980), 561–71. On corruption in Soviet-style systems, see John M. Montias and Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Corruption in a Soviet-Type Economy: Theoretical Considerations" in Steven Rosefielde, ed., *Economic Welfare and Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 53–83.

[9] Alan Friedman, *Ce la fara il capitalismo italiano?* (Milano: Longanesi, 1989); Gian Maria Gros-Pietro, "The Restructuring of Large-sized Industrial Groups" in Baldassarri, ed., *Industrial Policy in Italy, 1945–90*, 141–160. Marcello De Cecco, a leading economist, described the period as "criminal Keynesianism" in "Italia, partiti el il Keynesismo delinquenziale," *La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza*, 16 April 1993, 1–3. In 1981, Socialist Minister for State Holdings Gianni De Michelis issued a report that criticized the state's policy of incorporating loss-making companies into the system of public holdings. De Michelis et al., *Rapporto sulle partecipazioni statali* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1981).

[10] Mark Donovan, "Party Strategy and Centre Domination in Italy," *West European Politics* 12 (October 1989): 114–128; Paolo Farneti, "I partiti politici e il sistema di potere" in V. Castronovo, ed., *L'Italia contemporanea 1945–1975* (Torino: Einaudi, 1976), 61–104; Alfio Mastropaolo and Martin Slater, "Party Politics and Coalition Bargaining in Italy, 1948–87: Is There Order Behind the Chaos?" in M. J. Laver and Ian Budge, eds., *Party Policy and Government Coalitions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 314–341.

[11] Denis Mack Smith, "Italy's Dirty Linen," *New York Review of Books*, 30 November 1995, 13.

[12] Donovan, "Party Strategy," 116, 122.

[13] Mastropaolo and Slater, "Party Politics," 316.

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Christian Democrats as the only large party capable of forming a government coalition. As a result of its secure position, the DC did not need to be accountable to the voters. Forced to govern by coalition, it formed governments with different parties at different points in time and shared the benefits of political power with them.[14] This circumscribed the ability of the Socialist party and of other coalition partners to control or denounce corruption among the ruling elite, since they were sharing in the spoils.[15]

Even the Communists, although never sharing executive power, cooperated with the ruling parties. Between 1976 and 1979 they belonged to the parliamentary majority, but not to the executive; and both before 1976 and after 1979 they cooperated with the majority parties in the legislature.[16] In the early years, they did not share in the spoils of office, but the situation changed by the end of the 1980s. Since the Communists were strong at the local government level and since they needed national government resources in order to carry out local government functions, they had an incentive to play along. In recent years in Milan, according to one source, the major parties divided up the pool of bribes, with the Communists obtaining 25 percent.[17] The Communists supported measures that benefited the political parties relative to the economic establishment. As Angelo Panebianco wrote: "the PCI [Communist party] offers the government a pseudo-opposition in Parliament in exchange for the resources that the party needs in order to govern the periphery."[18]

Because the system operated on the basis of negotiation and compromise, often outside the formal institutional framework,[19] it produced stable expectations. In the absence of effective political competition, the stability of the political system reinforced the links between the state and the economy. Since the basic political configurations were fixed and since the system of sharing power was well established, government commitments made at one time were expected to be honored in the future. The stronger the financial links between the state and the large corporations, the less eager they were for political change.

[14] Giuseppe Di Palma, *Surviving Without Governing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Donovan, "Party Strategy"; Mastropaolo and Slater, "Party Politics."

[15] According to Franco Bassanini, a former member of the Socialist party, the sharing of bribery receipts by the political parties began in the early 1970s with a payment from Eni-Petronim. He claimed that the agreement conditioned their behavior in parliament. Giovanni Valentini, interview with Franco Bassanini, *La Repubblica*, 13 February 1993.

[16] Franco Cazzola, *Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano* (Milano: Giuffre, 1974); Di Palma, *Surviving*; Angelo Panebianco, "The Italian Radicals: New Wine in an Old Bottle" in Key Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, eds., *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 110–136.

[17] Sergio Turone, *Politica ladra: Storia della corruzione in Italia, 1861–1992* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1992), 342, reports that the DC, the Socialists, and the Communists each received 25 percent, with the Social Democrats and the Republicans dividing the rest.

[18] Panebianco, "Italian Radicals," 118.

[19] Joseph LaPalombara, *Democracy Italian Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 213.

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Within this basically stable system, competitive struggles occurred between factions of the dominant Christian Democratic party as well as among the parties belonging to the governing coalition. According to Giulio Sapelli, this competition did not take the form of overt political opposition, but of a competition for political spoils. Business interests benefited from these internecine struggles, since they increased the relative bargaining power of business.[20]

To illustrate the way the system worked at the highest political and economic levels, we review the material that was made public during the Cusani trial in 1993 and 1994. This major case reveals how an industrialist, impatient with the status quo, nevertheless used the system's own corrupt structures to enrich himself and the corporation he controlled. Rather than directly challenging the system, he raised the payoffs to such a high level that he eventually fell victim to the Clean Hands anticorruption investigations. In this effort he had a multitude of collaborators up and down the political and corporate hierarchy as well as opponents who attempted to influence the outcome using countervailing but equally corrupt methods.

The Cusani Trial

In February 1993, a year after the first Clean Hands arrest in Milan, prosecutors in Rome started investigating the nationalization of the chemical industry. The subsequent trial of Sergio Cusani in Milan was televised and caused a public sensation. Cusani was a private power broker who de facto worked for Montedison and distributed bribes on behalf of the company. Cusani was convicted in April 1994 and sentenced to eight years in prison for amassing and distributing illegally 150 billion lira (about $100 million).[21] All of the major politicians, awaiting their own trials for violating the party financing law, were obliged to give depositions. In March, as the trial neared its close, the Italians voted out the old ruling class. In October 1995, two former prime ministers and the leader of the Northern League were also sentenced for their role in the scandal.[22] What had happened?

In 1980, two large conglomerates controlled the Italian chemical industry—state owned Ente Nazionale Indrocarburi (Eni) and Montedison, a mostly private company whose largest single shareholder was nevertheless the state through Eni itself. In an attempt to recapitalize the industry and eliminate overlaps and competition between the firms, the government sold its share in Montedison and concentrated basic-commodity chemicals in Eni. Production

[20] Giulio Sapelli, *Cleptocrazia* (Roma: Feltrinelli, 1994).

[21] He appealed his conviction and in December 1995 his sentence was reduced to six years by an appeals court. See "Court Cuts Sentence for Italian Financier Cusani," *Reuter North American Wire*, 1 December 1995, NEXIS. In November 1996, his sentence in a related case was upheld, and he began a four year jail sentence. He is the first major figure to go to jail. See "Italian Financier Goes to Prison in Graft Scandal," *Reuter Financial Service*, 13 November 1996, NEXIS.

[22] "Ex-Premiers Convicted in Italy," *Washington Post*, 28 October 1995.

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of the more profitable chemicals was reserved for Montedison. Despite the Minister for State Holdings' opposition to nationalization, the 1982 agreement between Eni and Montedison enabled the private firm to unload troubled units onto Eni in return for a payment of 453 billion lira.[23]

By 1987, Montedison was doing well in the chemicals business but was heavily indebted. It needed access to capital, something the state firm could provide. The government was concerned about excess capacity in the industry and the ability of Italian firms to compete with multinationals. Thus in a second attempt to restructure the industry, Eni in 1988 signed a letter of intent with Montedison to create a joint venture between the two called Enimont. Enimont would include all of the chemicals produced by Eni and the heavy chemicals still produced by Montedison. In practice, the joint-venture amounted to a partial privatization, since the company was to be 40 percent owned by Eni and 40 percent by Montedison. The remaining 20 percent of the stock was deposited in two merchant banks prior to the firm's eventual listing on the stock exchange.

The oil and chemical industry in Italy is notoriously politicized. Offered the chance to take over Montedison in the early 1980s, Olivetti's Carlo De Benedetti recalled that he "felt the chemicals industry was too compromised by politics to be worth becoming involved with."[24] The publicly owned portion of the industry was known as a pork barrel and a source of illicit political contributions.[25] The Christian Democrats controlled Eni until 1979, when it passed to the Socialists but with the DC retaining some key posts.[26] Thus the restructuring contemplated by the joint venture would threaten entrenched political fiefdoms.

The joint venture required Montedison to list the companies involved at estimated market value rather than book value. The assessment of Montedison's assets, which was certified by a Milan court, was later criticized as being too generous. In calculating its 40 percent stake, Montedison benefited from the high assessment, but a high valuation had a downside. Since book values

[23] Alves Marchi and Roberto Marchionatti, *Montedison 1966–89, L'evoluzione di una grande impresa al confine tra pubblico e privato. Collana CIRIEC di Storie d'Impresa* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1992), 168, 187–190.

[24] John Glover, "Italy: A Death in Tangentopoli - Ferruzzi Chief," *Reuter Textline: International Investor*, 31 May 1994, NEXIS. De Benedetti was himself imprisoned as a result of the Clean Hands investigations. He claimed that when his company ceased paying bribes to the post office in 1991, it received no new orders. See *La Repubblica*, 18 May 1993.

[25] See the interviews in *La Repubblica*, 13 February 1993, with Florio Fiorini, Eni finance director in 1982 and on 29 December 1993 and 9 January 1994 with Franco Bernabe, governmental commissioner of Eni SpA. According to one press estimate, politicians extracted between 400 and 600 billion lira per year from the chemical industry during the 1980s. See Giuseppe Turani, "L'Enimont un alabicco di Pandora," *La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza*, 29 January 1993.

[26] Glover, "Italy." After the Socialists took over the chairmanship of Eni, the DC retained the power to appoint the directors of several operating companies. After three controversial chairmen held the post between 1979 and 1982, Eni appointed a respected professor who served until 1989. Interview with Franco Bernabe, *La Repubblica*, 29 December 1993.

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had been used in the past to compute tax liabilities, the sudden apparent increase in value of about 2,000 billion lira would have created a massive capital gains tax liability of 800 billion lira (about $550 million) for Montedison, which had agreed to the venture with the informal understanding that a special tax relief bill would be passed by Parliament. Given the history of cozy relations between business and government in the past, the firm had reason to trust the assurances of then Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita, even though the deal required parliamentary approval.

Montedison's optimism proved mistaken. In 1988 and 1989, with the collapse of the Soviet empire in progress, the Communist party in the parliament acted in a surprisingly independent manner and opposed tax relief. Perhaps the timing was merely fortuitous. In the past, since the public enterprises operated separately from parliament, the PCI was seldom in a position to have an impact on state-owned firms. Only the need for a special tax relief law gave the party a role. The Communists, supported by the Fascists and eventually by several important Christian Democratic politicians, defeated the government's tax relief bills in a series of 1989 votes. The independent stance of the Communists would not have been enough to defeat the bill. Divisions within the Christian Democrats were crucial and led to a change of government in the middle of 1989 producing a new coalition opposed to tax relief for Montedison.

Before we applaud the independence of the Communists, notice that although they opposed tax relief, they did not go further and expose the underlying corrupt relationships later revealed to be behind the deal. Nevertheless, the result does put in relief the impact the Communists could have had in earlier times if they had been willing to use the leverage given them by their one-third share of the popular vote and their control of a major newspaper and a national television channel. Perhaps their failure to act was due simply to ignorance, not calculation. With hindsight, it is impossible to sort out the relative importance of these two factors.

Montedison did not lose the tax relief battle for want of trying. Money from its Swiss bank accounts was available for campaign contributions and illegal payoffs. Later one member of the family that controlled Montedison claimed that one billion lira had been paid to the Communists, but this was never proved, and the failure of the tax relief bills cast doubt on this claim. Some of the money was never given to politicians. It was put aside by Raul Gardini, Montedison's chairman, for his own use and given to executives of Montedison and Enimont, presumably to facilitate the initial set of negotiations over the joint venture.[27] However, it is at least possible that the company thought that it was making payoffs to politicians when, in fact, the funds were going to its own executives. The lack of transparency of illegal payoffs creates risks for those making the payments. It is difficult to trace where the payments ultimately come to rest.

[27] Glover, "Italy."

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With the defeat of the tax bill, Gardini attempted to gain control of Enimont. The joint venture was not doing well due to disputes between the public and the private owners. The disputes involved both needed restructuring and competition between Enimont and the parts of Montedison's chemical business not included in the joint venture. Gardini's plan to achieve control involved arranging for a sympathetic group to buy 11 percent of the shares in the market so he could control 51 percent of the shares. This plan required a favorable regulatory decision permitting the sale of the shares held by the banks. Franco Piga, who oversaw the agency that regulated the stock exchange, permitted the sale of stock ahead of time, as an exception. On 24 February 1990, Gardini claimed, "I am Italy's chemical industry."

Gardini's reign over the industry did not last long, although he remained head of Montedison until his suicide in 1993 as the Milan prosecutors closed in. Gardini was married to a member of the Ferruzzi family that controlled Montedison's parent company. Other members of the family were against the takeover of Enimont. They paid Eni officials to block Gardini. It was later revealed that the president and chairman of Eni and a board member of Enimont received 5 billion and 4 billion lira, respectively. With some of these funds, Eni's president bribed the vice president of the Milan Court who on 8 November ordered the sequestration of the shares owned by both Montedison and Eni.[28] The impasse had to be resolved. To do this, the original contract setting up the joint venture was modified by the government so that Eni could set the price and conditions of sale and then let Montedison decide if it wanted to be a buyer or a seller. Unless Gardini was bluffing all along, this counterattack by the government, combined with Montedison's financial problems, convinced Gardini to sell, but he wanted a good price.

By all accounts he got one. Eni decided to set a price of 2.8 trillion lira for 40 percent of Enimont. Montedison had no difficulty deciding that it wanted to be a seller, not a buyer, at such a price. Montedison got a major influx of cash and turned over more loss-making divisions to the state. After paying 2.8 trillion lira to Montedison and another 1.4 trillion lira to buy out Gardini's associates who held the publicly traded shares, Enimont reemerged as a wholly-owned state company with a dominant position in the Italian chemicals industry. Enichem, which absorbed the companies that Montedison had contributed to Enimont, had been profitable when it only controlled Eni's chemical business. It made losses in the years following the venture's breakup. Eni pumped 3 trillion lira into the company to make it competitive, a payment that raised eyebrows at the European Union headquarters in Brussels. Italy thus became one of the few countries in the world that nationalized a large firm during a period when privatization was sweeping the globe.

In the subsequent trial of Gardini's middleman Cusani, it was revealed that 150 billion lira (about $100 million) was paid in bribes on behalf of Montedison;

[28] Ibid.

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but the timing is unclear, so it is difficult to know who paid whom for what. Clearly Gardini was not the only one paying bribes. At times he appears to have been competing with other members of the Ferruzzi family to influence the outcome. The prosecutor argued that these payments were bribes, not just illegal campaign contributions. He claimed that the payoffs were made to convince the government and Eni to nationalize Enimont at an exorbitant price.

The illegal funds never showed up on Montedison's balance sheets but were mostly hidden in real estate transactions. Such deals took considerable time and ingenuity to develop.[29] Between 1987 and 1991, the funds were deposited in Swiss bank accounts connected to party leaders. The Vatican bank, Istituto per le Opere di Religione, was apparently a way station for some of the funds. In keeping with the sharing arrangements noted above, the payoffs involved both major government parties. The Socialists received about 75 billion lira, and the Christian Democrats, 35 billion. All the members of the Eni board received bribes. The president and chairman of Eni, who received 5 billion lira, kept at least 1.3 billion in his private bank account. After he committed suicide in jail in 1993, his widow claimed that he needed the money to buy his nomination as head of Eni—that is, to bribe his fellow Socialists. Much of the money, however, has never been accounted for and probably slipped into many private pockets along the way. At his trial in 1993, Cusani admitted that he was still holding 35 billion lira.[30]

Lessons of the Enimont Deal

The corruption revealed by the Enimont deal illustrates several general features of corrupt political systems. First, the economic impact of high-level corruption is a function of the underlying institutional structure. However, that structure can itself be modified by corrupt officials in ways that increase both the private benefits and the accompanying social costs. Second, corruption can undermine the legitimacy of a political system by creating the impression of a state based on favoritism and payoffs. Even when the law places few restrictions on campaign contributions, illegal payments may still be made if politicians stand ready to supply illicit favors. Third, internal controls and political factors missing in the Italian case can help limit corruption. These include conflict of interest laws, a strong legislature, and an active political opposition. Fourth, an independent system of prosecuting and judging cases is essential for a sustained anticorruption effort against entrenched political interests.

The Costs of High-level Corruption

The Enimont case illustrates the distortions and costs that can arise. The case suggests the limitations of the analogy to private monopoly behavior. Some ar-

[29] "When the Fiddling Had to Stop," *The Economist*, 2 July 1994, 62.

[30] Glover, "Italy."

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gue that corrupt government officials with monopoly power will be more productively efficient than governments with multiple loci of power.[31] There are two problems with this argument in realistic applications. First, some evidence suggests that competition among parties that controlled different state-owned entities in the early 1980s produced an incentive for each group to stress good performance and to support strong technocratic management in order to maximize rents for their party.[32] Parties wanted good performance from the firms they dominated in order to generate campaign funds and other patronage benefits. However, as the case of the chemical industry shows, by the end of the decade strong economic results no longer mattered much, because the parties were colluding with each other, not competing. Second, even in stable political systems, most governments do not have enough monopoly power single-mindedly to maximize rents. They are under pressure to satisfy the demands of workers, managers, and voters, none of which is primarily concerned with efficiency. The private sector also may have interests that conflict with efficient performance. For example, in the Enimont case, where the state had only partial control of the chemical industry, private firms had an interest in shifting the loss-making portions of their business onto the state in return for inflated estimates of their worth. Similar, if reverse, incentives are created by efforts to privatize state-owned firms. The buyers want low prices and favorable treatment. Montedison, for example, sought a high stock valuation to minimize its contribution to the joint public-private venture. The one shot nature of both types of deal focuses attention on the division of the economic rents and encourages private businesses to pay bribes to get favorable terms.[33] Furthermore, in the Enimont case the corrupt gains were not fixed by outside market forces, but were influenced by the way the politicians and Montedison's managers structured the deal to make the gains as high as possible so that they could share the profits at the expense of ordinary citizens.

The costs of nationalizing weak firms at high prices or privatizing strong firms at low prices are borne by the public treasury and ultimately by taxpayers and citizens. Although it is true that no one had an incentive to destroy wealth or actually to produce inefficiently, the end result of organized high-level corruption can be very costly. In addition to excessive prices, firms are nationalized and kept in operation that should have been shut down, and even firms that

[31] Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87 (September 1993): 567–575; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny "Corruption," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108 (August 1993): 599–617.

[32] Between 1982 and 1988, the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) went from losing 2,825 billion lira to making a profit of 660 billion. Eni went from losing 1,734 billion lira in 1982 to a profit of 1,310 billion in 1988. The consolidated balance sheets of IRI and Eni are available in Marco Borsa and Allessandro Aleotti, "Fu vera gloria? *Espansione* 234 (November 1989): 25, 28. For a contrary view, see Ernesto U. Savona, "Beyond Criminal Law in Divising Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Italian Experience," *European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research* 3 (Spring 1995): 30.

[33] Luigi Manzetti and Charles H. Blake. "Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America," *Review of International Political Economy* 3 (Winter 1996): 662–697.

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can serve an economic function may deteriorate under state ownership. If corruption occurs in the process of transferring assets from private to public ownership or vice versa, it is likely to lead not only to resource transfers from the public to a wealthy business and political elite but to substantial inefficiencies as well.

The Impact on Political Legitimacy

Even if the economic consequences had been unimportant, the payment of bribes in lieu of legal campaign contributions undermined political legitimacy.[34] Corruption distorts democratic politics and makes citizens skeptical of government. Although Italians had long been skeptical of government officials, the revelation of the scale of illegal contributions had serious political consequences for politicians of all parties. Because of the cooperative relations between the parties, no one could be insulated from the resulting debacle.

So long as the corrupt arrangements remained undercover, they helped stabilize the distribution of political power in Italy. The payoffs helped maintain the system as a whole and played a role in neutralizing the potential for independent opposition from the Italian parties. According to one study, politicians were more concerned with the reward of office than with public policy.[35] The nominally democratic nature of the political system and the existence of free speech and a free press were insufficient to check longstanding corrupt relationships. Corruption appeared politically functional from the end of World War II until the advent of the Milan prosecutions. One could argue that although it may have imposed economic costs, it, nevertheless, furthered political stability.

The resulting scandals suggest, however, that Italians were not in fact tolerant of political corruption. Several years before the magistrates began their work, a poll of entrepreneurs, private managers, and professionals taken in February 1987 indicated that bribery was common throughout the country and that the vast majority of those questioned viewed corruption as unacceptable.[36] People appear to have been aware of widespread corruption but to feel that they had no way to effect change. Stability was only stasis, not an acceptable balancing of diverse public interests.

In a political system where illegal campaign contributions are prevalent, one reform should be the creation of a viable legal system of campaign finance. The Enimont scandal suggests the limits of this strategy when the economic

[34] Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, *Corruzione politica e amministrazione pubblica* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997).

[35] Mastropaolo and Slater, "Party Politics."

[36] The survey results are reported in A. Calabro and A. Zeni, "Italiani brava tangente," *Il Mondo*, 2 March 1987, 38–45. A survey of members of Confindustria, the industrialists' association, reported that 85 percent of those surveyed thought that before the Clean Hands investigations bribery was at least "frequent" in public works contracts. At the time of the survey, 47 percent thought corruption had drastically decreased. Summarized in "Still Crooked," *The Economist*, 5 February 1994.

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gains from corrupt deals are very large. Of course, if campaign laws are too restrictive, political operatives may have little choice but to amass illegal funds if they are going to run an effective campaign. The Italian campaign finance laws in force in the 1980s and early 1990s do not, however, seem very restrictive. The Law for the Public Financing of Political Parties, initially passed in 1974, provided state contributions that depended in part on votes received. Contributions by private citizens and firms had to be registered. A firm's board of directors was required to approve contributions, which had to be listed on the balance sheet. The parties had to submit reports to the Court of Accounts (State Audit Board) that evaluated the reports and notified parliament of its findings.[37]

The original law was enacted after a scandal involving private firms that made illegal payments to the state oil company in order to facilitate oil smuggling.[38] One goal was to limit the use of state-owned enterprises as sources of campaign money for the political parties and to limit the role of pressure groups.[39] The law has been ineffective at accomplishing these goals in part because the Italian parliament never enacted the accompanying laws needed to implement the statute.

Under the law as it stood in 1991, the state provided two types of funds. The first, totaling 30 billion lira at that time, was for campaign expenses. Twenty percent was divided equally among all qualified parties. The remainder was distributed proportionally to votes received. Qualified parties are those with candidate lists in more than two-thirds of the electoral districts that also obtain at least 300,000 votes or 2 percent of the national vote. Special subsidies are also given to parties in regions that afford special protection to linguistic minorities. The second subsidy, introduced in 1981, supports the ordinary management expenses of parliamentary parties. By 1990, this subsidy totaled almost 83 billion lira. The distribution formula is similar to the first type. Since the law does not impose conditions on the use of these funds, they may also be used for cam-

[37] Law No. 195—State Contribution to the Financing of Political Parties (May 2, 1974)—*Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana* (GU), No. 135 (25 May 1974). The law was amended by Law No. 11 (16 January 1978)—GU, No. 23 (24 January 1978); Law No. 422 of 1980—GU, No. 220 (12 August 1980); Law No. 659 of 1981—GU, No. 323 (24 November 1981); Law No. 22 of 1982—GU, No. 30 (1 February 1982), and Law No. 413 of 1985—GU No. 194 (19 August 1985). See Giovanni Salvo, "Italy," in United States Congress, *Law Library of Congress*, 1991, 110–15, In 1994, the public financing portions of the laws were abrogated in a popular referendum supported by 90 percent of those who voted. In 1997, public financing was reinstated on the basis of a citizen checkoff on individual tax forms. See Law No. 2 (2 January 1997)—GU, No. 5 (8 January 1997). Citizens can earmark 0.4 percent of their income tax payments for a fund to support political parties. The government determines the distribution of the funds on the basis of votes in the most recent election for the Chamber of Deputies. In addition to the tax writeoff, individuals and firms that give between 500,000 and 50 million lira of their own funds can take a tax credit totaling 22 percent of these contributions. The law also includes a requirement that political parties publish their balance sheets each year in two newspapers, one of which must be distributed nationally.

[38] Vittorio Testa, "Politici e faccendieri in un'autobotte fantasma," *La Repubblica*, 1 January 1993.

[39] Armando Cossutta, *Il finanziamento pubblico dei partiti* (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1974).

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paign expenses. Any other public contributions are prohibited. In particular, companies owned at least 20 percent by the state are forbidden from making contributions.[40]

Domestic and foreign companies and individuals can make donations. Business contributions made by firms must be voted on by firms' boards and entered in their balance sheets. All donations must be reported to the president of the Chamber of Deputies in a document signed jointly by the contributor and the recipient if the gift exceeds 5 million lira per year. Contributions from abroad require that only the recipient must report. Penalties for violating most provisions seem fairly severe, with the exception of violations of the political parties' budgetary requirements. However, the law had not been vigorously enforced as of 1991.[41]

According to a statement from the treasurer of the Christian Democratic party during the Cusani trial, the party required 60–65 billion lira (about $40 million) per year in a nonelection year and 80–85 billion in an election year. The state provided 25 billion, and legal contributions totaled 24 to 30 billion. The shortfall was made up by 16–17 billion lira per year in illegal funds—the result of financial speculation as well as off-the-books contributions.

Although legal funds did not cover the party's declared needs, the law placed no strong constraints on more vigorous legal fundraising efforts. Furthermore, the treasurer's statement hardly reveals a massive shortfall. The implication of his statement is that some portion of the bribes found their way into the personal bank accounts of powerful officials. This conclusion is buttressed by the essentially nonadversarial character of Italian politics during this period. Individual races might be hotly contested, but until the scandals themselves led to a reconfiguration of Italian political life, it is hard to see why massive campaign war chests should be necessary. The need for such funds is especially doubtful when one notices that the illegal contributions were shared among the parties. In the Enimont deal, the Socialists received the largest share and were strong supporters of Gardini; but he also contributed to the other parties including, of course, the Christian Democrats.

The Italian campaign finance laws do not appear to be so restrictive that parties must develop illegal back channels of finance. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the motivation for the payoffs came not from the necessity of finding campaign funds but from the monopoly gains inherent in the control of the chemical industry. This conclusion is consistent with Donatella della Porta's claim that the political parties in Italy were dominated, not by ideologues, but by "businessmen-politicians."[42]

[40] Salvo, "Italy," 112–113.

[41] Ibid., 113–115.

[42] Donatello Della Porta, "Actors in Corruption: Business Politicians in Italy," *International Social Science Journal* 149 (September 1996): 349–364.

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Weak Administrative and Political Controls on Corruption

Both direct controls and indirect political checks were weak. Until the Milan prosecutions began, Italy lacked appropriate systems to monitor and constrain corruption. The Enimont scandal uncovered a pattern of behavior that was widely accepted and institutionalized in the political system. Other cases exposed by the Milan prosecutors demonstrate that the Enimont case was not an aberration. By the end of 1993, magistrates had traced 620 billion lira to politicians, and between February 1992 and February 1994, 4,800 people were arrested. Of these, 930 were businessmen in private or state-owned companies. The industries most affected include advertising, insurance, mineral water, telecommunications, and office equipment. Other scandals involved government high officials taking bribes to speed the approval of new drugs. The construction industry generated, 2,000 arrests, almost 400 of them business people.[43] Ernesto Savona emphasizes the highly organized corruption in public construction contracts. According to him, the payoffs were a fixed percentage of the value of the contract, usually 10 percent.[44]

Internal checks that should have raised questions at the time did not operate effectively. Weak conflict of interest provisions permitted the president of the agency overseeing the stock exchange also to serve as a consultant for Montedison. The Court of Accounts, which has jurisdiction over the spending of public money, had a representative on Eni's board. He did not argue against the purchase of the private shares and only in mid-1991 filed a report stating that he thought the price was too high. The report should have been debated in parliament but was never taken up.

In addition to the failures of internal control mechanisms, the case reveals the risks inherent in systems without effective independent political opposition. In spite of the fragmented nature of the party system, all sides had been coopted to operate cooperatively. Even in states such as Korea and Taiwan, where external threats constrain rulers' self-seeking, the lack of a strong organized opposition always presents the danger that even growth-oriented rulers will give in to excessive kleptocratic behavior.

The Italian executive, however, is weaker and more constrained than in many other regimes. The failure of Montedison's attempt to get a tax break illustrates how an independent legislative body can limit executive and private-sector self-seeking. The example is ambiguous, since it is not clear that anyone had the public interest on his side. But it does show the potential of legislative activism that existed below the surface of Italian politics and that has now become more evident. Although examples of corrupt legislatures certainly exist, elected multimember bodies are inherently more difficult to control than hier-

[43] *The Economist*, 2 July 1994. Denis Mack Smith in "Italy's Dirty Linen" reviews the endemic nature of political corruption and attributes Italy's spiraling public debt in part to the corruption in public life.

[44] Savona, "Beyond Criminal Law," 128–129.

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archical executive organizations. Even when party discipline is high, as is not the case in Italy,[45] the need to convince a coalition of parties makes the coordination of bribes difficult. A two-house legislature creates even more problems. Thus corruption is difficult to use but may appear more necessary to firms as the complexity of the political process increases. However, although multimember, bicameral legislatures may increase the cost of paying bribes to effect a change in the law, they also make it easy to block change with well placed payoffs at strategic points.

The Role of Prosecutors and Judges

The independence of the Italian prosecutors and judges was essential to their attempts to uncover corruption and to their ability to sustain the process over several years. The prosecutors' career paths, training, recruitment, and salary are the same as those of judges; and individual magistrates can act independently of each other.[46] This independence is not some ingrained feature of Italian legal culture but is of relatively recent vintage, dating from the early 1980s.[47]

The prosecutors also have specialized techniques available to facilitate their investigations. In particular, they made widespread use of preventive detention. If a judge holds that a suspect is likely to taint the evidence or flee the country, he or she may be imprisoned for three months.[48] Defenders of the practice argue that detention time was short, and suspects were not asked to repent but only to acknowledge the evidence that the prosecutors had found.[49] Although an effective device to encourage lower-level officials to implicate higher-up ones, the practice risks violating civil liberties so that it is not obvious that it should be part of a blueprint for reform elsewhere. In Italy, preventive detention is a substitute for plea bargaining and the provision of judicial immunity for witnesses who turn state's evidence, neither of which is permitted under Italian law. Prosecutors have proposed a reform bill that would permit both options.[50] If these practices were introduced, preventive detention would be less valuable as a prosecutorial tool.

[45] Party discipline was difficult to maintain before 1988, because voting in the parliament was by secret ballot. See Donovan, "Party Strategy," 123–124.

[46] Vito Marino Caferra, *Il sistema della corruzione. Le regioni, I soggetle, I luoghi.* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1992).

[47] Cazzola, "Della corruzione," 143; G. Palombarini, "Stato di diritto caratteri del'emergenza e cultura della trasformazione," *Questione Giustizia* 2 (Summer 1983): 623–672.

[48] Alberto Vannucci, "La razionalità occulta della corruzione politica" in Antonio A. Martino and Fedele Ruggeri, eds., *Scelta razionale e azione politica* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1995), 129; Savona, "Beyond Criminal Law," 32–33.

[49] Pier Luigi Zanchetta, "Tangentopli tra prospettive politiche e soluzioni giudiziarie," *Questione Giustizia* 13 (1994): 486.

[50] Proposte in materia di prevenzione della corruzione e dell-illecito," *Finanziamento di Partiti Diritto Penale Dell-economia* 7 (October-December 1994): 911–918.

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The basic principle of an independent system of magistrates who can investigate and prosecute cases without obtaining the permission of elected politicians is an important check on malfeasance. Italy's politicians appear to recognize that fact. Some of those calling for constitutional reform in Italy argue that the judiciary is not accountable and that judges and district attorneys are too closely linked. The ruling coalition, however, argues that the judiciary has played an important role in the anticorruption effort and has resisted strong measures to curb their independence.[51]

The present independent judicial system is, however, a weak and insufficient check on corruption. The Italian prosecutors could only act on the basis on information revealed as they followed the leads from one case to another. The system they uncovered had persisted untouched for many years. Past legal prosecutions had remained limited in scope.[52] In addition, an independent group of prosecutors is pointless unless strong laws exist against bribery, illegal campaign contributions, and conflicts of interest, and unless the judiciary itself is largely incorruptible. After passing the 1974 law reforming the system of campaign finance, the Italian parliament never enacted complementary laws dealing with conflicts of interests and reform of state holding companies.[53] Current reform proposals in the parliament do not address these issues.[54] Parliamentary immunity existed until 1994, and it has only been possible to prosecute cabinet ministers for crimes during their tenure since 1990,[55] when a law was passed reforming the system of punishment.[56] Although it weakens some penalties on public officials, it may, in fact, make successful prosecutions easier by making penalties seem less punitive.

The Enimont case revealed the widespread acceptability of illegal payoffs within the Italian political system and showed how competitive payoffs by opposing groups helped determine political decisions with economic consequences. Corruption undermined the state officials' interest in setting a reasonable price on the chemical firm. Depending upon whom they supported and when, their interest was in either too low or too high a price. Given that continued state ownership would provide an ongoing source of patronage, however, it is not hard to see that nationalization had an advantage for politicians.[57]

[51] "Constitutional Reform in Italy Garners Critics," *Financial Times*, 1–2 November 1997.

[52] Caferra, *Il sistema della corruzione;* Vittorio Testa, "Politici e faccendieri in un'autobotte fantasma," *La Repubblica,* 22 January 1993.

[53] Caferra, "Il sistema," 141.

[54] Alberto Vannucci, "Come Combattere la corruzione in Italia?" *Quaderni di Sociologia*, forthcoming, 1998.

[55] Caferra, "Il sistema," 143–145.

[56] Ibid., 152.

[57] In 1995, the Italian government successfully privatized a portion of Eni, Enichem's parent company. To accomplish this, Eni was restructured and Enichem closed more than forty-five plants and sold off weak divisions. See "Six-legged Dog Out of the Kennel: The Eni Sale is a Test of Italy's Credibility and its Privatisation Plans," *Financial Times*, 1 November 1995; "Italian Eni Sale Under Way–At Last," *Financial Times*, 10 November 1995.

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Applications to Latin America

In many Latin American countries, corrupt paternalistic relationships mediate the links between political and economic life. Privatization may simply mean that public firms are transferred to wealthy domestic investors.[58] Those in power can discipline mavericks by accusing them of corruption or otherwise excluding them from power and wealth. Corruption is entrenched in many countries in the region, and reform looks especially difficult in those Latin American countries where a few interconnected families control the political and economic system.[59] Nevertheless, the Italian case suggests that even when a country has a large state-owned sector and a small, politically powerful business elite, anticorruption reform can be a popular political issue.

Most countries in Latin America have democratic governments, but many are newly formed and follow a long history of alternation between military and civilian power. They are characterized by strong executives with control over both the legislature and the judiciary. Most chief executives can govern extensively by executive order, particularly in critical times. Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela provide recent examples of countries where corruption has been combined with strong executive power.[60] Until recent gains for opposition parties in the national Congress and at the state and local level, Mexico has had a one-party state with executive dominance and high levels of corruption.[61] Elected Latin American presidents have great freedom of action while in office.[62] In contrast, Italy has been a democracy since the end of World War II, governed by coalitions led by one or another faction of the Christian Democrats. The executive is not very powerful in its own right.

In spite of these differences, most Latin American democracies are like Italy before the Clean Hands investigations in that little effective separation of

[58] Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, *The Financial System and Public Enterprise Reform: Concepts and Cases*, Policy Research Working Paper no. 1319 (Washington DC: The World Bank, July 1994).

[59] According to *The Economist*, "family-controlled conglomerates continue to dominate Latin America's private sector. They account for more than two-thirds of the 33 largest private business groups in Brazil. . . . The biggest business groups in Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, too are diverse family-owned empires . . . [T]wo Chilean family groups . . . continue to outstrip [newly privatized] companies in size as well as diversity," See Michael Reid, "Survey: Business in Latin America," *The Economist*, 6–12 December 1997, 7. On Venezuela, see Moisés Naim, *Las empresas venezolanas: Su gerencia* (Caracas: IESA, 1989), 504.

[60] David Fleischer, "Attempts at Corruption Control in Brazil: Congressional Investigations and Strengthening Internal Control" (paper prepared for the 1995 meeting on the Latin American Studies Association, Washington DC, 28–30 September 1995); Luigi Manzetti, *Privatizing South American Style* (draft manuscript, Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 1996); Manzetti and Blake, "Market Reforms."

[61] Stephen D. Morris, *Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991).

[62] Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990): 51–69; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy?" (Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172, 1992).

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powers exists. Thus in spite of its weak executive, Italy before 1994 is like a number of Latin American countries in that it lacked effective political constraints on government power. Italy illustrates the risks of combining a political system lacking strong independent voices with an economic system dominated by a small number of families and firms. Within the constraints of the Italian constitution, the economic elite had little difficulty organizing to gain political favors. The main problems they faced, as illustrated in the Enimont case, were fights among themselves that became battles for political favors. Such fights for publicly provided benefits sometimes became costly exercises in competitive bribery. If firms compete to purchase a privatizing firm by paying off officials, the result is likely to be less money for the treasury as part of the gain goes into the pockets of individuals and political parties. Alternatively, if the number of potential bidders is small, they may collude to keep bids low and share the resulting gains. Latin America contains a number of examples. In the privatization of the oil industry in Argentina, for example, instead of competing for all the oil fields offered for sale, the private companies each bid for a few. After the sales were completed, the companies swapped assets.[63] In the Argentine privatizations in 1989 and 1990, large domestic conglomerates that were President Carlos Menem's political supporters received favored access to enterprises privatized with their monopoly power intact.[64] In contrast, President Collor de Melo (1990–1992) in Brazil isolated himself from traditional power groups and demanded bribes of anyone who wanted a government benefit.[65] In spite of their differences, these cases show how unchecked political power, operating either through stable coalitions or populist rule, can contribute to widespread corruption.

The Italian case suggests a number of lessons for Latin American reformers. It illustrates the value of independent authority flowing from an active legislative opposition, an independent system of prosecutors and judges, and a free press. In Italy, all three factors were weak until shortly before the Clean Hands investigation began, and all contributed to its success. Most Latin American countries lack at least one of these features. Furthermore, Italy demonstrates the risks of an inefficient system of public administration. Finally, it illustrates how competitive forces in the private sector can facilitate change, although there is still considerable doubt as to whether the Clean Hands investigations will lead to the same fundamental reforms in the public administration as have occurred in the political realm.

Independent Legislative Power

An active legislature can check corruption in the executive if it contains credible opposition parties that are not open to bribery and have access to media

[63] Will Ollard, "Tricky Upstream Selloff," *Petroleum Economist*, 16–17 November 1990.
[64] Manzetti, "Privatizing."
[65] Ibid.

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publicity. Until recently, the lack of an effective parliamentary opposition in Italy helped sustain the corrupt system. Illegal campaign payments were revealed in the 1970s with little political impact.[66] The admission by the Lockheed Corporation that it had paid three billion lira in bribes to Italian officials to obtain a contract led to the resignation of a head of state in 1978 but produced no systemic change.[67] Only one politician was convicted, Mario Tanassi, a former defense minister—the only cabinet minister convicted for corruption before Clean Hands.[68] The situation was different in 1989, when the Communists in parliament, who were usually quiescent, changed tactics and opposed the special tax break for Montedison. Montedison officials may have attempted to bribe them as well, but the end result was failure. The independence of the Communists helped defeat Montedison's corrupt efforts.

Obviously a legislature can play only a limited watchdog role if it has little authority. In the highly centralized presidential systems common in Latin America, there is often no need for the executive to consult the legislature. A tax break, such as the one granted to Montedison, could have been awarded by executive order. In Latin America even when the executive must consult the legislature, the ruling parties often lack effective opposition, making the legislature essentially a rubber stamp. One exception that confirms the crucial role of an independent legislature in checking corruption in the executive was President Collor de Melo's impeachment in Brazil in 1991, after which the creation of a second committee to investigate the so-called Budgetgate was pushed through a reluctant congress because of a determined political opposition. However, the opposition was unable to sustain its early victories. The congressional committee investigating Collor's behavior quickly concluded its activities as soon as the case threatened to involve other politicians; the Budgetgate investigation was prematurely closed, and the Senate obstructed successive inquiries.[69]

Prosecutorial and Judicial Independence

Political solutions are not likely to be sufficient in political systems with entrenched corruption. A sustained inquiry requires independent prosecutorial and judicial systems. Brazil was the first Latin American country to impeach a sitting president on corruption charges. The Supreme Court was important in

[66] Robert M. Smith, "Exxon's Italian Payments Tied to Specific Benefits," *New York Times*, 17 July 1975; Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Drugs in Europe," *New York Times*, 21 March 1976.

[67] Smith, "Italy's Dirty Linen."

[68] Tanassi was treated leniently, because the Court of Accounts found that the bribes had not increased the sale price of the Lockheed Hercules airplanes. This finding ignores the opportunity cost of selecting a plane that had been earlier found not to meet defense industry requirements. See Caferra, "Il sistema," 161.

[69] Fleischer, "Attempts," 8, 10–12.

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keeping the congressional process open and honest,[70] but the lack of an independent prosecutorial system limited the courts' ability to follow through. The independence of the Italian prosecutors and judges was essential in permitting them to sustain their anticorruption investigations for several years.

No major Latin American country has an independent and effective prosecutorial and judicial system. Separation of powers does not exist even in countries whose political systems are open and pluralistic such as Venezuela, or are not dominated by the executive, such as Ecuador. In Venezuela, even though intraparty struggles encourage the denunciation of corruption, the judiciary lacks the resources, organization, prestige, and autonomy to assure the timely disposition of cases.[71] The reform of Ecuador's Supreme Court in the mid-1990s, originally designed to depoliticize the judiciary, will probably result in a concentration of power in the hands of Congress. Chile has an autonomous judiciary with almost all appointments and promotions decided within the system. However, because of centuries-old procedures, shortages of judges, widespread nepotism, low wages, and low public esteem, influence-trafficking and corruption are reputed to be widespread.[72] In both Argentina and Peru, the president and his congressional allies have packed the Supreme Court. Fundamental state reform is only just starting in Brazil, and reform in Bolivia did not include the judiciary. As a result, corruption is a major worry of businesses interested in investing in Latin American.[73]

If the prestige and competence of the judiciary can be established, their independence from the political branches can be a potent check on the executive.[74] Obviously, independence is not valuable if judges are not viewed with respect; and even then, they can produce rulings inconsistent with the reforming aims of government. For example, in Brazil the Supreme Court held back a major privatization for a time as it reviewed challenges to the sale, while Argentina's compliant judges made no objection to the recent economic reforms.[75] Nevertheless, inconvenient rulings are the cost of creating an indepen-

[70] Barbara Geddes and Artur Ribeiro Neto, "Institutional Sources of Corruption in Brazil," *Third World Quarterly* 13 (No. 4, 1992): 641–661.

[71] Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Venezuelan Program for Human Rights, Education and Action, *Halfway to Reform: The World Bank and the Venezuelan Justice System* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, August 1996); Rogelio Pérez Perdomo," Corrupción y ambiente de los negocios en Venezuela" in Rogelio Pérez Perdomo and Ruth Capriles Méndez, eds., *Corrupción y control: Una perspectiva comparada* (Caracas: IESA, 1991), 18.

[72] *The Economist*, 2 August 1997, 24–25; see also Gisela von Muhlenbrock, "Discretionality and Corruption: The Chilean Judiciary" (paper presented at the Corruption and Democracy Workshop, North-South Center, University of Miami, 9 May 1995).

[73] Maria Dakolias, *The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean: Elements of Reform*, World Bank Technical Paper No. 319 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), 3.

[74] Lawyers Committee, "Halfway," 45–55, 104–106.

[75] Manzetti, *Privatizing*; "Telia-led Group Waits for Cellphone Verdict," *Financial Times*, 9/10 August 1997; "Privatization Trundles Ahead," *The Economist*, 15 June 1996.

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dent judiciary that can in other situations take on cases dealing with malfeasance by high level officials.

Private-Sector Checks

Among the most important private-sector checks is public opinion, and an important influence on opinion is a free press. Although some observers claimed that journalists criticized government officials more strongly than private business leaders,[76] the Italian press, nevertheless, played an important and newly independent role in covering the Clean Hands investigation.[77] Investigative journalism has flourished in Latin America in recent years under the new democratic regimes. However, in some countries governments and businesses allegedly engage in indirect methods of control through contracts and special favors. In a few others, the government has gone even further to silence the media, either through "public ethics" laws (under discussion in Venezuela, Argentina and Peru), new television licensing laws (Columbia), or direct attacks on journalists (Panama).[78] Those concerned with the control of corruption in Latin America should be especially wary of laws that restrict the press in the name of avoiding "insults" to public officials or maintaining their privacy.

Public Administration Reform

A final direction for reform is improvement in the system of public administration. Italy operates under a system of weak and ineffective internal controls combined with a civil service that gives job security to public employees.[79] The control system operates with long delays. For example, the Court of Accounts rejected the 1982–1987 budgets of the Fund for International Cooperation, a very corrupt area, only in 1993.[80] Furthermore, the laws are very numerous and cumbersome.[81] An Italian expert in public administration, Sabino Cassese, argues that Italy's complex procedures and 100 thousand laws encourage corruption.[82] The process of awarding contracts for public works lacks transparency, according to one observer. This encourages corruption, but it also makes it dif-

[76] Caferra, "Il sistema," 93–94; Zanchetta, "Tangentopoli," 484–485.

[77] Pier Paolo Giglioli, "Political Corruption and the Media: the Tangentopoli Affair," *International Social Science Journal* 149 (September 1996): 381–194; Turone, "Political ladra," 356–357.

[78] *The Economist*, 16 August 1997, 28.

[79] Caferra, "Il sistema," 197.

[80] Luciano Barca, "La patologia degli anni Ottanta" in Luciano Barca and Sandro Trento, eds., *L'Economia Della Corruzione* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1994), 78–79.

[81] In September 1996 the Chamber of Deputies appointed a Council for the Study of the Prevention of Corruption. The Council's final report issued on 23 October 1996 listed as among the causes of corruption the breadth of state intervention and the disarray and complexity of legal norms. See Vannucci, "Come Combattere la corruzione in Italia?"

[82] Alberto Statera, "Cassese: Lo stato sprecone piace ai partiti," interview with Sabino Cassese, *La Stampa*, 2 March 1992.

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ficult for officials to spend the funds allotted.[83] European Union procurement regulations have been abused in the Italian context.[84] In Latin American, even the most successful recent reforms of the state have not improved administrative oversight. In fact, in some cases, such as Argentina, state "reform" led to the elimination of administrative control agencies and the creation of new executive structures filled with political appointees.[85] The Italian case suggests that if administrative reform is not immediately possible, then an independent law enforcement system is necessary to counteract the inadequacy of other oversight systems and the widespread incentives for bribery. Nevertheless, active law enforcement is not a long-term solution in any country. If the underlying causes of corruption include a weak civil service system and a large number of dysfunctional laws, then a long term solution must address these problems. So far, Italy does not provide a positive example on that score. The Commission for the Study of the Prevention of Corruption, a special body appointed by the president of the Chamber of Deputies, issued a report in 1996 that argued for an attack on the fundamental causes of corruption. The reforms actually proposed by the parliament do not address these concerns.[86]

Competitive Pressures

The Italian case suggests one final lesson for Latin America. One should approach the corruption issue not just from the public side but from the private side as well. Measures to increase the outside competitive pressures on the country's business leaders can help reduce economic rents. In general, this implies an open international trading environment and a domestic regulatory system that encourages the entry of new firms. However, reformers must recognize that businesses that expect to be harmed by a more competitive economy may use bribery to preserve their privileged positions. When legal forms of protection are eliminated, firms may turn to illegal methods. The nationalization of Enimont illustrates this possibility. The deal provided Montedison with badly needed resources and enabled it to shed unprofitable divisions for a good price. The Montedison case was apparently not unique. Other firms used corruption to maintain their monopoly or oligopoly positions.[87] According to one scholar, the Clean Hands investigation disclosed a network of public and private com-

[83] Luigi Giorgino, "Opere pubbliche prima e dopo Tangentopoli," *Stato e Mercato* 42 (December 1994): 413–414.

[84] Ibid., 427.

[85] Dora Orlansky, "Democratization, State Reform and Political Inflation," (paper presented at the XVI IPSA Meetings, Buenos Aires, 1994); Horacio Verbitsky, *Robo para la corona* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1991).

[86] Vannucci, "Come Combattere."

[87] Giuseppe De Rita, "Autolegittimazione e nuovi soggetti" in Barca and Trento, eds., *L'economia della corruzione*; Della Porta and Vannucci "Corruzione politica"; Zanchetta, "Tangentopoli," 482.

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panies and political pressure groups that maintained a protected domestic market under state guidance.[88]

Political-economic systems such as those in Italy and parts of Latin America may be difficult to reform from within. Existing business and political leaders may coopt the reform process. The Clean Hands investigations in Italy have shaken up the political world, but they have done little to change the structure of Italian business. Nevertheless, independent investigations are a useful tool. Latin American countries could take the first steps to make such investigations not only possible but also credible. Beyond that, they need to consider how to increase competitiveness. International aid organizations can help by insisting on economic liberalization, but some countries are too small to support a competitive structure. Here Italy provides another example. Its participation in the European Union has reduced the monopoly power of individual firms that must now compete with firms throughout Europe. Neither inefficient public firms nor private firms used to protected monopoly status can survive in such an environment unless they either become more efficient or extract even more subsidies from the state. The first possibility is the hoped for result, but the second should not be ignored and suggests the importance of including limits on state aids in multilateral free trade agreements. In fact, the funds pumped into Enichem after the public takeover raised warning signals in the European Union and prompted an investigation.

Conclusion

As the Italian case illustrates, democracy and the free market are not invariably an antidote for corruption. A shift from authoritarian to democratic rule does not necessarily reduce payoffs. Rather it redefines the country's norms of public behavior. A country that democratizes without also creating and enforcing laws governing conflict of interest, financial enrichment, and bribery risks undermining its fragile new institutions through private wealth seeking. A country that moves to liberalize its economy without a similar reform of the state risks creating severe pressures on officials to share in the new private wealth. A country that establishes the forms of a modern competitive economy while retaining the ties between concentrated private wealth and public power risks creating the form without the substance of a competitive market economy.

In Italy, the anticorruption investigations were possible because of the independence of the prosecutors and were aided by the openness of public debate and the freedom of the press. Thus the case contains a dark lesson for determined autocrats. In Latin American democracies, a strong president might conclude that independent prosecutorial and judicial authorities, and freedom of press and organization are dangerous institutions. This possibility is a real one,

[88] Gianmario Cazzaniga, "Sulle cause morali della corruzione" in Barca and Sandro, eds., *L'economia della corruzione*, 34–35.

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where powerful executives control the levers of power, and new or reconstituted democracies are struggling to become established. Most countries in the region are undergoing radical economic reforms that impose high social costs and create possibilities for private gain. If corruption arises in connection with these reforms, it will undermine both the reforms and the popular legitimacy of democracy itself. A subtle and restrained autocrat, even one who must face periodic elections, might seek to limit independent sources of power and information. The end result, however, could be the end of meaningful democratic government as well as a backlash against economic reform.*

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Bob Dole's Age and Health in the 1996 Election: Did the Media Let Us Down?

HERBERT L. ABRAMS
RICHARD BRODY

The age of Senator Robert Dole, the oldest man ever to run for the presidency, was a substantive issue in the election of 1996. But was it influential in the minds of the electorate as they cast their ballots? We consider in this article the association of aging with the likelihood of illness and of significant cognitive change. We also examine the risk factors revealed by Senator Dole's personal and family medical history. To determine how much of this information was available to the public, we analyze media content on these subjects across the election year. We then trace the sources of the public's assessment of whether Dole's age and health would affect his performance as president and whether this judgment, in turn, affected the likelihood of voting for him.

The election took place against a background of many years of hype on the pleasures of joining the ranks of the elderly.[1] This heady mix has gone well beyond longer life expectancy to include better health, more security, and the joys of the new passage. Ill health, disability, memory loss, poverty, and all of the afflictions of old age are somehow set aside in the thrust to paint a romantic picture of seniors that unfortunately corresponds to the reality for only a fraction of the group.

It is true that the life span is steadily increasing. In 1900, life expectancy in the United States at birth was 47 years, while in 1997 it is 76.[2] The proportion

[1] "The Age Boom: A Special Issue," *New York Times Magazine*, 8 March 1997.
[2] Alexandra Bandon, "Longer, Healthier, Better" in ibid., 44–45.

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of the population 65 years of age or older will virtually double by 2030, to reach the staggering figure of 20 percent. But even while some enthusiastically herald the graying of America, the conversation of others focuses grimly on Social Security and Medicare, and how quickly or slowly they will drive us to bankruptcy. Somewhat less attention is devoted to the potential political impact, the fact that even today seniors represent more than 20 percent of both the voting population and of those who actually cast their ballots.

The political strength of the elderly may well have been reflected in the choice of the Republican candidate for president in 1996. After all, Robert Dole was the oldest man ever to seek a first term. His nomination gave visibility once more to the issue of aging leaders and their capacity to govern. There was nothing new about this concern.[3] The United States in the twentieth century has witnessed numerous instances in which presidents have had major illness while in the White House. Some of them (Franklin D. Roosevelt and Warren Harding) died; others, like Woodrow Wilson, were impaired in the conduct of office. Many had heart disease, and others had high blood pressure, strokes, major surgery, and cancer.[4]

If Dole had been elected president, he would have reached the age of 77 by the end of his first term. We can only speculate about whether he would actually have lived through the four years without disability.

Age, Illness, and Cognition

The Likelihood of Disease in the Elderly

No matter how healthy the elderly candidate for the presidency appears to be, there is a significant likelihood that he will not survive or that his intellectual powers and leadership ability may be compromised, far more so than among those in their fifties.[5] For example, during the period from age 75 to 84, there is a thirty-four times greater probability that a man will die of a stroke, seventeen times greater chance that he will die of heart disease, and twelve times

[3] Jerrold M. Post and Robert S. Robins, *When Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Bert E. Park, *The Impact of Illness on World Leaders* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986); Hugh L'Etang, *Ailing Leaders in Power: 1914–1994* (London: Royal Society of Medicine Press, 1995); Robert E. Gilbert, *The Mortal Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Robert H. Ferrell, *Ill-Advised: Presidential Health and Public Trust* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992); Kenneth R. Crispell and Carlos F. Gomez, *Hidden Illness in the White House* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988); Edward B. MacMahon and Leonard Curry, *Medical Cover-Ups in the White House* (Washington, DC.: Farragut Publishing, 1988).

[4] Herbert L. Abrams, *The President Has Been Shot: Confusion, Disability, and the 25th Amendment in the Aftermath of the Attempted Assassination of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Norton, 1992), 259–60.

[5] These issues are treated in greater detail in Herbert L. Abrams, "Should a Senior Citizen be President?" *Atlantic Monthly*, in press.

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greater chance that he will die of malignancy than an individual aged 45 to 54.[6] One in three of all men aged 60 to 79 will develop an invasive cancer. In each successive decade after 55, the incidence of stroke more than doubles.[7] Among those alive at age 70–74, 24 percent will die within the next four years, while 33 percent of those aged 75–79 will die before they reach the age of 80.[8]

In the age group 65 to 74, a 60 percent higher rate of surgery occurs than in those 55 to 64.[9] During the decade after 65, far more coronary artery bypass grafts and open heart surgical procedures are performed than in the preceding decade.[10] When surgery is performed in those over 65, the mortality rate is twice as high as for those 55 to 65.[11] Although only 12 percent of all patients who come to surgery are actually over 60, 33 percent of those who die at surgery are in that age group.[12]

One illness that would incapacitate the occupant of the White House is Alzheimer's disease. Its incidence doubles every five years in those over the age of 65. Diagnosed in only 3 percent of individuals between 65 and 74, it develops in 19 percent of those in the next decade of life.[13]

Illness and Cognition

Heart disease, stroke, cancer, infection, and surgery, and its complications not only affect the elderly disproportionately but also have major cognitive consequences. Anxiety, depression, difficulty in concentration, and problems with

[6] Calculated from statistics in *Health United States 1994*, DHHS Publication No. (PHS) 95-1232 (Hyattsville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Services, National Center for Health Statistics, 1994), 113–116.

[7] American Heart Association, *Heart and Stroke Facts: 1995, Statistical Supplement* (Dallas: American Heart Association, 1995), 11.

[8] Charity A. Dorgan, ed., *Statistical Record of Health and Medicine* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1995), 10–11.

[9] Robin A. Cohen and Joan F. Van Nostrand, eds., "Trends in the Health of Older Americans: United States, 1994," *National Center for Health Statistics: Vital Health Statistics*, 3d ser., no. 3 (1995): 242–244.

[10] Brenda S. Gillum, Edmund J. Graves, and Lola J. Kozak, eds., "Trends in Hospital Utilization: United States 1988–1992," *National Center for Health Statistics: Vital Health Statistics*, 13th ser., no. 124 (1996): 50.

[11] S. C. Farrow et al., "Epidemiology in Anesthesia II: Factors Affecting Mortality in the Hospital," *British Journal of Anesthesiology* 54 (August 1982): 811; Floyd D. Loop et al., "Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery in the Elderly: Indications and Outcome," *Cleveland Journal of Medicine* 55 (January/February 1988): 23; K. F. Hatton et al., "Morbidity and Mortality Associated With Anesthesia: Preliminary Results" in John Lunn and William Mushin, eds., *Mortality Associated with Anesthesia* (London: Nuffield Provincial Hospital Trust, 1982), 24.

[12] G. F. Marx, C. V. Mateo, and L. R. Orkin, "Computer Analysis of Postanesthetic Deaths," *Anesthesiology* 39 (1973): 54.

[13] Dennis A. Evans et al., "Prevalence of Alzheimer's Disease in a Community Population of Older Persons," *JAMA* (Journal of the American Medical Association) 262 (November 1989): 2551–6.

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sleep are associated with heart attacks in many patients.[14] In the depths of the depression that President Dwight D. Eisenhower experienced following his heart attack in 1955, he reflected that time had passed him by.[15] One-third of patients are subject to fatigue, impaired memory, and inability to concentrate six to twenty-six months after the event.[16] Subsequent to a stroke, depression, anxiety and emotional lability are frequently observed.[17] Cognitive and emotional impairment, headaches, and memory loss are common.[18]

For many patients, major surgery is a drastic physical assault. Anxiety, difficulty in concentration, confusion, and deterioration of memory frequently follow.[19] When President Ronald Reagan required chest surgery after John Hinckley's assassination attempt in 1981, Nancy Reagan noted on the second postoperative day that the president was disoriented as to time.[20]

Postsurgical patients may lose the ability to conceptualize or to engage in analytic reasoning effectively.[21] Even following coronary artery bypass surgery, adverse effects on the brain are "common and serious" and patients may have neurologic deficits postoperatively.[22] Cancer is understandably accompanied by depression,[23] together with anxiety and regressive behavior in many patients.[24] Depression, anxiety, irritability, and emotional instability may interfere with function in the presence of hypertension.[25]

[14] E. L. Cay et al., "Psychological Status During Recovery From an Acute Heart Attack," *Journal of Psychosomatic Research* 16 (October 1972): 425–435; E. L. Cay et al., "Psychologic Reactions to a Coronary Care Unit," ibid., 437–447.

[15] Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 154.

[16] E. L. Cay et al., "Psychologic Reactions to a Coronary Care Unit," 437–447; Ole F. Leegard, "Diffuse Cerebral Symptoms in Convalescents from Cerebral Infarction and Myocardial Infarction," *Acta Neurologica Scandinavica* 67 (June 1983): 348–355.

[17] P. B. Storey, "Brain Damage and Personality Change After Subarachnoid Hemorrhage," *British Journal of Psychiatry* 117 (August 1970): 129–142.

[18] M. J. Short, W. P. Wilson, and G. L. Odom, "Psychiatric Sequelae of Subarachnoid Hemorrhage," *Southern Medical Journal* 61 (January 1968): 87–91.

[19] Nancy C. Andreasen, "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder" in Harold I. Kaplan, Alfred M. Friedman, and Benjamin J. Sadock, eds., *Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry*, vol. 2, 3d ed. (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1980), 1519. James L. Titchener, "Management and Study of Psychological Response to Trauma," *Journal of Trauma* 10 (November 1970): 974–80.

[20] John Pekkanen, "The Saving of the President," *Washingtonian*, August 1981, 125.

[21] Marek-Marsel Mesulam and Norman Geschwind, "Disordered Mental States in the Postoperative Period," *Urology Clinics of North America* 3 (June 1976): 199–215.

[22] Gary A. Roach et al., "Adverse Cerebral Outcomes After Coronary Bypass Surgery," *New England Journal of Medicine* 325 (19 December 1996): 1857–1863.

[23] Jing Hsu, "Depression in Cancer Patients: An Overview," *Hawaii Medical Journal* 45 (August 1986): 272–290; Peter Maguire, "The Psychological Impact of Cancer," *British Journal of Hospital Medicine* 34 (August 1985): 100–103; Carol A. Morris, "Self-Concept as Altered by the Diagnosis of Cancer," *Nursing Clinics of North America* 20 (December 1985): 611–630.

[24] Leonard R. Derogatis et al., "The Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorders Among Cancer Patients," *JAMA* 249 (11 February 1983): 751–7; T. T. Lloyd, A. C. Parker, and C. A. Ludlam, "Emotional Impact of Diagnosis and Early Treatment of Lymphomas," *Journal of Psychosomatic Research* 28 (1984): 157–162.

[25] Nathaniel S. Apter, Ward C. Halstead, and Robert Heimburger, "Impaired Cerebral Functions in Essential Hypertension," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 107 (May 1951): 808–813.

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Presidents and other leaders receive drugs for their illnesses that invariably have side effects. Anesthetics sometimes take days to be eliminated from the body.[26] Drowsiness, mental clouding, and a sense of detachment are sequelae of many drugs, more so in the elderly.[27]

Age and Cognition

Illness, surgery, and drug effects are not the only sources of disquiet. Mental acuity may decline with increasing age, in spite of the sometimes extravagant praise of the life-style of senior citizens.[28] Information processing becomes less efficient[29] and both verbal memory and reasoning ability decline with age.[30] Creativity, the ability to devise new answers to difficult questions, frequently diminishes with time,[31] together with resilience and the capacity to unravel complexity.[32] In the so-called decision-making skills, age decrements have consis-

[26] John R. Trounce, *Clinical Pharmacology for Nurses* (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1985), 147; Fred Leavitt, *Drugs and Behavior* (New York: John Wiley, 1982), 21, 31, 169; Kari Korttila et al., "Recovery and Simulated Driving After Intravenous Anesthesia with Thiopental, Methohexital, Propanidid, or Alphadione," *Anesthesiology* 43 (September 1975): 291–99.

[27] Leavitt, *Drugs and Behavior*, 20, 117; Kari Korttila and M. Linnoila, "Psychomotor Skills Related to Driving After Intramuscular Administration of Diazepam and Meperidine," *Anesthesiology* 42 (June 1975): 685–91.

[28] A glaring example of the excessive romanticizing of seniors may be found in an issue of the *New York Times Magazine* entitled "The Age Boom," 9 March 1997. Nowhere in the series of articles is there a serious effort to depict the health consequences, disability, and cognitive effects associated with aging. An unapologetic reference to "living to 100, with . . . brain functions, especially memory, relatively unimpaired" (p. 14) runs seamlessly into a "new stage of life [that] emerges more clearly every day . . . longer, better, healthier" (pp. 42, 44). "84 Going on 50" is the title of one piece (pp 52, 53). "We are living it up," 81 year old Mary Coleman said (p. 63). To be sure, more old people are more comfortable than in the past. What is buried in "The Age Boom," however, is the vast number of the elderly whose life is marginal because of physical, functional, and cognitive changes that are profoundly incapacitating.

[29] John M. Rybash, William Hoyer, and Paul A Roodin, *Adult Cognition and Aging* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1986), 99.

[30] Timothy A. Salthouse, *Adult Cognition: An Experimental Psychology of Human Aging* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), 67; Douglas H. Powell, *Profiles in Cognitive Aging* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 202; Timothy A. Salthouse and Kenneth A. Prill, "Inferences About Age Impairments in Inferential Reasoning," *Psychology of Aging* 2 (March 1987): 43–51; Jack Botwinick, "Intellectual Abilities" in James E. Birren and K. Warner Schaie, eds., *Handbook of the Psychology of Aging* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1977), 580–603; Warren F. Gorman and Cris D. Campbell, "Mental Acuity of the Normal Elderly," *Journal of the Oklahoma State Medical Association* 88 (March 1995): 119–23; Nancy W. Denney, "Critical Thinking During the Adult Years: Has the Developmental Function Changed Over the Last Four Decades?" *Experimental Aging Research* 21 (April/June 1995): 191–207.

[31] Dennis B. Bromley, "Age and Sex Differences in the Serial Production of Creative Conceptual Responses," *Journal of Gerontology* 22 (January 1967): 32–42; Patricia K. Alpaugh and James E. Birren, "Variables Affecting Creative Contributions Across the Adult Life Span," *Human Development* 20 (1977): 240.

[32] Salthouse, *Adult Cognition*, 83; Asenath La Rue, *Aging and Neuropsychological Assessment* (New York: Plenum Press, 1992): 76.

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tently been found.[33] Physical endurance becomes more limited[34] and may alter the fitness required to function in extended negotiations.

Cerebral arteriosclerosis frequently affects the elderly. Jerrold Post and others have described the inflexibility, emotional changes, and altered judgment that may characterize this condition in older leaders as a potential factor in unpredictable political decisions.[35]

Dole's Health Risks

Although Dole seemed to be in excellent general condition, he had a history of injuries and illness.[36] During convalescence from his war injuries, his right kidney was removed because of stones and infection. In 1981, he developed stones in the remaining left kidney, requiring surgery for their removal. Electrocardiograms in 1980[37] and 1981 showed abnormalities suggestive of a heart attack, prompting Dole to undergo coronary arteriography in December 1982, which was said to be normal.[38] Unfortunately, the arteriogram is no longer available for independent review.

Dole had radical prostatectomy for prostate cancer in 1991, and by December 1996 he became a "five year survival." Nevertheless, prostate cancer may recur in unpredictable fashion long after a symptom-free interval and years of apparent absence of disease. In 1985, adenomatous polyps were found in his colon and removed. These are potentially premalignant. It is not clear how many pack-years Dole smoked. He stopped in 1982 after about forty years and

[33] Salthouse, *Adult Cognition*, 101–2. In contrast to the uniform decrements in cognitive function with aging described by Salthouse and many other workers in developmental psychology, Baltes and his colleagues contend that certain problem-solving abilities are maintained throughout a longer part of the life cycle. See, for example, Paul B. Baltes, "On the Incomplete Architecture of Human Ontology," *American Psychologist* 52 (April 1997): 366–380. Baltes suggests that while such central cognitive functions as memory and speed of information processing ("cognitive mechanics," in his term) exhibit consistent age losses, so-called wisdom related performance ("cognitive pragmatics") may be maintained "at least up to age 70." Nevertheless, he believes that "when the age range of 70–100 years is reached, all cognitive dimensions exhibit losses."

[34] M. Powell Lawton, "Contextual Perspectives: Psychosocial Influences" in Leonard W. Poon, ed., *Handbook for the Clinical Memory Assessment of Older Adults* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1992), 35, 36.

[35] Jerrold M. Post, "On Aging Leaders: Possible Effects of the Aging Process on the Conduct of Leadership," *Journal of Geratric Psychiatry* 6 (1979): 109–116; Jerrold M. Post, "The Seasons of a Leader's Life: Influences of the Life Cycle on Political Behavior," *Political Psychology* (Fall/Winter 1980): 35–49; Bert E. Park, "Presidential Disability: Past Experiences and Future Implications" *Politics and the Life Sciences* 7 (August 1988): 50–66.

[36] 1996 medical report on Bob Dole, with the results of physical examination conducted by Dr. John F. Eisold, MD, 21 July 1996. Document obtained through Dole Press Office in Washington, DC. Lawrence K. Altman, "Doctors Call Dole's Health Excellent," *New York Times*, 21 July 1996.

[37] Freeman H Cary, "Health Status of the Candidates: Senator Robert J. Dole," *Medical World News*, 18 February 1980.

[38] Altman, "Doctors Call Dole's Health Excellent."

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has no residual respiratory symptoms. Still, past smoking is always a risk factor for lung cancer, bronchitis, and emphysema.

Dole's family history also warranted attention. His brother, a life long smoker, died of emphysema at 68. His mother died at 80 of a heart attack, and his father died of a ruptured aortic aneurysm at the age of 75. His sister, 75, has a lymphoma, now in remission after chemotherapy. Heart disease, aneurysms, and malignancy in family members heighten the probability of illness in the individual.[39]

The drugs that Dole was taking—pravachol and niacin for his cholesterol, zantac for esophagitis, ibuprofen for his shoulder pain—all have known complications, many involving the central nervous system, intestine, genitourinary tract, and blood elements. While these drugs are generally well tolerated, the older age group is more vulnerable to the side effects.

Those are the specifics, many of them relating to age and representing important risk factors. How aware was the voting public of the health effects and the cognitive changes that characterize the aging process?

Age and the Media

The motif of age arose early in the campaign. One study during the primary found over 800 news stories in which "age" was associated with Dole, while it was almost never referred to in articles on his rivals.[40] Dole helped maintain its prominence by alluding repeatedly to his "maturity" and the experience that came with it. In spite of the allusions to Dole's age, the potential consequences were rarely handled with the depth and specificity that might have made them fully understandable to the public. A search for news stories on these topics in seventeen national and regional newspapers, four television news programs, and three high-circulation news magazines revealed generally inadequate coverage during the two years preceding the presidential election on 5 November 1996. Beyond the volume of coverage, the stories that ran contained little substantive information on the serious cognitive and physical changes that are likely to accompany aging. By and large, the American public remained ignorant of the huge information base documenting the impact of aging and ill health on the cognitive capacities essential for an effective presidency.

Analysis of the number of news stories that dealt with the issue of age in the periods between CBS-TV/*New York Times* polls is recorded in Table 1. These results showed a noticeable peak in news magazines, on television, and

[39] Joellen M. Schildkraut et al., "Coronary Risk Associated With Age and Sex of Parental Heart Disease in the Framingham Study," *American Journal of Cardiology* 64 (September 1989): 555–559; Kaj Johansen and Thomas Koepsell, "Familial Tendency for Abdominal Aortic Aneurysms," *JAMA* 256 (10 October 1986): 1934–1936; Linda M. Pottern et al., "Familial Cancers Associated With Subtypes of Leukemia and Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma," *Leukemia Research* 15 (1991): 305–314.

[40] Frank J. Murray, "Selling a Golden Oldie in the Market of Youth: Dole Emphasizes His Health, Not Age," *Washington Times,* 11 March 1996.

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TABLE 1

Number of Magazine, Television News, and Newspaper Stories that Contained at Least a Paragraph of Information on Dole's Age and Health between Each Poll

Period between polls	*Dates*	*Magazine Articles*[a]	*Television News Stories*[b]	*Newspaper Articles*[c]
Before poll 1	1 January 1995 to 18 January 1996	8	4	11
1 and 2	18 January to 22 February	2	0	4
2 and 3	22 February to March 10	0	0	2
3 and 4	10 March to 31 March	0	1	7
4 and 5	31 March to 11 July	0	1	5
5 and 6	11 July to 3 August	0	5	11
6 and 7	3 August to 16 August	0	2	0
7 and 8	16 August to 2 September	0	1	0
After 8	2 September to 4 November 1996	1	1	3

[a] Collected from a Lexis-Nexis search of *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *USNews and World Report* magazines.

[b] Collected from a search of ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN transcripts compiled in the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

[c] Collected from a Lexis-Nexis search of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Los Angeles Times*.

in newspapers in July 1996, which coincided with Dole's 73rd birthday.[41] Dole also released copies of his most recent medical examinations in July 1996, which generated additional media attention to the age issue. In the newspapers, another small peak was apparent in March 1996, when Dole's lock on the Republican nomination became all but certain.

Among the three different media sources examined, the news magazines provided the least coverage of Dole's age. In 1995, they published eleven articles on the subject, but only three between 18 January 1996 and the November election, the period when the electorate might have been most affected by complete coverage of the issue. Some of the articles on age contained substantive information about Dole's health,[42] but none discussed in detail the cognitive and physical changes that occur with aging.

The television networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN) had slightly more coverage of Dole's age, particularly in July 1996 during his 73rd birthday. These news stories were somewhat more focused on Dole's health, with six of the fifteen containing at least a brief summary of Dole's medical records.

Collectively, the nation's three major newspapers (*New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Los Angeles Times*) published more stories on Dole's age and health than did magazine and television sources in 1995 and 1996. Coverage was still light, however, as shown in Table 2, which records the number of articles published per week per newspaper in the prestige and regional papers. This index of coverage remained well below one except for July 1996. The major

[41] There had also been a spike around his birthday in 1995.

[42] Christine Gorman, Hannah Bloch, and J. Madeleine Nash, "Medical Verdict: One Very Healthy Septuagenarian," *Time*, 31 July 1995.

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TABLE 2

Index of Coverage (Stories per Week) per Newspaper in the Period between Each Poll[a]

Period between polls	*Dates*	*NY Times, Washington Post, LA Times*	*Regional papers and selected news services*[b]
Before poll 1	1 January 1995 to 18 January 1996	0.07	0.04
1 and 2	18 January to 22 February	0.27	0.07
2 and 3	22 February to 10 March	0.27	0.06
3 and 4	10 March to 31 March	0.74	0.18
4 and 5	31 March to 11 July	0.11	0.06
5 and 6	11 July to 3 August	1.12	0.61
6 and 7	3 August to 16 August	0	0.19
7 and 8	16 August to 2 September	0	0.15
After 8	2 September to 4 November 1996	0.11	0.15

[a] The index was created to be certain of comparable coverage of poll periods of unequal length. Numbers in columns represent the total of articles during the stipulated period, divided by the number of weeks in the period, divided by the number of newspapers in the sample. Thus, from 11 January to 22 February 1996 there were five articles (in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*), divided by five weeks, divided by three newspapers—or 0.27 stories per week per newspaper.

[b] *Chicago Tribune*, *USA Today*, *Boston Globe*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Plain Dealer* (Cleveland), *Arizona Republic*, *Star Tribune* (Minneapolis), *Atlanta Journal*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *St. Petersburg Times* (Florida), *Orlando Sentinel*, *Seattle Times*, Gannet News Service, and Reuters North America.

papers consistently had greater coverage than the regional papers except for the last three months of the election.

Table 3 summarizes the total number of articles in the major and regional newspapers from January 1995 through November 1996. By September, the Dole campaign had succeeded in directing public attention to Clinton's failure to be more forthcoming on his medical status and records, with a spate of articles following. These initially raised questions as to what Clinton was hiding and subsequently analyzed the material he released in September, as well as his responses to an interview. As the campaign ended, there were far more articles in toto on Dole's age (124) than on his health (45), which were not a great deal more numerous than those on Clinton's health (33).

Of the articles written on Dole's age, few contained information that could have aided the public in weighing the risks and benefits of electing a 73-year-old president. Only four articles gave a comprehensive summary of Dole's medical record and explained the results.[43] About an equal number focused on Dole's prostate cancer and offered a general discussion of the risks of the cancer returning; two of these pieces also reported on his war wounds.[44] The remaining

[43] Lawrence K. Altman, "Medical Data Show Dole Is Remarkably Fit," *New York Times*, 22 July 1996; Altman, "Doctors Call Dole's Health Excellent"; Blaine Harden, "Dole's Birthday Renews Age-Old Old-Age Debate," *Washington Post*, 21 July 1996; Ceci Connolly, "Sturdy Enough?" *St. Petersburg Times*, 14 July 1996.

[44] Altman, "Dole Backs Idea of Independent Health Check," *New York Times*, 22 July 1996; David Willman, "Prostate Cancer Legislation Poses Dilemma for Dole," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 December 1995; Jack Nelson, "Dole Has Healthy Respect For Age Issue," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 July 1996; Don

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TABLE 3

Content by Topic of Prestige and Regional Newspaper Articles[a]

Period between polls	*Dates*	*Total*	*Dole Age*	*Dole Health*	*Clinton Health*[b]
Before poll 1	1 January 1995 to 18 January 1996	52	19	4	29
1 and 2	18 January to 22 February	9	5	0	4
2 and 3	22 February to March 10	5	5	0	0
3 and 4	10 March to 31 March	47	26	21	0
4 and 5	31 March to 11 July	19	16	3	0
5 and 6	11 July to 3 August	15	15	0	0
6 and 7	3 August to 16 August	5	4	1	0
7 and 8	16 August to 2 September	9	9	0	0
After 8	2 September to 4 November 1996	46	30	16	0
	Total	207	129	45	33

[a] Articles which contained information on both Dole's age and health were counted once in each column. (There were eighteen such articles.) Collected from a Lexis-Nexis search of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Los Angeles Times*, *USA Today*, *Boston Globe*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Plain Dealer* (Cleveland), *Arizona Republic*, *Star Tribune* (Minneapolis), *Atlanta Journal*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *St. Petersburg Times* (Florida), *Orlando Sentinel*, *Seattle Times*, Gannet News Service, and Reuters North America.

[b] Articles about the release of Clinton's medical records/health.

articles briefly summarized the findings in his medical report without any interpretation.

Among the articles dedicated to Dole's age, only about half contained any reference to the ability of a person in his 70s to handle the demands of the presidency, and most of these included only a superficial discussion of the issue. While eleven articles discussed the increased risk of illness that accompanies old age, only five included testimony from medical authorities.[45] Coverage of

Colburn, "Doctors Deem Dole Fit for 1996 Run," *Washington Post*, 22 July 1995; Judi Hasson, "Dole Shrugs Off Age Issue," *USA Today*, 21 July 1995.

[45] Connolly, "Sturdy Enough?"; Harden, "Dole Renews Age-Old Debate"; Abigail Trafford, "The Old Gray-Haired: They Ain't What They Used to Be," *Washington Post*, 26 March 1996; Sherry Jacobson, "Experts Divided on Impact of Dole's Age on Election," *Dallas Morning News*, reprinted in "Dole's Time or Past His Prime," *Arizona Republic*, 7 April 1996; Michael Kranish, "How Old is Too Old? At 72, Dole Feels Fit—But the Presidency is a Crushing Job," *Boston Globe*, 30 July 1995.

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the cognitive changes of aging was somewhat more substantial, with seventeen articles at least mentioning the issue and six citing studies of experts on aging.[46]

Slightly more than half of all the articles on Dole's age expressed the view that it was a political liability and would hinder his ability to be president.[47] A majority of the more detailed articles expressed the opposite view: that Dole's age should not be a cause for concern.

Three of the five articles that cited experts in their discussion of illness and aging presented a balanced view of the issue. The other two depicted the elderly as a generally healthy population and argued that Dole was perfectly able to carry on the responsibilities of the presidency.[48] Elsewhere, in a somewhat spurious equation, it was noted that "many elderly people are infirm and burdened with illness. But *far more numerous* are seniors in good health . . . in recent decades there has been an explosive growth of healthy 80-something men and women." More numerous than the sick and infirm? The same article pointed out that only 44 percent of men over 80 were fit and active.[49]

Five of the six articles that examined aging and cognition expressed the view that a downturn in sentience is not necessarily a correlate of old age.[50] To be sure, the changes are not uniform in the population. But the implication that its occurrence is unusual flies in the face of most psychometric data on the cognitive decrements in older individuals.

In summary, a thorough consideration of news coverage of the health and cognitive consequences of aging indicates that the media were delinquent in conveying an appropriate understanding of the issues involved. It was not that the candidates' health went unnoticed. But no one could derive from the media a sound estimate of Dole's likelihood of either death or disability before the end of his first term (or second, if he lived). Beyond the inadequate reportage of what was known, there was a deficit in conveying the degree to which slowed information processing might impair urgent decisions for the nation under the pressure of time. There was laxity in grappling with the meaning of the loss of memory, concentration, analytic ability, and energy that so many of the elderly complained of during interviews with many reporters. They, the elderly, knew

[46] Harden, "Dole Renews Age-Old Debate"; Trafford, "The Old Gray-Haired"; Connolly, "Sturdy Enough?"; Hanson, "Active Dole Says Age Not an Issue," *USA Today*, 22 July 1996; Maureen West, "When is One Old?" *Phoenix Gazette*, 26 July 1996, reprinted in "New Take on What Defines Old," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 August 1996; Tait Trussell, "Voter Concern Over Dole's Age is Off the Mark," *Orlando Sentinel*, 11 August 1996.

[47] One indication of the prevalence of this negative view is the fact that thirty-six of the forty-one articles that cited public opinion polls interpreted the data to indicate that most people think Dole is too old.

[48] Harden, "Dole's Birthday Renews Age-Old Debate"; Trafford, "The Old Gray-Haired."

[49] Trafford, "The Old Gray-Haired." (Emphasis added.)

[50] Harden, "Dole Renews Age-Old Debate"; Trafford, "The Old Gray-Haired"; Hanson, "Active Dole Says Age Not an Issue"; Maureen West, "When is One Old?"; Tait Trussell, "Voter Concern Over Dole's Age is Off the Mark."

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TABLE 4

Distribution on the Question, Over the Course of the Year, "If Bob Dole is elected president he will be 73 years old when he takes office. Do you think his age will help him to be an effective president, or do you think his age would be an obstacle to being an effective president, or wouldn't his age matter than much"?[a]

Poll Dates	*It Would Be an Obstacle*	*It Wouldn't Matter*	*It Would Help*	*N*
18–20 January	30	64	6	1052
22–24 February	35	61	4	1198
10–11 March	34	61	6	1239
31 March–2 April	29	66	6	1245
11–13 July	35	58	7	962
3–5 August	23	67	4	1154
16–18 August	23	67	10	1133
2–4 September	25	69	6	1273

[a] Entries are the percentage of the sample "N" giving the indicated response.

very well how it affected their behavior;[51] but the reporters were unable to dig deeply enough to understand fully the implications for the nation of the election of a senior citizen.

If the media did a shoddy job—and they did—how did the public respond to the matter of age in evaluating the candidates?

Age and the Public's Opinion

The physical and cognitive effects of aging and illness in general and of Dole's personal and family medical background in particular should have given a fully awakened electorate cause for reflection. The question remains whether Dole's age was truly a matter of consequence in the election.

Over the course of the 1996 primary and general election season, CBS-TV and the *New York Times* inquired about the public's judgment of the relevance of Dole's age to his capacity to govern. The following question was asked in their polls eight times during 1996: "If Bob Dole is elected president he will be 73 years old when he takes office. Do you think his age will help him be an effective president, or do you think his age would be an obstacle to being an effective president, or wouldn't his age matter that much?"

Excluding those without an opinion, the distribution on the question over the course of the election year is shown in Table 4. Most Americans expressed

[51] Two in five older Americans believed that because of his age Dole would be less able to handle the rigors of office (Jack Nelson, *Los Angeles Times*, May 5, 1995). When asked to comment about Dole's age, some said: "I think he's great. I like him a lot. But I'm afraid he won't make it the four years." (B. Dart, *Austin American Statesman*, 16 March 1996). "I'm 73 years old. . . . Anybody my age, you just can't do it." (W. E. Gibson, *Sun-Sentinel* [Fort Lauderdale], 6 November 1996).

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TABLE 5

Ratio of Respondents Considering Dole's Age an "Obstacle" to a "Help"

Jan	Feb	March	Apr	July	Aug	Sept
4.83	8.25	5.89	4.87	5.00	6.43	3.97

the belief that Dole's age would not much affect his performance as president one way or the other. But those who believed that his age was relevant were much more likely to think of it as a handicap than as a benefit. The ratio of the percentage perceiving Dole's age as an obstacle and the percentage viewing it to be helpful hovered around five to one, as shown in Table 5.

What were the sources of opinion on the relevance of Dole's age? As with any political attitude, we would expect opinion on this question to respond to a mix of predispositions and factors that are primed by the political situation. In an electoral setting, the key predispositions are usually partisanship[52] and ideology.[53] Voters' assessments of how well President Clinton and Congress were handling their respective jobs were likely to affect their judgment of the importance of Dole's age.[54] The voter's attention to the campaign was potentially salient but conditional on how the issue was handled by the media. If the press and Dole's opponents focused on his age and health, we might have expected that the views on the impact of age of those who followed the campaign closely would have been influenced significantly.[55] Finally, a voter's own age might well influence his/her opinion on whether Dole's age would help or hinder his presidency.[56]

If we consider responses on the Dole age question as partly a generally negative statement about his candidacy, it is not difficult to anticipate the direction of the relationship between most of the explanatory variables and opinions on the consequences of his age. Voters who identified themselves as Democrats would be more likely to consider Dole's age a handicap; given the way "party"

[52] Partisanship is indexed by combining the responses to a two-item sequence. The first item asks if the respondent "generally" thinks of herself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an independent. Independents and those who are unsure are then asked if they are "closer" to one or the other major party; those who are closer are classified as "partisans." The resultant index runs from "Republican" to "Democrat" with "Independent" as the middle category.

[53] Ideology is measured by the following item: "How would you describe your views on most political matters? Generally, do you think of yourself as liberal, moderate or conservative?"

[54] Clinton approval is measured by the response to the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling his job as president?" Congress approval is the response to a similar item: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?"

[55] Attention to the campaign ranges from "a lot" to "none," based on answers to the question: "How much attention have you been able to pay to the 1996 Presidential campaign—a lot, some, not much, or no attention so far?"

[56] The CBS/*New York Times* Poll records the respondent's age as a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 98.

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is scaled, we expected it to be negatively related to opinion on Dole's age. Similarly, we expect liberals to be more opposed to Dole and to consider his age as a potential handicap; given its scaling, ideology should have been positively related to opinion. Voters who "approved" of Clinton and/or "disapproved" of the Republican Congress might be more likely to see Dole's age as an obstacle than voters who "disapproved" of Clinton and/or "approved" of Congress.

The relationship of "attention to the campaign" to opinions on the link between Dole's age and his effectiveness seemed likely to be contingent on the character of the media coverage. Equated with "fixed" or "old" ideas, age would be perceived as an obstacle. Expressed as "experience" or "wisdom," it might well be considered a help.

It was difficult to anticipate the impact of the age of the respondents on their response to Dole. Older Americans could well have resented any implication in the polling question that age as such was a handicap and might well have judged Dole to be a stronger representative of their interests. If this were the dominant response, age would have been positively associated with the dependent variable. Alternatively, older respondents might have projected on Dole their own problems of coping with the problems of aging, with a consequent negative association.

For each of the seven CBS/*New York Times* polls,[57] we performed a regression analysis of the effect of the six explanatory variables on the perception of whether Dole's age was a problem.[58] By and large, our expectations were met on three of the variables: Clinton approval, Congress approval, and respondent's partisanship had the expected sign and reached accepted levels of statistical significance. Citizens who were Republicans, and/or voters who disapproved of Clinton's job performance, and/or voters who approved of Congress's-handling of its job were likely to believe that Dole's age would help him be an effective president. By contrast, Democrats, and/or those who approved of Clinton's handling of the presidency, and/or voters who disapproved of the Congress were likely to construe Dole's age as a hindrance to effective leadership.

Ideology also had the "correct" sign in each of the surveys but failed to reach statistical significance. Liberals and conservatives were not distinctively different in their assessments of the likely impact of Dole's age.

In only two instances did attention to the campaign significantly affect the voter's judgment of whether Dole's age would make a difference. In the February poll, those who paid more attention to the campaign were more likely to see Dole's age as an obstacle. Two months later, however, in the April poll, those who were more attentive to the campaign were apt to believe that Dole's age would help his presidency. Whether this represented a substantive shift is uncertain. The choice between these alternatives depends on the content of the campaign in the periods preceding the polls.

[57] The 16–18 August poll did not seek the respondent's opinion on how Congress was ". . . handling its job" and it is set aside in the analyses that follow.

[58] Details of the regression analyses may be obtained by writing the authors in care of this journal.

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There was no ambiguity in the relationship of the respondent's own age to his or her perception of the effect of Dole's age if he were elected. Across the entire election, the older the voter, the more likely he was to believe that Dole's age would be an obstacle. The coefficient on this variable was always negative, and in six of the seven polls it reached an acceptable level of statistical significance. Older Americans did indeed project on Dole their own experience with health and the problems of aging.

Before turning to the question of whether Dole's age was a factor in the actual vote decision, it is worth considering how media coverage and the campaign itself may prime a campaign issue. The CBS/*New York Times* poll taken between 22 and 24 February recorded that one voter in three viewed Dole's age as an "obstacle"; this was an 18 percent increase from the previous poll. In the same February poll, fewer than one American in twenty thought that his age would be a help; for every voter who thought Dole's age would help, there were eight who said it would hurt. This was also the poll in which attention to the campaign increased the likelihood of reacting negatively to Dole's age. Why did the age issue loom so large at this point in the election year?

The last part of January through the end of February was a difficult time for Dole. He continued his effort to deflate the age issue by maintaining a fast-paced schedule and emphasizing his lifetime of experience. On 21 January, he made his first overt effort to boost his image among younger voters by granting an MTV interview at a Dartmouth College fraternity. Asked if he were too old to be president, he replied, "It's not the age of the man. Its the man for the age."[59] When the students were questioned about Dole's age, they had mixed opinions.

On 23 January 1996, the president gave his State of the Union Address, which was widely praised as upbeat and forward looking. He even managed to slip in a subtle reference to Dole's age by saluting the senator and all the other veterans of World War II.[60] His comment was generally perceived as a compliment to his Republican rival. A tired Dole delivered the Republican response, and he was quickly labeled "the National mortician, brusque, impenetrable, embalmed by Washington."[61] Rush Limbaugh, usually a Dole supporter, declared on his radio program, "If this is the best we can do," then Clinton can easily gain reelection.[62]

Dole's opponents for the Republican nomination jumped in to suggest that his performance proved he would be no match for Clinton in a general elec-

[59] Katharine Q. Seelye, "A Grand Old Party Animal Tries Courting Younger Voters," *New York Times*, 21 January 1996.

[60] Katharine Q. Seelye, "State of the Union: The Response: Dole Says President Defends Old Elites Seeking Largesse," *New York Times*, 24 January 1996.

[61] Nancy Gibbs, "What Dole is Doing Wrong," *Time*, 5 February 1996.

[62] Sam Fulwood and Richard A. Serrano, "Dole's Performance Raises Some Doubts," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 January 1996.

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tion.[63] Lamar Alexander stated that Dole's speech was "a preview of what would happen in September and October if Senator Dole is nominated. You had a dynamic Democratic President faking a vision of the future, faking it convincingly, and Dole unable to match him. His vision for America is getting bills out of subcommittee. He's not the architect of our future.[64]

On 28 January, at the Louisiana State Republican convention, Pat Buchanan, Alan Keyes, and Phil Gramm also took subtle jabs at Dole's speech. Keyes told the audience that if the Republicans challenge Clinton with "a bone-dry, heartless representative of truth, you tell me where we're going to end up."[65]

In response to these attacks, the Dole campaign said that his response to the president's address was aimed at conservatives in New Hampshire and Iowa, and not the general public. "We're sorry if the liberal press doesn't like it," explained Dole. "If you don't sing their songs, you don't get good reviews."[66] Aside from these brief comments, the Dole campaign made no effort to control the damage done from the speech. Meanwhile, the media continued to portray his candidacy as a sinking ship.[67]

As February rolled around, it appeared that the prophesies about the front-runner stumbling were being fulfilled. A poll on 1 February showed Steve Forbes ahead of Dole by 5 percentage points in New Hampshire. A straw poll in Alaska two days earlier placed Dole in third place. Even leading Dole supporters began portraying his campaign as faltering.[68] In public, Dole tried to ignore his Republican challengers and focus solely on Clinton. He continued to stress his record by way of turning his age to advantage. "I believe the American people are looking for experienced leadership," he said.[69]

On 12 February, Dole narrowly won the Iowa Caucuses, the first contest in the race for the nomination. One sixth of those voting said that experience in Washington mattered most, and eight out of ten of those people supported Dole.[70] Dole's win appeared to boost the confidence of the Republican establishment, which then launched a concerted campaign to bring Forbes down.[71]

On 20 February, the New Hampshire primary was held, and Pat Buchanan narrowly defeated Dole. Most political commentators agreed that Buchanan's victory opened the race and raised questions about the inevitability of Dole's

[63] R. W. Apple, Jr., "Forbes Gathers Strength as Other Republicans Try to Wait Out Storm," *New York Times*, 29 January 1996.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Kevin Sack, "Three Republicans Seek a Boost in Louisiana," *New York Times*, 28 January 1996.

[66] Gibbs, "What Dole is Doing Wrong."

[67] Adam Nagourney, "Dole Tilts With Foes, Suggested and Real," *New York Times*, 31 January 1996.

[68] Apple, "Forbes Gathers Strength as Other Republicans Try to Wait Out Storm."

[69] Adam Nagourney, "Dole (Yes Dole) Plays the Age Card in Iowa," *New York Times*, 5 February 1996.

[70] Richard L. Berke, "Dole Tops the Field in Iowa Caucuses," *New York Times*, 13 February 1996.

[71] Nancy Gibbs and Michael Duffy, "Battling the Party Crashers," *Time*, 19 February 1996.

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nomination.[72] The general feeling in the media was that Dole's age played a role in his defeat. Among the large group of voters who considered his age a hindrance (about a third, according to the exit polls), only 7 percent voted for him.[73]

To summarize, in the period leading to the 22 February poll, there were numerous veiled references to Senator Dole's age—to his "tired ideas," to "dinosaurs," and to Dole's lack of "verve." These, the pointed criticisms of his "tired" response to the State of the Union Address, and his poor showing in the electoral contests in Iowa and New Hampshire apparently created links between attention to the campaign, Dole's age, and negative assessments of his capacity to govern. The period leading up to the April poll was very different and helps us understand why attention to the campaign was now related to the belief that Dole's age might be helpful.

Dole's fortunes changed after New Hampshire. He got his biggest boost on 12 March, sweeping all seven primaries on Super Tuesday. On 14 March, Forbes dropped out of the presidential race and endorsed Dole.[74] On 19 March, he celebrated victories in Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, which pushed his delegate count to 914 of the 996 needed to secure the nomination.[75]

With the nomination assured, Dole was able to focus exclusively on his contest with Clinton. Running against a single Democratic opponent allowed Dole to speak with a clarity rarely displayed before. He now more frequently displayed an easy-going and humorous demeanor which surprised voters who remembered him as a "sharp-edged partisan."[76]

To deal with the contrast between his and Clinton's ages, Dole continued to emphasize his experience. Speaking to an audience in Michigan, he stated, "It is about character. It is about growing up in America. About knowing America. About knowing what made America great. About having made a little sacrifice for America."[77]

Did Dole's age affect voting behavior in 1996? The answer is unequivocal: Over the entire election season, controlling for the usual sources of the vote, voters who believed that his age—experience, wisdom, etc.—would help Dole be an effective president were much more likely to support his candidacy than voters who saw his age as an obstacle. If we use a trial-heat question as our measure of the voter's likely decision at the time the poll was taken, we find

[72] R. W. Apple, Jr., "Buchanan a Narrow Victor Over Dole in New Hampshire," *New York Times*, 21 February 1996.

[73] R. W. Apple, Jr., "How 'Front Runner' in GOP Race Had a Flat Tire in New Hampshire," *New York Times*, 22 February 1996.

[74] Ernest Tollerson, "Bowing Out: Forbes Quits and Offers His Support to Dole," *New York Times*, 15 March 1996.

[75] Richard L. Berke, "Dole Continues to Roll Towards GOP Nomination," *New York Times*, 20 March 1996.

[76] Adam Nagourney, "Republicans Wondering Which Dole Will Emerge," *New York Times*, 16 March 1996.

[77] Adam Nagourney, "Dole Appeals to 'Reagan Democrats'," *New York Times*, 15 March 1996.

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that many of the standard factors and the judgment about the effect of Senator Dole's age help us explain the sources of the vote.[78]

Clinton "disapproval," Republican partisanship, and a belief that Dole's age would help his effectiveness were always predictive of a vote for Dole. Approval of Congress always had the expected sign—it predicted a Dole vote—and was statistically significant in six of the seven polls. On the other hand, "approval" of Clinton's job performance, Democratic party identification, "disapproval" of Congress, and a belief that Dole's age would be an obstacle to his effectiveness as president predicted a vote for Bill Clinton.

"Ideology" had a spotty record: it always had the expected sign—namely, "liberals" support Clinton and "conservatives" Dole. But it achieved statistical significance on just four of the seven surveys.

At the beginning of the fall campaign, the perception that age would reduce Dole's effectiveness as president helped lead voters to a preference for Clinton's reelection. Available data suggest that Dole's age also affected the actual vote in November 1996.[79] Eighteen percent of the National Election Study's 1996 sample (N = 1714) cited Dole's age as a negative factor.[80] The comparable figures for Ronald Reagan were 14 percent in 1980 and 9 percent in 1984; clearly, age was a salient factor in voters' perceptions of Senator Dole.

Democrats, older Americans, and those most interested in the campaign were most likely to cite Dole's age as a negative factor. The negative perception of Dole's age was independent of the voter's ideology; conservatives were as likely as moderates and liberals to mention or not mention Dole's age. This connotation of age carried over to the vote. If we attempt to account for the two-party vote in 1996 with models of increasing complexity, we find that negative opinion of Dole's age was a significant and independent factor in all but the most complex model. Thus, the addition of partisanship, ideology, attention to the campaign, and opinion of Congress's handling of its job to the explanation of the vote did not change opinion on Dole's age as an independent and significant source of the vote in 1996.

[78] The "trial-heat" item reads: "If the election were being held today, would you probably vote for Bill Clinton or would you probably vote for the Republican candidate?" Respondents who replied "can't say/other/don't know/no answer" were asked, "Well as of today would you be more likely to vote for Bill Clinton or more likely to vote for the Republican candidate?" Those who named Clinton on either probe are counted as Clinton voters; those who said the Republican on either probe are counted as Republican votes.

[79] The CBS-TV/*New York Times* Poll did not continue to ask about Dole's age after the beginning of September. In order to carry the analysis forward to account for the vote in November, we have created a measure of opinion of Dole's age using responses to the National Election Study's (NES) open-ended candidate likes/dislikes questions. Any respondent who on any of the five recorded mentions cites Dole's age (codes 450 and 451) as a reason for disliking him is scored "1" on the measure, otherwise the respondent is scored "0."

[80] The National Election Study is sponsored by the National Science Foundation. It provides the principal academic/scientific instrument for studying voting behavior. Neither the NES nor the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, which archives NES data, bears any responsibility for the uses to which the survey data are put.

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Dole's age was a looming presence in 1996. Over the course of the election year it came and went as an important factor, depending on the campaign strategies of Dole's opponents and the manner in which his age was covered by the media. Many older Americans, looking to their own perception of the link between age and health, always were aware that Dole's effectiveness as president could be negatively affected by his age. Others were not as well informed or concerned about the effects of age.

Conclusion

Age over 65—even more so, Robert Dole's age of 73—is a risk factor for death or disability during the four-year term of a president. The incidence and severity of the illnesses and trauma that affect the elderly—heart disease, cancer, stroke, infections, surgery—increase progressively with age, together with the cognitive changes associated with major illness. These are accompanied by an ever heightening mortality and morbidity rate. Simultaneously, a steady and unceasing decline in energy, concentration, memory and cognitive faculties occurs on average, beginning at the age of 30 and accelerating beyond 65. In a drug oriented society, the elderly consume the largest aggregate of pharmacologic agents of all kinds, many of them psychotropic in nature and virtually all of them with important known side effects in idiosyncratic patients.

On these grounds alone, an alert electorate might be expected to view older candidates skeptically. While the wisdom and experience of the candidates may be thoroughly documented over many years, their ability to process information rapidly in a crisis and to make the right decisions for the nation could be severely compromised.

Senator Dole, who was apparently vigorous and in good health, nevertheless represented an example of multiple risk factors—prostate cancer, forty years of smoking, parental deaths from heart disease and aneurysm, esophagitis, a mixture of drugs in his regimen. How did the media respond? While alluding to Dole's age and health throughout the period of the primaries and the general election, magazines, television, and the press failed to convey the potential effect of his age on the likelihood that he would survive the four year term, or even that he might be incapacitated. For the most part, the attention given to age implied that it might be a problem but neutralized that implication by uncritically accepting his doctors' assurance that he was in good health. There were few probing analyses or reviews of the large body of information that depicts the effects of age on performance under normal conditions and under stress. The possibility that Dole might not last out his term because of the high incidence of illness in his age group and because of his risk factors in particular was not seriously broached.

How did the public handle the issue? Among those for whom age was an important consideration, most believed that it was a potential obstacle to a successful presidency. Consistently, four times as many voters expressed the belief

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that Dole's age would hamper rather than help him as president if he were elected. Hence, it might appear that the electorate was sufficiently well informed about the potential negative effects of age to weight it appropriately, and that perhaps the media had done its job after all. But the largest single block of respondents to the question about Dole's age—over 60 percent—believed that it would not matter. They were simply unaware that the man they might vote for had a 20 percent chance of dying in office or, if they were, they didn't care.

Was opinion on the effect of Dole's age a determinant of how an individual might finally cast his vote? The data suggest that Dole's age played an important role. Voters who viewed his age as an obstacle to a successful presidency were far more likely to support Clinton than those who believed that age and the experience that went with it were likely to be helpful.

A number of lessons may be drawn from the election. Surely the media should have paid greater attention to the known health and cognitive sequelae of aging. This would imply many more careful and well documented articles that would fully inform the public so as to heighten their ability to integrate the issue into their ultimate voting decision. If age may affect the quality and duration of an incumbent's performance in the White House, as it may, and if informed individuals take this into account in casting their ballots, as they do, then the national interest is best served by making certain that the public has a solid perspective on the issue.

A second lesson that deserves consideration is the possible need for an upper limit on the age of presidential candidates.[81] This could best be achieved in practice by a congressional resolution. It would serve as a powerful deterrent to seniors who wish to run and politicians who would like to nominate them, while leaving the Constitution intact. It would represent a tacit acknowledgment of the physical, psychological, and cognitive changes that may accompany aging, and of their potentially catastrophic effect on presidential behavior in crisis or under sustained stressful conditions. It would embody the conviction that the presidency is such a uniquely demanding operational position in the twentieth century that it requires the energy, information-processing ability, and powers of concentration of more youthful candidates.

It has been suggested that an upper limit would deprive us of the Churchills and De Gaulles and other great elderly national leaders. That is a risk, although the nation could benefit from their wisdom and experience in a cabinet role or as consultants to the president and the Congress.

But surely, it is said, if the president is ill, or cognitively impaired, or unable to process the information and options before him in a crisis effectively, the structural and institutional constraints that both bind and support him will preclude a catastrophic decision. That is what his staff and the cabinet are all about, so why concern ourselves about the power of the office and its potential abuse

[81] Abrams, "Should a Senior Citizen Be President:" *Atlantic Monthly*, in press.

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by a sick leader? But it is simplistic to believe that anyone but the president, in the final analysis, can make and assume the responsibility for the great decisions that confront the nation. In the small hours of the night, John Kennedy alone determined the course we ultimately pursued in the Cuban Missile Crisis, avoiding a massive nuclear exchange, but not necessarily by much.

Finally, it may be argued that there is no need for an upper age limit, given the knowledge that only William Henry Harrison (68), who died one month after his inauguration, Ronald Reagan (69), and Robert Dole (73) were beyond the age of 65 when they ran for a first term. But the population is growing older, and if 1996 is any precedent, we may soon again confront a candidate whose age might interfere with his capacity to govern. An upper limit would recognize that the presidency is all too heavy a burden to place on the shoulders of an elderly citizen.*

* Kami Hayashi, research assistant to Herbert L. Abrams, made a major contribution to this article by organizing much of the material on which it was based with a fine intelligence, skill, and a full understanding of our goals.

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From Our Archives: A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson

MICHAEL LES BENEDICT

With the suddenly reawakened interest in presidential impeachment, many Americans naturally have turned for insight to the case of President Andrew Johnson. Johnson, Lincoln's successor, was the only president ever charged by the House of Representatives with "high crimes and misdemeanors." But the version of the Johnson impeachment that Americans have found in textbooks, studies of the presidency, and histories of the Reconstruction Era is hardly one to reassure them of the efficacy of impeachment proceedings—the only constitutional method outside of defeat for reelection to remove a president from office.

Traditionally, the Johnson impeachment has been portrayed as "the most insidious assault on constitutional government in the nation's history," "the culmination of a sustained effort to make [the president] . . . subservient to Congress, to alter the place of a coordinate branch in the constitutional scheme."[1] Recent studies of Re-

[1] Irving Brant, *Impeachment: Trials and Errors* (New York, 1972), 4; Raoul Berger, *Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 295. For similar assessments, see Claude Bowers, *The Tragic Era: The Revolution*

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construction, less sympathetic to Johnson's policies and more sympathetic to the congressional Republicans, suggest the impeachment "was a great act of ill-directed passion." The leading book-length study of the Johnson impeachment has been David Miller DeWitt's *Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson*, and it paralleled the pro-Johnson, anti-Republican historical orthodoxy of the times.

But all these interpretations do injustice to history and—more important—have impelled Americans to fear the great Anglo-Saxon "remedy" for official wrongdoing more than the wrongdoing itself. If we are to comprehend the real nature of that remedy, a better understanding of the origins and causes of the Johnson impeachment is necessary. Because of limited space, this article will deal only with the events leading to the Johnson impeachment. In my book, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson*, I argue that the long-held conviction that the trial itself was a travesty of justice—most recently articulated in Berger's book on *Impeachment*—has also been exaggerated.[2]

Most Americans are at least somewhat familiar with the background of the single impeachment of a president of the United States: Andrew Johnson became president after Lincoln's assassination in April, 1865, and immediately faced the intimidating task of restoring the shattered Union. Like Lincoln, he assumed complete authority over the question himself, and denied Congress's power to participate even more firmly than his predecessor. Johnson embarked on a policy designed to restore the former Confederate states to civil government with maximum speed and a minimum disturbance of Southern institutions beyond the abolition of slavery itself. But his policy placed former rebels in political control of nearly every Southern state and left Southern blacks to the mercies of the men

After Lincoln (Boston, 1929); Lloyd Paul Stryker, *Andrew Johnson: Profile in Courage* (New York, 1929); John Fort Milton, *The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the Radicals* (New York, 1930); Milton Lomask, *Andrew Johnson: President on Trial* (New York, 1960).

[2] Eric L. McKitrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago, 1960), 506; David Donald, "Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson," *American Heritage*, VIII (December, 1956), 21-25, 102-103; Hans L. Trefousse, *The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial Justice* (New York, 1969); David Miller DeWitt, *Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson, Seventeenth President of the United States: A History* (New York and London, 1903); Michael Les Benedict, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* (New York, 1973); Berger, *Impeachment*.

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who had fought so desperately to keep them in bondage.

Faced with returning Southern congressmen-elect, who so recently had tried to rend the nation, and with state "black codes" which reduced the freedmen to virtual peonage, Republicans in Congress felt the fruits of victory slipping from their grasp. They reacted by refusing to recognize the finality of Johnson's policy of Reconstruction and by legislating to protect the civil rights of the former slaves. Unsympathetic—if not antipathetic—to black aspirations, Johnson broke with his party and began a bitter conflict with its congressional majority, the so-called "Radical Republicans."

This account of the genesis of the confrontation between the president and Congress after the Civil War may be new to those unfamiliar with the conclusions of historians who have restudied the Reconstruction Era during the past decade and a half, but it has been generally accepted by the profession.[3] The Johnson impeachment was engendered by the partisan passions the conflict over Johnson's Reconstruction policies kindled among the Radical Republicans, Americans have been told. Still, Republicans approached impeachment reluctantly, unwillingly, and only voted for impeachment after they were convinced that the president had violated the law and intended to abort congressional authority over Reconstruction by any means necessary. Impeachment was, thus, the defensive response of a Congress faced by an aggressive executive using his presidential powers in a way that appeared to subvert the Constitution of the United States.

I

For almost a year after Johnson's final break with the party that elected him to vice-presidential office, many of the more conservative Republicans hoped for reconciliation. As late as February, 1867, when Congress fashioned the Military Reconstruction bill, these conservative Republican congressmen were still trying to negotiate a compromise with their powerful adversary, President Andrew

[3] See W. R. Brock, *An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865-1867* (New York, 1963); La Wanda and John H. Cox, *Politics, Principle, and Prejudice, 1865-1866: Dilemma of Reconstruction America* (New York, 1963); McKitrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction;* Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877* (New York, 1965); and Hans L. Trefousse, *The Radical Republicans.*

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Johnson.[4] When, at the same time, more radical Republicans announced their intentions to propose impeachment in the House, the Republican caucus, led by the influential John A. Bingham—author of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment—and Elihu B. Washburne, forbade any Republican from bringing impeachment resolutions to the floor without first getting caucus approval. Moreover, the caucus required that any actual impeachment have the sanction of the House Judiciary Committee.[5] The radicals refused to obey the caucus dictate and proposed impeachment resolutions anyway, but the Republican majority, trying to stifle debate, hurriedly referred them to various committees.[6] To conform to one of these impeachment resolutions, the House Judiciary Committee began slowly to investigate the president's conduct. In March, 1867, dismayed by the committee's slow progress and evident coolness to their project, radicals tried to bypass it and win caucus approval for impeachment. Again Bingham, now aided by Judiciary Committee Chairman James F. Wilson, thwarted his restive Republican colleagues.[7]

Defeated in their attempts to institute impeachment proceedings against Johnson, radicals, led by Representatives Thaddeus Stevens, Benjamin F. Butler, and George S. Boutwell, and Senators Charles Sumner and Charles Drake, hoped to keep Congress in session over

[4] *New York Tribune*, Feb. 15, 1867, p. 1; Feb. 17, 1867, p. 1; Feb. 18, 1867, p. 1. Unpublished testimony before the Select Committee . . . on a Corrupt Bargain with the President, Papers of that committee, 39 Congress, Record Group 233, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[5] *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1867, p. 1; Jan. 7, 1867, p. 5. Bingham was the second-ranking House Republican member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and author of the civil rights section of the Fourteenth Amendment; Washburne was the senior Republican in the House and also a member of the Reconstruction Committee.

[6] *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 2 session, 319-21 (Jan. 7, 1867), 443-46 (Jan. 14, 1867), 807-808 (Jan. 28, 1867), 991 (Feb. 4, 1867).

[7] *New York Times*, Mar. 7, 1867, p. 4; Boston *Evening Journal*, Mar. 6, 1867, p. 4; Mar. 7, 1867, p. 4; Senator James W. Grimes to Mrs. Grimes, Mar. 12, 1867, quoted in William Salter, *The Life of James W. Grimes, Governor of Iowa, 1854-1858; Senator of the United States, 1859-1869* (New York, 1876), 323; Senator John Sherman to William T. Sherman, Mar. 7, 1867, quoted in Rachel S. Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General Sherman and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (New York, 1894), 289-90; Francis Fessenden, *Life and Public Service of William Pitt Fessenden*, 2 vols. (Boston & New York, 1907), II, 128.

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the summer of 1867, both to guard against presidential intrigue and to maintain pressure for Johnson's removal. But here again more conservative Republicans, led by Bingham and James G. Blaine in the House, and Lyman Trumbull and William Pitt Fessenden in the Senate, checked the enthusiasm of their more radical colleagues.[8] When Johnson's provocative activities forced the 1867 summer meeting that conservative Republicans had sought to avoid, they limited business to amendments to the Reconstruction act and then squelched a radical effort to call an October session to deal with impeachment.[9] So the majority of Republican congressmen hardly displayed that eagerness for revenge upon the president that subsequent generations of Americans ascribed to them.

II

That reluctance to impeach President Johnson becomes even more apparent when one analyzes the dispute between radical and nonradical Republicans over the nature of impeachable offenses—a controversy still of importance. This controversy turned upon opposing interpretations of the terms "high crimes and misdemeanors," which provide, along with outright treason and bribery, the sole grounds for impeachment under the Constitution.[10] Conservatives, fearful of

[8] After a hard-fought struggle, Congress adjourned over the summer of 1867 with a provision allowing it to reconvene if a quorum was present on the first Wednesday in July. Behind the scenes, Representative Robert C. Schenck, generally allied with the more radical Republicans, and Senator Edmund D. Morgan, a conservative Republican, cochairmen of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, were delegated the responsibility of deciding whether Congress need meet. All had agreed that a July meeting was unlikely. *Cong. Globe*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 16 (Mar. 7, 1867), 303-308, 315-20 (Mar. 23, 1867), 321-22, 331, 334 (Mar. 25, 1867), 352-60 (Mar. 26, 1867), 387-91 (Mar. 27, 1867), 401-408, 419-20, 425-27 (Mar. 28, 1967), 438-41, 446-54 (Mar. 29, 1867); Zachariah Chandler, speaking at Ashtabula, Ohio, in McPherson scrapbook: Campaign of 1867, II, 135-36, in the Edward McPherson Mss., Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

[9] Boston *Daily Advertiser*, July 4, 1867, p. 1; *Cong. Globe*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 480 (July 3, 1867), 481-99 (July 5, 1867), 565-67 (July 10, 1867), 587-90 (July 11, 1867), 732-35 (July 19, 1867).

[10] These differing concepts were developed in three major exchanges during the critical year preceding the great trial. The first was an indirect exchange in the *American Law Register* in March and September, 1867, between Professor Theodore W. Dwight of Columbia College Law School and Representative (for-

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the institutional and political effects of impeachment on the stability of the country, turned to the theory propounded by the defense in several earlier nonpresidential impeachments, i.e., that government officers could be impeached only for indictable violations of criminal statute or common law. Many historians studying impeachment have accepted this position, accusing the more radical Republicans, who insisted on a broader interpretation of "high crimes and misdemeanors," of perverting the impeachment process in a purely political vendetta. But those who espoused the narrow view had a very difficult task in sustaining it against the weight of precedent and authority that contravened it, and it has been rejected by modern scholars who have investigated the question.

There had been innumerable English impeachments based on nonindictable offenses on the part of royal officials before the framing of the American Constitution. Every impeachment brought by the House before the Senate in 1868 had similarly alleged nonindictable but wrongful conduct, and in two cases the Senate convicted the defendants and removed them from office. Brant, who tries valiantly to limit the impeachment power which he feels is so liable to abuse, concedes that liability for criminal conduct alone would restrict the power too narrowly. He adds as grounds for removal "violations of the oath of office," a rather nebulous term in light of the vagueness of such oaths.[11]

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merly Judge) William Lawrence of Ohio, a member of the House Judiciary Committee; the second clash came in the Judiciary Committee's majority and minority reports on the impeachment resolution of November-December 1867; and the third was embodied in the speeches that Representative George S. Boutwell and Judiciary Committee Chairman Wilson, as ranking signers respectively of the majority and minority reports, delivered on the floor of the House in defense of their positions. Dwight, "Trial by Impeachment," *American Law Register*, XV, old series (Mar., 1867), 257-83; Lawrence, "The Law of Impeachment," ibid. (Sept., 1867), 641-80; *House Report No. 7*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 1-59 (Majority), 59-105 (Republican minority), 105-11 (Democratic minority); *Cong. Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., appendix 54-62 (Dec. 5, 6, 1867; Boutwell), 62-65 (Dec. 6, 1867; Wilson). Charles Mayo Ellis wrote a less influential article, endorsing what would become the radical position, "The Causes for Which a President Can Be Impeached," *Atlantic Monthly*, XIX (Jan. 1867), 88-92. The arguments echoed those forwarded in earlier impeachments, precedents upon which participants on both sides drew, described in Brant, *Impeachment*, 46-83, 122-32; Lynn W. Turner, "The Impeachment of John Pickering," *American Historical Review*, LIV (Apr., 1949), 485-507; and Richard B. Lillich, "The Chase Impeachment," *American Journal of Legal History*, IV (Jan., 1960), 49-72.

[11] See Benedict, *Impeachment and Trial*, 26-36; Berger, *Impeachment*, 53-102,

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As has been noted, radicals endorsed a much broader interpretation of impeachable offenses. Turning to the English precedents, examples of earlier American impeachments, and the almost unanimous agreement of the great American constitutional commentators of the early nineteenth century, the radicals argued that "our forefathers adopted a Constitution under which official malfeasance and nonfeasance, and, in some cases, misfeasance, may be the subject of impeachment."[12] They repeated the logic which preeminent legal scholars of the early Republic—Joseph Story, William Duer, James Kent, William Rawle, and the authors of the *Federalist*—felt compelled a broad construction of the impeachment power. The radicals recognized that the framers of the Constitution had defined the roles of the president, Congress, and the judiciary so loosely that in practice the maintainance of proper governmental checks and balances, which they believed guaranteed liberty, depended upon the good faith and mutual self-restraint of those entrusted with power. They felt that the danger lay not so much in the possibility that the president or lesser executive officers might abuse powers which the Constitution *had* delegated to them by acting in violation of explicit provisions of law. Although earlier constitutional analysts had arrived at the same conclusion, this consideration was stated most succinctly by the great nationalist legal scholar John Norton Pomeroy, writing at the very time the Johnson impeachment became a topic of popular discussion:

> The importance of the impeaching power consists . . . in the check which it places upon the President and the judges. They must be clothed with ample discretion; the danger to be apprehended is from an abuse of this discretion. But at this very point where the danger exists, and where the protection should be certain, the President and the judiciary are beyond the reach of Congressional legislation. Congress cannot . . . inter-

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and especially 305-306, where Berger challenges the citations of Theodore Dwight, the leading legal spokesman for the conservative position; David Y. Thomas, "The Law of Impeachment in the United States," *American Political Science Review*, II (May, 1908), 378-95; Alexander Simpson, Jr., *A Treatise of Federal Impeachments* (Philadelphia, 1916), 30-50; C. X. Potts, "Impeachment as a Remedy," *St. Louis Law Review*, XII (1927), 23-25; Andrew C. McLaughlin, *A Constitutional History of the United States* (New York, 1935), 320-24; Samuel P. Weaver, *Constitutional Law and Its Administration* (Chicago, 1946), 167; Edward S. Corwin, *The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation* (Washington, 1952), 502-504; Brant, *Impeachment*, 23.

[12] Lawrence, "The Law of Impeachment," 647.

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> fere with the exercise of a discretion conferred by the Constitution . . . If the offence for which the proceeding may be instituted must be made indictable by statute, impeachment thus becomes absolutely nugatory . . . in those cases where it is most needed as a restraint upon violations of public duty.[13]

For that reason, this school of analysts agreed, impeachment should be "of a liberal and comprehensive character, confined as little as possible to strict forms."[14]

Radicals complained of precisely the type of offenses these legal authorities believed were impeachable. There can be little doubt that Johnson had provided ample grounds for impeachment under this doctrine, by exercising his discretionary power in a manner that was strongly opposed by Congress. It was through this discretionary power under the Constitution that he had pardoned nearly all those who had rebelled, specifically requiring the return to them of all of their previously abandoned land. Thus President Johnson foreclosed the possibility of land reform in the South based on confiscation, in effect nullifying Congress's cautious legislative approach in that area.

The congressionally inspired Freedmen's Bureau act of 1865 had altered fundamentally the concept of confiscation. Under its terms, Southern lands abandoned by owners, which were subject to confiscation, were put under the administration of the bureau to be used to aid black men in the transition from slavery to freedom. The commissioner of the bureau was empowered, under the direction of the president, to set aside for the use of the freedmen and refugees the abandoned land and land to which the government had acquired title

[13] Pomeroy, *An Introduction to the Constitution of the United States* (New York, 1870), 491-92. Although first published in 1870, Pomeroy had completed the text by 1868, when he had it copyrighted.

[14] William Rawle, *A View of the Constitution of the United States of America*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1829), 211-12; Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist, No. 81*, in Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist on the New Constitution, Written in the Year 1788* . . . (Washington, D.C., 1818), 501-11, especially 505; Wlliam Alexander Duer, *Outlines of Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States* (New York, 1833), 89-91, and *A Course of Lectures on Constitutional Jurisprudence*, 76-78; Joseph Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1851), I, 553-58; James Kent, *Commentaries on American Law*, ed. George F. Comstock, 11th ed., 3 vols. (Boston, 1867), I, 302, 367n; Timothy Farrar, *The Manual of the Constitution of the United States* (Boston, 1867), 436-37.

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through confiscation proceedings. The land was to be divided into forty-acre plots or less and rented to individual freedmen and refugees for three years. At the end of the three years, or any time earlier, the occupants could purchase the land they were working, receiving from the government "such title thereto as the United States can convey."

The peculiar wording of the Freedmen's Bureau act referred to the provision of the Confiscation act which limited confiscation of Southern property to the lifetime of the rebel owner. This provision had been added at the insistence of President Lincoln in 1862, but in 1865 congressional Republicans evidenced their intentions to proceed with land reform when each house passed a bill which repealed the lifetime limitation. However, since no single bill passed both houses, the repeal did not go into effect. A large literature accumulated indicating how close Republicans came during the war to inaugurating a real land reform in the South.[15]

The president's land-return policy wreaked havoc upon the newly created Freedmen's Bureau, annuling its congressional mandate to rent land to freedmen at low rates or to rent to lessees who would deal fairly with black laborers. Within a year of the close of Civil War hostilities, the bureau had been forced by Johnson's policy to return to Southern white owners over one-half of the land that it had held at war's end.[16]

[15] *United States Statutes at Large*, XIII, 507-509; LaWanda Cox, "The Promise of Land to the Freedmen," *Mississippi Vally Historical Review*, XLV (Dec., 1958), 413-40; Paul W. Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the South, 1866-1888," *Journal of Southern History*, VI (Aug., 1940), 303-30; John A. Carpenter, *The Sword and the Olive Branch: Oliver Otis Howard* (Pittsburgh, 1964), 106-107. For experimental land reforms and the pressure leading to creation of the Freedmen's Bureau with its land-reform potential, see John G. Sproat, "Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction," *Journal of Southern History*, XXIII (Feb., 1957), 25-44; Willie Lee Rose, *Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment* (New York, 1964); George R. Bentley, *A History of the Freedmen's Bureau* (Philadelphia, 1955), 16-49; William S. McFeely, *Yankee Stepfather: General O. O. Howard and the Freedmen* (New Haven, 1968), 45-64.

[16] Message from the President Relative to Pardons and Abandoned Property, *House Executive Document No. 99*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess.; *House Report No. 30*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess.; William S. McFeely, *Yankee Stepfather*, 111-17; Oliver Otis Howard, *Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard*, 2 vols. (New York, 1908), II, 234-36; Jonathan T. Dorris, *Pardon and Amnesty Under Lincoln and Johnson: The Restoration of the Confederates to Their Right and Privileges* (Chapel Hill, 1953), 227-33; Carpenter, *The Sword and the Olive Branch*, 106-109.

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Moreover, when Johnson proceeded, without congressional authority, to begin the process of Reconstruction in the South, he ignored the Test Oath law in appointing certain provisional governors. The law required federal appointees to swear that they had never aided the rebellion. If strictly enforced, it would have effectively barred former Confederate military or civic officers from receiving appointments. Johnson also permitted the secretary of the treasury to ignore it in the appointment of Southern treasury officials, thereby placing control of an immense patronage system in the hands of men Congress clearly had proscribed.[17] By his encouragement of former Confederates, his blatant antipathy toward racial equality before the law, his inflammatory speeches—none of which violated law—Johnson succeeded in creating a spirit of determined resistance in the South to concessions on great war issues of importance to Northerners. The consequences for Southern loyalists, especially blacks, were disastrous.

III

Of course, Johnson had perpetrated these "offenses" (in the eyes of the radicals) before Congress had clearly manifested its hostility to his lenient Reconstruction policy. Congress overrode his program with the Reconstruction act of March, 1867, which, while not dispersing outright the governments created under Johnson's authority, made these governments provisional only. That law placed them under the ultimate control of five military commanders until each state framed a constitution guaranteeing equal legal and political rights to its citizens. Throughout 1867, Johnson used his discretionary powers as chief executive and commander-in-chief of the armed

[17] Hugh McCulloch, *Men and Measures of Half a Century* (New York, 1888), 227, 386; Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles—Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson*, 3 vols., (Boston and New York, 1911), II, 318-19 (June 20, 1865), 357-58 (Aug. 11, 1865); *Senate Executive Document No. 3*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess. (Dec. 18, 1865); Testimony on Impeachment, *House Report No. 7*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., appendix, 604-11, 661-63; Message from the President Relative to the Oath of Office, *House Executive Document No. 81*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess. (Apr. 6, 1866); Letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, *Senate Executive Document No. 38*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess. (Apr. 6, 1866). Of the seven provisional governors Johnson appointed, only two clearly could have taken the test oath had he required it of them.

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forces in a systematic effort to defeat the Republican legislative program. Within four months of the passage of the Reconstruction act and the first supplement to it, Johnson's attorney general, Henry Stanbery, appeared with a formal opinion which virtually emasculated Congress's program, forcing Republicans to return to Washington to patch the torn netting of the law. Stanbery's interpretation minimized the power of the military authorities to which Congress had entrusted administration of the unreconstructed states. According to the attorney general, the military could not remove recalcitrant officials of the Johnsonian provisional governments, enforce national laws in military courts, take cognizance of crimes committed before Congress passed the Reconstruction act, or prohibit activities not in violation of state or national statute law. His interpretation also provided that registration boards authorized under the Reconstruction law had to accept Southerners' oaths that they were not disqualified from voting and denied the boards power to investigate whether the oath-taker had perjured himself.

General Daniel Sickles, whose acts as military commander in the Carolinas Stanbery had specifically denounced as illegal, angrily requested to be relieved from duty so he could defend his conduct before a court of inquiry. "[T]he declaration of the Attorney General that Military authority has not superceded [the provisional governments] . . . prevents the execution of the Reconstruction acts, disarms me of means to protect life, property, or the rights of citizens and menaces all interests in these States with ruin."[18]

When Congress again adjourned, Johnson acted to gain more direct control of the military authorities to which Congress had entrusted enforcement of the Reconstruction law. In August, 1867, he suspended Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and he followed this act by ordering the removal of one of the five commanders in the South, General Philip Sheridan, who had come into conflict with the former rebels in Louisiana's provisional government. On August 27, the president removed a second commander, Daniel E. Sickles, again because of differences between the military authorities and the John-

[18] United States Department of Justice, *Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States*, XII, 182-206; Sickles to the Adjutant General, June 19, 1867, Edwin M. Stanton Mss., Library of Congress.

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sonian officials in Georgia.[19]

In none of these actions had Johnson violated a law and he had ample formal constitutional authority for each of his acts. But taken as a whole, it was plain by winter, 1867-68, that the president of the United States was consciously and determinedly following a program designed to nullify congressional legislation through the power of executive implementation. Yet in the last week of November, 1867, when the House Judiciary Committee finally reported its conclusion that Johnson's conduct justified impeachment, only five of the seven Republican members signed its statement. Chairman Wilson and another congressman on the committee joined the two Democratic members in opposition. With their colleagues on the committee divided, with their chairman in opposition, the majority of Republicans on December 7, 1867, influenced by Bingham, Wilson, Blaine, and Washburne, voted with Democrats to table the impeachment resolution on the floor of the House.[20] Naturally, the radical minority was outraged. "If the great culprit had robbed a till; if he fired a barn; if he had forged a check; he would have been indicted, prosecuted, condemned, sentences, and punished," the radical editor of the New York *Independent*, Theodore Tilton, fumed. "But the evidence shows that he only oppressed the Negro; that he only conspired with the rebel; that he only betrayed the Union party; that he only attempted to overthrow the Republic—of course, he goes unwhipped of justice."[21]

Radical anger was so great at this final failure that an outright party schism threatened. Voicing the feelings of the defeated Republicans, Tilton mourned, "[A] Republican majority of cowards gagged a Republican minority of statesmen." Two days after the

[19] General Ulysses S. Grant to Pope, Sept. 9, 1867. Headquarters of the Army, letters sent, Record Group 108, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[20] *Congressional Globe*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 791-92 (Nov. 25, 1867), 2 Sess., 61-62 (Dec. 5, 1867), 65-67 (Dec. 6, 1867), 67-69 (Dec. 7, 1867), appendix, 54-56 (Dec. 5-6, 1867); James A. Garfield to Burke A. Hinsdale, Dec. 5, 1867, quoted in Mary L. Hinsdale (ed.), *Garfield-Hinsdale Letters: Correspondence Between James Abram Garfield and Burke Aaron Hinsdale* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1949), 117-18; Fessenden to Francis Fessenden, Dec. 1, 1867. William P. Fessenden Mss., Bowdoin College Library, Brunswick, Maine; New York *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, Dec. 14, 1867, p. 2.

[21] New York *Independent*, Dec. 12, 1867, p. 4.

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vote, radicals met at Thaddeus Stevens' residence to discuss the prospects for creating a separate radical congressional party organization.[22]

IV

But Johnson, freed, he thought, from the threat of impeachment, embarked on an even more aggressive course. On December 28, 1867, he removed General John Pope from his command over Georgia and Alabama, and General Edward O. C. Ord from his command over Arkansas and Mississippi. He replaced them with the more conservative George Meade and the archconservative Alvan C. Gillem. At the same time President Johnson replaced Meade's subordinate, General Wager Swayne, who had been delegated immediate authority over Alabama. With these shifts of military personnel by the president, control of the military in every reconstructed state passed to officers more sympathetic to former rebels than to Southern loyalists.[23]

As Johnson continued his offensive, Freedmen's Bureau Commissioner Oliver Otis Howard expressed deep concern to one of his friends that "The President . . . musters out all my officers. . . . Measures are on foot . . . which are doubtless intended to utterly defeat reconstruction."[24] With the military "influence" in the hands of conservatives, Southern loyalists despaired of winning their states' compliance with the Reconstruction acts. From throughout the

[22] *New York Times* quoting the New York *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, Dec. 13, 1867, p. 8; New York *Independent*, Dec. 12, 1867, p. 4. Blaine recalled that the failure of the impeachment resolution "led to no little recrimination inside the ranks of the party" in his *Twenty Years of Congress . . .* 2 vols. (Norwich, Conn., 1884-86), II, 347; likewise, radical George W. Julian in *Political Recollections, 1840-1872* (Chicago, 1884), 312-13, and his report in the Centreville *Indiana True Republican*, Dec. 19, 1867, p. 93, published by his brother, Issac.

[23] General John Schofield, commander of the district embracing Virginia, remained in place. He had little sympathy for Republican policy, executing it, he later wrote, in such a way as to "save that State from the great evils suffered by sister States." Schofield, *Forty-Six Years in the Army* (New York, 1897), 397. See also James L. McDonough, "John Schofield as Military Dictator of Reconstruction in Virginia," *Civil War History*, XV (Sept., 1969), 237-56.

[24] Howard to Edgar Ketchum, Dec. 30, 1867. Howard Mss., Bowdoin College Library, Brunswick, Maine.

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South came warnings of the disastrous effects on Congressional reconstruction policies of Johnson's offensive.[25] ". . . Johnson defeats Congress at every point," the Boston *Commonwealth* lamented. "The work of reconstruction, at very short intervals, receives from him a staggering blow. . . . While Congress is passing acts to reconstruct the South, the President is driving a carriage and six through them."[26]

The success of the president's policy was made manifest when pro-Reconstruction forces were defeated in the first state to vote on its new constitution, framed under the terms of the Reconstruction act. In fact, Republican forces would prove unable to bring about compliance with the Reconstruction law in four of the ten states that it covered.[27]

Johnson's course appeared to congressional Republicans to be fraught with danger. It seemed, at a minimum, that the president hoped to delay Reconstruction until an anti-Republican reaction developed in the North, born of frustration and weariness with constant crises. Of course, if voters in the states which had not left the Union elected a Democratic Congress before Southern states were reconstructed along Republican lines, it would be a simple matter to repeal the Reconstruction act and recognize the Johnsonian civil

[25] Foster Blodgett to John Sherman, Dec. 30, 1867. Sherman Mss., Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (This was a circular letter sent to many congressmen.) John C. Underwood to Elihu B. Washburne, Dec. 9, 16, 1868; George Ely to Washburne, Feb. 9, 1868; W. H. Gibbs to Washburne, Jan. 18, 1868. Washburne Mss., L. C.; B. W. Norris to [the Republican congressional Campaign Committee], Jan. 4, 1868; Ed. I. Costello to T. L. Tullock, Jan. 17, 1868, files of the Select Committee on Reconstruction, 40-41 Congresses, R. G. 233, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (file 40A-F29.8 and 40A-F29.23, respectively). *House Miscellaneous Documents Numbers 43, 54,* and *57,* 40 Cong., 2 Sess. McKitrick cites several of these letters in his *Johnson and Reconstruction,* 500n. I cannot explain why they carry so little weight in his analysis.

[26] Boston *Commonwealth,* Jan. 4, 1867, p. 2. See also *Chicago Tribune,* Dec. 30, 1867, p. 2; Horace White to Elihu B. Washburne, Jan. 16, 1868. Washburne Mss.

[27] The four were Alabama, Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas, although Republicans repealed part of the Reconstruction law to facilitate Alabama's restoration. Moreover, in the second state to vote upon a new constitution, Arkansas, pro-Reconstruction forces won by a margin of only 1400 out of 55,000 votes. Not until impeachment discouraged white Southerners and forced Johnson to cease interference did Republican margins of victory become comfortable in those states which finally complied with the law. Edward McPherson (ed.), *The Political History of the United States of America During the Period of Reconstruction* . . . 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1875).

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governments as legitimate, admitting, then, their representatives to Congress. But this was extremely unlikely. The real danger was that a Democratic presidential candidate might win enough Northern and border-state electoral votes in 1868 to win a majority of the whole, if Democratic votes from unreconstructed Southern states were counted.[28] A second anticipated peril was that Johnson might use the military to interfere with presidential balloting in those states which were yet to comply with the Reconstruction law and be restored by Congress. "Do you not suppose that next November a single soldier at each polling place in the southern country, aided by the whites, could prevent the entire negro [sic] population from voting?" the radical Boutwell asked. Again there was the danger that Democratic electoral votes from Northern and border-states combined with Southern votes won through such illicit tactics might constitute a majority. If the Republican-controlled Congress refused to count Southern votes in either case, as they undoubtedly would, President Johnson might view the refusal as a denial of the democratic process. As Boutwell grimly prophesized: "[T]he next inauguration of a President . . . [would] be the occasion of renewal of fratricidal strife."[29]

Many Republicans believed the president capable of such audacity. During the summer and fall of 1866, Johnson supporters had hinted darkly that if enough Democrats were elected to Congress from the North, they might withdraw from the Capitol and join Southern congressmen-elect in a counter-Congress, arguing that it represented more congressional districts than its Republican-dominated counterpart. Many Republicans believed the scheme had been abandoned only because Northerners had returned an overwhelming Republican majority.[30] Again, in the fall of 1867, rumors of a John-

[28] See Boutwell's prophecy, *Cong. Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., 595 (Jan. 17, 1868).
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] Justin S. Morrill to Jewett, May 4, 1866, quoted in William B. Parker, *The Life and Public Services of Justin Smith Morrill* (Boston and New York, 1924), 229-30; George S. Boutwell, *Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs*, 2 vols. (New York, 1902), II, 79, 107-12; Charles Sumner to John Bright, Sept. 3, 1866, quoted in Edward L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, 4 vols. (Boston, 1893), IV, 298-99; Samuel F. Miller to David Davis, Oct. 12, 1866. Davis Mss., L.C.; Testimony on impeachment, *House Report No. 7*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., appendix, 45-51, 833-34; Adam Badeau, *Grant in Peace: From Appomattox to Mount McGregor—A Personal Memoir* (Hartford, Conn., 1887), 51; John

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and moderates would be willing to dump Stanton in favor of the archconservative, but independent-minded, Jacob D. Cox, he found Johnson uninterested in compromise. Johnson wanted his own man in the office. Sherman abandoned his efforts, realizing, as he wrote home, that "there must be something behind the scenes."[33] Instead of compromising, Johnson determined to take the ominous step—at least to Republicans—of creating a new army department, the Army of the Atlantic, with headquarters in Washington. The sympathetic Sherman would be placed in command. Sherman resisted the appointment, but nonetheless on February 6, 1868, Johnson ordered General Grant to promulgate an order creating the department and giving command to Sherman. At the same time he acted to promote Sherman to General of the Army—Grant's rank—sending the nomination to the Senate on February 13, 1868. Johnson himself knew the effect his action would have on congressional Republicans: "This would set some of them thinking," his secretary quoted the president as saying.[34]

Sherman refused the command and telegraphed his brother, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, to oppose confirmation of his new rank in the Senate. "The President would make use of me to beget violence. . . ." he wrote, "He has no right to use us for such purposes, though he is Commander-in-Chief." On February 19, Johnson acceded to Sherman's pleas and rescinded his transfer to the new command.[35]

Two days later Johnson again removed Stanton, this time without complying with the provision of the Tenure of Office law. To

[33] W. T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, Jan. 13, 1868. W. T. Sherman Mss., Notre Dame Archives, South Bend, Ind. The letter is excerpted in M. A. deWolfe Howe (ed.), *Home Letters of General Sherman* (New York, 1909), 364-65.

[34] Notes of Col. William G. Moore, Feb. 17, 1868, in the Andrew Johnson Mss., L.C.

[35] W. T. Sherman to Johnson, Jan. 31, Feb. 14, 1868, quoted in Rachel Sherman Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (New York 1894), 300-304; W. T. Sherman Mss., Notre Dame Archives (excerpts quoted in Howe [ed.], *Home Letters of General Sherman*, 369-70); Sherman to Thomas Ewing, Sr., Feb. 13, 1868, quoted *ibid.*, 370-74; Johnson to Grant, Feb. 6, 1868; Johnson to Sherman, Feb. 19, 1868. Headquarters of the Army, Letters Received, Record Group 108, N.A.; W. T. Sherman to John Sherman (letter), Feb. 14, 1868; W. T. Sherman to Grant, Feb. 14, 1868; W. T. Sherman to John Sherman (telegram), Feb. 14, 1868, quoted in Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters*, 305-306.

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Republicans it appeared to be another step in a course which threatened incalculable disaster to their program and to the country. But this time all Republicans agreed that Johnson had crossed the bounds of legality, that he had, as even Bingham conceded, "deliberately . . . violated . . . the laws of the country."[36] Conservative Republicans, sadly and bitterly but feeling they were left no choice, joined the radicals in presenting articles of impeachment to the Senate.[37]

So the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson was no hasty, passionate decision by vindictive Radicals. That long-time opponent of impeachment, Judiciary Committee Chairman Wilson, perhaps best expressed the spirit of his nonradical colleagues when he explained: "Guided by a sincere desire to pass this cup from our lips, determined to drink it if escape were not cut off by the presence of a palpable duty, we at last find ourselves compelled to take its very dregs."[38] The Johnson impeachment was the reluctant decision of men who felt that they had been pushed to the wall and forced to

[36] *Congressional Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., 1340 (Feb. 22, 1868).

[37] During the trial, Johnson's counsel argued that Stanton was not protected under the general provisions of the Tenure of Office act. The House and Senate had originally disagreed over whether the tenure of department heads should be protected under the bill—the House insisting upon protection, the Senate insisting that the president's power to replace Cabinet members should remain untrammeled. As often happens in such cases, the conference committee on the bill decided to obfuscate rather than compromise the issue, providing that the terms of department heads would run one month beyond the term of the president who appointed them, during which time they could be removed only with the consent of the Senate. The House conferees confidently announced that this language was "in fact an acceptance by the Senate of the position of the House." *Congressional Globe*, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., 1340 (Feb. 19, 1867). Representatives did not know that the Senate conferees had told their colleagues the opposite. *Ibid.*, 1514-18 (Feb. 18, 1867). Moreover, the president appeared to acknowledge the necessity for Senatorial approval of a removal when he suspended Stanton in August, 1867, naming Grant, his replacement, secretary of war *ad interim*, as the act required. In December, Johnson had sent a message to the Senate, once more as the law required, offering justifications for Stanton's removal. When the Senate rejected Johnson's presentation, Stanton retook possession of the War office, again in conformity with the law. All this seemed to have settled the question of whether Stanton was covered by the act.

[38] *Congressional Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., 1386 (Feb. 24, 1868). See also the remarks of Representatives Rufus P. Spalding, *ibid.*, 1340 (Feb. 22, 1868); Ebon C. Ingersoll, *ibid.*, 1358 (Feb. 22); Austin Blair, *ibid.*, 1367-68 (Feb. 22); James K. Moorhead, *ibid.*, appendix, 157 (Feb. 24); Frederick E. Woodbridge, *ibid.*, 1387-88; and Luke P. Poland, *ibid.*, 1394 (Feb. 24).

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take a stand defending the constitutional prerogatives of Congress against presidential aggression. For as even the most conservative of Republicans (in this case Representative Austin Blair of Michigan) finally saw it, President Johnson had "thrown the gauntlet to Congress, and says to us as plainly as words can speak it: 'Try this issue now betwixt me and you; either you go to the wall or I do.' "[39]

[39] *Ibid.*, 1368 (Feb. 22, 1868).

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Book Reviews

Alliance Politics *by Glenn H. Snyder. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997. 414 pp. $39.95.*

Few scholars have contributed as much to our understanding of international relations as has Glenn Snyder. His latest book on the formation and management of alliances, the product of nearly two decades of research, is arguably his most sophisticated and important work. Unparalleled in conceptual clarity and theoretical richness, *Alliance Politics* is a monumental achievement that sets a new standard by which future alliance studies will be judged.

Linking two large but previously discrete bodies of theory, bargaining, and structural realism, and borrowing from social psychological theories of coalition formation, Snyder investigates both alliance formation and management in multipolar systems composed of actors of unequal strengths. Alliance formation, Snyder claims, is "the product of systemic anarchy, strength inequalities and conflicts and common interests among the states, and a bargaining process" (p. 78). The distribution of capability and conflict determines the "inherent" worth of prospective alliances to their members, which predisposes a multipolar system toward certain alliances. But who aligns with whom and under what terms is ultimately decided by a bargaining process that turns on the parties' inherent value for the alliance and their alternatives. Alternatives set the bargaining range, while comparative inherent value affects where within the range proposed terms will fall.

A good deal of the empirical validity and theoretical usefulness of Snyder's highly deductive, mathematical model depends on the ability of the researcher or statesperson to calculate with some precision the value of every prospective alliance for all the relevant actors. Given that a five-actor system yields ten different two-member alliances, and more than ten if alliance combinations of three or more actors are included, each of which contains a specific pair of prebargaining payoffs, the ability to make precise and reliable numerical calculations of the kind that Snyder envisions is, indeed, no small task.

Not surprisingly, the empirical tests provide only qualified support for the hypotheses on alliance formation, particularly those derived from bargaining set theory. The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance (1891-1894), for instance, favored France even though it valued the alliance more and had fewer alternatives than Russia. The model does a better job at predicting the formation and terms of the Austro-German alliance of 1879. Yet, the timing of Germany's move toward Austria was prompted by Otto von Bismarck's fear that the retiring Germanophile Austrian foreign minister, Count Andrássy, would be replaced by a Germanophobe like his predecessor, Count Beust. Further, while Bismarck's arguments in

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favor of the alliance terms follow Snyder's logic, they "failed to convince" Kaiser Wilhelm, "who made essentially three counterarguments, all of them weighty" against the treaty (p. 88). The kaiser backed down only after Bismarck threatened the resignation of the entire cabinet as well as himself.

Several plausible counterfactuals (for example, if Andrássy had been replaced by someone from the anti-German camp prior to the alliance; if German foreign policy had been directed by someone less defiant and adroit than Bismarck in the face of Wilhelm's adamant objections to the treaty) might have produced different outcomes, though Snyder suggests otherwise. That said, one of the strengths of Snyder's bargaining model is precisely that it can incorporate chance and contingency. Thus William Gladstone's accession to power increased Austria's dependence on Germany by eliminating Britain as a "sleeping partner," and this explains why the terms to the Three Emperors' Alliance of 1881 were so lopsided to Austria's disadvantage.

To Snyder's credit, the empirical divergences from the model's predictions are not swept under the rug but instead used to provide some of the book's more fascinating and valuable theoretical insights. For instance, Snyder finds, inter alia, that in actual practice: there is a scarcity of alternatives that "throws into question the conventional notion of the flexibility of alliances in a multipolar system" (p. 148); statesmen often overestimate the prospective partner's options and exaggerate the preclusive value of the alliance, weakening the estimating state's bargaining power; and "norms of equity and considerations of salience were at least as important as relative bargaining power in determining outcome" (p. 153).

Part II of the book explores alliance management. Here Snyder extends the arguments contained in his influential 1984 article on the alliance security dilemma, that is, how alliance partners deal with fears of abandonment and entrapment. As in the earlier work, Snyder nests intra-alliance politics within a simultaneously played adversary game, explicating the often counterintuitive logic of the interplay between alliance and adversary relations. Updating the original piece, Snyder offers valuable insights on buck-passing, chain-ganging, and bandwagoning behavior; the advantages and disadvantages of alliances versus ententes; how expectations create obligations; why reciprocity is at the heart of most alliances; the functions of alliance norms; and why states sometimes play a "community" game that cuts across alliance and adversary relations.

This is but a brief overview of a rich and complex but crisply written book that should be required reading for any serious student or practitioner of international relations. *Alliance Politics* is a virtuoso performance by a mature scholar of unsurpassed intellectual firepower; it ranks among the finest books the field has ever produced and was well worth the wait.

RANDALL L. SCHWELLER
The Ohio State University

What if They Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came? Interpreting International Crises *by Ron Hirschbein. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1997. 240 pp. $59.95.*

Most studies of international crises take for granted the actors' beliefs that the situation is dangerous and calls for forceful actions. Indeed, without such a definition of the situation there would be no crisis. In an engaging if not entirely convincing study, Ron Hirschbein argues that most crises are not objective challenges to vital national interests, but rather are

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construed and constructed by individual leaders. Why they see a situation as a crisis depends at least as much on their personalities and needs as it does on others' behavior. For evidence, he turns to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Cienfuegos incident in the fall of 1970. The former case, he says, was not a challenge to American national security: Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and others believed that the missiles had little impact on the military balance. The Soviets' construction of a submarine base at Cienfuegos Bay in Cuba, on the other hand, would have changed the balance more. Yet the former episode led to what was probably the most dangerous crisis of the cold war and the latter was handled by quiet diplomacy.

The explanation, Hirschbein argues, lies in the different ways in which leaders invested the Soviet behavior with meaning and the ways in which the incidents resonated with individuals' senses of themselves. Using a hermeneutic approach and drawing on a loosely psychoanalytic appreciation, he argues that while John Kennedy was prone to see events in terms of crises in which leaders could establish their mastery of situations (and of themselves), in his books of history that reflected his self-conception, he "seldom depicts unalloyed heroes" (p. 110). Thus while he was quick to turn the Soviet deployment of missiles into a crisis, he was loathe to abandon prudence. In the end, he rejected the advice of belligerent colleagues and made major concessions to keep the peace. (Hirschbein's interpretation of this as indecision strikes me as unconvincing but is perhaps required by his view of Kennedy as a deeply and perhaps dangerously divided person.)

Richard Nixon reacted very differently when he learned the Russians were building a base at Cienfuegos, because he was a very different person. For him, events only were a crisis when they challenged him and his need to be liked personally. Hirschbein draws an interesting parallel between Nixon and Arthur Miller's salesman, Willy Loman. Unloved as child, humiliated in early adulthood, Nixon's sense of self was fragile; but as long as the challenges were not personal, he could view them with detachment. Thus Nikita Khrushchev's rude treatment of him on his visit to the Soviet Union in 1959 was a crisis, while the numerous foreign policy confrontations of his presidency were not. Cienfuegos did not call for a public confrontation, and his reaction was so lethargic that Henry Kissinger, who viewed the world more through the lens of power politics, had to maneuver him into taking the initiative. The events of October 1962 called into question who Kennedy was; those eight years later did not raise such questions for Nixon.

Were the two challenges really so similar? Hirschbein is correct that a totally objective judgment is impossible. But in fact, the change in the military balance portended by the earlier events was much greater than that potentially involved in Cienfeugos. Furthermore, Kennedy had pledged not only his own word, but his country's reputation on not permitting offensive weapons into Cuba. Thus it is not surprising that no officials were willing to allow the Soviet missiles to stay, although they did differ on the tactics to be followed and the concessions the United States should be willing to make. The other side of this coin is that Kennedy did not turn other incidents, such as the erection of the Berlin Wall, into crises. In retrospect, few observers believe that quiet diplomacy would have led Khrushchev to remove the missiles.

It is unfortunate that Hirschbein's account is not only out of date (much new information has become available only recently), but is careless and unreliable. Hirschbein is at pains to stress that adopting an interpretive approach does not mean that evidence is irrelevant. In the end, I do not think the interpretations he offers will replace more conventional ones, although they may supplement them. But at a minimum, he has reminded us that crises are

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made, not found, and that it is not self-evident why some situations and not others are handled with quiet diplomacy.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events *by Thomas A. Birkland. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1997. 192 pp. Cloth, $53.00; paper,* $20.95.

To state that major catastrophes, natural or man-made, can generate a lot of political heat is an understatement. In this carefully researched and well argued new book, Thomas Birkland goes a long way toward explaining why some catastrophes lead to more governmental response than others. Paying careful attention to the seriousness of the problem, or the scope of the catastrophe, he shows that this alone will not take us far in explaining the nature, scope, or magnitude of governmental response. Choosing his cases to cover a range of disasters rather than only one type, Birkland provides a rich theoretical treatment with plenty of systematic evidence to convince the reader that affected communities must be organized and demand governmental response in order for it to occur. But the communities Birkland has in mind are not those that lose their homes in a hurricane or their fishing routines to oil spills; rather the communities of interest are professionals, experts, and activists who can mobilize the technical arguments and promote a sense that some potentially workable solutions exist to prevent or at least to mitigate the effects of similar disasters in the future.

Birkland begins with a useful summary of a variety of approaches to the topic of agenda-setting, showing how focusing events can play an important role in pushing a concern to the public agenda. He introduces the idea of a "potential focusing event" in pointing out that disasters, accidents, and catastrophes of various magnitudes occur regularly, but that only some of them become the object of much attention. In explaining why some disasters generate more reaction than others, Birkland does not avoid confronting the obvious: maybe they generate more reaction because they are more serious, affect a greater number of people, cause a greater economic harm, or lead to more deaths and injuries. These indicators help in some instances, but for the most part he demonstrates quite clearly that there must be more than only a crisis to get government to respond.

The emphasis of the book is on developing a theoretical explanation of an important part of the agenda-setting process. Birkland places great emphasis on the roles of policy entrepreneurs, particularly as these come out of professional communities and interest groups active in the policy domain. Incidents at nuclear power plants and oil spills generate more government reaction than hurricanes and earthquakes, not only because these disasters are man-made where the others are natural, but also because the organized interests active in those areas include more who are capable and willing participants in conflict expansion processes. With chapter-length treatments of natural disasters (hurricanes and earthquake), oil spills, and nuclear plant accidents, Birkland is able to show considerable variation in how the government responds to different incidents even in the same domain. The results are fascinating, providing the first systematic review of how and why government responds to some problems more than others.

The book includes a good effort at systematic data collection on congressional activities, media coverage, and various indicators of severity of the disasters to show the statistical

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relations (or lack thereof) among these variables. More important than these statistical treatments are the rich case histories setting some prominent disasters (Three Mile Island, Exxon Valdez, Santa Barbara oil spill, Hurricane Camille) in the context of other, less well remembered disasters of similar magnitude. Finally, the book never strays too far from developing and testing theories of how the processes of agenda-setting and issue-definition work. It is a neat, simple, and well done book that should be of interest to a wide audience.

FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER
Pennsylvania State University

Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions *by Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1998. 520 pp. Cloth, $69.50; paper, $24.95.*

In international relations scholarship, there has been a relative dearth of studies on risk taking, despite the fact it is a central characteristic of many types of national behavior, in both military/security and economic realms. In the security arena, assumptions about risk are central to deterrence theory. National leaders are generally assumed to be risk-averse, especially if they perceive that they would not achieve their military goals in the face of stronger retaliation by their adversary. A problem with this assumption is that highly risk-acceptant decision makers may not go by the axioms of deterrence theory and could engage in militarily provocative behavior resulting in war. This danger is amplified if such decision makers are in possession of nuclear weapons.

Risk is central to understanding the psychological dimensions of decision making. It is no surprise that at least some past wars have been started by decision makers who took risky decisions with the hope of gaining their political and military objectives through war. Misperceptions about the risk-taking propensities of adversaries can cause underestimation or overestimation of threats, resulting in low preparedness or overreaction to provocative gestures by the opponent. Miscommunications can occur when risk-taking propensities are communicated to others, especially to adversarial states. Evaluations of risk-taking behavior of an opponent could also influence the willingness of parties to engage in peace negotiations or arms control agreements.

This book supplements Vertzberger's well received previous work, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (1990). The new book fills a major void in understanding the concept of risk in its multidimensional aspects. Vertzberger marries theory and empirical materials in an in-depth study. The book starts with an extensive review of the subject of risk taking. Vertzberger offers an alternative to rational choice theories by developing a socio-cognitive theory based on cognitive and motivational drives and biases of decision makers. His is a context-dependent theory according to which cultural, organizational, and small group behavioral variables greatly affect the decision-making process. Further, decision makers over a period of time learn the pros and cons of risk taking, often in a nonlinear fashion. The framework that Vertzberger develops is a useful one, as standard rational choice theories have great difficulty accommodating risk-taking characteristics of decision makers, given their assumption that decision makers in general are cool-headed strategic calculators and utility maximizers. Risk taking is, however, a natural part of any decision making, given the uncertainties involved in the process.

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The study then turns to applying the theoretical arguments to five case studies of foreign military intervention. These are two low risk cases—U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989; one moderate risk case—Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968; and two high-risk cases—U.S. intervention in Vietnam 1964-1968 and Israel's intervention in Lebanon in 1982-1983. The cases are well selected. The methodology of process tracing is ideally suited for understanding the complex decision processes that led to these interventions. The latter two interventions were failures, unlike the first three, which the author terms as successful. His findings point out the conditions under which some interventions remain short and successful and others are protracted conflicts and failures.

One general criticism is that the book is unnecessarily lengthy. Although useful, both the literature review and the case study sections are voluminous and could have been succinctly written in fewer pages. Despite this criticism, the book could be of much use to scholars interested in decision making and policy makers attempting to improve their own decision-making capabilities. This book certainly shows that psychological approaches to understanding security behavior can be fruitfully developed beyond past works on deterrence theory.

T. V. PAUL
McGill University

American Foreign Policy: Consensus at Home, Leadership Abroad *by Karl Von Vorys. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1997. 392 pp. $59.95.*

This is neither the usual chronological analysis of recent U.S. foreign policy nor the usual analysis leading toward a political science model. Instead, Karl Von Vorys, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, is concerned that U.S. officials and, perhaps more importantly, the American people will pull back now that the cold war's grave dangers have ebbed and revert to a pick-and-choose isolationism. Or, and one has the feeling this especially worries the author, Americans will limit their attention, guarantees of security, and benefits of the dollar to fellow westerners. The danger, in other words, comes less from Herbert Hoover's ghost than political scientist Samuel P. Huntington's presence. For as Von Vorys quotes him, Huntington argues that "western leaders" must "preserve and renew the unique qualities of western civilization. . . . Neither globalism nor isolationism, neither multilateralism nor unilateralism will serve American interests" (p. 321).

Von Vorys attacks this argument from two general directions. He first notes that not only is the U.S. population becoming less "western" and waspish, but that as it includes more Asian-Americans and Hispanic-Americans, as African-Americans exert more pressure on Washington, and as the many profitseeking Americans focus on the potential of Asia, "strictly speaking ours is no longer a western civilization, not even the American phase of western civilization" (p. 322). Second, the author ranges widely to analyze U.S. overseas policy to demonstrate how Washington officials learned from interwar and other disasters to establish a post-1945 decentralized world order. After this quest's success was partly short-circuited by the Vietnam War, Washington played a kind of balance-of-power game, aided by new technology, to bring down the Soviet Union.

The argument for U.S. global leadership is buttressed by a useful series of historical analyses examining, among other episodes and not in chronological order, the Gulf War, the

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development of the U.S. security system, the creation of the Munich syndrome, the debate and negotiations over German unification in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the evolution of Latin America's political economy. Most of these depend on secondary sources. A notable exception is the section on Europe at the end of the cold war. Most also stress security and politics. The Latin American section is interesting for its tracing of economic themes climaxing in the North American Free Trade structure.

Oddly missing, given the early emphasis on tensions between U.S. domestic demands and the demands made abroad on Washington's policies, is any extended analysis of how American leaders shaped domestic views and interests to support global policies in the 1940s and 1950s. There is nothing, for example, on the Truman Doctrine, which set up a forty-year consensus for fighting the cold war. The thesis is challenging, the vignettes supporting the thesis are readable, but the argument's indispensable domestic dimension is largely assumed rather than analyzed.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy *by Peter Trubowitz. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998. 353 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

Peter Trubowitz has written an important book that adds much to our understanding of how U.S. foreign policy has developed over the last century. Trubowitz focuses on how domestic regional and sectional politics configured U.S. foreign policy, taking a multidisciplinary approach to make his case that not only depends on traditional political science, but also on the disciplines and subdisciplines of history, geography, international relations, and American political development. The result is a rich narrative that parsimoniously unites different theoretical approaches in its analysis of U.S. foreign policy.

For those interested in American political development, *Defining the National Interest* is one of a set of new books that views U.S. external policy as fundamentally linked to domestic policy planning. Trubowitz makes a very important critical argument: in the case of the United States, there is no single "national interest" and there never was a single "overarching" definable national interest that drove foreign-policy planning. This view works against "outside-in" realist theory, which holds that external changing security dilemmas are what define a nation-state's national interest. Trubowitz's analysis focuses on the "interpenetration" of internal and external policy making. In the author's view, the U.S. "national interest" has always been malleable, contingent on domestic politics and specifically defined in terms of regional political economy. Following this foundational premise, regional political economy and the power distribution (coalitions) in Congress are what determine grand strategic policy. Trubowitz examines three important periods in the last century of U.S. foreign policy: the 1890s, in which seapower and imperialism are examined; a "long" 1930s, in which international interests are analyzed; and finally the 1980s, where a "resurgent America" is analyzed. In all three periods, Trubowitz is able to show how sectional politics fundamentally configured grand strategy.

The longest and most challenging chapter is an expanded investigation of the long 1930s: a careful analysis of the interwar years, World War II, and an all-too-short side glance at

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the cold war. It is this chapter and the penultimate chapter on the 1980s that raise questions for me and, I think, will raise questions among diplomatic historians and scholars of the Realist/Neorealist tradition. In his last two substantive chapters, Trubowitz deploys a two-level analysis that conflates primary and secondary factors regarding U.S. foreign policy development. The framing technique that Trubowitz uses of juxtaposing "Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians" with so-called hawks and doves in foreign policy illustrates the difficulty of confusing primary and secondary factors regarding policy planning. Primary arguments deal with exactly what kind of foreign policy is put into operation, and secondary arguments tell us about the domestic political friction that configures the specific policy. The problem with using the historically exhausted and highly questionable Hamiltonian/Jeffersonian dichotomy is that Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson were both empire builders, and empire building is the primary argument. Put otherwise, the difference between Hamilton and Jefferson centered only on the means to the end—how to build what Marc Egnal has termed "A Mighty Empire." Conceived this way, Hamilton and Jefferson were two sides of the same coin. An analysis of the politics surrounding the means to an end is an analysis of secondary arguments. Trubowitz focuses primarily on secondary arguments in his analysis of postwar foreign policy development. For example, I would argue that there was no significant debate in Congress or the White House about the primary foreign-policy interest: containing the Soviet Union and Soviet communism. At the secondary level of debate, however, there was substantial contention about how to contain Soviet expansion. This secondary area of debate is where the contentious issue of trade policy can be examined and where Trubowitz's analysis shines. Trubowitz's book gives one of the best analyses I have read of the secondary level of inquiry. The author illustrates that a postwar consensus was forged within a contentious crucible of sectional politics. But the question remains: Was the national grand-stragetic policy to contain Soviet expansionism systematically influenced only by sectional debate and regional political economy? I think not. Anticommunism was a postwar ideology (even a culture) that was acted on by state managers and the public. Focusing only on political economy and sectionalism is to oversimplify the continuity of postwar U.S. foreign policy development. The puzzle given short shrift by Trubowitz is the continuity of U.S. foreign policy in the last half of this century. A Realist/Neorealist interpretation of Trubowitz's postwar analysis would hold that all the sectional friction that took place in Congress was not about defining the postwar national interest per se, for everyone knew what that was—to stop Soviet expansionism at all costs. In short, national security planners and Congress agreed on a simple, operational definition of the national interest. I am not sure that Trubowitz has convincingly answered the Realist/Neorealist contention about the primary influences on U.S. foreign policy.

Despite these suggestions and quibbles, the book is extremely well written with an absolutely superb use of descriptive statistics to bolster arguments about section, regional political economy, and domestic politics. Trubowitz deploys his narrative and statistical data in a way that, to my mind, makes the book mandatory for upper-level undergraduate students and graduate students. *Defining the National Interest* is an important and serious scholarly contribution to the growing literature in American political development. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the subject.

ANDREW D. GROSSMAN
Albion College

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Still Seeing Red *by John Kenneth White. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1997. 348 pp. $29.95.*

It is difficult to overstate the impact of the cold war on American politics of the last fifty years, though John Kenneth White at times comes close. His thesis is that the Republican party was the prime beneficiary of the cold war, because it could overcome the Democrats' post-Roosevelt domestic advantage by tarring them as soft on communism. The chief result of this was the seven GOP presidential victories in ten elections between 1952 and 1988. Communism was built up into the opposite of the classic liberalism that America stood for: individualism, equality of opportunity, freedom. Hence the rise of that uniquely home-grown phrase—Un-American activities. Whatever flaws there may be in this account of the influence of the cold war on American domestic politics, White has posed one of the key contemporary questions that students of American politics ought to be addressing.

Justifiably, White goes beyond his narrow electoral argument. The cold war "tainted every political issue" (p. 14). Civil rights and civil liberties, unemployment programs, spending on highways, education and numerous other seemingly domestic issues had to fit through the eye of the cold war needle. In addition, the international struggle caused structural changes including the growth of the federal government, the centralizing of power in the presidency, the fragmenting of political parties, and the rise of a strident nationalism before which all seekers of office needed to bow.

White makes the interesting point that "The separation of presidential politics from congressional politics remains one of the permanent legacies of the cold war" (p. 195). Republican presidential candidates put on the hat of commander-in-chief and "all but excluded" Democrats from the presidency during the cold war (p. 193). The Democrats remained a majority in Congress by distancing themselves from their presidential candidates and riding economic distribution policies to a near-permanent control of Congress.

These points hint at the limits of single causes. The cold war provided a context for presidential elections between 1952 and 1988, but it seldom ranked as the key issue. John Kennedy would probably not have won in 1960 without television and a recession. The 1968 realignment did not come because Lyndon Johnson was soft on communists, but because—if only one reason is allowed—the Democrats were divided and dispirited. Ronald Reagan won in 1980 because Jimmy Carter let inflation and the economy get away from him. And Michael Dukakis in 1988? How about rerunning that one with Dukakis not burdened by the least competent campaign management of modern elections. At some level of generality White has a point. But when brought down to specific elections the insight fades.

White's history-as-argument sometimes fails to be either. There are times when one wants his interesting points expanded. Instead, he often substitutes attractive quotes and narrative for what would otherwise be a more elegantly constructed thesis. At other times he breezes through complex matters—1968's changes—on the strength of his cold war theme without getting very deeply into conflicting data. White's approach can be justified if it emphasizes information otherwise slighted. But he neither gives the reader enough history nor seals the door on his argument. A concluding chapter clarifying his points might have helped.

Journalists pride themselves on writing history's first draft. White can be equally pleased that he has advanced to a second draft of American politics during the cold war. He has taken on an important and complicated subject and integrated it into a challenging argument. While not the final word, it is a necessary step to understanding the cold war from which we are still emerging.

GARY WASSERMAN
Georgetown University

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Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World *by James N. Rosenau. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 467 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $22.95.*

For over forty years Rosenau has produced some of the most insightful and creative empirical work on international relations as they are traditionally understood: political relations *between* states. Throughout the last decade his empirical studies have led him to challenge the assumption that the traditional distinction between domestic and international remains meaningful. Here the assumption has been almost completely abandoned. Rosenau's topic is "governance in the world" as it exists today, the regulation of social action that emerges within and across a variety of once more meaningful frontiers, including those between sovereign states.

Rosenau argues that the world has changed in fundamental ways over the last fifty years, even though it was only the rapid political changes at the end of the cold war that focused attention on the extent of those transformations. Rosenau accepts the view of British social theorist David Held that the vastly greater complexity of today's transnational relations distinguishes this era of globalization. While a global economy has existed for 500 years, the speed, frequency, and multiplicity of possible connections among people in different parts of the world have been totally transformed by the telecommunications revolution that is barely thirty years old. To capture the salient features of today's global economy, Rosenau summarizes the Wharton Schools' Steve Kobrin, who argues that: the scale of research and development required by all of today's lead industries demands markets that are much larger than those of any single nation; transnational alliances and mergers are blurring the nationality of most leading companies; and the network limits of information technology rather than the demands of hierarchical control have now become the most important force shaping the evolution of profit-seeking firms.

Rosenau outlines a political science that is relevant to a world economy thus transformed. He would have us analyze governance at the geographic levels and across the domains in which it now appears to occur. For example, if we have an interest in arms races, we need to look not only at the politics among arms producers and traders, and national and private purchasers, but also at the technological and educational systems that have vested interests in the current system of arms production, as well as the cities, regions, and professions that also gain. In fact, we may even wish to look at the arms trade, itself a governance structure with implications for specific regions, populations, physical environments, governing parties, etc.

One of the key reasons we should approach political questions in this way, Rosenau argues, is a recent revolution in the political skills of citizens in almost all parts of the world, a revolution connected to the technological revolution that has also transformed private firms. Political boundaries have become porous, in part because citizens almost everywhere now know how to seek allies at a great distance in order to support their very local struggles. The point is well taken, although Rosenau may underestimate the degree to which continuing microprocesses of nationalism may blind citizens to the extent of their potential range of international allies. Ironically in our current world, the nightly news that tells us about our "American" national political world and the schools that organize our education around the imagined histories of our national polities, cultures, and languages, may be some of the strongest forces maintaining the frontiers whose weakening requires the new political science that Rosenau outlines.

CRAIG N. MURPHY
Wellesley College

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Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making *by Barbara Readen Farnham. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 323 pp. $39.50.*

Political analysts have long been sensitive to the importance of domestic considerations for the policy choices that leaders make and the difficulty they sometimes have in making trade-offs between consequential values. Political scientists and political psychologists have studied both questions. Barbara Farnham wants to take the next step and develop an approach to decision making that integrates contextual imperatives and psychological processes. She attempts to illustrate the utility of her approach in a case study of Franklin Roosevelt's response to the Munich crisis of 1938.

Farnham reasons that political leaders must determine whether they have a political as well as a policy problem. If domestic considerations appear to constrain leaders from pursuing an appropriate foreign (or domestic) policy, they confront a value conflict. Their first response is likely to search for alternatives that will finesse this conflict and by doing so preserve all the values involved. Policy makers are unlikely to accept the need for compromise at the outset and will adopt a variety of sophisticated strategies designed to increase their wiggle room. They may attempt to find a more complicated variant of their preferred strategy that is acceptable to diverse constituencies, push and prod these constituencies into accepting their preferred policies, and tinker with the policy in the hope that it might be made more acceptable than a first analysis indicates. These several strategies represent attempts to loosen the acceptability constraint, buy time, and educate constituencies in the hope of changing their preferences. Policy makers may eventually be forced to make trade-offs among important values and will do so reluctantly after trying all available means of reconciling the competing interests or constituencies involved.

The political approach to policy making that Farnham describes differs from a pure optimizing strategy in several ways. It is likely to exhibit fewer and less sharp trade-offs among important values. The policy process is likely to be stretched out to allow feasibility probes, education, and sequencing. Finally, the resulting policies are likely to assume more risk. In particular, policy makers will be more prone to discount long-term policy consequences, because they display more sensitivity to shorter-term domestic political needs.

Farnham contends that Franklin Roosevelt's response to the European dictators represents a good plausibility probe for her propositions. In four chapters that trace in some detail the evolution of Roosevelt's foreign policy, she offers a more compelling interpretation than conventional systemic, domestic politics, or personality explanations for Roosevelt's initial hesitancy, indecision, and seeming contradictions and subsequent commitment—after Munich—to assume more risks to constrain Hitler and Mussolini. Roosevelt's early policy was a response to his uncertainty about the nature and goals of the dictators; he attempted to elicit more information and to avoid value conflicts by educating and prodding Germany and Italy to pursue more responsible policies. Munich convinced him that the dictators could not be socialized. He reframed the problem as one of direct concern to the United States and increasingly sought to educate the American public about the danger of Hitler and to find policies that would strengthen France and Britain and be acceptable at home. Aid to Hitler's adversaries, which ultimately took the form of Lend-Lease, was the satisficing solution to this political dilemma.

Farnham uses the historical evidence fairly and is sensitive to competing interpretations of Roosevelt's behavior. Her case study demonstrates that political leaders are often more sophisticated about value trade-offs than political analysts and theorists give them credit for. Their use of experimentation, stalling, education, and repeated fine tuning of their poli-

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cies stands in sharp contrast to simple theories of rational choice. We must also recognize that Franklin Roosevelt was not your average politician. Ironically, Farnham's analysis partially undercuts her broader theoretical point by convincingly demonstrating just how open-minded, uncommitted, experimental, and wily Roosevelt could be when seemingly caught between the Scylla of foreign threat and the Charybdis of domestic constraints. By her own admission, Jimmy Carter did not demonstrate these qualities. Nor did Woodrow Wilson or Lyndon Johnson.

Farnham has undeniably made a contribution to our understanding of political leadership, and her analysis highlights a broader problem: the different styles and capabilities of leaders. She has done an excellent job of defining the way in which one type of leader responds to impending values conflicts. On the base of additional case studies, we must identify other patterns of response and the kinds of leaders with which they are associated.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
The Ohio State University

Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations *by Helen V. Milner. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 309 pp. Cloth, $47.50; paper, $18.95.*

Traditionally, domestic-level arguments in international political economy (IPE) begin with an analysis of the distribution of interests within a country, perhaps examine the ease or difficulty of organizing interests, then relate interest groups to political parties and more formal political structures to explain state policy. Several states' policies can then be joined to arrive at a picture of systemic outcomes. We can easily borrow from economics work portraying the distribution of interests within societies, thus we have a growing literature building off variants of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (notably the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and its rivals). This literature employs economic models to fill in substance about interests and then makes broad assumptions about how interests compete to shape policy.

In this book, Helen Milner emphasizes the politics at the domestic level rather than the economic interests. She seeks to explain the success or failure of agreements to cooperate, an issue central to debates between Realists and Institutionalists. Milner argue that both fail to take domestic politics adequately into account. She poses an alternative that uses the interaction of the distributions of interests, of information, and of decision-making powers to inform our understanding of the negotiation and ratification of international cooperative arrangements. Since it is not about the substance of interests, but rather about how interests are distributed, the overall argument is strikingly different. By drawing much more heavily on analyses of domestic politics and informational asymmetries, and by abstracting out the details of interests for the purposes of modeling, the results are a fresh cut at an old question; international factors still matter, since domestic political leaders must reflect on the need for international cooperation and the possibility of retaliation in issue areas that exhibit policy externalities.

Innovation typically generates wariness, and in this case the wariness may spring from the literature Milner draws on, since it is less familiar to specialists in international relations (IR). This literature is centered not simply on democratic politics, but on American practices. For instance, divided government drives many of Milner's findings. This has clear applications to the United States, but Milner must (and does) construct convincing reasons

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why parliamentary systems, which produce coalitional governments or which lack parties able to discipline their back-benches, would exhibit similar patterns. Britain, Japan, or other states thus may exhibit decision-making and ratification processes more like the United States than we would first expect. More importantly, cases where decision making is concentrated in the hands of an executive are actually easier to model. Milner can therefore not only cover different regime-types and states open or closed to the international economy, her arguments can also encompass the explanations that Realists or Institutionalists provide for cooperation. Another potential problem is that the analysis is about directional dyads (one state's decisions concerning interaction with one other state). This, however, does not limit the results, partially because in practice many negotiations take place between two states and then are extended to cover others through multilateral institutions, but more importantly because the model is sufficiently abstract that its assumptions can be easily altered to deal with such concerns.

The book may not be easy reading for the very audiences Milner wishes to persuade; when the first half of the book is devoted to theoretical models, some readers may be lost along the way, no matter how clear the thinking or writing. Part I of the book covers much ground, and the abstraction is necessary to zero in on those causal forces deserving greater attention. While I found the graphs and models presented in chapters three and four tied things together, such representations may not be so illuminating for those unused to them—much of the IR audience; those in IPE who already focus on domestic forces are more likely to be receptive. These representations might have been more accessible if they contained referents to the substance of policies, though this is simply a stylistic point. It does highlight a disjuncture between Parts I (theory) and II (cases), however, since these representations are not replicated as devices for organizing evidence, as one might expect.

That point aside, the cases provide compelling support for the arguments. Each chapter considers a pairing of attempts to reach an agreement on cooperation, controlling for different factors. By examining decisions involving the same countries at the same time, but where cooperation was achieved in one issue-area but not the other, Milner provides ammunition for criticisms of purely systemic explanations. By including the failure of the European Defense Community, she deals with an example in security affairs, showing that the arguments apply outside economic issue areas. The cases also illustrate how the arguments draw in a number of factors. As she also points out, often the domestic bargaining is more difficult and takes more time than the international negotiations!

Interests, Institutions and Information helps us focus on domestic-level variables, which have received too little attention in IPE. It brings us back to the politics of domestic-level analyses to balance the emphasis on economics. It also provides important insights into questions concerning the foreign policy behavior of different regime-types—a burgeoning issue in IR more generally. This is a powerful work that will be the springboard for further research, since it gives us a new lens through which we may examine issues central to the field.

MARK R. BRAWLEY
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Power to the People: Democratization Around the World *by Robert K. Schaeffer. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1997. 325 pp. $30.00.*

The end of the cold war has led to something of a crisis in paradigms in political science: "Who got it right, who got it wrong?" is one debate. "Can't we just begin in many respects

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all over again with new conceptions of how the world operated then and how it is operating now?" is another. Seen from this perspective, Robert K. Schaeffer's book is an answer to both questions, for to an extent it develops, though without acknowledging it, the arguments of one of the traditional literatures on the cold war; while in other ways it tries to introduce rather novel ways of understanding the world over the last half century.

The essential argument of the book can be summed up in five propositions that build on one another: first, the Soviet Union and the United States collaborated in the division of the world after 1945, so that the cold war essentially ended in 1955/56 (*sic*!) with the division of the globe into superpower spheres of influence; second, these spheres came to be dominated by local "republics" that were in effect dictatorships designed to preserve imperial influence; third, these junior republics in the world system set out to strengthen themselves internally, and at times externally, relying largely on economic development schemes; fourth, both these regimes and the greater system were threatened by a series of economic crises exacerbated by the shortcomings of geriatric dictatorial systems, military defeats, and popular unrest; finally, eventually not only the Soviet Union and its satellites but also a variety of junior states within the American system (southern Europe, South Korea, and Latin America) collapsed, opening the door for the current wave of democratization, whose primary contemporary characteristics are not so much political (for it is unclear that these states will consolidate their democratic rule) as they are economic, with openings to the international market and internal privatization.

While for this reviewer, such an integrated set of assumptions distorts far more than it reveals about the state of world affairs from the mid-1940s to the present, there is nonetheless something of value in each of Schaeffer's basic contentions. Take the first assumption, the U.S.–Soviet division of the world, which Schaeffer actually likens to the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, when Spain and Portugal divided the globe. Surely Schaeffer is right that there were collaborative aspects that have gone unappreciated in the relations between Washington and Moscow. Otherwise our species might well have perished in a nuclear holocaust. Still, to privilege "cooperation" and "collaboration" as he does without discussion over the conflictual elements of the struggle, which are not analyzed at all, is simplistic to the point of ultimately being quite misleading.

Schaeffer's second assumption—that East and West "designed a new interstate system based on republican states"—is if possible even more defective. Except in a footnote, he never defines what a "republic" is except that it is "constitutional" (n. 10, p. 248), but to give to Latin America, Eastern Europe, South Africa, and other parts of the world essentially similar forms of government, and to call them "republics," whereby the term suggests constitutional governance, is analytically indefensible. Still, there is some value in his insight that the structure of the superpower contest imposed a certain uniformity on local affairs that was often dictatorial.

The third and fourth assumptions—stressing the role of the junior republics in the evolution of the cold war—strike me as inherently more valid and novel propositions. These states did have a life of their own that did intersect with the great power struggle, and it is a merit of the book to single out the matter with a series of brief portraits of minor powers, which are well done. But the analysis is far from perfect. Nowhere does Schaeffer talk about nationalism, charismatic government, political ideology and the like, content as he is to let economic matters take center stage as the moving force of history.

Schaeffer's fifth assumption also has value: that the democratization we see around the globe today represents the outcome of economic forces and calculations more than anything else. Hence, he would presumably not be surprised, for example, should the current eco-

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nomic difficulties facing East and Southeast Asia and parts of Latin America and Eastern Europe lead to the emergence of antidemocratic forces in these regions. Once again, however, this shrunken range of political variables does not allow him to forecast where and why democratization is likely to encounter the greatest obstacles to success.

An additional shortcoming, not inherent in Schaeffer's assumptions, also mars the volume. It is curious that aside from some thank-yous in his acknowledgments, Schaeffer does not anywhere acknowledge his intellectual debts to leftist historians, especially like Immanuel Wallerstein, who share three critical assumptions: that the world is best understood as an interrelated whole, whose parts may have their own forms of action but are nonetheless contained within the greater logic of the world political whole; that economic forces may not be the sole, but they are the most decisive, explanation of long-term political changes; and that the superpowers were in many ways more collaborative than conflictual during the period from 1947–1989.

Had Schaeffer been more self-conscious in his borrowings, he might have remedied the fact that his book gives so little relative attention to the United States as the maker of the system that won the cold war and as the ultimate guarantor of that which has followed.

On the other hand, perhaps this oversight is understandable. No one in this school has ever had a kind word for the United States. Yet unless American policy and power are directly linked to this large-scale series of events, how good can such an analysis be? What we witness here is the development of a school of thought after the cold war in a direction that can best be called decadent, for in its concern to keep its anti-American animus alive it has forsaken its own theoretical presuppositions.

These criticisms should nonetheless not be taken to mean the book is totally without merit. Some of Schaeffer's arguments have more value than others, but all of them make plausible points. Moreover, the number of thumbnail sketches the book provides of a wide range of small countries' economic and political development often provide excellent summaries. And the general lines of his argument are clear enough so that even if like me you are not persuaded of their validity, you may nevertheless find it a worthwhile intellectual exercise trying to specify just why.

TONY SMITH
Tufts University

Disunited States: What's at Stake as Washington Fades and the States Take the Lead *by John Donahue. New York, Basic Books, 1997. 256 pp. $25.00.*

Devolution of power and policy to the states has been touted as a solution to problems of governance by Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, presidents and state governors. John Donahue's book takes a sweeping critical look at devolution, noting a few positive features, but on the whole finding it both disingenuous and potentially disastrous for the American position in the global economy.

Donahue begins with an overview of the theory and history of the American federalist experiment. Ardent devolutionists who have forgotten American experiences under the Articles of Confederation should heed his cautionary tale. In addition to the problems of interstate rivalry, multiple currencies, and questionable banking practices, the fledgling Confederation faced serious obstacles to international trade. Alexander Hamilton, George

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Washington, John Adams, and other federalists argued persuasively that only a UNITED state system could negotiate favorable terms of trade with European economic powers and attract investment.

Donahue next provides readers with a close look at the major arguments for devolution to the states. Administrative efficiency? Gains here are likely to be very slight; he finds little evidence that state bureaucracies have outperformed their federal counterparts. Closer to the people? Even the smallest states are far larger than the communities political philosophers have used as models for participatory democracy, and the lack of media coverage of state government issues and policies renders citizen input and oversight less plausible. Polls show the public generally supportive of state and local control rather than federal control, but this may be based as much on disillusion with government as on any nuanced assessment of state government capacities. Sensitivity to cultural differences? Donahue concedes the validity of local variations in policies such as speed limits and gaming. But while the states may indeed be laboratories of democracy and agents of innovation, he finds little systematic effort to analyze or learn from other states' experiences.

Donahue then looks more closely at several specific policy areas to assess the advantages of devolution. He agrees that traditional state or local functions (corrections, elementary and secondary education) should remain the province of subnational governments, although with some degree of federal standards or judicial oversight. But he argues forcefully that relegating environmental enforcement to the states would undercut advances made in legislation on clean air, clean water, and pesticide control (as the original legislative debates over these policies clearly recognized). Devolution of nuclear waste disposal to interstate compacts has been disastrous. He also presents compelling evidence that devolution of responsibility for higher education and welfare reform is likely to produce a "race to the bottom," as states endeavor to compete for business and residents by cutting taxes, heedless of the long-term impacts of lack of investment in human capital.

The villain here is interstate competition for capital. This has accelerated in recent years, despite some efforts by the National Governors' Association and the federal courts to regulate subsidies given to business. Donahue includes a thoughtful appendix summarizing the literature on the impact of business-attraction policies. He concludes that, despite the difficulties of obtaining good data through either surveys or tax records, differences across states do matter, more so in recent years as capital has become more mobile. The effects on business location vary by industry and by the details of the tax codes, and are far less than the impact of unionization or labor costs. The results, however, are likely to be "individually irresistible but collectively perverse" (p. 115), with a high risk that the government's authority and administrative capacity will be squandered on investment that would have occurred anyway in localities with little need of assistance. Private players (increasingly effective as lobbyists in the states) may be enriched, but Donahue is skeptical that growth will result in the economy as a whole.

The problem is that future growth depends less on promotion of industry (as early industrial-policy advocates argued) and more on the skills and adaptability of the country's workforce. In this light, Donahue's chapter on "The Stewardship of Skills" is chilling. Faced with federal mandates, soaring expenditures for corrections and Medicaid, the political popularity of spending on prisons and K-12 education, and the high mobility of college graduates, state legislatures have been cutting budgets for state universities and shifting more of the cost of higher education to students and their families. The results have been soaring debt for recent graduates, decreased access for working-class and minority students, and chronic underinvestment in the research, libraries, laboratories, and graduate training required to

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maintain American universities on the cutting edge. Despite lip service to competitiveness and the high-tech demands of the job market, the paradoxical consequence of devolution is that the United States is investing far too little in policies that have the best chance of long-term enhancement of our global economic position and the middle-class lifestyle that Donahue views as the crowning American economic achievement. The consequence may well be both economic stagnation and further disenchantment with politics and public life.

What is to be done? If the states are to have greater leeway to experiment and innovate, we might as well make the best of the situation by much more systematic and comparative analysis of state achievements and failures in different policy areas, and by furthering devolution where it makes sense. Joint state and/or federal action may also be necessary to constrain the ravages of interstate competition for capital, while preserving its positive effects. Donahue notes in passing that this is being done in the European community; he might have provided us with more comparative analysis on this point. The federal government should also play a greater role in financing education, antipoverty policy, and reducing states' dependence on their own tax revenues. Donahue concedes that the current political climate makes a resurgence of federal authority highly unlikely. Given public attitudes and the results of recent elections, he sees little chance of reversing the recent devolution of welfare. Donahue's own highly readable account is thoughtful and provocative, and his extensive notes offer a useful bibliography for scholars and policy analysts who wish to continue the long-standing dialogue on the nature of American federalism.

SUSAN B. HANSEN
University of Pittsburgh

The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted? *edited by John Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1997. 170 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

This timely volume seeks to combine a theoretical discussion of policy devolution with empirical evidence on its effects. As the title promises, the authors examine the proposition that decentralization in federal systems inevitably triggers a "race to the bottom." They all conclude that it does not.

The most valuable essay in the collection is an overview of the theoretical literature on decentralization within federal systems. Ronald McKinnon and Thomas Nechyba review the rationale for and against the federal separation of jurisdictions, both economic (efficiency) and public choice (rent seeking and collusion). In part, their analysis presents a compelling reformulation of Barry Weingast's concept of "market preserving federalism"; competition among highly autonomous jurisdictions can be salutary provided the central government guarantees full-factor mobility and credibly commits not to encroach on lower levels. McKinnon and Nechyba go beyond this standard treatment by noting the centrality of hard-budget constraints to achieving the benefits of decentralization. Only monetary and fiscal separation of different levels of government can harden budgets by bringing the discipline of credit markets to bear on the states. Thus, they argue, American states face greater constraints than either Canadian provinces with their large redistributive subsidies from the federal government, or Brazilian states with their own networks of commercial banks. As a consequence, American states are more energetic in seeking to stimulate economic growth. While such observations demonstrate the broad comparative potential of the analysis, the remaining essays in the book are disappointingly limited to the American case.

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At the heart of the book are three chapters devoted to specific policy areas—welfare, environmental regulation, and corporate charters. While each chapter purports to show that competition among states has not led to an underprovision of public goods, the chapters together present a varied picture. Craig Volden's discussion of the new Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program includes a strong argument for the 1996 welfare reforms but limited evidence about their real consequences. Volden's primary data consist of aggregate figures demonstrating the existence of state-to-state disparities in welfare benefits, from which he argues that if a race to the bottom was likely to happen we would have seen it already. His conclusion that "state governance is not devoid of compassion" (p. 94) seems tangential to the central argument of the book (a race to the bottom represents a failure of coordination, not of compassion) and unsupported by his limited evidence.

Richard Revesz's discussion of the Clean Air Act would also have been strengthened by more comprehensive data. Revesz argues that federal intervention is not justified by the interstate externalities associated with air pollution, but his own data suggest a different story. For the main issues he discusses—emissions standards, acid rain provisions, and interstate spillovers—the chief source of unintended consequences is not federal intervention per se, but rather excessively crude federal programs or their lax implementation. In a more richly empirical contribution, Roberta Romano finds that Delaware's success in attracting corporate charters is a result of a race to the top more than to the bottom. She considers interstate competition for charters more likely to maximize shareholder value because, like Revesz, she views policies formulated at the federal level more vulnerable to political market failure.

While the editors' answer to their title question—Can the States Be Trusted?—is clearly "yes," the more precise answer that emerges from the substantive chapters is "more than the federal government." While the editors' previous work has included explorations of whether and when the federal government can be "trusted" by the states, that analysis is curiously lacking from most of this volume. The result is a valuable, if somewhat unbalanced exploration of a central aspect of how federal systems work.

STEVE SOLNICK
Columbia University

Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of Congress *by Forrest Maltzman. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997. 197 pp. $39.50.*

This book makes an important contribution to the ongoing scholarly debate over the role of committees in the United States Congress. Maltzman begins by laying out the issue in question: what principal do congressional committee serve as agents? The parent chamber? The party caucuses? Or constituencies outside of the Congress? He stresses that though these approaches are often presented as mutually exclusive, none of the models fully explains congressional committee behavior. Rather, context is important, and the principal-agent relationships in which committees are engaged vary according to procedural innovations, the strength of the majority party caucus, and the salience of any particular committee's jurisdiction.

Students of the Congress will find the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 to be particularly valuable. Unlike many works that grow out of dissertations, Maltzman's discussion of

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the legacy of Richard Fenno's pathbreaking studies of congressional committees avoids mere recitation of others' findings and comes to grips with the implications of the models championed by Arthur Maass and Keith Krehbiel, by Gary Cox, Roderick Kiewiet, and Mathew McCubbins, and by Barry Weingast and William Marshall. This section has an extremely thorough discussion of the recent literature in the field, a discussion in and of itself worthy of note.

The empirical chapters of the book use various means to prove Maltzman's points. Some aspects of this analysis succeed more than others. I found some of the arguments in Chapter 3 on the appointment process less than convincing. Maltzman concentrates on Democratic appointments to committees (in the 94th and 96th Congresses, a time frame chosen largely, I assume, because of the availability of data); the "focus on the Democrats is justified by the greater significance of their assignments as the majority party through most of the twentieth-century" (p. 42). But a successful principal-agent explanation surely should explain the minority party actions as well as the majority's. Too much of our analysis of the twentieth-century Congress is really analysis of the Democrats; but rigorous theories should explain Republican activities as well.

The discussion in Chapter 4 of the ways in which rules and procedures—and changes in them—have an impact on the principal-agent relationship is extremely well done. In this regard the discussion of the impact of the 1970s reforms is most compelling. The analysis of how the roles of committees have changed over time—for instance as the 1946 reforms had their impact or as the salience of issues coming before committees changed—raises important theoretical points with which others have not dealt. Similarly, Maltzman's explicit recognition of the limitations of roll call analysis to explore the behavior of congressional committees (in Chapters 5 and 6) strengthens the uses he does make of these data.

Maltzman includes what seems to be the obligatory chapter on the Senate. I would have preferred it if a book so rich in data and empirically convincing in its discussion of House committees had left the other body for another scholar, or at least another day. But that was not to be. In sum, this is a book that adds in important ways to our understanding of why different committees behave differently and why it is important to understand that they do. As such, it deserves careful attention by serious students of the Congress.

L. SANDY MAISEL
Colby College

Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States *by Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder. Washington, DC, Brooking Publications, 1997. 208 pp. $24.95.*

Does the term "gated community" deserve a permanent place in the lexicon of social science and planning, or is it merely a dramatic rubric under which the news media can conveniently discuss a number of possibly unrelated trends in private land use planning? These trends, all discussed in this book, include middle-class "forting up," the spread of residential private governments, and the commodification of community by large-scale real estate developers. Blakely and Snyder have written the first academic work to examine the sudden proliferation of walls and gates around new residential subdivisions and to ask what this phenomenon can tell us about American culture.

The authors, both urban planning scholars, attempt to define the gated community, to create a typology of such neighborhoods, to explain why they suddenly have become so

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popular, and to consider whether it is advisable for developers and public officials to facilitate their continued spread. The authors note the absence of reliable statistical data on the number or characteristics of gated communities and the paucity of published studies. Their methodology employs a combination of "ethno-descriptive and statistical evidence" (p. 37), including site visits, interviews, focus groups, a survey, and a review of available literature. They used on-line searches of newspaper data files and contacts with planners, journalists, neighborhood activists, and other informants to construct their data base. Their focus groups, which included residents, public officials, realtors, and developers, were conducted primarily in California but also included neighborhoods in Dallas and Miami.

Gated communities, Blakely and Snyder tell us, are "residential areas with restricted access in which normally public spaces are privatized" (p. 2). "Normally public spaces," as the authors see it, include "streets, sidewalks, parks, beaches, rivers, trails, playgrounds—all resources that without gates or walls would be open and shared by all the citizens of a locality" (p. 2). But the authors do not consider the lobbies, hallways, and parking lots of multifamily structures to be "normally public spaces," so apartment and condominium buildings are not considered gated communities.

They identify and describe three varieties of gated communities, which they label "lifestyle," "prestige," and "security zone." Each variety promotes a particular combination of four social values: the "sense of community," "exclusion," "privatization," and "stability." For example, the lifestyle community values privatization highest, exclusion and stability next, and the sense of community last; for the prestige community, the primary value is stability; and for the security zone community, exclusion comes first (p. 44).

In laying out this typology and supporting it, the book does a good job of presenting the views of gated community residents, generally in their own words. Attempting to go beyond these observations and present a book of more general interest, the authors also try to use gated communities as a window on America. As the authors put it, "Underlying our study is the question of how gated communities reflect community and citizenship in America. The real issue is not about the actual walls and gates, but why so many feel they need them" (p. 3).

Here the authors are trying to relate their study to the literature on the search for "true community" (p. 31) in America, such as the work of Amitai Etzioni and Robert Bellah. They do not use their data to test or critically evaluate any specific theme or thesis in that body of literature. Instead, they provide something resembling a running communitarian commentary throughout the book. They conclude that "the fabric of civitas, communal commitment to civic and public life, has begun to rip. . . . The borders of the gated communities are emblematic of the proliferation of boundaries being set and hardened as communities fragment, looking inward" (p. 176).

This may be true, but the raw material of this study and its theoretical core are not sufficient to reexamine the themes of individualism, community, justice, and liberal democracy found in the communitarian literature. For example, the book's attempts to define community are confused and contradictory. The authors state, "In this book we are dealing with a place-based notion of community, one rooted in the territory of a residential development." But they go on to say that "neighborhood as community also includes a sense of mutual responsibility, significant interaction, and cooperative spirit" (p. 34). Later, they say that "the concept of community used in this book refers to "both the community of sentiment . . . and to the community of public participation and involvement toward mutual ends" (p. 130).

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However, the book's shortcomings as a moral-philosophical meditation on community are offset by its value as a thoughtful, original, and sensitive examination of a most peculiar institution. Blakely and Snyder help us better understand the people who are choosing to live in fortified communities, and this is a significant contribution.

EVAN MCKENZIE
University of Illinois at Chicago

The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress *by David Lublin. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 159 pp. $29.95.*

The issue of racial redistricting to create districts from which minority group members would be elected fuels intense passion. Since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, creating legislative districts on the basis of race had been encouraged by the federal government with considerable and vocal conservative opposition. This was certainly seen in the failed attempt to confirm Lani Guinier as head of the Civil Rights Office of the Department of Justice. As a result of the five-four decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Miller v. Johnson* in 1995, the practice was for all intents ended. But that ending was not without considerable political fallout and controversy that continues today.

The Paradox of Representation tells the story of the effects of racial gerrymandering on the cause of minority groups. The author's approach is relatively free of ideology as he uses statistical data to examine the impact of the Voting Rights Act from two perspectives. The first involves the link between gerrymandered districts and the success of electing minority legislators. The second involves the success of racial gerrymandering in terms of advancing the cause of the political interests of minorities.

In terms of electoral success, Lublin makes it clear that the creation of minority districts under the Voting Rights Act had the effect of electing substantial numbers of blacks and Latinos to the Congress. While he claims that too much emphasis was placed on threshold levels of minority populations within the districts that were greater than necessary, the racial gerrymandering that took place was necessary to achieve even modest representation for minorities.

From the second perspective, Lublin advances the proposition that there has been a significant political cost paid for the concentration of minority group members in heavily minority districts. This is particularly so in the South, where the presence of heavy concentrations of minorities in minority districts has diluted the influence of minorities in other neighboring districts. With this dilution comes the result that the political interests of minorities are weakened. This is particularly true if the result is to elect Republicans in districts that have been stripped of minority voters in order to pack minority districts. The author finds that the dilution of majority districts in the North does not have the same effect, since the ideological differences among groups in the North are not as significant as in the South.

Lublin gives us a good analysis of the data and a dispassionate view of the future. Indeed, he sees strength for minorities in the periods both pre- and post-*Miller*. By eliminating racial gerrymandering, we may actually see minority interests strengthened by the coalition building that is necessary in the winner-take-all, single-member legislative districts that have not been racially gerrymandered.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
St. Francis College

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You Won—Now What? How Americans Can Make Democracy Work from City Hall to the White House *by Taegan D. Goddard and Christopher Riback. New York, Scribner, 1998. 270 pp. $24.00.*

Chastened by his first-term experience, President Bill Clinton declared in his second inaugural address: "Government is not the problem; government is not the solution." It was a play on predecessor Ronald Reagan's dictum that "Government is not the solution; government is the problem." The authors of this primer on the workings of the American government assert that both presidents were wrong. The problem, they emphasize, is not in government per se but in the people who by election or appointment are chosen to run it.

But this is not another negative political screed attacking those in office. On the contrary, its approach is largely positive, with the bulk of the text devoted to chapter and verse on how some public officials at every level of government have met the challenges of their offices and delivered the quality of services the public expects. Before getting to their positive recommendations, the authors whack the notion of "reinventing government"—especially the proposals originally offered and later modified by Vice President Albert Gore. The vice president, they note, was only following the lead of a dozen previous administrations in devising commissions, boards, or schemes to change bureaucratic structures. It is always easier to blame faceless bureaucracies for governmental shortcomings than to pinpoint individuals.

Perhaps the single biggest misconception, say Goddard and Riback, is the notion that government agencies fail because they are not run like a business. Government is NOT a business, they emphasize, and cannot be approached the way the corporate overseers of General Motors or IBM handle their affairs. Unlike a business, the citizens served by government are not merely customers to be pleased but owners of the business with a stake in its success and a right to be heard on its policies. Moreover, where corporate boards may meet for weeks in private and then spring major announcements on company policy and actions, government must operate in a semi-goldfish bowl, either by law or political reality.

For most new officials the problem is that they are novices in government. They need to begin their service by settling on realistic goals, choosing the right talent to implement those objectives, and learning to control and/or live with the permanent bureaucracy. This is best done, they suggest, with a light but positive hand in which long-term government workers are encouraged and praised for their performance.

As matter of course, the new office holder must also expect to be blindsided by events that can prove embarrassing or even catastrophic. It is important to be prepared for crises and to deal with them quickly and firmly. Another key operating principle should be the framing of a message about the purposes and goals of the office and the regular projection of that message to the public, with the understanding that the public's responses will be heard and considered.

The lessons offered are accompanied by specific examples of how various officials at municipal, state, and federal levels have successfully carried out major changes or improvements in government operations—proof that government need not be inept or corrupt.

Two aspects of modern American government are only scarcely considered. One is the influence of large campaign contributions and the degree to which that money affects a winning candidate's policies and practices. A second concern is the emphasis on diversity and the need to reflect gender and racial/ethnic balances in government, which tends to constrict

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personnel choices. Some practical advice on these matters would undoubtedly be welcomed by new office holders. Perhaps this could be Goddard and Riback's next book.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

The Decline of Representative Democracy: Process, Participation, and Power in State Legislatures *by Alan Rosenthal. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997. 369 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $24.95.*

Textbook authors must strive for the goals of accessibility, comprehensiveness, and currency. At the same time, they must choose a balance between abstraction and particularity and one between breadth and depth of coverage. Some authors finally adopt one or more themes to unify their work, while others let the facts speak directly with little effort to integrate them.

Rosenthal makes clear choices among these options and offers a distinct voice on his subject matter: state legislatures and their politics in contemporary America. The book offers a survey of that subject with modest integration on the question of how democratically these institutions function. The book is direct and highly readable, if a bit slow going at points for the wealth and kind of detail that is Rosenthal's forte. It addresses the most important topical concerns for state legislatures in considerable depth. And it relies on various kinds of current knowledge.

Rosenthal begins with a review of the various postures from which one might evaluate the representational process, then he proceeds to a series of chapters that consider key aspects of current state legislative affairs. The development of contemporary legislative operations since the 1970s, legislative cultures, lawmaking, interest group activities, relations with the governor, and similar topics are reviewed. These chapters form the heart of the work, and they are covered in a fair bit of nuts-and-bolts detail.

Rosenthal's approach to all these topics is principally to keep his scholarly ear close to the real legislative ground. To illustrate his arguments, he favors the legislator's quote or anecdote, and such material is used extensively. He has a catholic flair for unearthing and reporting such material from around the nation.

Rosenthal also draws from current scholarly literature on these bodies, and he taps what one might call the better sort of applied policy knowledge that is relevant. State opinion polls and research from good government groups are also used to good effect. But the primary evidentiary material is from the horses' mouths. And there's a lot of it. Such material is piece-by-piece accessible and appealing. It emphasizes, too, the direct and the particular. But the wealth of it at some points makes the reading slow going. And even the lay student may yearn occasionally for more systematic evidence and generalization.

In fairness, Rosenthal does extract some principal conclusions from each substantive chapter. In the midst of the book, however, it is difficult to know what he wishes to make of those conclusions in any larger fashion. The broad survey of representation is seldom referenced in these chapters, and there is little integration across them. Yet Rosenthal has a larger goal for the book, even if one must wait until the last chapter to see it materialize.

The concluding chapter is a critical opinion essay on the question of how democratically these institutions currently function. Here Rosenthal brings together and evaluates the im-

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plications of the key points and conclusions from his preceding substantive chapters. He offers opinions about current proposals for legislative- and democratic-process reforms, as well as some reform ideas of his own. So the book ultimately offers some unifying ideas and seeks a whole for the many parts it reviews earlier. That is a rarity, too, in the textbook genre.

One challenge for the instructor using this book will be creating complementary systematic evidence for the arguments in the substantive chapters. One must also decide how to engage the chapter-by-chapter evidence with the representational questions while Rosenthal himself is holding off that effort until he has considered all the substantive material.

On another matter, finally, there could well be scholarly fodder of a different sort here. Some of Rosenthal's close-to-the-ground conclusions about current legislative trends and patterns might inspire systematic research. Given the still spotty coverage of such research across the spectrum of important issues and the effects of evolving political behavior on the generalizations and "settled knowledge" from some past research—as Rosenthal at times reminds us—new work of this kind could be a boon for the field.

KIM QUAILE HILL
Texas A&M University

The New Deal's Black Congressman: A Life of Arthur Wergs Mitchell *by Dennis S. Nordin. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1997. 320 pp. $39.95.*

Dennis Nordin's biography of Arthur Wergs Mitchell conveys the complexity of an African American who held elective office as a congressman from Chicago's Bronzeville during the Roosevelt administration, and as a member of the party representing the Solid Democratic, Segregationist South. Nordin characterizes Mitchell in unusually negative terms, as an extortionist, an opportunist, good in pomposity, a liar (who said he had attended Talladega College when he had not), an Uncle Tom, a man with a devious mind, and "a safe niggraw" (p. 214). Nordin tracks Mitchell's life and career in Alabama during Booker T. Washington's era, through Washington, DC to Chicago, where he quickly established himself politically despite the complexities of Illinois, Chicago, and partisan politics in the early 1930s. Back in Washington as a member of Congress, Mitchell played the leader of his people, although he was often also in opposition to the most well known black organizations and leaders of the era. Nordin argues that Mitchell skillfully manipulated the ambiguities and complexities of self-definition in terms of the individual versus the group to his own advantage.

In the early stages of Mitchell's career, Nordin documents that Mitchell lied and cheated his way into positions of educational leadership and engaged in various land schemes in a number of towns to exploit newly freed blacks who wanted education for their children and land for economic stability. When Booker T. Washington accused him of dishonest activities, he "black-mailed" him into backing down, leaving Mitchell free to raise funds as he chose (pp. 18–20).

Mitchell moved between Washington and Chicago from 1919 through 1943, first establishing himself as a client of newly elected Alabama Congressman John McDuffie, later as an attorney and landlord, a member of a black fraternity, a Democratic party member when few blacks were, who eventually defeated Republican Oscar DePriest of Chicago, the first black elected to the Congress from the North and the first black elected to Congress since

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the end of Reconstruction. Nordin often questions Mitchell's behavior and his motives, noting that he was a "masterful flatterer of whites. . . . Whenever individual Democrats had done anything of importance . . . Mitchell was likely to offer them his help. . . . His letters, however, compromised African American respectability . . . [but suggested] that he might be personally useful if a need should arise to manage and control troublesome African Americans" (p. 45).

Democratic control of citywide, statewide, and national office offered black candidates willing to join the party an opportunity to challenge DePriest, who had supported President Herbert Hoover well into the Depression. Moreover Nordin reports Mitchell an extremely effective campaigner who undermined the less articulate DePriest.

The strongest sections of the book center around Nordin's description of Mitchell's shift toward "temperate black representation" late in his congressional career. Mitchell first intruded into the NAACP's already well established campaign against lynching. He proposed legislation that others considered counterproductive; even when Mitchell became involved in reform activities in civil rights, he acted alone, undercutting the groundwork laid by other organizations. Executive Director Walter White of the NAACP reached out to Mitchell to encourage him to support the association's antilynching bill, but he rejected the offer.

Not until 1937 when southern Democrats and others defeated Mitchell's weaker bill, did Mitchell reach "a pivotal point" in his legislative career (p. 220). The Democrats' rejection pushed him toward support for the NAACP's position on this legislation, and his charges of discrimination in the civil service drew the NAACP's support. By the end of his career in Congress, Mitchell took strong reform positions on a number of issues including housing issues and the treatment of blacks in the military. Mitchell also brought suit against the Rock Island Line Railroad and the Illinois Central for refusing him a first class seat in an all white compartment, an oddly ironic circumstance and action, but one that Nordin argues forced Mitchell to confront racial discrimination; some contradictions were apparent as he sued for first class service rather than for an end to discrimination as a whole. While Mitchell eventually won the suit, the victory was that blacks had to be provided first class accommodations if they purchased them, not that they be given access to the same space as whites.

Nordin offers a richly detailed biography, so rich that one feels awash rather than enlightened by the specifics. Consequently it is sometimes difficult to keep interested or to grasp the point of the analysis. Nordin also notes that Mitchell didn't want to work with Thurgood Marshall, for which there is incomplete or unclear documentation. Despite these limitations, *The New Deal's Black Congressman* offers insight into the motivations of a man capable of playing with racial identity and group loyalty as the partisan system shifted toward national Democratic control and the party of the solid South.

DIANNE M. PINDERHUGHES
The University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights *by Belinda Robnett. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 256 pp. $35.00.*

Most studies of the American civil rights movement have failed to adequately investigate the important role that black women played in procuring social, economic, and political rights for blacks in America. Using interviews with women as well as sociohistorical analyses

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of women participants in seven civil rights movement organizations including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Women's Political Council of Montgomery, Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, (MFDP), Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), Belinda Robnett carefully examines the nature of women's interactions with male leaders and the contributions of women's leadership to the civil rights movement. The book fills an important gap in the literature on social movements as well as the civil rights movement.

In eleven crisp chapters and an epilogue, Robnett has offered her readers a cascade of the civil rights movement's varied strengths within the context of black women's involvement. In Chapter One, she provides a rethinking of social movement within the purview of race, class, gender, and culture, relying heavily on Max Weber's prescription for leadership. In Chapter Two, she offers an excursion into race and gender relations as they exist in exclusion, empowerment, and partnership. Chapter Three deals with women and the escalation of the movement. She uses Chapter Four to provide the strengths of Ella Baker and others in sustaining the momentum of the movement. Chapter Five underscores how the seeds of mass mobilization were sown in gender and strategic political contexts. Students are discussed in Chapter Six as a viable bridge for the movement and its heroines. How race, class, and culture mattered in the movement is eloquently discussed in Chapter Seven; the roles of women in such organizations as the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, local women's activism, and indigenous bridge leadership have also been discussed in Chapter Eight. Indeed, women have been presented as primary formal leaders in Chapter Nine. How women played roles in such specific organizations as the Black Power Movement and the basis for the collapse of the female's bridging tier have been rationalized in Chapter Ten; and, in Chapter Eleven, Robnett provides her readers with theoretical conclusions whereby black women are seen as real leaders. In her epilogue, the author draws lessons from the past, contending that "SNCC, more than any other movement organization, left us with a model for grassroots mobilizations that sought to empower all and to encourage everyone to reach his or her potential" (p. 203).

The author uses her book to epitomize the viable roles of black women in the movement—including her call "for leadership to be developed in every Black community in America" (p. 208). But Robnett still, if ironically, deems it necessary to utilize a male voice (Dr. Martin Luther King's) to reecho King's axiomatic query of "How long? How long?" it would take for change to come about for African-Americans. Subsequently, she quotes King as promptly answering his own query, "Not long" (p. 209). Nevertheless, Robnett's argument about the substantive role of women in the civil rights movement is convincing as she contends that African-American women participated as leaders and not merely organizers in various phrases of America's civil rights movement. The book is a must-read for civil rights, social movement, and feminist scholars.

YVETTE ALEX-ASSENSOH
Indiana University

Leaders and Leadership: An Appraisal of Theory and Research *by Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1997. 144 pp. $49.95.*

The authors set out to review the extensive literature on leaders and leadership, to highlight cutting-edge contemporary studies, and to provide a useful bibliography for reference purposes. They only partially succeed on all three fronts.

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Admittedly, the leadership literature is so rich and heterogeneous that anyone would be hard pressed to review it well. Nethertheless, this survey of the literature lacks both comprehensiveness and balance. Several topics, such as followership and the psychological motivations of leaders, are covered thoroughly; other crucial subjects, such as organizational leadership and the environment in which leadership occurs, are hardly mentioned. Chapter 6, "Comparative Studies of Leadership," is an appalling thin seven pages long. The authors' work is featured prominently in the review, comprising about nine pages; Max Weber's seminal work is summarized in a single page and dismissed with the comment: "while the concept of charisma has a certain intuitive appeal, in principle it is not amenable to empirical or scientific analysis and discourse" (p. 27). Prominent theories of leadership and public administration, such as those of Chester Barnard, Phillip Selznik, and Robert Behn, are not even mentioned in the text (although Barnard and Selznik do appear in the bibliography, which is inconveniently organized by chapter).

Besides the (mis)treatment of Weber, the authors provide other questionable conclusions regarding debates and bodies of work. They establish an "operational" definition that leadership consists of experiences that provide a person with a vision, the ability to articulate that vision, organizational skills, and insight into the needs of followers (p. 9). The authors admit that this definition is merely a concatenation of elements from previous efforts to define leadership, yet they claim that "it helps settle a long-standing controversy in leadership studies: leaders are not *born*, they are *made*" (p. 9). Although I sympathize with their position on that question, it is difficult to see how their presentation of a synthetic definition magically defuses one of the most intractable empirical controversies in social science, that of nature versus nurture. At another point, the authors discuss the results of a provocative study of the biochemistry of leadership and leaders. They disparage the study as "a methodological nightmare" with "only heuristic value of the remotest nature" (p: 58); they fail to discuss in any detail the purported methodological weaknesses of the study or explain why research of such questionable value was included in their review.

This book has redeeming features. It is concise, with text that covers a mere 93 pages (using big print). Several of the chapters include categorizations and topologies—some famous, some obscure—many of which might prove useful to social science scholars. Examples of the particular experiences of leaders appear in various chapters, adding welcome historical context to the abstract discussion of theory that is the mainstay of the book. However, I suspect that this book will have difficulty finding an audience. It is neither comprehensive enough to be of great value to leadership scholars nor is it thickly textured enough to sustain the interest of undergraduate or professional students. If you are looking for an overview of Rejai and Phillips's work and a stylized presentation of some related scholarship on leadership, then you will enjoy this book.

PATRICK J. WOLF
Georgetown University

America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible *by Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1997. 704 pp. $30.00.*

Offered as an answer to Andrew Hacker's frequently quoted best-seller, *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal*, this is an ambitious attempt ostensibly to chal-

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lenge both liberal and conservative interpretations of race relations. Both are said to distort the picture for political ends and advance opposing views that leave little room for reasoned debate. Liberals, according to the authors, deny black progress in order to nurture black anger and white guilt that sustain race-based policies, while Conservatives deny the existence of racism, fearing that admission might be used to justify such policies. Unburdened by ideological strictures of either camp, at least in their estimation, the authors set out to develop a more objective picture. Their book, divided into three parts, reconstructs recent race relations history; analyzes the social, economic, and political trends that evolved out of the turbulent 1960s; and assesses the impact of race-specific policies on the current racial climate.

Regrettably, the authors' search for a middle ground is more apparent than real. Except for acknowledging the history of racism, their position is indistinguishable from that of the conservative extremists. Even when racism is acknowledged, the impact of their confession is softened by a table purporting to show that in Europe white minorities are disliked more intensely by majority whites than are blacks in America, inferring that antiblack feelings are routine outcomes of intergroup relations.

Essentially, the authors are committed to the proposition that blacks have made amazing progress in an environment much less hostile than commonly assumed, black leadership is unwilling to acknowledge the growing middle class, and that "... the serious inequality that remains is less a function of white racism than of the racial gap in levels of educational attainment, the structure of the black family, and the rise in black crime" (p. 534). To make their case, they offer a revisionist interpretation of history used, sometimes rather disingenuously so, to attempt to refute practically every element of the liberal argument. For example, the claims of some black corporate executives of a racially restrictive work environment are dismissed as psycho-facts: "... the allegations aren't true but we feel they are and, therefore, they become so" (p. 508). The author who reported the claims is accused derisively of conducting research by Rolodex methodology. Classics such as John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town,* Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma,* and the *Kerner Commission Report* are all chided for being too pessimistic. Thurgood Marshall's *Bakke* dissent is dismissed as lurid (p. 417).

Stripped of all pretensions, the overarching purpose of the book is to delegitimize support for race-specific remedies. Regrettably, the authors add no new theoretical insights. Like other conservatives, they frame the question as whether special consideration should be given because of race. The question could have been phrased differently. They might have asked should special consideration be given to individuals who belong to groups that were first enslaved and later singled out for unequal treatment by the United States Constitution and by statutory law at all levels of American government, and whose unequal treatment was sanctioned by social custom and reinforced by terror and economic intimidation and who, as a result, have always lagged behind white Americans on practically every indicator of socioeconomic well being. Raising the latter question would have fulfilled their stated intention of setting the stage for a more productive dialogue.

MACK H. JONES
Clark Atlanta University

Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups, Congress, and Communications Policy *by Charles R. Shipan. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997. 173 pp. $42.50.*

In this concise, well written book Charles Shipan attempts to use the insights of positive political theory to explain how interest groups and members of Congress shape judicial re-

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view provisions in federal statutes. The first half explores the general issue of how and why interest groups use judicial review to achieve preferred policy outcomes. The second half provides a richly textured case study of the Communications Act of 1934. Although Shipan claims that the former help us understand the latter, this reader is most struck by how little light formal models shed on the politics of the 1934 act.

Shipan begins with the reasonable assumption that interest groups try to shape judicial review to achieve policy goals. Groups with close ties with administrative agencies (for example, the Veterans of Foreign Wars [VFW] and the Veterans Administration) will try to insulate their agencies from judicial oversight; those fearful of agency action (business and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration) will favor sweeping judicial review. Matters become more complex when one notes that Congress can specify not just scope of review, but standing, venue, timing, burden of proof, attorneys' fees, and much more. Political calculations are further complicated by the fact that "judicial review is often a two-way street" (p. 22), available to one's enemies as well as one's friends. The same statutory provision that allows business to block Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules also allows environmental groups to argue for more stringent regulations. Predicting the consequences of judicial review is made particularly difficult by the "great disparities" (p. 51) among judges on different courts and over time.

In Chapter 5 Shipan tries to construct formal models that help us understand the complicated political world to which he has introduced us. Unfortunately, the propositions he advances constitute little more than platitudes. Above all we learn about the "primary role" of uncertainty. True, but not particularly illuminating.

Much more illuminating is Shipan's analysis of the 1934 Communications Act. Given that he chose to study this law precisely because judicial review was one of the most controversial issues before Congress, it is hardly surprising that interest groups devoted significant attention to the matter. The most interesting part of the case study is his careful analysis of the positions taken by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), which represented established commercial radio stations. The NAB's members wanted to be able to challenge Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rulings that revoked their licenses or imposed new restrictions. But they did not want to allow new entrants—who were both competitors and sources of interference—to use the courts to garner licenses. Consequently the NAB favored centralizing review in the DC Circuit. Not only did this foster predictability, but it gave a significant advantage to established broadcasters who—unlike upstart station owners—could afford to travel to Washington. This arrangement also favored broadcasters in the East, who were particularly well represented in the NAB.

While Shipan does a masterful job explaining NAB's strategy, he does not so artfully explain why the NAB lost in Congress on crucial judicial review issues. The final version of the act allowed "anyone adversely affected" by an FCC order to file suit either in the DC Circuit or in federal district court. "More than just reflecting interest-group pressures," Shipan notes, "Congress had its own interests in the debate over these provisions" (p. 121). What this seems to mean is that Congress had a general aversion to granting too much autonomy to administrative agencies. Members of Congress were concerned about the "legitimacy of independent agencies" (p. 98), not just the distribution of government benefits. Apparently, it is *not* true that "procedural politics is interest-group politics" (pp. 4–5).

If Shipan convinces the reader that Congress often pays attention to judicial review, he does not show that the courts always pay attention to Congress. Indeed, two of the cases he describes in detail (FRC [Federal Radio Commission] v. GE and Office of Communications v. FCC) indicate just the opposite: federal courts can easily find ways to evade congressional commands. Shipan politely calls this "judicial drift." This casts further doubt on the

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ability of interest groups or members of Congress to fine-tune judicial review. Current fads in constitutional and administrative law are at least as important as legislation in shaping judicial review. And these are not easy to model.

It is a testament to Shipan's thoroughness and honesty as a scholar that his detailed case studies expose the limitations of the interest-group model he seems to espouse at the beginning of the book. No apologies are necessary: it is more important to be right than to be parsimonious.

R. SHEP MELNICK
Boston College

Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865–1919 *by Paul A. C. Koistinen. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1997. 394 pp. $45.00.*

Paul Koistinen has spent decades studying the role of a military-industrial complex (the interlocking of governmental, military, and industrial interests and institutions) in cold war American politics. In this book, the second in a projected five-volume series on the neglected topic of the political economy of American warfare, he offers evidence that the origins of that complex may be traced to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to the watershed of World War I in particular. American intervention in World War I, Koistinen argues, produced two significant and lasting effects: it solidified a nascent Progressive era government-business regulatory alliance, placing it at the helm of economic planning and mobilization for war; and it integrated the heretofore resistant military services into the economic mobilization system and by implication into the complex of power that managed the American political economy. In effect, the experience of World War I reinforced the elite role of the giant, consolidated corporations that had come to define American corporate capitalism. More importantly, it allied them in a politically controversial and hence undefined partnership with government, a relationship that at once satisfied the state's need for industry's resources and experience and gave industry the assurance it desired that modern war would not disrupt the economic status quo. Economic mobilization for World War I thus "confirmed what had already become a truism: nations prepare for and fight wars according to the patterns of their peacetime traditions and institutions" (p. 294).

Koistinen has plumbed an array of primary and secondary sources to arrive at this conclusion, and his history ably and comprehensively supports it. Less convincing is the schematic framework that is intended to unify the series of which this volume is a part. It seems too much to expect that any framework might comfortably capture the myriad developments in American military history over the course of three centuries from the colonial era to the cold war. Koistinen's particular framework argues that the method of mobilization for war depends on the nation's level of economic maturity; the size, scope and strength of the federal government; the nature of civil-military relations; and the state of military technology. This seems overbroad to yield the significant insights scattered throughout this book. At best, the framework is unnessary. At worst, it allows Koistinen to skim over other potentially illuminating issues.

Despite his appreciation that the nature and duration of any given war dictated what the United States had to do to mobilize its resources, Koistinen does not address the particular international challenges that distinguished American participation in World War I. What

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effect did America's late entry into the war, its deliberately removed status as an "Associated" rather than "Allied" belligerent, and its refusal to amalgamate American troops with British and French armies have on the mobilization process? Koistinen's history is too inward oriented to encompass these questions. Even on its own domestic turf, it wants for a more satisfying theoretical framework to make sense of the complex developments it details so well. Thus, for example, Koistinen faults the U.S. military services and the army in particular for constraining more efficient economic mobilization for war in the interest of defending institutional prerogatives. But the story of institutional inertia in U.S. civil-miliary relations during and preceding World War I is a complicated one, which implicates not only the services but also a Congress jealous of its power vis-à-vis the growing executive branch and creative in its ability to use the services to secure legislative interests. In other words, one of Koistinen's determining factors in assessing a state's method of mobilization—namely, the political factor associated with the strength and scope of the federal government—cannot be read off the historical map. It needs to be, as political scientists are fond of saying, problematized and explained.

Still, Koistinen has written an important book placing the economics of modern warfare in a larger historical framework, one which interestingly categorizes patterns of American mobilization into three stages: the pre-industrial (Revolutionary War), transitional (Civil War), and industrial (20th-century wars). If as Koistinen argues in this volume, World War I marked a major step in the establishment of a U.S. national security state distinguished by an elitist partnership of civilian and military interests, one waits for the next volume to resolve questions about the economic, political, and international constraints on that progression during the interwar years.

MICHAL HERSHKOVITZ
Columbia University

Federalism and Environmental Policy: Trust and the Politics of Implementation *by Denise Scheberle. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1997. 207 pp. Cloth, $58.00; paper, $20.95.*

Political scientists since James Madison have attempted to understand the impact of relationships between public officials at different levels of government on policy outcomes. The importance of such understanding continues to grow in today's political climate of decentralization and devolution. Yet, important questions remain. How can we systematically explain how some policies enjoy cooperative relations across levels of government and some don't? How can problematic relations be improved?

Denise Scheberle offers considerable insight into these and other questions in *Federalism and Environmental Policy*. She provides a theoretical framework for examining intergovernmental working relationships and then uses that framework to assess five different issue areas. The framework is summarized as a two-by-two typology consisting of two dimensions: degree of trust between actors at different levels of government and extent of involvement by oversight personnel. The four cells within the two-by-two identify different working relationships, ranging from those "pulling together" (when trust and involvement are high) to those "coming apart" (p. 18). Five environmental programs illustrate the different possible combinations of trust and involvement: radon, surface mining, drinking water, asbestos, and

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wellhead protection. To succinctly summarize the analyses, Scheberle concludes that "synergistic, pulling together relationships are rare and exist only when mutual trust and respect is coupled with high levels of the right kind of federal involvement in state programs" (p. 193).

Scheberle's book has many strengths. The theoretical argument is accessible and compelling. Each case study is informed and informative. Much of the empirical work that fleshes out the variation between these programs is based on an impressive data collection. In short, the author conducted several hundred surveys of state and federal employees in 1995 and then followed up with eighty-five telephone interviews. The authors presents the survey results for each program in tabular form and uses appropriate comments from the interviews to reinforce different points. The book also includes an additional chapter that summarizes the regional perspective on working relations between officials at different levels of government. This regional perspective is one that is rarely studied but, as Scheberle describes, often crucial to the relative success of policy implementation efforts. Finally, the author is to be commended for offering specific recommendations for improving working relationships, suggestions for moving programs into the pulling-together cell.

I have only minor reservations. First, I'm not completely clear as to why programs display the characteristics that they do. In other words, why are working relationships on radon pulling together while those for asbestos are coming apart? Admittedly, this is not the author's major focus of inquiry, and the empirical work does at least implicitly address the question. But a concise explanation of the front end of the variance in relationships would nicely complement the back end, how the different relations impact policy results. Second, the insights in this book will undoubtedly lead to important new research, some of which might have been more explicitly anticipated in the final chapter. For example, how well does the typology generalize to other policy areas, welfare for instance, that require intergovernmental relations?

In conclusion, I strongly recommend this book to students of federalism, environmental scholars, policy analysts and practitioners alike. We can all learn from Scheberle's book, and we can all hope that those pursuing implementation of these programs take their lessons to heart.

WILLIAM R. LOWRY
Washington University

Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance *by Bradley Richardson. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997. 336 pp. $35.00.*

Over the post-World War II years, western writers have given several answers to the question: "Who really governs Japan?" In his new book, Bradley Richardson challenges some of the old answers and develops a new paradigm.

In 1945, the United States occupied Japan. A principal concern was to establish a democracy and an early act was to rewrite the Japanese constitution. The people became sovereign. They elected representatives to a Diet (national assembly), described as the sole lawmaking body and the highest organ of state. Records of debate in the Diet reveal that few members had any understanding of the new democracy. American scholars turned their attention to the question: Would this new democracy succeed? Or would it maliciously or inadvertently be replaced?

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The answer was neither. By the 1960s, the Japanese had constructed an informal government parallel to, yet respectful of, the formal government described in the constitution. American scholars now turned their attention to describing this new, informal government. Three schools of interpretation emerged: elitist, corporatist, and pluralist.

First off the blocks were the elitists, who identified the political actors. Winning a majority or near majority in every general election, thus having the numbers to form the government, was the Liberal Democratic party (LDP). Its elders drafted 90 percent of the legislation and gave themselves great discretionary powers within the legislation; they were the bureaucrats. Financing the LDP and fulfilling the bureaucrats' plans were the big businessmen, who had to be important.

Voila! A troika ruled Japan. But how? Some scholars saw the relationship between the LDP politicians, the central government bureaucrats, and the big businessmen as symbiotic. All agreed or nothing happened. Other scholars saw the politicians as reigning, the bureaucrats as ruling, and the businessmen as noisy but submissive. Still other scholars saw the politicians and the businessmen forming the key relationship.

The second group of scholars to leave the blocks were the corporatists. They believed interest groups played an active role in Japanese politics. Not all pressure groups, mind you, just those that spoke for a large segment of the population. In return for consultations, these pressure groups were expected to support the resulting policy. Many interest-group leaders sit in the Diet, corporatist-leaning scholars noted. And many bureaucrats work for the pressure groups upon retirement. Who represents whom? Hard to say, since the bodies are hermaphroditic and their relationships are incestuous.

The third group of scholars to leave the blocks were the pluralists: Bradley Richardson is their most articulate spokesman. In his view, political power in Japan is fragmented and conflictive. The LDP divides into factions and policy groups. The factions fight to choose the prime minister; the policy groups fight to control what he does. The bureaucrats are arrayed in ministries each of whose interests differ one from the other. The business people shatter into trade associations. And there are lots of other interest groups. From this jumble emerge coalitions that change according to the issue. Richardson calls this process "complex." He understates the condition.

Has Richardson lapped the field? No, the corporatists and elitists are still running strong. But he has done much careful research that will be hard to refute. Richardson publishes at an awkward time. Japan's economy has been stagnant for a decade, and the conviction grows among the public that something is wrong politically as well. Recently enacted is a new electoral law. Polls show that a majority are willing to contemplate a new constitution. The prime minister wants to cut his cabinet from twenty-one to twelve ministers. Everyone (save the bureaucrats) has concluded that Japan suffers from too many regulations. In sum, Japanese citizens appear willing to restructure the formal government. If that actually happens, the elitists, the corporatists, and the pluralists return to the starting line. A new race is to be run.

NATHANIEL B. THAYER
The Johns Hopkins University

Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History *by Bruce Cumings. New York, W.W. Norton, 1997. 448 pp. Cloth $35.00; paper, $17.95.*

The literature in East Asian and Korean studies has seen two trends over the past few decades: the growth of rational choice approaches; and a continuing strain of nationalist histo-

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ries. Neither offers a comprehensive and balanced study for the general reader unfamiliar with Korea. Bruce Cumings fills this void well with *Korea's Place in the Sun.*

The author persuades us to appreciate Korea for Korea's sake, not merely as a bridge between China and Japan, an economic "miracle," or a pawn of big power balancing. Such caricatures miss a more complex story of an "indigenous Korea and the 'unstinting Koreanization' of foreign influence, not vice-versa" (p. 20). In this vein, the book also implicitly criticizes social science methods that "black box" the state and modernization/development theories that apply unapplicable standards to the peninsula.

Empirically, the book provides a careful, dispassionate survey that is both praiseworthy and critical of various aspects of the Korean experience, often in ways that other works on Korea miss. For example, Cumings finds a heroic quality in those Chosôn dynasty nationalists in the late nineteenth century who resisted the force of modernization. These individuals correctly foresaw "opening" the Korean hermit kingdom not as positive or progressive, but as departure from an old universe of inconsequential hierarchy and real independence (that is, the Chinese tributary system) and victimization in a new western system of "fictive equality and real subordination" (pp. 95, 107). Similarly regarding contemporary politics, while the book admirably recounts South Korea's struggle for democracy, it also reminds us that the conventional championing of the middle class as the agent for democratization in the mid-1980s is overstated. Such a view discounts this group's "prototypical nouveau social formation" (p. 389) and its materialistic obsessions that have caused it to return to apolitical pursuits in the 1990s, abandoning still-marginalized groups like labor.

In explaining economic development, the author disabuses us of the judgmental label "miracle" (implying an absence of anything Korean to explain this growth), instead citing an entrepreneurial spirit in Seoul's open-air markets that constituted "an incubator for capitalism every bit as good as the Harvard Business School" (p. 309). Amid this success story of growth, Cumings also gives voice to exploited groups like female labor, who were so critical to the Republic's initial take-off in the textiles and light manufacturing industries. Finally, regarding security, the book's discussion of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis again undercuts the conventional wisdom. Cumings maintains that the West's inability to acknowledge the North's energy self-reliance aspirations with the Yôngbyôn facility, as well as the threats posed by the history of U.S. nuclear deployments on the peninsula, were as much to blame for heightening the crisis as North Korean intransigence.

The book does not emphasize enough the role of war in development. Cumings notes how the South's participation in the Vietnam War was a boon to its economic growth; however, illustrations of the extent to which Americans and Koreans were consciously motivated by and drew parallels with Japan's profiting from the Korean War might have been useful. Given the recent Asian economic crisis, a fuller explication of the deficiencies of the incestuous culture of government-business relations is lacking. The book gives examples of this, but nowhere is this tied together in a larger discussion of crony capitalism. In fairness to the author, the economic crisis happened after the book was written. Nevertheless, one wonders whether the "virtues" that led to Korea's economic growth might also explain the current problems.

What one is left most thirsty for is another work by the author on the asymmetrical nature of the U.S.–South Korean relationship. Cumings makes clear a historic neglect and reactiveness of policy on Washington's part and almost-total dependence by Seoul. Key parts of the story, however, still need fleshing out, particularly the American role in key political events on the peninsula (for example, 1960 coup, formation of the KCIA, or the many deci-

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sions to implement martial law under the U.S.–administered Combined Forces Command). Once the documents become available, one hopes Cumings will enlighten us further.

These detractions, however, are minor. The book is a welcome contribution to the field. It reminds the specialists of things less emphasized in the conventional wisdom and provides the generalists with a more complete picture of Korea.

VICTOR D. CHA
Georgetown University

Great Wall, Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security *by Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross. New York, W.W. Norton, 1997. 268 pp. $27.50.*

There are two dimensions to this book. One provides a solid and comprehensive survey of the Peoples Republic of China's (PRC) foreign relations for people not very familiar with them. To this end, the book reviews the major dimensions of PRC foreign relations: the influence of China's pre-modern and modern historical experience on its contemporary world view; China's territorial conflicts with neighboring countries; ethnic factors as they relate to internal security and external threats; the vicissitudes of China's relations with the USSR/Russia, the United States, Japan, India, Pakistan, and the two Koreas; foreign economic relations and the post-1978 struggle for an international environment conducive to economic development; China's efforts to come to terms with the international human rights regime; and so on. This aspect of the book is solid and occasionally deeply insightful. The analyses of shifting Japanese-Chinese-Russian relations in the transition to the post-cold war era and of China's interests on the Korean peninsula, or of PRC–U.S. negotiations over Chinese participation in the nuclear and missile technology nonproliferation regimes, for example, are especially interesting.

Parallel to and interspersed with this first aspect is a second: to make the case that China is a weak, nonaggressive, nonbelligerent country motivated by defensive purposes, not threatening to its neighbors, and not constituting a threat or challenge to the Untied States. Thus the book is filled with propositions like these: China "is a vulnerable power with little opportunity to be expansionist or aggressive [even] if it wanted to be," (p. xiii); "For the foreseeable future China will lack the resources to compete as a military equal with the other great powers, much less establish regional dominance or become a global superpower" (p. 156); or "Strategy must be used when power is not adequate to the task" (p. 194). The second purpose of the book, in effect, is to refute the "China threat" hypothesis formulated most famously by Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro in *The Coming Conflict with China.* In this regard the book should perhaps be seen as a contribution to the U.S.–China policy debate of 1997.

There is an uneasy tension between these two purposes. Lengthy discussions of various aspects of China's foreign relations necessary for an introductory survey make impossible a tightly focused and intellectually powerful refutation of the "China threat" hypothesis. On the other hand, the tendency to state forcefully and unequivocally very problematic hypotheses central to the polemical purpose of the book detracts from the more even-handed approach appropriate to an introductory survey.

The authors trace what they see as China's benign, nonthreatening nature to its weakness. China is surrounded by many countries, several of which are militarily more powerful

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than China and whose militaries collectively outnumber China by a ratio of two to one. China's military is technologically more backward than that of its likely rivals. China needs a peaceful international environment to develop economically, and its leaders realize that overly forceful moves could precipitate a coalition among China's neighbors aimed at containing China. These are cogent and well taken points. Unfortunately, the authors do not grapple with or even acknowledge the obvious counters to these propositions. China's material inferiority has not prevented it from effectively employing its military instruments against other countries, including the great powers: from Korea in 1950 when China's leaders decided for war with the United States from a position of great inferiority, to 1962 when its leaders opted for war with India even though its Soviet ally had abandoned it and China was racked by starvation, to 1969 when Mao decided to strike at Soviet forces at Chen Bao Island, even though China was isolated and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) was enmeshed in the Cultural Revolution, to 1996 when Beijing undertook armed coercion of Taiwan even though Taiwan was backed by the United States and also happened to be one of the largest suppliers of foreign investment to China. Beijing has not been reluctant to use military force when it deemed China's interests required it. Indeed, while China has resorted to military force less frequently than the United States, its record in this regard is second only to the United States. China may be a relatively weak power, but this weakness has not prevented it from frequently and effectively employing military instruments of power, even against far superior nations.

Nor do the authors consider the possibility that China's deep sense of vulnerability and deeply suspicious view of the outside world could lead to belligerent policies. The authors simply assume these attributes will lead to cautious, nonaggressive Chinese behavior. This, of course, is what we all hope, but one does not have to look very far in recent history to find cases in which these variables worked in other directions. Wilhelmine Germany too was surrounded by many nations whose combined military strength far exceeded Germany's own. It too felt hemmed in on all sides and excluded from its proper status in an international order set up and dominated by Britain and France. The result was not a cooperative approach to international relations.

In line with their benign interpretation, the authors also argue that the PRC "has always" used force for "near-in defense of home territory and deterrence of invasion" (p. 138). In some cases this is palpably wrong: the mobilization on India's borders during the 1965 war with Pakistan was clearly aimed at influencing the South Asian balance of power, and the 1978 punitive war against Vietnam was at least in part aimed at maintaining a structure of power in Indochina favorable to China, that is, preventing Vietnamese domination of Cambodia. Even in such cases as Korea in 1950, Mao Zedong was influenced by the effect that defeat of American forces in Korea was expected to have on China's standing in the socialist camp and in Asia. Unfortunately, the book's ability to deal with such obvious objections to the thesis about the nonexistent China threat is limited by the requirements of providing a comprehensive introductory survey of PRC foreign relations. The book, in this reviewer's opinion, suffers the proverbial pitfall of attempting to straddle two stools.

JOHN W. GARVER
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The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland *by Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 365 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

In the eleven chapters and epilogue of *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland,* Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd very nicely demonstrate that the Irish conflict derives from a "sys-

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tem of relationships with different levels which interlock and mutually reinforce each other" (p. 3). In the early chapters of the book they examine the history and the ideology of the conflict, and separate chapters examine the dynamics of the conflict with respect to politics, the economy, and culture. Their analysis is not confined to the history, politics, economy, and culture of those living in Northern Ireland, however. Rather, they examine the conflict broadly, including chapters on "the British context" and "the Republic of Ireland" context. Insight is plentiful in these chapters, including a discussion of the development of "Britishness" for persons living in Great Britain and the different interpretations of Britishness for Protestants and Catholics in Ireland. Britishness appealed to many Irish Protestants, but many Irish Catholics equate it with imperialism, the denial of the value of their ethnicity, etc. Further, in Britain, the Britishness of Irish Protestants is not always recognized—they are Irish, not British. In general, the presentation of how both historical and contemporary events are differently interpreted by Northern and Southern Irish Protestants, Northern and Southern Irish Catholics, and the British is insightful and demonstrates that the conflict is complex, involving two communities that are divided by a web of relationships that involve ethnicity, notions of settler vs. native origin, national identity and allegiance, and religion.

Ruane and Todd argue for an "emancipatory approach" to the conflict. If the conflict is ever to be resolved, it will require a "dismantling" of a system of relationships that is centuries old (p. 307). And, it will require that all who are part of the system "cooperate in its dismantling" (p. 307). The process will be emancipatory "in the sense that it would flow from conscious choice and purposive action designed to bring to an end a mutually destructive power struggle, creating thereby a 'realm of freedom' in which new social and cultural potentials could be realised" (p. 307).

Central to disassembling the structure of the conflict, they argue, are: first, confirmation and more positive expression of the British government's stated position that it has no selfish interest in Ireland and that it seeks to facilitate reconciliation; second, the construction of an alternative source of security for Northern Irish Protestants (i.e., an alternative to partition and the majority Protestant community it created); and third, the establishment of full economic, political, and cultural equality between Northern Irish Catholics and Northern Irish Protestants. They recognize the difficulties inherent in these proposals, but they argue convincingly that while emancipation does not promise a simple and risk-free solution to the conflict, "no simpler, quicker, neater, solution is possible" (p. 316).

My own objections are relatively minor. First, in Chapter 1, they note interviews and participant observation conducted "while resident in Northern Ireland from October 1987 to September 1988" (note 5, p. 3). More information on this would have been helpful. Who did they interview, for example? Were interviews only confined to persons living in Northern Ireland? At various points in the text, they simply cite their field research as "interviews" (note 18, p. 184). Because their arguments are grounded in a thorough knowledge of the literature, rather than being solely based on their observations, this is not a big issue.

Second, the authors tend to present some actors as if they were monolithic, when this is not the case. Consider their treatment of Irish Republicans. In describing the aftermath of the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) 1950s campaign, we are told that the IRA "abandoned violence and embraced a new form of socialist republicanism . . ." (p. 94). Then, when the crisis came in 1969, it "renewed traditional republicanism." After the split (in 1969), the Provisionals returned to "militant nationalism . . ." (p. 95). The Republican Movement then and now is more complex than this. Embedded in the 1962 cease-fire statement was the threat of renewed violence. Not all Republicans abandoned violence, including some of those who accepted socialism. Similarly, militant nationalism was an important motive for creating the Provisional IRA in 1969, but not all of those involved had abandoned politics.

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This complexity is missing from their analysis, as is a more general recognition that Sinn Fein and the IRA are not the only Republican organizations in Ireland. The Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) and Irish National Liberation Party (INLA) and the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein have not embraced the recent cease-fire, as witnessed by recent events—the killing of Billy Wright and its aftermath.

These concerns aside, this is a good book. The authors draw on a very large body of literature and present a comprehensive account of the many social forces that have produced the situation in Ireland today. The account is well written, informative, and worth reading.

ROBERT W. WHITE
Indiana University–Purdue University at Indianapolis

The Politics of Preference: Democratic Institutions and Affirmative Action in the United States and India *by Sunita Parikh. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997. 230 pp. $39.50.*

Sunita Parikh's excellent and important book traces the origin and course of affirmative action policies over several decades and shifting political regimes in the world's two largest democracies. The juxtaposition of the United States and India is inspired and intriguing. Despite their myriad institutional, historical, sociocultural, and economic differences, both countries implemented affirmative action policies to provide preferential treatment for historically oppressed groups.

Parikh's main theme is that political elites in both countries were motivated to appeal to the targeted groups in order to gain political support. She takes advantage of the fact that both countries experienced a great deal of political change over the period under examination. It is not coincidental, she argues, that the course of affirmative action policies has advanced and retreated in fits and starts, punctuated by acrimonious and sometimes violent political debates.

In the United States, the first affirmative action policies were implemented within the executive branch by presidents interested in appealing to black voters, but wary of congressional opposition. Once Court-ordered desegregation and realignment mobilized and empowered black voters, more sweeping affirmative action policies were possible. However, the very success of these efforts served to mobilize opposition to group-based preference policies, and when the Reagan revolution swept affirmative action opponents into power in the presidency, the Senate, and consequently the Supreme Court, these policies were rolled back.

In India, the first preference policies to target disadvantaged castes were promulgated by the British, who were interested in developing indigenous groups that could counter the looming threat posed by the Indian National Congress. The British hoped that by disbursing benefits on the basis of ascriptive groups, they could keep India divided enough to prolong their own rule. In the ensuing years, "reservation" policies (so called because they reserved a guaranteed share of representation for oppressed groups in such areas as politics, education, and government contracts) were frequently the focus of political battles in India at both the national and state levels. Parikh demonstrates how the proposals to extend or roll back these policies could have been predicted by reference to the electoral coalitions backing the various politicians and parties making the proposals.

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A key finding is that groups were able to secure these preferential policies as long as they constituted a pivotal vote bloc for key politicians. Fortunately for low-caste beneficiaries in India, their numbers are so large that they cannot be ignored by any ambitious politician or party. In the United States, however, the recent retrenchment of affirmative action over the past fifteen years has coincided with the marginalization of black voters. As long as Republicans (even Richard Nixon!) still saw black voters as a potential support group, the survival of affirmative action policies was assured. But since 1980, black voters and the Republican party have gone their separate ways, so GOP control of any political branch has been bad news for affirmative action supporters.

The book contains several inventive comparative applications of the electoral-politics-driven model of affirmative action policy making. Parikh shows that varying partisan control within the United States led predictably to affirmative action policy change; that the low-caste-dominated Indian state of Karnataka produced predictably more generous reservation policies than the high-caste dominated state of Gujarat; and that low-caste-supported Indira Gandhi was more staunch in her defense of reservation policies than was the more heterogeneous, successor coalition government under V. P. Singh.

The Politics of Preference combines the best attributes of two very different approaches in the political science tradition—rational choice analysis and "comparative historical analysis," and does so quite fruitfully. As Parikh discusses, policy decisions are made by politicians with strategic motivations that derive from the context in which they operate and hope to prosper. Thus, the dual focus on strategic calculations on the one hand, and on social, cultural, and historical context on the other, is not only intriguing—it is vital.

MICHAEL F. THIES
University of California, Los Angeles

The British General Election of 1997 *by David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1998. 343 pp. $55.00.*

New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls *by Anthony King et al. Chatham, NJ, Chatham House Publishers, 1998. 272 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

As they have for earlier British elections, the highly accomplished authors of these two books usefully describe and explain the 1997 general election in which the Labour party, after four consecutive losses, won a larger Commons majority than it had ever won before, and the largest held by any party since 1935. And both books show how this massive majority—over 63 percent of parliamentary seats—was secured by a party whose candidates won just over 43 percent of the total vote. The work by David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh is the fifteenth in a Nuffield College series that began with the 1945 general election and that Butler has authored or co-authored since 1951. Like the preceding fourteen, it includes a comprehensive summary of relevant governmental and party developments since the last election, an extremely well informed account of national and constituency campaigning, special chapters on public opinion polling and the mass media, and a full presentation and analysis of the election results. For specialized British readers as well as for scholars elsewhere, this Nuffield volume, no less than its predecessors, will serve as the standard source of knowledge about its subject. Anthony King's less detailed book, though without the attractive photographs and cartoons of the Nuffield book, is designed for a wider audience,

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notably in the United States. In several of its interpretive chapters, King and his co-authors try to make British events intelligible in American terms—without, however, being so heavy-handed as to lose British readers. For example, when King tells us that the Conservative party's share of the 1997 popular vote was its lowest since 1832, he adds that the American president was then Andrew Jackson (p. 8).

Each volume deals clearly with the process by which once apparently perpetual Conservative success and Labour failure was stunningly reversed. King's treatment of this reversal is especially interesting because he notes that five years earlier he, like many others, did not expect it to occur. Indeed, he cites the view, suggested in an arresting conclusion to his 1992 election study, that one-party Conservative government was likely to persist into the next millenium. Now, King incisively summarizes how the electoral situation was transformed soon after the 1992 election, when the Conservatives lost their reputation for economic competency and then suffered several years of internal division, scandal, and weakening leadership. Equally important, King points out, were concurrent changes in the Labour party which, particularly under Tony Blair, finally convinced enough marginal voters that it could be trusted to govern as a nonsocialist alternative that was more attentive to social needs and public services than the Conservatives. Earlier chapters by David Denver and Philip Norton amplify Conservative misfortunes, and Patrick Seyd provides a valuable account of Labour's major organizational and ideological changes. In other chapters, Pippa Norris describes what she terms the postmodern campaign waged through increasingly diverse communication media, David Sanders analyzes a new electoral battleground in which voting is demonstrably based less on class and a fixed partisanship, and Iain McLean discusses the distinctive and occasionally obscure constitutional politics of Scotland.

Illustrative of the rich informational content of each of these books are the following items from the Nuffield study. Labour's individual party memberships increased in the few years before the election, while Conservative memberships declined. More campaign news was presented than the public wanted for an election whose outcome seemed predictable from Labour's long-held lead in public opinion polls. The evidently limited interest produced the lowest electoral turnout of the postwar years. In an historic shift, the circulation of pro-Labour newspapers was well ahead of that of pro-Conservative newspapers. There was a decrease in paid political advertising in newspapers. By a concerted effort, Labour elected many more women to the House. Partly because of tactical voting, more Liberal Democrats were elected than in 1992, despite a slight decline in their party's percentage of the total vote. Continuing a long-term trend, a smaller share of Labour MPs had working-class backgrounds. Constituency campaigning was more limited than a generation ago, and even where it was most intensive—in seats targeted by a party—its impact did not seem crucial. This finding, like others concerning election results, is carefully spelled out in an analytical appendix contributed by John Curtice and Michael Steed.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Redefining "Mexican Security": Society, State, and Region Under NAFTA *by James F. Rochlin. Boulder, CO, Lynn Reinner Publishers, 1997. 217 pp. $49.95.*

A growing number of international relations scholars have turned to interrogating the meaning and definition of security in the post-cold war era of globalization. Traditional realist conceptions of security, narrowly focused on interstate military concerns, are increasingly

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perceived as inadequate to understanding many of the sources of insecurity at the end of the twentieth century. James Rochlin, a Canadian political scientist, contributes to the effort to rethink security with a sweeping and provocative tour of the Mexican security landscape in the era of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

With Mexico as a case study, the author places his work at the under-explored intersection between international political economy, international relations theory, and critical security studies. An underlying theme in Rochlin's study is that Mexico's revolutionary nationalist notion of national security has become obsolete, while new regional and global conceptions of security are still in their formative stages. The resulting ambiguity, we are told, is marked by eroding political legitimacy, widespread social and economic chaos, and even a crisis of Mexican national identity. Problems such as ecological decay, economic shocks, drug trafficking, migration, the Chiapas uprising, and mushrooming crime are detailed to illustrate Mexico's changing security challenges in the 1990s. While the author uses the term "security" rather promiscuously throughout the book (indeed, it is not evident what would not qualify as a security issue in his account), what is all too clear is a rather bleak picture of ungovernability in Mexico. What this will likely lead to, however, is much less clear.

The most important causal forces in Rochlin's story are globalization and more specifically, regional economic integration. In what is otherwise a loosely organized analysis of a wide range of issues, a persistent message is that technological and economic change are powerful motors driving the erosion of old security challenges and the emergence of new ones.

Unfortunately, the book reads as if it has bitten off more than it should try to chew and suffers from some factual errors and overstatements. In analyzing the migration issue, for example, the author discusses the passage of Proposition 187 in California as if it had actually been implemented. It was declared unconsistitutional. And he exaggerates by asserting that building a 2,000-mile-long wall along the U.S.–Mexico border has actually become a realistic possibility. In the current political climate at least, such a construction project is as unlikely as Patrick Buchanan becoming president. Rochlin also devotes considerable space to discussing the drug issue, but misses some basic factual points. For example, he claims that 70 percent of the U.S. drug control budget is spent on border interdiction and eradication. In fact, most of this 70 percent is spent on domestic drug enforcement. Rochlin is right to warn repeatedly about the militarization of Mexican society via the war on drugs. But by stressing that this is merely a convenient and cynical cover for other repressive policy objectives he misses an important part of what drives militarization—the political imperative to appease U.S. congressional critics who are eager to see Mexico display greater anti-drug resolve.

One of the more questionable points stressed by the author is that economic integration between the United States and Mexico has been paralleled by military integration. As Rochlin appropriately points out, cross-border military ties have certainly increased since 1995, rationalized by a rapidly expanding antidrug mission. But so far at least, this is not remotely comparable to NAFTA-style economic integration. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the U.S.–Mexico integration process is how institutionally limited it is outside of the formal mechanisms of NAFTA (compared, for example, to the much deeper integration process in the European Union).

Despite its various shortcomings, this book contributes to recent scholarly efforts to expand the narrow parameters of the security debate in an age of rapid global and regional transformation.

PETER ANDREAS
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Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic *by Hugh Poulton. New York, New York University Press, 1997. 350 pp. $35.00.*

In his end-of-mission report to the Grand Signory in late 1585, the Venetian Ambassador Gianfrancesco Morosini observed that "[t]he Turks are a sordid and depraved lot, and very lazy." This western arrogance has outlived the Ottoman Empire and in some measure may lie at the root of the strained relations of the modern Republic of Turkey with the European Union. Such condescension is probably even more evident in the belief that the only saving grace for the Turkish people is to be found in continuing to pursue a policy of wholesale westernization. Given this outlook, the average observer might be forgiven if he assumed that the great issue today in Turkey is the divide between the followers of the secular agenda of Kemal Ataturk (Kemalists) and the Islamists. That, surely, is the way that the situation was presented last year when, following a "soft coup," the Islamist leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was forced from office. It is undoubtedly true as well that the complexity of Turkish politics was simplified and misrepresented as a clash between progress and the forces of reaction.

Hugh Poulton's work does not follow that approach. His research is grounded in a real appreciation for the complexities of Turkey. The events of the past years or so, following the growing electoral prominence of the now-proscribed Islamist Welfare (*Refah*) party, have demonstrated to one and all how little we really did know about this fascinating land. Some people might argue that the "real" Turkey is only now emerging, while others that the country is "evolving": in either case, a degree of unpredictability has been injected, which behooves us to make a greater effort to understand Turkey, its people, and the new dynamism in its society and politics. Poulton's book strongly urges political observers not to take Turkey for granted. His study orbits two main arguments. The first is that the Kemalist approach to modernization was not inevitable. Indeed, Poulton identifies three different strategies for social and political reform—Ottomanism, Islamism, and what is now called Kemalism. Ottomanism, such as was found in the *Tanzimat* reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, could not overcome the growing nationalism within the empire; the Islamism of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1878–1908) only served to divide further the peoples of the empire and ignored the growing sense of "Turkism"; the secular Turkish nationalism of Ataturk and his followers, while a logical consequence of developments after 1908, directly confronted deep-seated religious beliefs and the identity of minority groups within Anatolia. The authoritarian nature of Ataturk's rule made it possible for him to impose his understanding of what constituted the Turkish nation—all Muslims within the post-1918 borders of Turkey. Poulton argues that Ataturk was originally rather tolerant of differences among the peoples of Anatolia, particularly the Kurds, and sought to draw their support by appealing to them as fellow Muslims. Faced with a series of Kurdish insurrections and continuing opposition from the religious hierarchy (*ulema, tarikats, medresses*), the official view of Turkishness became territorial and not just secular, but anti-Islamic. While the anti-Islamic view was moderated almost immediately after Ataturk's death in 1938, it is the territorial definition that is followed today.

The second thesis of Poulton's study is the tremendous influence that Islam continues to exercise in Turkish affairs. It is clear from Poulton's work that at no time was Islam excised from Turkish society. He takes direct issue with the argument that secularizing reforms had a strong impact in Turkey, not just at the elite level but also among the masses. Ataturk may have formally dissolved the institutions of the Caliphate, the Sheik-ul-Islam, the *tarikats*, and the *medreses*; but at no time did the people ever abandon the faith of their ances-

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tors. This is hardly surprising, for culture is always more resilient than many political scientists are willing to admit; and one tends to see in the literature considerable focus on the re-Islamicization of Turkish society (a charge that this reviewer has also made). It is not, Poulton argues, the society that is returning to its historical faith, but that political and community leaders of all stripes today are rediscovering the importance of Islam. The reemergence of Islam in the political sphere is, therefore, coincidental with the process of democratization in Turkey. The events of last year suggest that the tensions between these two tendencies will continue for some time to come.

There is no such thing as the perfect book, and Poulton's is no exception to this rule. However, the basic fault of this book is the inclusion of the first chapter. A survey of the major theories of nationalism, it tends to lose the reader in an arcane theoretical discussion. This chapter is probably a very good primer on theories of nationalism, but it adds nothing to the book itself and almost dissuades one from reading any further—and that, in the opinion of this reviewer, would be a very great shame.

In conclusion, this is the very best introductory study of Turkish politics that this reviewer has yet read. It is a first-class piece of research, is well organized, and with the exception of Chapter One presented in a very fluid writing style. Hugh Poulton is to be congratulated on a job well done, and one will learn a great deal by reading this book. *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent* is strongly recommended.

BEN LOMBARDI
Department of National Defence
Ottawa, Canada

Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective *by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 328 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

It would be a shame if this book became known as an excellent review of political liberalization experiments in Africa of special note to students of sub-Saharan politics. In fact, it is an excellent review of the new democratic politics in Africa. However, the book will also be of critical importance to scholars studying democratic transitions across the world. To date, students of transition have largely ignored sub-Saharan Africa, although a significant percentage of the world's experiments in political liberalization are in fact located in the countries of Africa. The Bratton and van de Walle book will end this oversight. Indeed, the book is cast from the start as a comparative analysis that examines both the differences between African countries and how transitions in Africa have compared to the rest of the world.

Democratic Experiments in Africa attempts a comprehensive review of the transitions in dozens of African countries, especially between 1988 and 1994. The authors have collected an enormous amount of data, which they analyze in interesting and nuanced ways to explore a variety of hypotheses about transitions in Africa. They are especially interested in the origins of protest, why some transitions seemed to go better than others, and the fate of Africa's fragile new democracies. Their most interesting and perhaps most controversial conclusion is that: "The domestic heritage of postcolonial African regimes (as measured by levels of political participation and political competition) was systematically linked to politi-

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cal liberalization" (p. 186). This is a somewhat startling statement given the widespread view that institutions in Africa are so weak as to be irrelevant. At the same time, Bratton and van de Walle are able to include nuanced observations about unique events and the role of international actors to qualify their conclusions in a convincing manner.

The book is certainly not the last statement on African democratization. It will, however, be a major work with which all who subsequently write on the subject of transitions in developing countries will have to wrestle. The scholarly effort is also excellent evidence of why the current debate on regional studies versus comparative politics is so empty and sterile. The authors have learned much from the general comparative literature, and through intensive study of a region they are able to contribute much to the general scholarly dialogue. The entire field of comparative politics is enriched by their efforts.

JEFFREY HERBST
Princeton University

Theories of International Regimes *by Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 248 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

As global issues have mushroomed over the past few decades, international collaboration and rulemaking have proliferated. These trends have sparked scholars' interests in international regimes—sets of interconnected norms and rules that regulate cooperation in world politics. Examples include the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the international trade regime, and the international monetary regime. Unlike much of the earlier scholarly literature on international organizations, which often was legalistic and atheoretical, modern students of international regimes have placed their work at the heart of major, enduring paradigmatic debates in international relations. Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger have produced a volume that seeks to take stock of these theoretical conversations and to define some fruitful areas for further work. In both respects, it has largely succeeded.

The book poses two major questions about international regimes. First, how effective are they in inducing certain behaviors and in achieving specific purposes? Second, how resilient are they in the face of changes in their environments? The authors identify three major schools of thought, each of which takes a distinct, intellectually coherent position on the two questions. Interest-based approaches, primarily neoliberal, focus on the ways regimes help states achieve compatible objectives that would otherwise be difficult to attain. In this approach, state policy makers are viewed as rational egoists concerned only with their own welfare and as largely indifferent to the gains achieved by other states. Power-based (Realist) approaches agree that state policy makers are careful utility-maximizers, but the content of that utility is assumed to be quite different from the one found in the interest-based interpretation. Here, state policy makers are seen to pay attention not just to their absolute payoffs but to their relative utilities as well. As a result, the possibilities for effective and enduring cooperation are fewer than one would expect from the perspective of an interest-based approach, and regimes are expected to be weaker. By contrast, knowledge-based approaches focus on the way policy makers understand themselves, one another, and the issues they face, and the way those understandings evolve through interaction and learning. In the "weak" version of this argument, state policy makers are highly motivated, active learners,

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consciously seeking out expert advice and using it to help navigate around uncertainties in their environments. In the "strong" version of the argument, policy makers are embedded in interstate communities of various kinds and effectively act as role players in these groupings. As a result, they are seen as much more likely to participate actively in various international institutions than would be expected from either of the two cost-conscious, rationalistic approaches.

Not surprisingly, Realists argue that the distribution of power strongly affects regimes' effectiveness and robustness. Cooperation is often difficult to achieve in the first place, because of concerns over which states are gaining at others' expense; alternatively, changes in the distribution of power adversely affect the durability of institutions that might have worked under a hegemonic distribution of resources but cannot do so under conditions closer to multipolarity. Interest-based approaches assume a much wider set of conditions under which policy makers' preferences converge and thus lead one to expect considerable demand for regimes. These arguments also tend to regard regimes as fairly durable, especially in what the authors call the "contractarian" variant of the interest-based approach. This argument sees regimes as functional solutions to mixed-notive situations in world politics and as negotiated with such ends in mind. As such, they are successful to the extent that they reinforce actors' incentives to cooperate under those conditions. From this viewpoint, regimes also tend to be durable, since they make a reputation for rule-governed behavior a valued asset in future interactions. Of the three approaches, knowledge-based arguments tend to be most strongly institutionalist in the way they answer the book's two main questions. From this perspective, regimes are expected to be quite effective, largely because state policy makers are seen as active learners and eager to discover collaborative solutions to global problems. In the strongest version of the knowledge-based approach, actors' very identities may become tied up in the construction of various communities across sovereign lines, leading to a situation in which rule-governed collaboration is the norm and unilateralist behavior the puzzle to be explained.

While many of these observations are familiar, the book makes three contributions. First, it helps to focus the conversation about regimes around the key issues of effectiveness and durability. At least implicitly, if not explicitly, most twentieth-century conversations about international institutions have centered on at least one of these issues. In doing this, the book pulls together an increasingly large and disparate literature, identifies and summarizes the major intellectual positions, and offers thoughtful critiques of each. For scholars unfamiliar with the sizable and often provocative German literature on international regimes, this in itself may be a major benefit. Second, the book offers some useful suggestions for future scholarly work on regimes. It recommends a rigorous way to test the contractarian version of the interest-based argument, which despite wide influence has not faced demanding tests. It urges that further efforts be made to integrate the power- and interest-based arguments. Despite quite different assumptions about actors' external environments, the underlying logic of purposive choice in these approaches is identical, suggesting that each is at least implicitly part of a more comprehensive argument. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, this volume suggests that rationalistic and strong knowledge-based arguments about regimes explain "different aspects of the phenomenon under consideration, and, consequently, neither one is dispensable" (p. 224). More specifically, knowledge-based approaches provide at least one plausible explanation of what actors want to achieve; rationalistic arguments can explain the outcome of their interactions, given a particular set of

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preferences. For those world-politics scholars who would like to see fewer unproductive debates in their field, this book ends on a promising note.

JOSEPH LEPGOLD
Georgetown University

Governing Ideas: Strategies for Innovation in France and Germany *by J. Nicholas Ziegler. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997. 255 pages. $35.00.*

This book is concerned with modern industrial policies in France and Germany. The focus is on three industries: telecommunications, machine tools, and semiconductors. In all of these industries, technological advance has been rapid and the ability of firms to compete on world markets has been dependent on their ability to stay up with the rapid movement of technology. The author's central interest is industrial policies in such industries where knowledge-based competition is central.

The central analytic focus of the book is on two institutional structures that the author persuasively argues are broad and durable nationally: the nature of the national scientific and technical community (particularly in engineering) and the ideology and style of government interactions with business in matters regarding technology. While these matters are different, Ziegler proposes that they are strongly interdependent.

France has had a long tradition of training an elite group of technologists largely in theoretical matters, and leaving practical, dirty-hands engineering training largely to business firms themselves. To a considerable extent, the technological elite goes to work in public agencies, including both ministries and government laboratories, with the engineers who work for industry to a considerable extent being second-class citizens. Not surprisingly, as Ziegler argues along with many others, the French style of industrial policy in matters involving technology is that of top-down, with the government technologists basically trying to determine what they think industry ought to be doing.

In contrast, Germany has a long-standing tradition in which engineers receive practical, hands-on training, as well as theoretical training. Since the last part of the nineteenth century, engineering education in Germany has been geared to training engineers for industry. Aside from the elite public research laboratories and university jobs, government employment is not a particularly high-prestige career for Germany's scientists and engineers. And it is not surprising that German policies regarding technology and industry have relied to a very considerable extent on the advice of technologists who were not civil servants and on the performance of technologists in industry.

Ziegler's three cases show significant differences in the efficacy of these two different approaches. French top-down policy worked reasonably well in telecommunications, where the system was largely nationalized, but has had very little success in machine tools. The German experience has been less successful in telecommunications, but has been quite successful in machine tools, which is an industry where relatively fragmented understanding of the market resides to a considerable extent in the firms. Neither country has done very well in semiconductors.

All in all, Ziegler tells an interesting story rather well. However, the writing is curiously lacking in two related areas. First, Ziegler shows little familiarity with the extensive writing on the nature of technological change, and the processes of innovation and adoption of new

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technology. There is no reference, for example, to the work of Christopher Freeman, Edwin Mansfield, or Nathan Rosenberg, who have written extensively on these subjects. A consequence is that Ziegler's discussion of technological advance is much less sure-footed than it might be.

More curious and more important, Ziegler pays very little attention to the capabilities of the firms in the industries he is studying. To a considerable extent in the industries in question, technological capabilities reside within firms, at least as much as they reside within more extensive technological communities. Thus Ziegler takes little note of the fact that German firms have been strong in machine tools since early in the twentieth century, while French machine tools firms have tended to be weak. That certainly is an important part of the reason why German policies aimed to help the industry have been more successful than French policies. And regarding the failure of both national industries regarding semiconductors, it would have seemed useful to have compared the industries in these two countries with their American and Japanese counterparts, which have been much more successful. To a considerable extent, the differences there reside in the nature of and the strength of the relevant firms in the different countries.

I think these are important limitations. Nonetheless, this is a good and interesting book. In particular, I admire and am in accord with Ziegler's attempts to focus on national technological communities as important factors molding and constraining national technological policies.

RICHARD R. NELSON
Columbia University

Business and the State in Developing Countries *edited by Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997. 348 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $17.95.*

Orthodox economists typically champion relatively free markets while objecting to state intervention beyond the provision of basic public goods. State intervention, in these accounts, distorts price signals resulting in economic inefficiencies and elicits unproductive rent-seeking behavior. In response, political scientists and sociologists argue that the character of domestic political-economic institutions intervenes to determine the outcomes of state intervention. Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Schneider have collected a set of uniformly excellent essays that summarize this institutional position and extend it in new directions.

The contributors agree that business-state collaboration can boost economic development by promoting the flow of information, creating performance-enhancing reciprocity and cultivating the credibility and trust needed to formulate and implement effective policies. Furthermore, the authors specify conditions impeding collaboration from degenerating into unproductive rent-seeking. Peter Evans summarizes his work detailing how state structures of embedded autonomy allow for successful state intervention. One important finding of several chapters is that in the absence of capable bureaucracies, business associations may act as engines of development, not as redistributive pressure groups. These chapters hypothesize the features of some associations that render them developmentally effective. The contributors also analyze how political and economic threats prompt elites to create developmentally effective institutions. Finally, the essays assess whether business is most appropriately conceived as capital, sectors, firms, business associations, or networks.

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The shared analytic focus and the tight integration of theory and evidence provide a powerful defense of the institutionalist position. For example, Eduardo Silva attributes the superior policy making and outcomes of the post-1983 period in Chile to the initiation of collaboration with broadly based business groups. Ben Schneider compares the consequences for economic reform of broad collaboration in Mexico with its relative absence in Brazil. Jesse Biddle and Vedat Milor compare business associations in Turkey, highlighting how the internal characteristics of these associations influence the character of collaboration and its effect on performance. None of the authors argues that tight business-state collaboration is a universal panacea for developmental problems, and all of them are correctly sensitive to how the outcomes of collaboration change over time. But it would be difficult for any reader of this volume to continue crediting the neoliberal contention that business-state collaboration always results in inefficient rent-seeking behavior.

But this victory comes at some cost. The definition of successful collaboration varies across the chapters: for example, Peter Evans and Michael Shafer focus on shifts into higher-return industrial sectors, Eduardo Silva considers levels of investment and exports, and Rosemary Thorp and Francisco Durand examine diversification and reduced dependence on primary exports. While demonstrating that collaboration can promote all of these goals, the essays less energetically analyze what levels of state intervention and which economic strategies most effectively achieve them. For example, while Karl Field's chapter on Korea and Taiwan examines the effect of collaboration "under conditions of deep state intervention" (p. 134), other chapters examine collaboration under more liberal conditions without estimating their effect on development. Consequently, the essays converge on the relatively diffuse theoretical proposition that many conditions permit state-business collaboration that will be beneficial regardless of the policies chosen or the challenges faced. As Michael Shafer cautions in his chapter, this approach often yields only descriptive categorizations rooted in "ad hoc historicist and circumstantial explanation . . ." (p. 92). Producing generalizeable causal arguments about trajectories of economic development requires a more elaborate theoretical core, for which Shafer's chapter should provide inspiration, regardless of how we assess his specific propositions. Scholars engaged in this project and others wishing to peruse its most important findings will be well served by this excellent volume.

DAVID WALDNER
University of Virginia

Domestic Constraints and the Breakdown of International Agreements *by Jeffrey S. Lantis. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1997. 256 pp. $65.00.*

Reading this fine volume upon my return from a trip to Europe, I was tempted to test the author's international cooperation model by applying its conditions to Chancellor Helmut Kohl's staunch commitment to the European Monetary Union and the intense mass-mediated policy debate between proponents and opponents I had just witnessed in the Federal Republic of Germany. While the author presents case studies of West German decisions to ratify or abandon NATO and the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) commitments in the 1970s and 1980s, his model seems equally useful to understand—and perhaps even predict—the effects of domestic constraints during postcommitment phases in the reunited Germany of the 1990s and beyond.

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Building on Robert Putnam's challenge to unidimensional explanatory models of state behavior and Putnam's and other scholars' two-level game concept of simultaneous international and domestic effects on leaders, the author offers an alternative model that explains national leaders' defections from international commitments as the result of domestic politics.

While hardly surprising in the American presidential system with the Senate's constitutional role in treaty ratification, postcommitment defections from prior international agreements are less plausible in parliamentary democracies, where chief executives and their governments are backed by legislative majorities. Lantis identifies five specific domestic conditions that determine whether leaders in parliamentary democracies validate or desert their international commitments: major party unity/disunity, ruling coalition consensus/dissensus, symmetry/asymmetry of effects on various domestic interests, election gains/losses, and public approval/disapproval.

Lantis tests his theoretical framework by examining eight actual cases in which domestic politics affected West German leaders' commitments to military-strategic NATO policies and economic-development EC positions. Some were upheld: 1978—decision for a Common Monetary System; 1979—agreement to the Dual Track Plan; 1983—agreement to INF modernization; 1985—decision for the Single European Act. Some were abandoned: 1975—stance against the Regional Development Fund; 1982—decision to build the Siberian gas pipeline; 1985—decision against cereals price cuts; 1989—position against the Lance modernization.

In his skillful analysis of the internal political struggles in West Germany and the factors affecting the ultimate decisions for or against NATO and EC policies, Lantis sketches a fascinating history of differences and similarities in German governments, majority parties, ruling coalitions, and heads of government from Willy Brandt and Helmt Schmidt to Helmut Kohl. More important, the case studies substantiate the identified domestic conditions' effects on leaders' ultimate positions on the international commitments they have made. The cases affirm the author's hypothesis that the degree of each political condition's influence depends on its proximity to top decision makers. Thus, major party disunity and dissensus in the governing coalition are most instrumental in derailing international agreements. The remaining conditions, especially public opinion and election outcomes, represent less potent influences. However, as reunified Germany moves noticeably toward a media democracy, public support or opposition will become more influential—not only with respect to domestic issues but in salient foreign policy issues as well.

At the end of the book, the author explores the importance of skillful leadership in building consensus for the ratification of international commitments. This aspect deserves fuller treatment. As I read the case studies, I concluded that the magnitude of the particular leaders' initial support for the international commitments at issue affects their engagement in and the outcome of the domestic post-commitment struggle.

While this well researched, persuasively reasoned, and well written book is of special interest to students of international relations, I recommend it to the interested general audience as well.

BRIGITTE L. NACOS
Columbia University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

American Academic Culture in Transformation: Fifty Years, Four Disciplines *edited by Thomas Bender and Carl E. Schorske. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 371 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

Colonial Origins of the American Constitution: A Documentary History *edited by Donald S. Lutz. Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, Inc., 1998. 396 pp. Cloth, $17.00; paper, $9.00.*

The Columbia History of the 20th Century *edited by Richard W. Bulliet. New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. 651 pp. $49.95.*

Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the "Other Federalists," 1787–1788 *edited by Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell. Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, Inc., 1998. 524 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $15.00.*

Handbook of Political Science Research on the Middle East and North Africa *by Bernard Reich. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1998. 400 pp. $89.50.*

Latin American Political Yearbook: 1997 *edited by Robert G. Breene, Jr. Piscataway, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1998. 290 pp. $49.95.*

Political Science Abstracts Database: 1975–Q2 1997, Quick Reference Guide, and Free Software Resource CD—January 1998. *Norwood, MA, Silverplatter Information, 1998. $1,495.00 yearly subscription.*

Required Reading: Sociology's Most Influential Books *edited by Dan Clawson. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1998. 221 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $14.95.*

A Study of Crisis *by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997. 1088 pp. $115.00.*

Toward Democracy: A Journey, Reflections: 1940–1997, Vol. 1–2 *by Robert A. Dahl. Berkeley, CA, Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1997. 1160 pp. $95.00.*

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Correspondence

Netanyahu and Israel

To the Editor:

Regarding Jerome Slater's article "Opinion: Netanyahu, A Palestinian State, and Israeli Security Reassessed" in PSQ 112 (Winter 1997-98), it would have been entirely appropriate for Slater to make a case for a Palestinian state without questioning the legitimacy of the Jewish historical claim to Palestine and in effect Israel's legitimacy itself. I refer to his statement about "the unimpressive [Jewish] 'rights' derived from a self-interested reading of ancient Biblical history or contemporary colonialism, however well intentioned," and his wondering about the lack of Zionist "flexibility" in choosing Palestine. (As if they should have colonized Uganda!) Such statements can only come from a complete lack of understanding of Judaism, Israel, and Middle Eastern history.

One has only to take what is seemingly a minor statement in his article: "despite the agreement on the relatively minor matter of a partial Israeli withdrawal from Hebron." This agreement was anything but minor. In fact, it was nearly not made. The actual agreement was delayed beyond its deadline. Even so the withdrawal was "partial."

Hebron is really a symbol of the entire Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict. It is in Hebron that the Cave of Machpelah is situated. It is the burial place of the Hebrew patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and their wives (except Rachael). Because Abraham is also a revered figure in Islam, the Cave of Machpelah is not only a Jewish holy site but also a Muslim holy site. It is this religious aspect of Hebron that has led to repeated violence between Jews and Arabs. In 1929, the Arabs in Hebron murdered over sixty Jews, many of them old people, women, and children. Similar violence has broken out at other Jewish and Muslim holy sites—Rachel's Tomb and the Temple Mount, to name but two.

This is really exactly the point. One cannot discuss Israel without discussing the Bible. The Jewish presence in Israel until the Roman conquest was at least 1,300 years in duration. Even after the Roman conquest there has been a continual Jewish presence in the Holy Land. In 1840, the majority of the Holy City of Jerusalem was Jewish.

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The Palestinians are a twentieth-century phenomena. As Slater well knows, in 1948 the United Nations offered the Jews and Palestinians a Partition. Israel accepted, but the Palestinians and their Arab allies rejected the offer and invaded the then small state of Israel with the stated purpose of exterminating the Jews. Israel made clear that those Palestinians who would remain in their homes would not be molested. Nevertheless, some 700,000 Palestinians fled (not a million). The fact that there are over a million Israeli Arab citizens today is proof that Israel kept its word.

Slater does not mention the equal number of Arab Jewish refugees who fled the neighboring Arab countries, leaving everything they possessed, and entered Israel. It is not Israel's problem that the Palestinians' Arab brethren treated them with contempt, forced them into refugee camps, and let them fester there.

Jerusalem, the Holy City, and Israel, the Holy Land, have been synonymous with the Jewish people and a central motif of Judaism for over 3,000 years. Using the Hebrew calendar, 5,758 years. That is why I find Slater's statement, "a self-interested reading of ancient Biblical history," such a complete misreading of Middle Eastern history. Why did the Vatican extend diplomatic recognition to Israel if they were going to make a claim for it? Why is the holiest center of Islam, Mecca, in Saudi Arabia? Israel has always been considered the Holy Land of the Jews.

While I sympathize with Slater's desire for peace, it cannot be bought by turning the tail on its head. What the Palestinians call the Nakba (the Catastrophe) was a result of their and their Arab allies' desire to exterminate Israel. One is reminded of Isaiah (5:20): "Woe to those who speak of evil as good and of good as evil; who make darkness into light and light into darkness; they make bitter into sweet and sweet into bitter!"

While Slater's arguments for a Palestinian state are cogent, they misread completely the prevalent Arab rejectionism (except for Jordan). They also allow for Palestinian claims that are devoid of any validity whatsoever. (Such as Jerusalem as a capital.)

I don't know if Slater has been to Israel. But anyone who has, whether American or European, Jew, Moslem, or Christian, will immediately testify to the deep Biblical character of the land. It is for that very reason that the press coverage of Israel is so extraordinary. Slater's remarks denigrating Israel's legitimacy are without foundation and deeply disturbing.

MOSES MORDECAI TWERSKY

The Author Replies:

As a Zionist who has taught and lived in Israel, I emphatically do not question Israel's legitimacy. However, its fundamental legitimacy is not based on what I continue to insist is a self-interested reading of the Bible, nor on other

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pseudohistorical claims made by Moses Mordecai Twersky and others. Rather, the true basis of Israel's legitimacy is the global history of murderous anti-Semitism and, even more importantly, the fact of Israel's existence for over fifty years.

Aside from the question of whether Twersky's interpretation of Biblical history is accurate or even relevant, there are other fundamental historical issues that divide us. For example, he clearly thinks that Israel has an exclusive right to sovereignty over most of Palestine and all of Jerusalem, because there was a continued (though tiny) Jewish presence there, even after the Roman conquest. But by that logic he should be ready to support a renewed Native American claim to sovereignty over the United States today.

Finally, Twersky's interpretation of twentieth-century history is tendentious and uninformed. Instead of consulting his Bible and reiterating the usual tired mythology, he would do well to study the recent scholarship by leading Israeli historians, which casts an entirely new light on the entire history of Israel-Palestinian relations, especially the events of 1948 and later.

JEROME SLATER
State University of New York, Buffalo

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

To the Editor:

Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler are recognized authorities on separation of powers issues affecting American foreign policy. Nevertheless, despite their extensive coverage in "The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye," PSQ 113 (Spring 1998), there were several cogent factors omitted that beg for discussion.

The most critical legal loop-hole, a judicial one, encourages presidential misbehavior of the kind exhibited by not only Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan-Bush, but also Franklin Roosevelt and particularly, Harry S. Truman. Our present occupant in the White House was also correctly included in the list by authors; however, the tremendous impact of the Court's opinion in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936) was not. One can not comprehend the evolution of a war-making or Imperial presidency without discussing the decision. In this case, the Court casually discarded a near-constitutional dogma that had existed for nearly a century and a half, since the Supreme Court's first term in 1790: the formulation and execution of American foreign policy was a matter of mutual cooperation between the President (Article II) and Congress (Article I) under the Constitution.

Born and raised in Great Britain, Justice George Sutherland, who wrote the Court's opinion in *Curtiss-Wright*, believed, apparently, that presidential authority over foreign affairs was akin to the omnipotent "divine right of kings"

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for which Charles Stuart (I) paid with his head! The thrust of Sutherland's obiter dicta can be summed up by his often-quoted phrase: the president is "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an Act of Congress. . . ." Almost overnight, the same "nine old men," a majority of which had earlier struck down seven major New Deal statutes, made up the "legislative-executive" balance of power by shifting to the presidency almost unlimited power in external matters while shoving Congress out of the picture almost totally. Another effect of the Curtiss-Wright decision was that it overruled in effect an earlier Court decision, *Little v. Barreme*, 2 Cr. 170 (1804). This little-known case was the only Supreme Court decision to declare a presidential order invalid in foreign affairs, as an unconstitutional usurpation of congressional power. The Supreme Court has failed to do so since that time with the only possible exception being *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). However, the latter decision had only a secondary connection to the Korean War (1950–1954).

The second point omitted by Fisher and Adler is that both Congress and the president accepted without question their new "inferior" and "superior" constitutional roles, respectively. Only fourteen years later, Truman, acting totally on his own authority, committed hundreds of thousands of American troops to a full-scale military effort based inter alia on the *Curtiss-Wright* case. However, he even exceeded the broad boundaries, provided by Associate Justice Sutherland, since he had neither a declaration of war nor a joint resolution approved by both houses of Congress—the minimum standard required by *Curtiss-Wright*. The facade of U.S. participation in a United Nations' "police action" with other countries fooled practically no one. Whether Truman was "politically correct" in so acting is quite beside the point; as Edward Corwin pointed out, the Korean War and U.S. participation in it were played outside the boundary lines of constitutional authority. In constitutional terms, more recent presidents are in fact Johnnie-come-latelys to the practice of presidential excesses in world affairs.

Given the insulting abuses in this arena during the Johnson and Nixon years, when linked to those in past history, Congress felt it absolutely necessary—particularly with the televised horrifics of Vietnam—to curb presidential war-making practices. Attempts to control such activity were not new and could be traced back to the so-called Bricker Amendment, the Case Act, and other such legislative attempts. However, because of the cold war with the USSR and China plus the development of nuclear weaponry, such attempts were at best half-hearted, since all agreed that the presidential thumb alone rested on the nuclear button. In other words, technological advances negated the established process of presidential-congressional power sharing.

The fourth and final factor ignored by the authors is the most important and most relevant to their discussion: the total collapse of congressional will and authority to do anything to really contest presidential hegemony in con-

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ducting foreign policy. It was nearly eighty years ago that Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stood up to President Woodrow Wilson in defeating his League proposal and the treaty. The Republican Senator from Massachusetts reportedly told an idealistic Woodrow Wilson: "This is neither the time for 'miracles,' nor for miracle workers." Thus, the actual time to have said goodbye to the War Powers Resolution was the day it outlasted Richard Nixon's veto of it.

It is easy to criticize the working and mechanics of the resolution as a restraining law and to attack the awful language and whimsical construction of its provisions; but it is all beside the point. If the War Powers Resolution had been brilliantly written in precise, nonequivocal language, it would have nevertheless failed in its objective. With few exceptions, the real reason for the law's failure has been the total collapse under the guise of bipartisanship of congressional backbone and the absence of the guts or will to enforce it. George Bush's actions in Panama and the Middle East finally put the matter to rest. In foreign policy, the American people can no longer expect the Congress to say what it means, and mean what it says. Political scientists, including Fisher and Adler, should have known as early as 1973 that whether the legislative limit was sixty or ninety days, no majority in either house of Congress would cut off aid to "our boys in the field" once called upon by the president to act.

The time to have said goodbye was at the law's birth in 1973, since it was truly dead at birth.

RANDALL W. BLAND
Southwest Texas State University

The Authors Reply:

Randall W. Bland's thoughtful letter largely shares our concerns, premises, and conclusions, and notes our "extensive coverage" of the War Powers Resolution (WPR), but he chides us for our failure to expand the universe beyond those issues immediately relevant to the resolution. Thus he claims that there are "several cogent factors omitted that beg for discussion."

Bland wonders why we did not discuss the Supreme Court's opinion in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright* (1936), for one "can not comprehend the evolution of a war-making or 'Imperial' presidency without discussing it." No doubt Justice George Sutherland's bizarre opinion in *Curtiss-Wright* represented a radical, path-breaking departure from the Constitution's blueprint for the conduct of American foreign relations. His contention that the president is not only the "sole organ" of American foreign policy, but that he enjoys an extraconstitutional power to boot is not remotely consistent with the constitutional design, which assigns Congress senior status in a partnership with the president. But our immediate purpose did not require a historical review of presidential aggrandizement of foreign affairs powers in general or the war power in particu-

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lar, which we have done elsewhere. [See Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 1995; Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," *Political Science Quarterly* 103 (Spring 1988): 1–36.] Our more limited purpose was to lay bare the flawed conception, construction, and implementation of the WPR as part of a larger effort to persuade readers that the resolution did not satisfy constitutional norms; fulfill its authors' expectations, hopes, and aspirations; and that it continues to confuse and confound Congress, the press, and the public. Repeal of the tortured statute would remove the legislative gloss that has obscured and stained a perfectly clear constitutional plan that vested in Congress the sole and exclusive authority to initiate military hostilities. Discussion of *Curtiss-Wright* was not necessary for that purpose.

Contrary to Bland's contention, *Curtiss-Wright* did not overrule (even "in effect") *Little v. Barreme* (1804), a case arising out of America's war with France in 1798. Chief Justice John Marshall, holding invalid a presidential proclamation because it violated a statute, affirmed the law-making authority of Congress in areas of war and foreign affairs. *Curtiss-Wright* involved the question of the authority of Congress to delegate to the president the power to impose an arms embargo on two nations at war in the Chaco. Under the statute, an exercise of contingent delegation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt would impose the embargo if he determined that it would be helpful to the restoration of peace between the warring countries. The decision was a simple one. Since the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was a principal supplier of both nations, effecting the statutory authority by FDR would satisfy the congressional policy objective by restoring peace. Sutherland's opinion for the Court sustained the statute and congressional authority to control the sale of arms abroad. His musings about the president's inherent or extraconstitutional powers were rightly dismissed as dicta by Justice Robert H. Jackson in the Steel Seizure Case. At bottom, of course, dicta cannot override a holding.

Bland's letter reflects a frustration felt by many who seek constitutional (that is, congressional) control of United States warmaking decisions. Congress has failed to assert its powers. Over the years, as we have noted, efforts to amend the WPR have been half-hearted and, ironically, would actually have increased presidential power. In fact, as we have shown, some clear-thinking members of Congress recognized in 1973 that the WPR would not curb but would enhance presidential power in the area of warmaking. Some of those who voted to support it did so in spite of that flaw, principally as an effort to override President Richard Nixon's veto of the resolution in a kind of anti-Nixon vote in those dark days dominated by the Saturday Night Massacre and Vice President Spiro Agnew's resignation.

We share Bland's frustration with Congress but do not agree that Congress would refuse to cut off aid to "our boys in the field" once placed there by the president. Congress used the power of the purse in 1973 to end the Vietnam War and used the same tool in 1993 to end our military involvement in Somalia. It can be done.

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We have urged Congress to reassert its constitutional powers, duties, and responsibilities in order to restore constitutional governance of warmaking. We argue for repeal of the resolution as an important first step toward that goal. As we write, an amendment to the defense appropriations bill, written by Representative David Skaggs (D-CO), has been passed by the House to prohibit the president from initiating or conducting offensive military operations without first obtaining authorization from Congress, as required by the Constitution. If the Senate concurs and Congress sustains an override of a threatened presidential veto, we will have witnessed a powerful legislative effort to resuscitate the Constitution.

DAVID GRAY ADLER
Idaho State University
LOUIS FISHER
Congressional Research Service

PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESS

To the Editor:

As I read Jacobs, Lawrence, Shapiro, and Smith, "Congressional Leadership of Public Opinion," PSQ 112 (Spring 1998), and their analysis of the role of public opinion in the battle over the Clinton health care proposals, I was astonished that there was no reference to the distinguished public opinion expert Daniel Yankelovich and the theory he sets forth in *Coming to Public Judgment/Making Democracy Work in a Complex World.*

In contrast to the apparent underlying assumption that your authors make that public opinion at each stage of a debate has equal validity, Yankelovich argues that there is a process, particularly on complicated issues like health care, by which the public moves from "mass opinion" to "public judgment," "the state of highly developed public opinion that exists once people have engaged an issue, considered it from all sides, understood the choices it leads to, and accepted the full consequences of the choices they make."

Plainly, no public judgment had been reached on health care as the Clinton administration took office. There was great concern about health-care costs and coverage, and Congress had to a degree responded by substantially increasing the income limits for Medicaid coverage of children and their mothers and imposing a variety of cost control measures on health care providers in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Senator Harris Wofford's upset victory in the 1991 Pennsylvania Senate election forcefully brought the issue to the attention of the political establishment. Governor Bill Clinton made skillful use of it in defeating President George Bush in 1992, though perhaps more as a surrogate for his larger claim of Bush's inattention to domestic issues than because of any general public support for, let alone understanding of, managed care.

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Certainly the concerns of many players were not identical. Employers who provided health insurance and individuals who paid for their own health care either through insurance or on a fee basis were concerned about costs rising faster than the cost of living. Employers were further concerned that health-care costs were far higher than in competitive countries, thus making us uncompetitive internationally. Unions were concerned that as employer-provided healthcare remained a bargaining issue (rather than being mandated by the federal government), soaring costs meant they could get little else for their members. Veterans were concerned that as Veterans Administration (VA) medical costs rose, the VA's rationing system was excluding more veterans from access to the VA medical system. Senior citizens were concerned that Medicare did not cover nursing homes or extended care facilities and that they would have to spend down to poverty levels before Medicaid would cover their care.

On the other hand, hospitals feared that price controls were eroding the quality of care, and the teaching hospitals feared that those price controls were undercutting their ability to educate new doctors. Physicians, and to some degree their patients, feared that their ability to do what they thought was best for their patients was being eroded.

Thus, there was in Yankelovich's analysis a "mass opinion" that there was a great problem, but no "public judgment" as to how to set it right. If the Yankelovich theory is correct, then it may well be that the Clinton administration made a fatal mistake in holding the meetings that formulated the Clinton plan in secret, thus losing the opportunity to bring the voters to public judgment. Yet "Congressional Leadership of Public Opinion" makes only a passing reference to that circumstance (p. 37) and treats criticism of it by then Minority Whip Gingrich only as an example of Republican propaganda, even though the courts ultimately found the procedure illegal.

The conclusion of "Congressional Leadership of Public Opinion" that it was shrewd leadership by the Republican minority leadership in 1993–1994 that shaped public opinion on the health-care issue really does not seem to hold water. Indeed, the article shows a vacillating leadership looking over its shoulder at the latest polls before putting out its next press release.

It seems to me that the important article remains to be written: Why did the incoming Clinton administration, riding the crest of public concern with the health-care system, fail to bring the "mass opinion" that something was wrong to the "public judgment" as to how to fix it?

BILL GREEN
Member of Congress, 1978–1993

The Authors Reply:

We can only accuse Bill Green of a broader and shrewder reading of our article than we might have expected. We framed the article in terms of debates

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in political science about congressional behavior, at the expense of *PSQ*'s wider audience interested in broader processes of education and development of public opinion. The central theme of our article was that leadership efforts to manage the impact and shape of the valence of public opinion were important.

Green's commentary on Yankelovich's arguments about bringing public opinion to some later public judgment is right on target, as is the final puzzle he cites about the behavior of the Clinton administration. But to examine further the process by which "mass opinion" that something was wrong in health care failed to be transformed into a policy to fix it requires more than an article-length analysis. Two of us (Jacobs and Shapiro) have just completed a book-length manuscript on this subject, entitled *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Leadership, Public Opinion, and American Politics.* This larger work describes how the Clinton administration chose to focus on its own ideas regarding health-care reform rather than what the public would accept as part of a process by which mass opinion would be both responded to and led by policy makers, in a way that may put somewhat of different spin on Yankelovich's observations.

Thus we agree with Green on what our article lacked in terms of the big picture. We would, however, take issue with some of his other specific comments. Our emphasis on leading public opinion in the article does not diminish the need for the policy-making process to be open to public input. In that spirit, Newt Gingrich's criticism of the White House's "secret meetings" (p. 37)—which was justifiable, as Green correctly notes—still seems a bit hypocritical in that the Republicans had made their own decision on health-care reform without their decision-making process being open to public scrutiny and public input. Gingrich himself chose to personally head the Medicare task force and kept the issue out of the regular committee process, which everyone read as an effort to manage a politically sensitive issue right at the top. On this, the Republican leadership did not vacillate: there was no way they were going to allow Clinton and the Democrats to pass a reform plan they could claim credit for. The "vacillating leadership" that Green cites had to do with how the Republicans would use the latest polls to change their strategy and tactics on how to influence public opinion. "Some 'congressional leadership'," as Green states? We agree. Call it political manipulation? This insinuation seems all the more credible coming from an astute former member of Congress; we do not feel good about it either. Whether we call it leadership or manipulation, any good judgment that might come from public opinion was indeed kept out of the picture.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
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
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



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

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

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

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



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